Philosophy of Idol Worship

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Synopsis

  1. Philosophy of Worship
  2. Philosophy of Offerings
  3. Principles behind Founding Endowments by Rulers
  4. History of Idol Worship
  5. Not God but Worshippers, Ultimate Beneficiaries
  6. Idols Represent Supreme God; Idols can be replaced
  7. Explanation of Conception onLegal Personality
  8. Crown and court – Protector of all Charities
  9. It is the Duty of Courts to Protect Trusts

Philosophy of Worship

Primitive man feared all the forces of nature. He thought heavy rains, furious storms, frightful thundering, etc. were plunged on him, out of fury of some unseen powers in the sky. Man began to offer prayers to please those ‘powers’ so that they may not hurt him. Gradually man incarnated these unknown forces – ‘God’.

Even now man wonders looking at nature. People worship God because they consider Him powerful. He is believed to be the creator, sustainer and destructor of all and everything. Man who realises himself to be insignificant and meek, adore Him to humble himself: sometimes out of fear, and sometimes out of regard to Him for the ‘grace’ He showered. Worship is also considered to be the way to please Him to benefit in life-with-Him-in-eternity, or to attain moksha (salvation) finally. According to some, it helps to escape from the ‘bondages of sin’. Certain theorists exhort that God deserves continuous praise since He is ‘perfect’, and mindful to those who worship Him. Certain logicians urge that God demands men to worship Him; for, the purpose behind all creations is to fetch glory to the creator.

The benefit that is derived by a worshipper, by worship, is depended upon his faith, attitude and notions. According to some people, worship bestows satisfaction, content and happiness. Some others assert that worthy worship brings spiritual gains, happiness or ‘heavenly bliss’. And, still other ardent worshippers testify that proper worship is even capable of bringing improved mental and bodily condition.

Philosophy of Offerings

Why people make donations to religious establishments, or offerings in the name of God?

The answer to this question is also that it depends upon the faith, attitude and notions of each person. One thing is certain: most people make offerings, only because it is a tradition followed by generations to pray God making some kind of valuable presentation. Worship generally implies offerings of some kind. In Babu  Bhagvan Din Vs. Gir  Har  Saroop (1940)[1] Privy Council observed that ‘worship generally implies offerings of some kind’.

Man who feared the forces of nature began to offer sacred food (prasada) and to sacrifice animals, and at times, even human beings also, at specified sacrosanct places.

With respect to offerings, some may say: it is to please God as we make elders happy by giving presents; some others may say: it is a depiction of renouncement or sacrifice of a part of material-possession they consider dear and substantial; and still others may say: it is to acquire benefit, or to get their wishes granted, as God will reward in the proportion one glorifies Him. The rationale of offerings may also be a thanks-giving expression.

In the celebrated decision DeokiNandanVs. Murlidhar[2] it was observed that the true purpose of a gift of properties to the Idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship.[3]

History of Idol Worship in India

In Vedic times a number of beneficent and radiant powers of nature were named and worshipped as Gods, e.g. sun, air, earth, sky, fire, etc.; making offerings to them, mainly of clarified butter which was poured on the sacred fire. In this period rituals and sacrifices were prevalent.

In Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. The State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 255, it is held as under:

  • “There has been difference of opinion among the writers as to whether image worship had a place in the religion of the Hindus, as revealed in the Vedas. On the one hand, we have hymns in praise of Gods, and on the other, we have highly philosophical passages in the Upanishads describing the Supreme Being as omnipotent, omnicient and omnipresent and transcending all names and forms. When we come to the Puranas, we find a marked change. The conception had become established of Trinity of Gods, Brahma, Vishnu and Siva as manifestations of the three aspects of creation, preservation and destruction attributed to the Supreme Being in the Upanishads, as, for example, in the following passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad, Brigu Valli, First Anuvaka:
    • ” That from which all beings are born, by which they live and into which they enter and merge.”
  • The Gods have distinct forms ascribed to them and their worship at home and in temples is ordained as certain means of attaining salvation. These injunctions have had such a powerful hold over the minds of the people that daily worship of the deity in temple came to be regarded as one of the obligatory duties of a Hindu. ‘It was during this period that temples were constructed all over the country dedicated to Vishnu, Rudra, Devi, Skanda, Ganesha and so forth, and worship in the temple can be said to have become the practical religion of all sections of the Hindus ever since. With the growth in importance of temples and of worship therein, more and more attention came to be devoted to the ceremonial law relating to the construction of temples, installation of idols therein and conduct of worship of the deity and numerous are the treatises that came to be written for its exposition. These are known as Agamas, and there are as many as 28 of them relating to the Saiva temples, the most important of them being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the Suprubedagama, while the Vikhanasa and the Pancharatra are the chief Agamas of the Vaishnavas. These Agamas, contain elaborate rules as to how the temple is to be constructed, where the principal deity is to be consecrated, and where the other Devatas are to be installed and where the several classes of worshippers are to stand and worship.”

Rise of Budhism, a Non-Theistic Religion

The epoch of Budhism which came as a protest against the ritualism and sacrifice prescribed in the Vedas. Budhism was actually a non-theistic religion. They developed monasteries. In this period there was no place for the worship of images of Gods but the Budhists paid respect to relics and sacred structures, and later image of Budha himself. This paved way for image worship in India.[4]

The image worship was developed as a symbol of the one Supreme Being. The devotee attributed to the Supreme Being (Idol) all functions of creation, preservation as well as destruction. But, Dr. PV Kane, in History of Dharmshastra took a different view when he depicts the origin of image worship. He discussed three principal views:

  • (1) that the worship of images was derived from Sudras and Dravidian tribes, and absorbed in Brahminical cult;
  • (2) that the making of images was copied from the Budhists; and
  • (3) that the practice was a natural and spontaneous growth.

Dr. Kane did not agree with the view that the images of Gods originally came to be made in imitation of images or statutes of Buddha, as temples and images of Gods had become widespread throughout India in the fourth or fifth century BC. According to him when Vedic Sacrifices became less and less owing to various causes, particularly because of the influence of doctrine of Ahinsa, various Upasanas and the Philosophy of the Absolute set forth in the Upanishads, there arose the cult of the worship of images. Originally it was not so universal or elaborate as it became in the medieval and modern times.[5]

Idols Represent Supreme God

Idol is regarded as the image or embodiment of Deity, which ultimately represents the Supreme Being. Idol or Image may be broken or lost; it can be replaced or substituted.[6]But Deity remains as same. In spiritual and legal concepts the ‘Deity’ is an image or a representative.

Actually, when a devotee worships at the temple, he offers his prayers, or glorifies the Eternal Spirit attributed, to the Idol (and not the visible material of Idol, as it is).  This is the reason for regarding the Idol as Deity (one of the Gods).

In Hinduism, physical manifestations of the Supreme Being exist in the form of Idols to allow worshippers to experience a shapeless being. The Idol is a representation of the Supreme Being. The Idol, by possessing a physical form is identifiable.[7]

In Bhupati NathVs. Ram Lal Maitra (1910) [8] the question before the Privy Council was whether dedication to an Idol which was then not in existence was valid. It was held that a Hindu Deity was in the contemplation of Hindus and is always in existence and consecration of Hindus and is always in existence and consecration of a visible image was merely a physical manifestation. The dedication of the property to a Deity, even if it was not installed, was valid.

The above view was accepted by the Supreme Court in Mahant Ram Swaroop Das JiVs. SP Shahi[9] wherein it was observed that even if the Idol was broken or is lost or stolen, another image might be consecrated and it could not be said that the original object had ceased to exist. The concept of image worship invites the philosophy of Upanishads that the image reflects the Divine spirit which is Omnipresent, Omniscient and Omnipotent.[10] It is neither mud nor clay, but it is the Divine spirit which is relevant.

Adverting to Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. ‘On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ the Apex Court has pointed out in Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar,[11] the principal principles underlying Idol worship as under:

  • “That whichever God the devotee might choose for purposes of worship and whatever image he might set up and consecrate with that object, the image represents the Supreme God and none else. There is no superiority or inferiority amongst the different Gods. Siva, Vishnu, Ganapati or Surya is extolled, each in its turn as the creator, preserver and supreme lord of the universe. The image simply gives a name and form to the formless God and the orthodox Hindu idea is that conception of form is only for the benefit of the worshipper and nothing else.”

In this decision[12] the Supreme Court demonstrated the principles as to Idol-worship quoting following passage from BhupatinathVs. RamlalMaitra(1910):[13]

  • “A Hindu does not worship the ‘Idol’ or the material body made of clay or gold or other substance, as a mere glance at the mantras and prayers will show. They worship the eternal spirit of the Deity or certain attributes of the same, in a suggestive form, which is used for the convenience of contemplation as a mere symbol or emblem. It is the incantation of the mantras peculiar to a particular Deity that causes the manifestation or presence of the Deity or according to some, the gratification of the Deity.”

Idol as Representing Spiritual Purpose of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court in M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
    • “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Rationale of Founding Religious Institutions

In Vidyapurna  Tirtha Swami Vs.  Vidyanidhi  Tirtha Swami (1904)[14] it was observed by the Madras High Court that ‘the religious instinct of the people designed’ the Hindu Temples ‘as places of public resort for worship’; and they were established ‘in order that organised worship of God and spiritual knowledge might go hand in hand’. It was observed by our Apex Court in Thayarammal  Vs. Kanakammal[15]that Hindus in India considered the establishment of temples, mutts and other forms of religious institutions or excavation, consecration of tanks, wells and other reservoirs of water, planting of shady trees for the benefit of travelers and  establishment of Choultries, Sarais or alms houses and Dharamsalas for the benefit of mendicants, wayfarers and pilgrims, as pious deeds which would bring happiness and heavenly bliss.

In PF Sadavarthy Vs.  Commissioner, HR and CE[16]our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “A religious institution will be a temple if two conditions are satisfied. One is that it is a place of public religious worship and the other is that it is dedicated to or is for the benefit of, or is used as of right by the Hindu Community, or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship.”
  • “To constitute a temple it is enough if it is a place of public religious worship and if the people believe in its religious efficacy irrespective of the fact whether there is an Idol or a structure or other paraphernalia. It is enough if the devotees or the pilgrims feel that there is some super human power which they should worship and invoke its blessings.”[17]

Religious institutions and worship there are for strengthening faith in God and to derive heavenly blessings by bringing people closer to God. Though the Supreme Beingis bodiless, consists of pure spiritand has got no second, it is for the benefit of the worshippers that theconception of images of Supreme Being has been brought in. It is a general feeling that divine power abides in places where people worship and that grace dwells with people who are associated with saintly activities.

‘Hindu and Mohamedan Endowments’ by PR Ganapathi  Iyer[18] reads as under:

  • “Religion has always occupied an important place in the public life of this country as it is believed to be a potent factor in raising humanity to a higher level of thought and life. It is in this view that Temples, Mosques and Churches were founded by Kings and by men of piety…”

The real motivation for ‘dedication’ among devotees may differ. But the Hindu scholars say: true purpose of gift to a religious endowment is not to confer benefit on God/Idol, but to acquire spiritual benefits by providing facilities to worshipers.[19]


[1]     Babu  Bhagvan Din Vs. Gir  Har  Saroop, AIR 1940 PC 7.

[2]      AIR 1957 SC 133

[3]      See notes under: Hindu Conception on Legal Personality of Idol

[4]      BK Mukherjee on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Chapter I)

[5]      Thakur Charnar  Bindu  Yogal Jodi Shri  Gokul  Nathiji Vs. Third Addl. District Judge Mathura: 1997-29 All LR 575: 1997-1 ARC 216

[6]      Mohatap  Bahadur  Vs Kali Pada  Chatterjee: AIR 1914 Cal 200. Referred to in M Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[7]      M SiddiqVs. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1.

[8]      ILR 37 Cal 128

[9]      AIR 1959 SC 951

[10]    Thakur Charnar  Bindu  Yogal Jodi Shri  Gokul  Nathiji Vs. Third Addl. District Judge Mathura:  1997-29 All LR 575: 1997-1 ARC 216; See also: Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1999 SC 2131.

[11]    AIR 1999 SC 2131.

[12]    AIR 1999 SC 2131 

[13]    (1910) ILR 37 Cal 128.

[14] 27 ILR Mad 435.

[15]AIR 2005 SC 1588

[16]    AIR 1963 SC 510

[17]    It  is quoted in Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1999 SC 2131. See also: TRK Ramaswami  Servai Vs. The Bd. Commrs. Hindu Endnts: ILR 1950 Mad 799; Venkataramana  Murthi Vs. Sri Rama Mandhiram: (1964) 2 ANWR 457.

[18]    Quoted in: Papanna  Vs. State of Karnataka: AIR1983 Kar 94.

[19]    Deoki  Nandan  Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Dedication of Property in Public Trusts

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Synopsis

  1. Introduction
  2. Dedication: Essential for Endowment
  3. No Document Necessary
  4. Dedication-Document, Not Compulsory Registrable
  5. Dedication: Question of Fact
  6. Terms of the Document, if any, Important
  7. ‘Once a Dedication, Always Dedication’
  8. Terms of Dedication Determine Ultimate Vesting
  9. ‘Ultimate Vesting’: No Importance in Public Trust
  10. Fundamental Principles Cannot be Changed
  11. Partial Dedication Creates ‘Charge’ Alone
  12. Partial Dedication Creates Only ‘Charity’
  13. Partially Dedicated – Alienable and Partible
  14. Dedication – Different Connotations
  15. ‘Partial Dedication’ – Contradiction in Terms 
  16. Dedication may be ‘Complete’ or ‘Partial’
  17. ‘Limited Dedication’ – Recognised
  18. Dedication without Trust
  19. Description of Property in a Deed – Not Conclusive
  20. Long User and Dedication
  21. Gift to a Non-existent Being  
  22. Clear Directions for Management to Trustees Necessary
  23. Founding Endowment by Subscriptions or Donations
  24. Entries in Revenue Records and Dedication
  25. ‘Acceptance’ of Gift & ‘Dedication’ of Endowed Property
  26. Revenue Records in the Name of Deity not Decisive
  27. Gift on Trust to a Society

Introduction

In common parlance, the word ‘charity’ denotes the giving to someone in necessitous circumstances and in law, a giving for public good.[1] Message of charily and compassion is found in all religions without any exception.[2] An ‘endowment’ is created when a competent person dedicates or sets apart his specified property[3] for purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[4]

In St. Peter’s Orthodox Syrian Church Vs. Abraham Mathews[5] it is observed that if Indian life should be a true guide for the determination of questions arising in court, then we should go back to our ancient treatises to find out the true meaning of charity, which may be either dana or utsarga. It is observed further as under:

  • “In the case of dana the donor gives up his ownership over a thing, makes another the owner of it and cannot thereafter use it nor has any control over it. When a man makes an utsarga, he no doubt gives up his ownership but gives up the thing for the benefit of all. Opinion is, however, divided whether as a member of the public he can also use a thing thus dedicated for the public. But in any event, he would no longer have any control over the thing dedicated (Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries, New Delhi, AIR 1981 SC 1408). The word “Charity” in a legal sense includes every gift for the general public use, to be applied consistent with the existing laws for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons and intended to benefit them from a religious, moral, physical or social standpoint. (Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 1023).”

In Pratap  Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner[6] our Apex Court held as followes:

  • “Under the Hindu law the image of a deity of the Hindu pantheon is, as has been aptly called, a ‘juristic entity’, vested with the capacity of receiving gifts and holding property. The Hindu law recognises dedications for the establishment of the image of a deity and for maintenance and worship thereof. The property so dedicated to a pious purpose is placed extra-commercium and is entitled to special protection at the hands of the Sovereign whose duty it is to intervene to prevent fraud and waste in dealing with religious endowments. Dedication need not always be in writing and can be inferred from the facts and circumstances appearing. It would be a legitimate inference to draw that the founder of the temple had dedicated it to the public if it is found that he had held out the temple to be a public one: Pujari Lakshmana Goundan V. Subramania Ayyar, AIR 1924 PC 44.”

Law Commission Report

Law Commission of India, Report No. 70, The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Forward to the Union Minister of Law and Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India by P.B. Gajedragadkar, Chairman, Law Commission of India, on August 15, 1977, reads as under:

  • “12.40. Rules of Hindu law. — It may be noted that in regard to religious offices and things dedicated to religious purposes, the rules of Hindu Law1 and Muslim Law2 agreed with that of the ancient Roman law in rigidly classifying public trusts and property and offices as extra commorcium. Such offices were not transferable like other property, and even where a transfer was allowed, that was within certain well defined limitations.
  • 1. Narayan v. Chintamani, ILR 5 Born 393 (396, 397) (Westropp, C.J.).
  • 2. Shama Charun Roy v. Abdul Kabeer, 3 Calcutta Notes 158.”

Essential Legal Formalities for Dedication

The word ‘endow’[7] expresses the idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something for some purpose.[8] An ‘endowment’ is founded by dedication of property for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment. There may be dedication of property for ‘easement’. But, in the ‘law of trusts’, dedication involves the extinguishment of the rights of the original owner of the lands.[9] By ‘dedication’, the owner divests all his rights, title and interest in the property which becomes the property of the deity[10] or other endowment.

An ‘endowment’ can be public or private.[11] It is a corporeal reality to which social concepts are adhered to; whereas, a trust is primarily a legal conceptattached to the administration of the endowed property.[12]

Dedication involves complete[13] extinguishment of the rights, or cessation of ownership,[14] of the original owner of the lands.[15] The essential formalities for the creation of a religious or charitable endowment are:[16]

  • the property in respect of which the endowment is made must be designated with precision;
  • the object or purpose of dedication should be clearly indicated;
  • the founder must effectively divest[17] himself of all beneficial interest (right of enjoyment as owner or beneficial ownership[18]) in the endowed properly.

Hindu Religious Formalities and Principles of Dedication

Sankalpa and Utsarga (or Samarpana) are the religious formalities for dedication under Hindu Law.[19] By Sankalpa one formally decides renunciation and indicates the purpose of dedication; and by Utsarga or Samarpana he renounces his ownership.  It is obvious that ‘Sankalpa and Samarpana’ are intrinsic, formally or informally, in all true dedications.

In Ram Jankijee Deities Vs. State of Bihar[20] our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “The Deva Pratistha  Tatwa of Raghunandan and Matsya and Devi Puranas though may not be uniform in its description as to how Pratistha or consecration of image does take place but it is customary that the image is first carried to the Snan  Mandap and thereafter the founder utters the Sankalpa Mantra and upon completion thereof the image is given bath with Holy water, Ghee, Dahi, Honey and Rose water and thereafter the oblation to the sacred fire by which the Pran  Pratistha takes place and the eternal spirit is infused in that particular idol and the image is then taken to the temple itself and the same is thereafter formally dedicated to the deity. A simple piece of wood or stone may become the image or idol and divinity is attributed to the same. As noticed above, it is formless, shapeless but it is the human concept of a particular divine existence which gives it the shape, the size and the colour.”

Rule Against Perpetuity

Section 18 of the Transfer of Property Act enacts that “the restrictions in Sections 14, 16 and 17 shall not apply in the case of a transfer of property for the benefit of the public in the advancement of religion, knowledge, commerce, health, safety or any other object beneficial to mankind”. The Hindu law has always regarded gifts for religious or charitable purposes as exempt from the rule against perpetuity.[21]

Dedication to the Almighty

The dedication to a deity is actually a renunciation of the ownership of the private individuals in the property. In effect, it is dedication to the Almighty. A Full Bench decision of Madras High Court said in the case of Narasimha Vs. Venkatalingam[22] held that a gift to Almighty is not a gift to a living person and therefore, it is neither a gift nor a conveyance under the Transfer of Property Act. [23]  

Trust Arises on Transfer of Title to Trustees

An endowment is created when a property is set apart or dedicated by its owner divesting all his beneficial interest (ie. pertaining to ownership) therein for the purposes of religion or charity having both the subject and object certain and capable of ascertainment.[24] It is the relinquishment of entire rights of the donor or founder in the property dedicated;[25] and, there should be proof of renunciation by the owner or divestment of his title to the property dedicated. [26]

For creation of a trust, it is essential that such property should be transferred to the trustee. The ingredients of trust stated in the former part of Section 6 (ie. intention, purpose, beneficiary and property), are the legal requirements for endowments also. ‘Transfer of the trust-property to the trustee’ is the differentiating particularity of trust from the endowment.

Sec. 6 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882   reads as under:

  • “6. Creation of trust: Subject to the provisions of section 5, a trust is created when the author of the trust indicates with reasonable certainty by any words or acts (a) an intention on his part to create thereby a trust, (b) the purpose of the trust, (c) the beneficiary, and (d) the trust-property, and (unless the trust is declared by will or the author of the trust is himself to be the trustee) transfers the trust-property to the trustee.”

No Document  is Essential for Dedication in Public Trust

The act of delivering property, by its owner, for the use of the public is called ‘dedication’.

With regard to private trusts, under Sec. 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, for creation of trust on immovable property, ‘declaration by a non-testamentary instrument’ is essential; and for creation of trust on movable property, ‘transfer of ownership’ will be sufficient. 

Sec. 5 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882reads as under:

  •  “5. Trust of immovable property: No trust in relation to immovable property is valid unless declared by a non-testamentary instrument in writing signed by the author of the trust or the trustee and registered, or by the will of the author of the trust or of the trustee.
  • Trust of movable property: No trust in relation to movable property is valid unless declared as aforesaid, or unless the ownership of the property is transferred to the trustee. ….”

A public ‘endowment’ is created by dedication of property by a competent person.[27] The subject and object of such dedication must be certain and capable of ascertainment. Trust arises by appointment of trustees to the endowments.[28] Declaration by a registered deed transferring rights to trustee is the usual mode of creating trust on immovable property. But, a document is not essential for the dedication of property to charity or public trust.[29]  It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence as to complete dedication and extinction of the private character of the property. Dedication can be inferred from conduct of the parties also.[30]

For a valid dedication, there should be proof of renunciation by the owner or divestment of his title to the property dedicated.[31] A document is not essential for the dedication of property to charity.[32]  It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence as to complete dedication to charity and extinction of the private secular character of the property. Dedication or divestiture of property can be established by attendant circumstances or conduct of the parties also.[33]

It had been held by the Privy Council in Hemanta Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari[34] while dealing with a bathing ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, it was observed that in the absence of a formal and express endowment evidenced by deed or declaration, the character of the dedication can only be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs.[35]

If Document for Dedication, it Requires Registration

Dedication of the property directly to the deity does not need compliance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, there being no transfer of property to a ‘living person’ within the meaning of Section 5 of that Act.  If property is transferred by way of a gift to the trustee of a temple, it being one made to a living person, requirements of S. 123 of the Transfer of Property Act must be complied and the deed must be registered. [36]

The same view had been taken in Narasimhaswami Vs. Venkatalingam[37] and it had been observed that though an idol is considered by a fiction of law as a juristic person clothed for some purposes with rights of persons, yet a juristic person is not a living person for the purpose of the Transfer of Property Act.

Dedication and Section 9, TP Act

Section 9 Transfer of Property Act states that a transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which writing is not expressly required by law. TP Act does not require execution of a document when a property is dedicated for charity or for the use of the general public. (See: Narsingdas Takhatmal v. Radhakisan Rambakas, (1952) 54 BomLR 492; Peddu Reddiar v. Kothanda Reddi, AIR 1966 Mad 419).

In Ramdas Chimna v. Pralhad Deorao, AIR 1965 Bom 74, it is held as follows:

  • “The relinquishment by Bainabai of her interest in the joint family property was merely abandonment of here interest in the joint family property in favour of her two sons. Such a relinquishment or abandonment of interest in the joint family property, even though it consists of immoveable properties and is of the value of Rs.100/- and upwards, can be effected without a written instrument, though if one is executed, it would undoubtedly require registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, Gauri Bai v. Gaya Bai, AIR 1927 Nag. 44.”

In The Weavers Mills Ltd. v.  Balkis Ammal, AIR 1969 Mad 462, it is observed, referring Sec. 9 as under:

  • “That section says that a transfer of property may be made without writing in every case in which a writing is not expressly required by law. The Transfer of Property Act is not exhaustive of the kind of transfers. We are inclined to agree with the proposition of Ramaswami J., in Sarandaya Pillai v. Sankarlinga Pillai 1959-2 Mad LJ 502 at p. 503 namely, that
    • “the test, therefore, in this country to determine whether a transaction (be it a transfer or not) can be made without writing is to see if it is expressly required by law to be in writing. If the transaction is a ‘transfer of property’ and there is no express provision of law requiring it to be in writing. Section 9 will enable it to be made without writing. If on the other hand, the transaction is not a ‘transfer of property’ and there is no express provision of law requiring it to be in writing, the general principle referred to above will enable it to be validly made without writing.”
  • The learned Judge, if we may say so with respect, rightly pointed out that Section 9 underlines the general principle that everything is to be taken permissible unless there is a prohibition against it and has been inserted in the statute ex abundanti cautela.”

Hindu Law on Dedication

For a valid dedication there should be proof of renunciation of the ownership of (dedicated) property, by the owner.[38] In case of a dispute as to dedication, the court decides the same on the basis of its particular facts and circumstances.[39] The ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpana are relevant to show the intention of the owner. If there is clear evidence of divesting of ownership with the intention of devoting it to religious or charitable purpose, dedication can be inferred even without specific evidence of ceremonies.[40]

In Deoki  Nandan Vs. Murlidhar[41] it is observed:

  • “It is a settled law that an endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but, absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it.” 

In Menakuru Dasaratharami Reddi Vs. D Subba Rao[42] it is held:

  • “The principles of Hindu Law applicable to the consideration of questions of dedication of property to charity are well settled. Dedication to charity need not necessarily be by instrument or grant. It can be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and use of the property which shows the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.”

In Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P[43] while dealing with a Dharmasala, it is held:

  • “Dedication of property either may be complete or partial. When such dedication is complete, a public trust is created in contradistinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity…… A dedication for public purposes and for the benefit of the general public would involve complete cessation of ownership on the part of the founder and vesting of the property for the religious object…. A dedication, it may bear repetition to state, would mean complete relinquishment of his right of ownership and proprietary.”

It is pointed out by Dr. BK Mukherjea, J., on the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts, Tagore Law Lectures, that ‘it is undoubtedly possible for a founder to dedicate property in the form of a gift; he can also, if he likes, create a trust through the medium of trustees’.[44] 

Mulla, Hindu Law: reads as under:

  • “A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution, may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. … “[45]

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts[46] observes that a dedication by a Hindu for religious or charitable purposes is neither a ‘gift’ nor a ‘trust’ in the strict legal sense.

The Privy Council held in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Vs Balusami Ayyar[47] that a ‘trust’ in the sense in which the expression is used in English Law, is unknown in the Hindu system, pure and simple. Gift is made directly to idols, or images consecrated or installed in temples, or to a temple. Called by whatever name, the person attached to the administration is only the manager and custodian of the idol of the institution. The property is not conveyed to or vested in him. He is not a ‘trustee’ in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations and duties vesting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense, for maladministration.[48]

In the Mahomedan system also, the dedicated property is not conveyed to a the mutavalli. No property vests in him; and whatever property he holds is for the  institution. He holds it as manager with certain beneficial interest regulated by custom and usage.

Dedication: Question of Fact

Terms of the Document, if any, Important

Dedication is a question of fact which would have to be decided with reference to the terms of the document, if any. If the founders’ intention is clear from the document of foundation or other direct evidence, oral or documentary, no difficulty arises; and if there is no document or its language is ambiguous, or where the express dedication cannot be proved by positive evidence, it will be a matter for legal inference, legitimately drawn from the proved facts and attending circumstances of each case.[49]

In Baby Vs. Steward Co. Ltd[50] the Kerala High Court observed interpreting the title deed under which the defendant Company, engaged in charity, obtained title, that though the title deed did not contain specific words as to the character of public trust, there was sufficient indication to suggest that a trust was intended to be created.

In Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa[51] it is held:

  • “Where, however, a document is available to prove the nature and origin of the endowment and the recitals of the document show that the control and management of the temple is retained with the founder or his descendants, and that extensive properties are dedicated for the purpose of the maintenance of the temple belonging to the founder himself, this will be a conclusive proof to show that the endowment was of a private nature.”[52]

In S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs.  K. Shanmugam Pillai[53]  it is observed by the Supreme Court as under:

  • “Whether or not a dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case on the terms of the relevant document if the dedication in question was made under a document. .. “[54]

In Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of HP[55]  the Supreme Court has held that in absence of a formal and express endowment, the character of the dedication may have to be determined on the basis of the history of the institution and the conduct of the founder and his heirs. If the family of the donor retained the control over the property, a complete dedication cannot be inferred.

When a dedication to a charity is sought to be established in absence of an instrument or grant, it can be by oral evidence or by drawing inference from the conduct of the parties.[56] The law requires that such dedication be established by cogent and satisfactory evidence of conduct of the parties and user of the property which show the extinction of the private secular character of the property and its complete dedication to charity.  In such a case the onus is heavy upon the party who sets-up dedication. It must be proved that the donor intended to divest himself of his ownership in the dedicated property. [57]

‘Once a Dedication, Always Dedication’

Dedication of property is like a rocket fired.  As long as it is in private realm it retains the character of a private property. [58]  Once dedication is complete, it cannot be revoked. [59] It is a trite law that ‘once a trust always a trust’.[60]  In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass[61] the Supreme Court has described ‘Endowment’ as under:

  • “Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court.”

A dedication of property to a deity is irrevocable, and the rules, if any, laid down by the founder at the time of dedication regulating succession to the office of the shebait should be deemed to be irrevocable also unless the power of revocation is reserved by the grantor. The condition relating to the rule of succession of shebaitship forms an integral part of the dedication itself.[62]

Trustees Cannot Remodel the Trust.

In RP Kapur Vs. Kaushalya Educational Trust[63] it is held by Delhi High Court (Avadh Behari Rohatgi) as under:

  • “The trustees can bring the trust to an end where there is power of dissolution, as in this case. But they cannot alter the purposes of the trust. They are not authorised by the trust instrument to remodel the trust. The trustees have no power to alter, amend or vary the trust purposes, whether on the ground of “expansion” or “addition” or “enlargement” of the objects of the trust. I decline to accept any suggestion that the trustees can alter a man’s intention because they think it beneficial to divert the trust property to charity. It seems to me: that is quite impossible. The reason is that a trust is an obligation, that is to say a tie of equity (viniculum juris), whereby the trustee accepts the confidence reposed in him by the author of the trust to hold or apply the trust property for the purposes of the trust.”

Fundamental Principles Cannot be Changed

The fundamental principles upon which a trust is founded cannot be varied. Therefore, the courts cannot sanction any drastic amendment to the document of trust which would destroy the basic purpose for which the trust was created.

It is held in Pragji  Savji  Vaja  Vs.  Chhotalal  Narsidas  Parmar that no deviation from the object of the trust would be allowed; and that the properties would not be allowed to be sold to the members of the community for whose benefit the trust was created and the properties were acquired.[64] This principle in Milligan Vs. Mitchel,[65] Attorney General Vs. Anderson[66] and Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[67] is referred to in Prasanna  Venkitesa  Rao Vs. Srinivasa  Rao.[68]

House of Lords held in Free Church of England Vs. Overtoun[69] (by a majority of 5-2) that the minority was entitled to the assets of the Free Church. It was observed that when men subscribe money for a particular object, and leave it behind them for the promotion of that object, their successors have no right to change the object endowed. It was held that, by adopting new standards of doctrine (and particularly by abandoning its commitment to ‘the establishment principle’, which was held to be fundamental to the Free Church), the majority had violated the conditions on which the property of the Free Church was held.

It held further:

  • “Whether or not dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case in the light of the material terms used in the document. In such cases it is always a matter of ascertaining the true intention of the parties; it is obvious that such intention must be gathered on a fair and reasonable construction of the document considered as a whole. The use of the word “trust” or “trustee” is no doubt of some help in determining such intention; but the mere use of such words cannot be treated as decisive of the matter. The answer to the questions whether the private title over the property was intended to be completely extinguished or whether the title in regard to the property was intended to be completely transferred to the charity can be found not by concentrating on the significance of the use of the word “trustee” or “trust” alone but by gathering the true intent of the document considered as a whole. If the income of the property is substantially intended to be used for the purpose of the charity and only an insignificant and minor portion of it is allowed to be used for the maintenance of the worshipper or the manager, it may be possible to take the view that dedication is complete. If, on the other hand, for the maintenance of public charity a minor portion of the income is expected or required to be used and a substantial surplus is left in the hands of the manager or worshipper for his own private purposes, it would be difficult to accept theory of complete dedication. It is naturally difficult to lay down a general rule for the solution of the problem. Each case must be considered on its facts and the intention of the parties must be determined on reading the document as a whole.”

Partial Dedication Creates ‘Charge’ Alone

Complete dedication is essential for establishing a valid endowment, and partial dedication creates charge alone.[70]

In Menakuru  Dasaratharami  Reddi  Vs. D Subba  Rao[71]  it is held:

  • “Dedication of a property to religious or charitable purposes may be either complete or partial. If the dedication is complete, a trust in favour of Public Religious Charity is created. If the dedication is partial, a Trust in favour of the charity is not created but a charge in favour of the charity is attached to, and follows, the property which retains its original private and secular character.”
  •  “Whether or not dedication is complete would naturally be a question of fact to be determined in each case in the light of the material terms used in the document. In such cases it is always a matter of ascertaining the true intention of the parties; it is obvious that such intention must be gathered on a fair and reasonable construction of the document considered as a whole. The use of the word “trust” or “trustee” is no doubt of some help in determining such intention; but the mere use of such words cannot be treated as decisive of the matter. The answer to the questions whether the private title over the property was intended to be completely extinguished or whether the title in regard to the property was intended to be completely transferred to the charity can be found not by concentrating on the significance of the use of the word “trustee” or “trust” alone but by gathering the true intent of the document considered as a whole. If the income of the property is substantially intended to be used for the purpose of the charity and only an insignificant and minor portion of it is allowed to be used for the maintenance of the worshipper or the manager, it may be possible to take the view that dedication is complete. If, on the other hand, for the maintenance of public charity a minor portion of the income is expected or required to be used and a substantial surplus is left in the hands of the manager or worshipper for his own private purposes, it would be difficult to accept theory of complete dedication. It is naturally difficult to lay down a general rule for the solution of the problem. Each case must be considered on its facts and the intention of the parties must be determined on reading the document as a whole.”

Partial Dedication Creates Only ‘Charity’

The Supreme Court held in Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of HP[72]  that when such dedication was complete, a public trust was created in contra-distinction to a partial dedication which would only create a charity.

Partially Dedicated or Charged Property – Alienable and Partible

In MR Goda Rao Sahib Vs.  State of Madras[73] it is held by our Apex Court that if the property is given out and out to an idol or to a religious or charitable institution and the donor divests himself of all beneficial interest (pertaining to ownership[74]) in the property comprised in the endowment, the dedication is absolute; where the dedication is partial, a charge is created on the property or there is a trust to receive and apply a portion of the income for the religious or charitable purpose. In such a case, the property descends and is alienable and partible in the ordinary way, the only difference being that it passes with the charge upon it.[75]

Dedication – Different Connotations

‘Partial Dedication’ – Contradiction in Terms 

Dedication is a word susceptible to different connotations.  The extreme view is that dedication is the act under which the owner of the property relinquishes his entire rights for the benefit of whole world[76] or at least to a class thereof;[77] and therefore, no question arises as to ‘partial dedication’ or to dedication for a family; because it would amount to contradiction in terms.  If this extreme view is accepted there would not be ‘dedication’ in private/family temple.

Dedication may be ‘Complete’ or ‘Partial’

Another view is that dedication can be ‘partial’ also. Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. ‘On Hindu Law of Religious & Charitable Trusts’ observed as to absolute and partial Debutter thus:

  • “Where the dedication, made by a settlor in favour of an idol, covers the entire beneficial interest which he had in the property the Debutter is an absolute or complete Debutter. Where however, some proprietary or pecuniary right or interest in the property is either indisposed of or is reserved for the settlor’s family or relations, a case of partial dedication arises. In a partial dedication the deity does not become the owner of the dedicated property but is in the position of a charge holder in respect of the same.”[78]

Our Courts laid down two different facets for ‘partial dedication’. 

  • (i) Partial dedication in favour of an existing endowment results in making a ‘charge’ over the property dedicated[79] and it is liable to be alienated and partible.[80]
  • (ii) Partial dedication of property for the purpose of creation of an endowment gives rise to creation of a ‘charity’ alone.[81]

‘Limited Dedication’ – Recognised in three different areas

First, to result in making a ‘charge’ over property whereby, in effect, no endowment as such is created.[82]Secondly, in creation of a ‘charity’, as in the case of a Dharmasala.[83]Thirdly, in establishment of a family/private temple, for the benefit of an ascertained group.[84]

Dedication without Trust

A Hindu can establish or endow a religious or charitable institution even without creating a trust. Mulla’s Hindu Law[85] reads:

  • “A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution, may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it. A trust is not required for that purpose. All that is necessary is that the religious or charitable purposes should be clearly specified, and that the property intended for the endowment should be set apart for or dedicated to those purposes….”[86]

Description of Property in a Deed – Not Conclusive

 Execution of a deed by itself will not prove dedication..  Though it is a piece of evidence, it is not conclusive for determining the dedication.  In Paras Nath Thakur Vs. Mohani Dasi Deceased Ana[87] it is held that when a document is solemnly executed and registered, burden is heavy on the person who plead it to be fictitious. [88]

In M. Appala Ramanujacharyula Vs. M. Venkata-narasimha-charyulu[89] that it was held by AP High Court that the mere execution of a deed of dedication without the donor intending to act upon the terms of the deed, would not create a valid endowment.[90] In other words, to constitute a valid endowment, it must be established that the donor intended to divest himself of his ownership in the property dedicated.

Purchase of property in the name of deity is not per se evidence of dedication though it may be one of the circumstances.

Long User and Dedication

Long user of income from a land for support of an idol renders strong corroborative evidence of debutter and that by itself would not lead to an inference that dedication of the property in favour of the public was complete and absolute.   Instances of appropriation of property by a person to his own use for a long period will be a good evidence of his right; but, if instances are only recent or few and far between, it leads to inference as to abuse of trust. The endowment and its dedication will remain valid even if there is misappropriation or abuse of trust   by   the   trustees subsequent to a valid dedication.[91]

Permanent Dedication’ Essential for Wakf

The Wakf Act, 1995. defines wakf as under:

  • “(r) “wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable and includes –
    • (i) a wakf by user but such wakf shall not cease to be a wakf by reason only of the user having ceased irrespective of the period of such cesser;
    • (ii) “grants”, including mashrut-ul-khidmat** for any purpose recognised by the Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable; and
    • (iii) a wakf-alal-aulad to the extent to which the property is dedicated for any purpose recognised by Muslim law as pious, religious or charitable,
  • and “wakf” means any person making such dedication;”

**Note: ‘Waqf Mashrut-ul Khidmat’ is a public waqf where the wakifs (i.e creator of wakf) has devoted the property for the general benefit of the Muslim community and means a grant stipulated for rendering services.

It has been defined in The Mussalman Wakf Act, 1923, as under:

  • “(e) “Wakf” means the permanent dedication by a person professing the Mussalman faith of any property for any purpose recognised by the Mussalman law as religious, pious or charitable, but does not include any wakf, such as is described in section 3 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, under which any benefit is for the time 6 being claimable for himself by the person by whom the wakf was created or by any of his family or descendants.”

In Trustees of Sahebzadi Oalia Kulsum Trust v. Controller of Estate Duty, A. P. , Hyderabad, AIR 1998 SC 2986; 1998 6 SCC 267, it is laid down as under:

  • “The mention of the poor is required by Mohammad (not by Abu Yusuf with whom is the Fatwa) not to give validity to the wakf, but to ensure perpetuity; and as human beings are liable to become extinct and as a wakf must be a permanent dedication, Mohammad required that the poor should be expressly named or implied by the use of the word “sadakah”. Abu Yusuf, on the other hand, held that whether the poor were named or not, or whether the word “sadakah” was used or not, the word “wakf” implied perpetuity, and, therefore, unless some other object was named, on failure of the wakif’s posterity, the income would be applied for the poor. There is no question about the validity of the wakf; the mention of the poor does not make the wakf per se more or less valid; it only ensures perpetuity insisted upon in the law (pages 296-297).
  • The position in Islamic Law is summed up by Fyzee at page 303 by quoting the words of Ameer Ali:
  • From the promulgation of Islam up to the present day there has been an absolute consensus of opinion regarding the validity of wakfs on one’s children, kindred and neighbours. Practical lawyers, experienced judges, high officers of every sect and school under Mussulman sovereigns are all in unison on this point. There are minor differences, viz. Whether a wakf can be created for one’s self, whether the unfailing object should be designated, whether the property should be partitioned or not, whether consignment is necessary or not; but so far as the validity of a wakf constituting one’s family or children the benefaction, in whole or in part, is concerned, there is absolutely no difference. A wakf is a permanent benefaction for the good of God’s creatures: …”

In Aligarh Muslim University (The) VS Syed Mohammad Sayeed Chishty, 2008 2 RLR 59; 2007 3 RLW(Raj) 2394; 2007 3 WLC 298, it is observed as under:

  • “(38). Thus, the Act of 1913 brought the law in conformity with the lslamic Jurisprudence on wakf. In the case of Trustees of Sahebzadi Oalia Kulsum Trust vs. Controller of Estate Duty, A.P. (1998) 6 SCC 267), the Honble Supreme Court expressly over ruled the case of Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak (supra).
  • (39). Thus, “wakf is an unconditional, irrevocable, perpetual dedication of property, vested in God, the ownership of the founder, called `wakif is extinguished, the usufruct or profits of the property are used for the benefit of mankind, except for purposes forbidden by lslam. The essential of a valid wakf according to the Hanafi Law are threefold:
  • (1) The dedicator (wakif) should be a person professing the Musalman faith and of sound mind and not a minor or a lunatic, and
  • (2) The dedication should be for a purpose recognized by the Musalman law as religious, pious or charitable. (I Mulla. 621).
  • (3) However, according to the Act of 1913, the wakf can be created for the benefit of the wakifs children, kindred or descendants as long as the ultimate purpose is the benefit of the poor or any religious, pious or charitable work in accordance with Muslim law.”

Permanent Dedication Inferred From Long User As Wakf Property

It is held by the Supreme Court in Syed Mohammad Salie Labbai Vs. Mohd Hanifa[92]  that once a Kabarstan had been held to be a public graveyard then it vested in the public and constitutes a wakf and it could not be divested by nonuser but would always continue to be so whether it is used or not. The following rules were laid down by our Apex Court in order to determine whether a graveyard was a public or a private one:

  • “(1) That even though there may be no direct evidence of dedication to the public, it may be presumed to be a public graveyard by immemorial user i.e. where corpses of the members of the Mahomedan community have been buried in a particular graveyard for a large number of years without any objection from the owner. The fact that the owner permits such burials will not make any difference at all;
  • (2) that if the grave-yard is a private or a family graveyard then it should contain the graves of only the founder, the members of his family or his descendants and no others. Once even in a family graveyard members of the public are allowed to bury their dead, the private graveyard sheds its character and becomes a public graveyard;
  • (3) that in order to prove that a graveyard is public by dedication it must be shown by multiplying instances of the character, nature and extent of the burials from time to time. In other words, there should be evidence to show that a large number of members of the Mahomedan community had buried their corpses from time to time in the graveyard. Once this is proved, the Court will presume that the graveyard is a public one; and
  • (4) that where a burial ground is mentioned as a public graveyard in either a revenue or historical papers that would be a conclusive proof to show the public character of the graveyard.”

Is Trust  a ‘Living Person’ under S. 5 of the TP Act 

Can transfer of property be made to or by Trusts/Associations

Sec. 5 of the TP Act reads as under:

  • 5. “Transfer of property” defined:  In the following sections “transfer of property” means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and “to transfer property” is to perform such act.
  • In this section “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.

Existing Laws as to Transfer of Property, will Remain in Force

Two points are emphasised in the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 5 –

  • First, all unregistered associations, whether incorporated or not, are ‘living persons’, so that transfer of property can be made.
  • Second, the qualifying second limb – ‘nothing herein contained shall affect any law for the time being in force relating to transfer of property to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals‘ – makes it clear:
    • if any law regulates transfer of property to (or by) companies, associations or bodies of individuals, it will remain in force.

See also: Usha Rani Kundu  Vs. Agradut  Sangha[94].

It is now settled law that though an idol is considered by a fiction of law as a juristic person clothed for some purposes with rights of persons, it is not a living person for the purpose of the Transfer of Property Act.[95]

Body of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act

It may also be pointed out that, “body of individuals” in Sec. 5, TP Act (transfer to – “living person” includes a company or association or body of individuals) is wide in meaning; and it stands independent. It is broad enough to take-in ‘beneficiaries’ of a Trust.

Can ‘Law for the Time Being in Force’ Include ‘Common Law’

‘Law for the time being in force’ in Sec. 5 TP Act includes “common law”.[96]

It is a reality – the common law of our country accepts as valid the ‘transfer of property’ made to or effected by well-known institutions, organisations,[97]and associations attached to well reputed trusts,[98] institutions[99] etc., though they are not juristic-persons in its strict sense. Our courts sumptuously refer to such deeds as documents executed by or in favour of such entities, when they are referred to as exhibits. For example:

  • Settlement deed by Ashramam–Swayam  Prakash  Ashramam Vs. G Anandavally  Amma : AIR  2010 SC 622;
  • Settlement to trust – S N Mathur  Vs. Board of Revenue: 2009-13  SCC 301;
  • Sale deed by unregistered society – Suresh s/o. Bhagwanrao  Puri Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2016-3 AIR Bom R (Cri.) 603;
  • Gift to unregistered Association – Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna Satram: 1984-2 ALT 157;
  • Sale deed to an association – K. Kala Vs. Dist Registrar, Madurai: 2016 3 MLJ 50, 
  • Sale deed to an association – State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor: [1990] 79 STC 315; ILR1991- 2 P&H 218.
  • Sale deed to an association – Asst. Commr. Vs. Shivalingawwa: ILR 2003 Kar 2855;
  • Lease deed by trust to school – TNP Mothoo  Natarajan Vs. PV Ravi: 2015-2 MLJ (Cri.) 656;
  • Lease deed by a firm -2014-3 ALT 46;
  • Settlement deed to private trust –Kolli  Venkata Raja Vs. Govt. of AP: 2014-1 ALT 155;
  • Lease deed to a public trust –Nadigar  Sangham Charitable Trust, rep. by its managing Trustee, R. Sarathkumar Vs. S. Murugan:2013-1 MLJ 433;
  • Sale deed to Board of Trustees – Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Chemists and Druggists Association Building Trust: 1995-215 ITR(Mad) 741;
  • Mortgage deed by a College – Sonar Bangla Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College:  AIR 1960 Cal 450.

Similarly, the registration and revenue authorities, without objection, register deeds relating to such properties in the names of such institutions, associations etc.

It was held by our Apex Court in Kamaraju  Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Sub Collector,  Ongole[100] that, under Hindu Law, a tank can be an object of charity and when a dedication was made in favour of a tank, the same was considered as a charitable institution. Without deciding whether that institution can also be considered as a juristic person, it was held that the same had to be registered in its name (ie., in the name of the tank) in the Inam register though it had continue to be managed by its Manager.

It is also noteworthy that Salmond on Jurisprudence[101] reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases.”

Religious Trusts & Gift to a ‘Non-existent Being’

The Privy Council in Bhupathi  Nath Vs. Ramlal[102]  settled the position that the law laid down in Tagore Vs. Tagore[103] (a gift to a non-existent being is invalid) had no application to a religious trust, and held that such a gift to a would-be-installed deity would not be invalidated.

Religious Trusts & ‘Acceptance’ of Gift

 Though ‘acceptance’ is an integral part to take effect a gift in case of secular property, it is not material in religious gift or dedication.

Religious Trusts: Clear Directions for Management Not Necessary

If a secular endowment is created with management under trustees, clear directions for management to the trustees are necessary; and it cannot be left to the discretion of a trustee, in which event a valid trust would not be created. If intention for dedication and setting apart of the property are proved, the form of religious gift is immaterial. 

But, with respect to religious or charitable institutions, lack of details of entrustment may not invalidate the dedication. In the celebrated decision, Manohar   Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram,[104] it is held:

  • “A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may, according to his law, express his purpose and endow it, and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least protect it so far, at any rate, as is consistent with his own dharma or conception of morality.”

In Arjan Singh Vs. Deputy Mal Jain[105] it is held:

  • “Dedication to purposes beneficial to the community are charities. ‘Gifts for charity are supported although no particular mode of carrying out the intention is prescribed’. (Tudor on Charities 5th ed. p. 133). If a trust was intended but there is no provision by the donor of machinery to carry his charitable purpose into effect the court supplies the omission. (Tudor on Charities 6th ed. p. 231).”

Hindu Law & Roman Law – Vesting of Dedicated Property

In Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram[106] West and Birdwood, JJ. held:

  • “The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those derived from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception of morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the alter of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the idol.”

Dr. BK Mukherjea, J. enlightens us, in ‘On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’, referring to Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakhmiram, as under:

  • “The religious institutions like mutts and other establishments obviously answer to the description of foundations in Roman Law. The idea is the same, namely, when property is dedicated for a particular purpose, the property itself upon which the purpose is impressed, is raised to the category of a juristic person so that the property which is dedicated would vest in the person so created. And so it has been held in Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir[107] that a mutt is under the Hindu Law a juristic person in the same manner as a temple where an idol is installed.”[108]

Hindu Law: Dedication Otherwise than ‘Complete Relinquishment’

While dealing with a Bathing Ghat on the banks of the River Ganges, pointing out peculiarities of Hindu Law,  it is observed by the Privy Council in Hemanta  Kumari Debi Vs. Gauri Shankar Tewari[109] that complete relinquishment of title was not the only form of dedication under Hindu Law.[110] It observed:

  • “Complete relinquishment by the owner of his proprietary right is however by no means the only form of dedication known to the Hindu law and is very different from anything that could ordinarily be inferred from the public user of a highway. From the standpoint of the Hindu law ‘it is not essential to a valid dedication that the legal title should pass from the owner nor is it inconsistent with an effectual dedication that the owner should continue to make any and all uses of the land which do not interfere with the uses for which it is dedicated.’ The Chairman, Hawrah Municipality Vs.  Khetra  Kristo  Mitter (1906) 10 C.W.N. 1044, S.C. 4 C.L.J. 343, (per Mookerjee J., at p. 348).”[111]

If Valid Dedication, No Change of Character, On Regn. as Socieety

  • “Any addition to those properties must also have the same character.”

As stated above, normally, the property acquired by a society does not part-take the character of ‘public purpose’ stated in Sec. 92 CPC. (Keshava Panicker Vs. Damodara Panicker AIR 1976 Ker 86; C Chikka Venkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296) .But, if a charitable or religious institution of a public nature (Eg. A temple or a math or Guru Granth Sahib, revered in a Gurudwara) is expressly or constructively founded by an ascertainable number of persons or an association, by valid dedication of properties acquired by the members or society, it will accomplish the character of ‘public purpose’ stated in Sec. 92 CPC.

Subsequent registration of an association involved in a trust, under the Societies Registration Act, will not make any change to the trust character of the properties dedicated.  Kesava Panicker Vs. Damodara Panicker (AIR 1976 Ker 86) was a case where the entire community in a particular area took an active interest and contributed funds for the purpose of creating ‘a trust fund’ for establishing a school. A committee was formed for collecting funds. Utilising that fund the school building was constructed. Subsequently a society was formed and registered under the Societies Registration Act for the purpose of management of the school. A question arose whether the character of the properties would be changed by the formation of the society. The Full Bench of the Kerala High Court held as under:

  • “If there was a trust created by the public, for a public charitable purpose namely establishing, maintaining and running a school, the fact of the registration of a society could not change the character of the properties which had already been constituted as trust properties and impressed with the trust and any addition to those properties must also have the same character.”

We can take cue from Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma, AIR 1966 SC 411, where their Lordships said the following as to the addition of property acquired from the joint-family-nucleus-

  • “Under Hindu Law, when a property stands in the name of a member of a joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. When it is proved or admitted that a family possessed sufficient nucleus with the aid of which the member might have made the acquisition, the law raises a presumption that it is a joint family property and the onus is shifted to the individual member to establish that the property was acquired by him without the aid of the said nucleus. This is a well settled proposition of law. But the principle is not applied to acquisition of properties in the name of a junior member of a tarwad (anandravan) under the Marumakkathayyam law. There is no presumption either way and the question has to be decided on the facts of each case. In the case of a property acquired in the name of the karnavan, however, there is a tarwad property and the presumption holds good unless and until it is rebutted by acceptable evidence….”
  • Also see: Sonnappa Iyer v. KR Ramuthaiammal, (1994)1 Mad LJ 44, Thambiran Naicker v. Duraiswamy Naicker, 1996-2 MadLJ 207.

Gift on Trust to a Society

If property is gifted to a registered society on condition that the property should be used for public purposes and casted duties on the society to act as trustee, a trust is brought home.[112]

An Association Cannot Claim Rights Over the Property of a Trust

In Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai  Ratanjibhai (AIR 2005 SC 2544) it is held that an association of persons cannot claim rights over the property of a trust, if the property had already been vested in the trust.

Brief facts:

The Church, FCDB, was a registered religious society.  This Church and other 6 Churches resolved to dissolve; and consolidate into a single entity, The Church of Northern India (CNI). The ‘CNI Trust Association’ was subsequently formed under the Companies Act and was appointed as the trustee of the CNI. Defendants 1 to 4 (though given consent to unification proceedings, earlier) obstructed the functioning of the CNI and asserted their independent right to hold all the movable and immovable properties of their congregation (Valsad Brethren Church) and took the stand that there was no resolution for ‘dissolution’ as set out in the So. Regn. Act.

During the pendency of the suit, unification was ‘given effect to’ by the Charity Commr. under the BPT Act.  The plaintiffs filed the suit to declare ‘that the former FDCB has ceased to exist’ and ‘that the CNI is the legal continuation and successor of the FDCB …’ etc. The Civil Court may have jurisdiction over a matter which is outside the purview of the Act, or over a question arises in relation to a matter unconnected with the administration or possession of the trust property.

The effect of ‘dissolving’ a registered society (FDCB) by taking resolution ‘for unification’ with other associations (Churches) to form a single entity (CNI) was placed for consideration of our Apex Court several times. Besides, this decision (Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai), Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti [(2013) 15 SCC 394] is important among them. The dismissal of the suit was upheld by our Apex Court holding that the civil court had no jurisdiction where bar is imposed in relation to a matter whereover the statutory authorities (under BPT Act) have the requisite jurisdiction and that a society created under a statute must conform to its provisions and the courts would interfere in case of its violation.

  • See: also: The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras Vs. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282; Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1954 SC 388.

It was observed, inter alia, in this land-mark decision (Church of North India Vs. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai),rendered by SB Sinha, J:

  • “In terms of Section 5 of the Societies Registration Act, all properties would vest in the trustees, and only in case in the absence of vesting of such properties in the trustees would the same be deemed to have been vested for the time being in the governing body of such property. In this case, it is clear that the properties have vested in the trustees and not in the governing body of the society.” (Para 60)
  • “Unless a suit is filed in terms of Section 13 of the Act, the society is not dissolved.” (Para 64)
  • “Concededly, the properties of the trust being properties of the religious trust had vested in such trust.” (Para 64)
  • “If the properties of the churches did not belong to the society, the appellant herein cannot claim the same as their successor.” (Para 64)
  • “Even if it is contended that the administration of the property would mean the properties of the Brethren church both as a trust and as a society, still then having regard to the legal position, as discussed supra, the property belonging exclusively to the trust, the suit will not be maintainable (by virtue of the provisions of the BPTA).” (Para 64)

It is observed in Vinodkumar M. MalaviaVs. Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti, (2013) 15 SCC 394, a under:

  • “The argument that as per Article 254 of the Constitution, the Societies Registration Act overrides the BPTA or that the Societies Registration Act and BPTA are in conflict, does not stand either, since both the statutes are not in conflict with each other. On the contrary, they are in consonance with each other regarding the administration and regulation of public and religious trusts.”
  • “The High Court has rightly observed that: ‘… The trust which has been created as public trust for a specific object and the charitable or the religious nature or for the bonafide of the Society or any such institution managed by such trusts for charitable and religious purpose shall continue to exist in perpetuity and it would not cease to exist by any such process of thinking or deliberation or the Resolution, which does not have any force of law’.”

Founding Endowment by Subscriptions or Donations

Where a person collects subscriptions from various persons and builds a choultry or a temple he has a right to direct in what manner the institution should be managed and what right the trustees should have in the management of that institution. This is recognised by the Hindu Law. There is nothing illegal or improper in a person who builds a temple whether out of his own funds or out of the funds collected by subscriptions[113] or getting donations from people to create a trust and endow it, directing by the deed of endowment, in what manner and by whom it should be managed.[114] If a number of persons provide the original endowment, they may apparently together constitute the founder.[115]

In Attorney-General V/s. Clapham[116] Lord Cranworth, Lord Chancellor observed as under:

  • “Where a fund is raised for a charitable purpose like that of founding a chapel and the contributors are so numerous as to preclude the possibility of their all concurring in any instrument declaring the trusts, but such a declaration is made by the persons in whom the property is vested, at or about the time when the sums have been raised, that declaration may reasonably be taken prima facie as a true exposition of the minds of the contributors. The presumption is, that the trusts declared were those which the contributors intended. It would be open to them, if the trusts were not so framed as to effect the object they had in view, to take steps for getting any errors corrected. If no such steps are taken, it must be assumed that the instrument declaring the trusts fairly embodies the intentions of the contributors.”[117]

In Thenappa Chettiar Vs. Karuppan Chettiar[118] it is held: 

  • “It is not a correct proposition of law to state that every donor contributing at the time of foundation of a trust becomes a founder of the trust. It may be that in a particular case all the contributors of a trust fund become the founders of the trust itself’ but the question when a contributor would become in law a joint founder of the trust would depend not merely upon the fact of his contribution but also upon the surrounding circumstances proved in the particular case and the subsequent conduct of the parties.”

Entries in Revenue Records and Proof of Dedication

Following propositions are relevant in the matter of dedication of property of an endowment:

  • (i)    If dedication or its nature (private or public) is convincingly proved, revenue records will not displace such proof.[119]
  • (ii)   Revenue Records are not documents of title.
  • (iii)  Revenue Records raise presumption alone; that too, rebuttable.
  • (iv)  When no other evidence is forthcoming, it is a valuable piece of evidence. Sec. 35 and 114 Evidence Act are attracted.[120]
  • (v)  Where a statute (eg. Land Revenue Acts of certain States) confers presumption to a Revenue entry, it must be considered.[121]

It is held by our Apex Court in Syed Mohammad Salie Labbai Vs. Mohd Hanifa[122]  that where a burial ground is mentioned as a public graveyard in either a revenue or historical papers, that would be a conclusive proof to show the public character of the graveyard. In Shamshuddin Vs. State of U P[123] it is held by the Allahabad High Court with respect to Revenue Entry as to a graveyard, as under:

  • “On the aforesaid discussion, the Court finds that a graveyard once dedicated as such will always remain a graveyard even no traces of dead may be found. … The revenue records may not prove such dedication, but that once it is proved that the dedication is complete, the entries of such land in the revenue records, in favour of the owner of the land would not take away or write off effect of such dedication.”

In Narayana Prasad Agarwal Vs.  State of MP[124] it is laid down as under:

  • “Record of right is not a document of title. Entries made therein in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act although are admissible as a relevant piece of evidence and although the same may also carry a presumption of correctness, but it is beyond any doubt or dispute that such a presumption is rebuttable.”

In Poohari Fakir Sadavarthy of BondilipuramVs.  Commr., Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments[125] it was observed:

  • “The observations of the Privy Council in Arunachellam’s case that in the absence of the original grant the Inam Register is of great evidentiary value, does not mean that the entry or entries in any particular column or columns be accepted at their face value without giving due consideration to other matters recorded in the entry itself.” [126]

In Kuldip Chand Vs. AG Government of HP[127] the Supreme Court held that had a dedication been made, the same was expected to be recorded in the revenue records; and that in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the entries in the revenues record would be presumed to be correct, although the same was a rebuttable one. It is also held by our Apex Court in Sukhdev Singh Vs.  Maharaja Bahadur[128] that ‘when a party to the suit had not been able by clear and conclusive evidence to rebut the presumption arising from the Record of Rights and the record of Permanent Settlement and he had failed to establish his claim’, the entries in Revenue Records could be relied upon.

In Gurunath  Manohar  Pavaskar  Vs.  Nagesh  Siddappa  Navalgund[129] after quoting Narayana Prasad Agarwal Vs.  State of MP[130] it is held:

  • “A revenue record is not a document of title. It merely raises a presumption in regard to possession. Presumption of possession and/or continuity thereof both forward and backward can also be raised under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act.”

Revenue Records in the Name of Deity not Decisive

Even if the ownership of property is set-down in revenue records in the name of Deity, it is not treated as inconsistent with its private ownership.


[1] Fazlal Rabbi Pradhan Vs. State of West Bengal: AIR 1965  SC  1722.

[2] John Vallamatoom Vs. Union of India: 2003 6 SCC 611

[3]      Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[4] Pratap  Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064.

[5] ILR  2011-4 Ker 760

[6] AIR 1987 SC 2064

[7]     Vidarbha and Marathwada, Nagpur Vs. Mangala: 1982 MhLJ 686; Maria Antonica Rodrigues Vs. DR Baliga: AIR 1967 Bom 465.

[8]     Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan: (2020) 5 Mad LJ 331(SC); MJ  Thulasiraman Vs. Comr, HR & CE: AIR 2019 SC 4050.

[9] Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR  1957 AP 941.

[10] SM Manorama Dasi Vs. Dhirendra Nath Busu: AIR  1931 Cal 329,

[11]   DeokiNandan  Vs. Murlidhar:  AIR 1957 SC 133, Quoted in: M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case): 2020-1 SCC 1, PratapSinghji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[12]Birdhi Chand Jain Charitable Trust Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Sham Lal: ILR 1973-1 Del  144,

[13] Kidangoor Devaswom v. Krishnan Namboothiri, 2016-1 KerLT 778

[14] Kuldip Chand Vs.  Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685, Amolak Nath Vs. Keshav Ji Gaudia Math Trust: 2013-1 ADJ 363; 2012-94 All LR 573

[15] Gulam Mohideen Khan Vs. Abdul Majid Khan: AIR 1957 AP 941.

[16]    See: Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh AIR 1984 All 72.

[17]    State of Madras Vs. S. S. M. Paripelena Sangam: AIR 1962 Mad 48;         See also: Idol Murli Manoharji Vs. Gopilal Garg: AIR 1971 Raj 177.

[18]    See: M. R. GodaRao Sahib Vs.  State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653; Sree Siddhi Budhi Vinayakagar Vs. S V Marimuthu: AIR 1963 Mad 369

[19] Shailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs. State of Orrisa: 1956 AIR SC 346.

[20]    AIR 1999 SC 2131 

[21] Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591

[22] ILR 50 Mad 687

[23] Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018-8 ADJ 843; 2018-130 AllLR 591

[24]    Pratap  Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064

[25] Kuldip Chand Vs.  Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685

[26]    M R GodaRao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 S C 653; Ram Charan Das Vs. Mst. Girjanandani Devi AIR 1959 All 473; Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh AIR 1984 All 72; S. Shanmugam  Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam  Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[27]    Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[28]   Pratap  Singhji  Vs. Charity Commissioner: AIR 1987 SC 2064; M R Goda  Rao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653. Ram Charan Das Vs. Mst. Girjanandani Devi AIR 1959 All 473; S. Shanmugam  Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam  Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[29]    Menakuru Dasaratharami Reddi Vs. D Subba Rao: AIR 1957 SC 797;         Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685; State of Madras Vs. SSM Paripelena Sangam: AIR 1962 Mad 48; Idol Murli Manoharji Vs. Gopilal Garg: AIR 1971 Raj 177.        Ramalinga Chetti Vs. Sivachidambara Chetty (1918) ILR 42 M 440: 36 MLJ 575,        R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262. Kapoor Chand Vs. Ganesh Dutt,  AIR 1993 SC 1145, Referred to in: Bala Shankar   Vs. Charity Comner Gujarat State: AIR 1995 SC 167. 

[30]    Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72.

[31]   M R Goda  Rao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653. See also: Ram Charan Das Vs. Mst. Girjanandani Devi: AIR 1959 All 473; S. Shanmugam  Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam  Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069; Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[32]    Vidyawati Vs. Ram Janki: 2019 0 Supreme(All) 517; Tilkayat Sri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. State of Rajasthan: AIR SC 1638, Tangella Narasimhaswami Vs. Iamidi Venkatalingam:1927-25 LW 806; 1927-53 MLJ 203, Ramalinga Chetti Vs. Sivachidambara Chetty: (1918) ILR 42 M 440: 36 MLJ 575,         Tammi Reddi Vs. Gangi Reddi (1921) ILR 45 M 281 : 42 MLJ 570, See also: R Venugopala Reddiar Vs. Krishnaswamy: AIR 1971 Mad  262. Menakuru Masaratharami Reddi Vs. D Subba Rao: AIR 1957 SC 797

[33]    Bihar State Board Religious Trust Vs. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das: AIR 1971 SC 2057, Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72. Kapoor Chand Vs. Ganesh Dutt:  AIR 1993 SC 1145; Referred to in Bala Shankar  Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: AIR 1995 SC 167.

[34]   AIR 1941 PC 38

[35]   Quoted in:Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[36]    Ramanathan Vs. Palaniappa: AIR 1945 Mad 473

[37]    AIR 1927 Mad 636, Referred to in: Sainath Mandir Trust Vs.  Vijaya: AIR 2011 SC 389; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. Commissioner of IT: CTR 1984 38 76,ITR 1984 148 532.

[38]    AIR 1953 Nag. 351;  AIR 1959 All. 473. 

[39]    (1972 All 273). 

See 1963 SC 1638.

[40]    ILR 16 Lah.85. 

[41]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[42]   AIR 1957 SC 797.

[43]   AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[44]   Quoted in Iswar Madan Mohun Vs. Priyamoni Dasi: 1971 Cal LJ  314, 1971-1 Cal LT 254; Rivers Steam Navigation Co Ltd Vs. State: 1966-71 Cal WN 854.

[45]   Quoted in : Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72; Also referred: Lalta Prasad Vs. Brahmanand: AIR 1953 All 449 (DB).

[46]    pages 102 & 103.

[47] AIR 1922 PC 123

[48] See: M. Siddiq Vs. Mahant Suresh Das

[49]    Ram Ratan Lal Vs. Kashinath Tewari: AIR AIR 1966 Pat. 235.         Dr. BK Mukherjea, J.: Tagore Law Lectures, On the Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts: Page 188.

[50] ILR 1991-1 Ker 587, 1990-2 KerLJ 272

[51]   AIR 1981 SC 798

[52]   Quoted in: Kuldip Chand Vs. Advocate General to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[53]   AIR 1972 SC 2069

[54]    It is quoted in Sitaram Agarwal Vs. Subarata Chandra: AIR 2008 SC  952; Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Calcutta Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[55]    Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[56]    Kapoor Chand Vs. Ganesh Dutt,  AIR 1993 SC 1145; Referred to in Bala Shankar Vs. Charity Commissioner Gujarat: AIR 1995 SC 167.

[57]    See: Kuldip Chand Vs. A G to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[58]   See:MAppalaRamanujacharyulu Vs. M Venkatanarasimha: 1974 AP 316; Siva KantaBaruaVs.RajaniramNath:AIR 1950 Ass. 154: ILR 51 All. 626.

[59]    Radhika Mohan Nandy v. Amrita Lal Nandy: AIR1947 Cal  301, Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17;      M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273;T C Chacko  Vs.  Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107.Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchand: AIR 1997 Bom 46

[60]    See: Narayanan Vs. Nil: AIR 2005 Mad. 17; M Ashok Kumar Vs. N Janarthana: 2013(7) Mad. LJ 273; TC Chacko Vs. Annamma:  AIR 1994 Ker. 107. KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[61] AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[62]    Radhika Mohan Nandy Vs. Amrita Lal Nandy and another: AIR1947 Cal  301, Virbala K. Kewalram Vs. Ramchand Lalchandlaws: AIR 1997 Bom 46, [63]    1982-21 DLT 46; ILR  1982-1Del 801

[64]    AIR 2014-3 Bom R 211: 2013-6 BCR 72.

[65]    40 ER 852

[66]    (1888) 57 LJ Ch 543

[67]    (1904) AC 515.

[68]    AIR 1931 Mad. 12

[69]    (1904) AC 515.

[70] Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy Vs. PK Thoppulan Chettiar: 2020-2 ALT 79 (SC)

[71]    AIR 1957 SC 797.

[72]    AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[73]    AIR 1966 SC 653.

[74]    See: M. R. GodaRao Sahib Vs.  State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC 653; Sree Siddhi Budhi  Vinayakagar Vs. S V Marimuthu AIR 1963 Mad 369.

[75]    Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew Vs. Sushila Bala Dasi: AIR 1954 SC 69;  Sappani Mohamed Mohideen Vs. R V Sethusubramania Pillai: AIR 1974 SC 740.

[76]    As in the case of a way.

[77]    See: Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133; Marua Dei alias Maku Dei Vs. Muralidhar Nandair, 1999 SC 329; Narayan Bhagwant Gosavi Vs. Gopal V Gosavi, AIR 1960 SC 100; Goswami Mahalaxmi Vs. Ranchhoddas, AIR 1970 SC 2025; Radhakanta Deb Vs. Commr. of Hindu Reli. Endts, 1981 SC 798.

[78]    Quoted by VK KrisnaIyer, J in Comner. of IT, WB Vs. Jagannath  Jee: AIR1977 SC 1523.

[79]    See: S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069; See also: Iswari  Bhubaueshwari Vs. Brojo  Nath  Dey: AIR 1937 PC 185; M. R. GodaRao Sahib Vs. State of Madras: AIR 1966 SC; Sappani Mohamed Mohideen Vs. Sethusubramania  Pillai: AIR 1974 SC 740; Commissioner of IT WB Calcutta Vs. Jagannath  Jee: AIR1977 SC 1523.

[80]   Controller of Estate Duty WB Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312

[81]    Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of HP: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[82]    S. Shanmugam Pillai Vs. K. Shanmugam Pillai: AIR 1972 SC 2069, Sappani Mohamed Mohideen Vs. Sethusubramania  Pillai: AIR 1974 SC 740, Controller of Estate Duty West Bengal Vs. Usha Kumar: AIR 1980 SC 312.

[83]    Kuldip Chand Vs. AG to Government of H P: AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[84]    DeokiNandanVs.Murlidhar: AIR 1957 SC 133.

[85]    Page 600, 21stEdn

[86]    Quoted in Shri Ram Kishan Mission Vs. Dogar Singh: AIR 1984 All 72.

[87]    AIR 1959 SC 1204:1960(1) SCR 271

[88]    ILR 18 Cal. 10;  ILR 42 All. 295.

[89] AIR 1974 A.P. 316

[90] Vidyawati Vs Ram Janki: 2019 0 Supreme(All) 517

[91]    ILR 1936 Cal. 420; Kuldip Chand Vs.A G Government of H P (AIR 2003 SC 1685); AIR 1954 M. 1110.

[92] AIR  1976  SC 1569,

[93]    Under the Companies Act.

[94]   (2006) 3 Cal LT 139; 2006 (3) CHN 77.

[95]   Narasimhaswami Vs. Venkatalingam: AIR 1927 Mad 636, Referred to in: Sainath Mandir Trust Vs.  Vijaya: AIR 2011 SC 389; Raja Sir Muthiah Chettiar Vs. Commissioner of IT: CTR 1984 38 76:  ITR 1984 148 532; Ramanathan Vs. Palaniappa: AIR 1945 Mad 473.

[96]   See: Kelans Son Kodakkat  Kannan Vs. Tharakandi  Kadissa: AIR 1971 Ker 61; Shantilal Ambalal Mehta Vs. M.A. Rangaswamy: 1977-79 BLR 633; Union of India Vs. Official Assignee of Bombay: 1971-73 BLR 623; Tan Bug Taim Vs. Collector of Bombay: AIR  1946Bom 216.

[97]   Such as well-known political parties, trade-unions, etc.

[98]   Such as temple-related trusts, Wakfs, church-related trusts, etc.

[99]   Such as libraries, universities, etc. See: Pullamma Vs. Valmiki Anna: 1984-2 ALT 157

[100]  AIR 1969 SC 563.

[101]   12thEdn., Page 305.

[102]  ILR 37 Cal. 128.

[103]  (1872) L.R. IndAp 47

[104]  ILR 12 Bom. 247.

[105]  ILR 1982- 1 Del 11

[106]  (1888) ILR 12 Bom 247

[107]  AIR 1972 All 273.

[108]  Referred to in Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588.

[109]  AIR 1941 PC 38. See also: KS Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

[110]  Referred to in Menakuru  Dasaratharami  Reddi  Vs. D Subba  Rao: AIR 1957 SC 797.

[111]  Quoted in Menakuru  Dasaratharami  Reddi  Vs. D Subba  Rao: AIR 1957 SC 797.

[112]  Swami Shivshankargiri Chella   Swami Vs. Satya Gyan Nikethan: AIR 2017 SC 1221;

YMCA Ernakulam Vs. National Council YMCAs of India: LAWS(Dlh) 2018-7 484.

[113]  Re St. Leonard (1884) 10 A.C. 304

[114]  Settikara Venkatarama Chettiar Vs. OP Damodaram Chettiar: AIR 1926 Mad 1150.

[115]  Ananda Chandra Chuckerbutly Vs. BrajaLal Singh: (1922) ILR 50 C. 292;   Re St. Leonard: (1884) 10 AC 304; Settikara Venkatarama Chettiar Vs. OP Damodaram Chettiar: AIR 1926 Mad 1150.

[116] (1855) 43 E.R. 638

[117] Quoted in: Settikara  Venkatarama Chettiar Vs. OP Damodaram: AIR 1926 Mad 1150.

[118] AIR  1968 SC 915 

[119]  Arunachallam Chetti Vs. Venkata Chalapathi Guruswamigal: AIR 1919 PC 62; Panchayat Deh Vs. Punjab Wakf Board Ambala: AIR 1969 P&H  344; B. Satyanarayan Vs.  K. Venkatapayya: AIR 1953 SC 105. 1964 KLT 1034; relied on in 2014 (3) KLT 497, 2013 (3) KLT 1017.

[120]  Periaswami Vs. SunderesaAyyar: AIR 1965 SC 516; Sankarnarayana Pillayan Vs.  Hindu Religious Endnts. Boards: AIR 1948 PC 25 B. Satyanarayan Vs.  K. Venkatapayya: AIR 1953 SC 105; Nanduri Yogananda Chari Vs. Agasthe Swaraswamivaruair: AIR 1960 SC 622; Narayanan Nambiar Vs. Raman Chettiar1969 KLT 449.

[121] Sulochna Vs. Jasbir Singh: PunLR 2016-183 747.

[122] AIR  1976  SC 1569,

[123] 2012 -91 All LR 717; All LJ 2013 6 435; AWC 2012- 6 5846;  RCR(Cri) 2014- 7 2450,

[124] 2007 AIR (SCW)  4165

[125]  AIR 1963 SC 510.

[126]  Quoted in Jammi Raja Rao Vs. Anjaneya Swami Temple AIR 1992  SC 1110.

[127]  AIR 2003 SC 1685.

[128]  AIR 1951 SC 288.

[129]           AIR 2008 SC 901

[130]           2007 AIR (SCW) 4165



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Is an Idol a Perpetual Minor?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Introduction.

The management and administration of temple property by Shebait is often described to be similar to that of a manager of the estate of an infant heir.[1] But, Indian Law does not favour it in its full sense.

Position of Shebait: Whether Similar to Guardian of Infant Heir

In Thenappa Chattiar Vs. Karuppan Chettiar[2]  our Apex Court referred to the Calcutta High Court decision, in Bimal Krishna’s case,[3] where it was observed that in India, ‘the Crown is the constitutional protector of all infants’; and, as the deity occupies in law the position of an infant, the shebaits who represent the deity were entitled to seek the assistance of the Court in case of mismanagement, fraud or maladministration, and to have a proper scheme for management framed for the administration of the private trust.

Power of trustees to alienate – Analogous to that of a manager for an infant.

In Shridhar Vs. Jagannathji Temple[4] our Apex Court following the Judicial Committee, in Hanooman Prasad Vs. Mt. Babooee,[5] held that the trustees had no power to alienate a debutter property except in case of need or for the benefit of the estate. The power of the trustees of such religious trust to alienate property of the religious endowment was held to be analogous to that of a manager for an infant. In In-Re, Man Singh[6] it is held by the Delhi High Court that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant.

Court is constitutional protector of all charities

Referring Thenappa Chattiar Vs. Kuruppan Chettiar and Shridhar Vs. Jagannathji Temple, it was observed in Hamumiya Bachumiya Vs. Mehdihusen Gulamhusen[7] that the court, as constitutional protector of all charities, was the sole guardian of the paramount interest of the charities; and its jurisdiction was analogous to one as a protector of the infant.

Alienation of Trust Property – Analogous to that of an Infant Heir

Pollock and Maitland’s ‘History of English Law’, Volume I, p. 463 reads as under:

  • “A church is always under aged is to be treated as an infant and it is not according to law that infants should be disinherited by the negligence of their guardians or be barred of an action in case they would complain of things wrongfully done by their guardians while they are under age.”[8]

Mulla’s Treatise on Principles of Hindu Law states as under:

  • “The power of a Shebait or a Mohunt to alienate debutter property is analogous to that of a manager for an infant heir as defined by the Judicial Committee in Hanooman  Pershand Vs. Mt. Babooee, (1856) 6 Moo Ind App 393 (PC). As held in that case, he has no power to alienate dubutter property except in a case of need or for the benefit of the estate. He is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself. Nor can he, except for legal necessity grant a permanent lease of debutter property, though he may create proper derivative tenures and estates conformable to usage.”[9]

Shebait: Guardian of Infant Heir, Analogy Not Favoured by Indian Law

Dr. B K Mukherjea J. did not accept the analogy that the  Shebait is the  manager of the estate of an infant heir.  ‘On Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’,[10] it is expressed by Dr. BK Mukherjea J. as under:

  • “A Hindu idol is sometimes spoken of a perpetual infant, but the analogy is not only incorrect but is positively misleading. There is no warrant for such doctrine in the rules of Hindu Law and as was observed by Rankin, C. J., in Suyendra Vs.  Sri Sri  Bhubaneshwari, ILR 60 Cal 54: (AIR 1933 Cal 295), it is an extravagant doctrine contrary to the decision of the judicial Committee in such cases as Damodar Das Vs.  Lakhan Das.[1] It is true that the deity like an infant suffers from legal disability and has got to act through some agent and there is a similarity also between the powers of the Shebait of a deity and those of the guardian of an infant. But the analogy really ends there. For purposes of Limitation Act the idol does not enjoy any privilege and regarding contractual rights also the position of the idol is the same as that of any other artificial person. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to suits by minors or persons of unsound mind do not in terms at least apply to an idol; and to build up a law of procedure upon the fiction that the idol is an infant would lead to manifestly undesirable and anomalous consequences.”[11]

It was observed by the Privy Council in Prosunno  Kumari  Debya Vs. Golab Chand Baboo[12] and our Apex Court in Yogendra  Nath  Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta[13] that the description as to the administration of property by Shebait to be similar to that of a manager of the estate of an infant heir could be in an ‘ideal sense’ alone. In the light of the distinctive and well accepted conceptions as to the legal status of idol and management of its property, the analogies with respect to a minor is not accepted by our courts as apposite in its full details.

The Federal Court, in Kondamudi Sriramulu Vs. Myneni Pundarikakshayya,[14] explained the phrase de facto guardian used in Hanooman Persaud Pandey Vs. Mt. Babooee as under :

  • “Before concluding my observations about the scope of the decision in Hanooman Persaud Pandey’s case. 6 MIA. 393: (18 WR 81 PC), I would like to make a few observations about the phrase ‘de facto guardian’. In my opinion, it is a loose phraseology for the expression ‘de facto manager’ employed in Hanooman Persaud Pandey’s case, 6 MIA 393: (18 WR81 PC); their Lordships in different parts of the judgment used the words, guardian, curator and de facto manager. This phrase is certainly not known to any text of Hindu law, but it aptly describes the relations and friends who are interested in the minor and who for love and affection to him assume superintendence over his estate. A father may not necessarily be the guardian of an illegitimate child, but his de facto guardianship cannot be repudiated. Such is the case of the natural father of an adopted son, of Ganga Prasad v. Hara Kanta Chowdhury, 7 KIC 234: (15 CWN 558). A person who is not attached to the minor by ties of affection or other reasons of affinity and remains in charge of his estate is in truth a mere intermeddler with his estate. In order to come within the scope of the rule in Hanooman-persaud Panday’s case it is necessary that there is course of conduct in the capacity of a manager.”
  • “In law there is nothing like a de facto guardian. There can only be a de facto manager, although the expression ‘de facto guardian’ has been used in text books and some judgments of Courts. That is the correct description of a person generally managing the estate of a minor without having any legal title to do so.”

This decision is followed by our Apex Court in Madhegowda Vs. Ankegowda.[15]

The property being vested with the idol, a Shebait is not a trustee in the sense it is used in English Law. (Under English Law the legal title of the trust property is vested with trustee. See Blog: Indian Law of Trusts Does Not Accept Salmond, as to Dual Ownership)  Still a Shebait is qualified as a trustee in the general or ordinary sense of the term.  The Shebait holds the debutter property for carrying into effect the pious purposes as directed by the founder. 

Degree of Prudence Expected

A trustee has to administer the affairs of the trust and manage its property as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with the same, if they were of his own. All powers incidental to the prudent and beneficial administration of a charitable or religious institution/ endowment are also entrusted to the trustees. The principles with respect to the same in the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 apply to the public trusts also. Though the Indian Trusts Act does not apply, in terms, to the public trusts, the common legal principles contained in the Act, [16] which cover matters of both public and private trusts, apply to public trusts also.[17]

Indian Trusts Act, 1882, Sec. 15 reads as under:

  • Sec. 15. Care required from trustee.—A trustee is bound to deal with the trust property as carefully as a man of ordinary prudence would deal with such property if it were his own (and a trustee so dealing is not responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the trust property).

It was observed in Jagat  Narain Vs. Mathura Das[18] that the degree of prudence expected from a manager of an endowment would be the prudence which an ordinary man would exercise with the knowledge available to him.

While considering the sale of an old house by the manager of a temple, which was not in a dilapidated condition but it required extensive repairs, it was held in Behari  Lal Vs. Thakur Radha  Ballabhji[19] that the sale was neither a prudent act nor it was for the benefit of the estate.

In KPLS Palaniappa  Chetty  Vs. Shreenath  Devasikamony  Pandara  Sannadhi[20]  it was laid down that a Shebait would not be justified in selling debutter land solely for the purpose of getting capital to embark in the money lending business. Mulla’s Hindu Law reads:

  • “He (Shebait) is not entitled to sell the property for the purpose of investing the price of it so as to bring in an income larger than that derived from the property itself.”[21]

Suit by Worshippers & Appointment of Next Friend

Ordinarily, no person other than the Shebait can represent the idol in civil suits.[22] In certain circumstances a suit can be brought by any person interested in the matters of the deity. 

In Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy Vs. Konduru Seshu Reddy[23] our Apex Court held, following Pramath Nath Vs. Pradyumna Kumar,[24] as under: 

  • “As a matter of law the only person who can represent the deity or who can bring a suit on behalf of the deity is the Shebait, and although a deity is a judicial person capable of holding property, it is only in an ideal sense that property is so held. The possession and management of the property with the right to sue in respect thereof are, in the normal course, vested in the Shebait.  But where, however, the Shebait is negligent or where the Shebati himself is the guilty party against whom the deity needs relief it is open to the worshippers or other persons interested in the religious endowment to file suits for the protection of the trust properties. It is open, in such a case, to the deity to file a suit through some person as next friend for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated or for other relief. Such a next friend may be a person who is a worshipper of the deity or as a prospective Shebait is legally interested in the endowment. In a case where the Shebait has denied the right of the deity to the dedicated properties, it is obviously desirable that the deity should file the suit through a disinterested next friend nominated by the court.”[25]

In Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji, [26] a next friend of the idol challenged the alienation of its properties by the defendant Shebait. One of the defenses taken by the Shebait was that the next friend was not capable of maintaining a suit on behalf of the deity. To the question, can a worshipper as next friend represent the idol when the Shebait acts adversely to its interest and fails to take action to safeguard its interest  it was observed as under:

  • “On principle we do not see any justification for denying such a right to the worshipper. An idol is in the position of a minor when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest. It is a pragmatic, yet a legal solution to a difficult situation. Should it be held that a Shebait, who transferred the property, can only bring a suit for recovery, in most of the cases it will be an indirect approval of the dereliction of the Shebait’s duty, for more often than not he will not admit his default and take steps to recover the property, apart from other technical pleas that may be open to the transferee in a suit. Should it be held that a worshipper can file only a suit for the removal of the Shebait and for the appointment of another in order to enable him to take steps to recover the property, such a procedure will be rather prolonged and a complicated one and the interest of the idol may irreparably suffer. That is why decisions have permitted a worshipper in such circumstances to represent the idol and to recover the property for the idol. It has been held in a number of decisions that worshippers may file a suit praying for possession of a property on behalf of an endowment.”When the Shebait is not willing to sue, or cannot sue because he himself is responsible for the alienation which is to be questioned, or if there is no de facto Shebait or Mahant, the interest of the idol can be protected by a proper person as next friend.[27] Such person should be one who has more than a benevolent interest,[28] such as a worshipper[29] or a person who has made large donations[30] or a de facto trustee[31] or a prospective Shebait or any member of the donor’s family.[32]

Ayodhya Case

In M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case)[33]  our Apex Court considered the following questions:

  • Can a worshipper institute a suit?
  • If so, in what circumstance?
  • Can it be in his personal capacity?
  • What are the reliefs entitled to by the worshipper?
  • Should idol be a necessary party in such a suit?
  • Should Shebait be a necessary party in such a suit?
  • Should there be a court-appointment as ‘next friend’ of deity?

The legal position handed-down by the Supreme Court can be summarised as under:

  • (i) A worshipper can file a suit for enforcing individual rights (like access to the idol or worship) in a personal capacity. Such an ordinary suit can be filed in his own name without being obliged to bring a suit in the name of the idol. The relief may be against the Shebait. The deity is not bound by the suit of the worshippers unless the remedy provided is in rem in nature.
  • (ii) If the suit for enforcing individual rights is actually to protect the deity’s interests, such a suit can be filed by a worshipper only ‘on behalf of the deity’.
  • (iii) When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
  • (iv) No decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the worshipper has the ‘present right to the possession’. But a mere declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity can be granted.
  • (v) The worshippers, out of their own independent action, cannot exercise the deity’s power of suing to protect its own interests, like taking action against a Shebait who acts adverse to the interests of the deity, or for recovery of possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait.
  • (vi) In such situations, a worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the idol itself – directly exercising the deity’s right to sue.
  • (vii) The next friend being so allowed, steps into the shoes of the Shebait for the limited purpose of the litigation. Or, the next friend, the worshipper, directly exercises the deity’s right to sue.
  • (viii) In a suit for the recovery of property on behalf of the idol, the court cannot deliver possession of the property to the next friend. The next friend is merely a temporary representative of the idol.
  • (ix) The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.
  • (x) To protect against the threat of a wayward ‘next friend’, the court has to satisfy, in some manner, that the next friend is bona fide and that he can satisfactorily represent the deity.
  • (xi) If the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. In the absence of any objection, and where a court sees no deficiencies in the actions of the next friend, there is no reason why a worshipper should not have the right to sue on behalf of the deity where a Shebait abandons his sacred and legal duties.
  • (xii) In an appropriate case, the court can scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend, of its own accord. 

An Appointment of Next Friend Under Order XXXII, CPC Not Necessary

It was made clear in the judgment that ‘the worshipper must be permitted to sue as next friend’. It is not specifically stated that the permission must have been obtained as provided under Order XXXII, CPC (Suits by or against Minors). But, it appears that a ‘scrutiny’ is warranted only ‘if the next friend’s bona fides are contested’. It is held as under:

  • “Therefore, where a shebait acts adverse to the interests of the deity, a worshipper can, as next friend of the deity, sue on behalf of the deity itself, provided that if the next friend’s bona fides are contested, the court must scrutinise the intentions and capabilities of the next friend to adequately represent the deity. The court may do so of its own accord, ex debito justitae.”

It is held in the following decisions that a worshipper can, in a proper case, file a suit as next friend of the deity; and appointment by court, under Order XXXII CPC, is not necessary.

  • (i)      Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj (1985).[35]
  • (ii)     Ram Ratan Lal Vs. Kashi Nath Tewari (1966).[36]
  • (iii)    Angoubi Kabuini Vs. Imjao Lairema (1959).[37]
  • (iv)    Sri Ram Vs. Chandeswar Prasad (1952).[38]
  • (v)     Sree Sree Sreedhar Jew Vs. Kanta Mohan (1947) [39]  
  • (vi)    Annapurna Devi Vs. Shiva Sundari Dasi (1945).[40]
  • (vii)  Surendra Krishna Vs. Ishwari Bhubhaneshwari, (1933)[41]
  • (viii) Gopalji Maharaj Vs.  Krishna Sunder Nath (1929),[42]

The Allahabad High Court, in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Mahara (1985),[43] sought support from the Supreme Court decision in Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji (1967)[44] which held that the worshipper had an ad hoc power of representation of the deity when the Shebait acts adversely. In this decision it was pointed out that no definite procedure was laid down, in the Civil PC, relating to suits on behalf of idol and that the provisions of Order XXXII CPC which related to minor did not specifically provide for the appointment of the next friend of an idol.

Contra view as to appointment of ‘next friend’ by the court under Order XXXII

Following decisions took the view that appointment of next friend by court, under Order XXXII, CPC, is necessary:

  • (i)   Jogesh Chandra Bera Vs. Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur: (1981);[45]
  • (ii)   Ramaraghava Reddy v. Seshu Reddy: (1967);[46]
  • (iii) Iswar Radha Kanta Jew Thakur Vs. Gopinath Das: (1960);[47]
  • (iv) Smt. Sushma Roy Vs. Atul Krishna Roy: (1955); [48]
  • (v)  Sri Ram v. Chandeshwar Prasad: (1952);[49]
  • (vi) Tharith Bushan v. Shridhar Salagram Sinha: (1942);[50]
  • (vii) Pramatha Nath v. Pradyumna Kumar: (1925)[51]

In Jogesh Chandra Bera Vs. Iswar Braja Raj Jew Thakur (1981)[52] it was held that, suits brought by persons other than the Shebait or a prospective Shebait, must have been instituted through a next friend ‘appointed’ in that behalf by the Court.[53]

Relying on Bishwanath Vs. Radha Ballabhji[54]  it is pointed out in Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs. Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi (2018) [55] that the Supreme Court held that an idol is in the position of a minor and that when the person representing the idol leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol can certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interests. In this decision of Murti Shivji Maharaj the Allahabad High Court observed as under:

“The Supreme Court referred to the well-known decision of the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Vs. Pradyumna Kumar, AIR 1925 PC 139, which held that under certain circumstances the idol can be represented by disinterested persons. It is well known that for a Shebait to file a suit, no permission of the Court is necessary. It is only where persons other then Shebaits file suits, an ad hoc power of representation for them is necessary.”

View of Dr. BK Mukherjea: [56]

Fiction – Idol an Infant – would Lead to Anomalous Consequences:

‘Dr. B K Mukherjea on Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’ has taken a firm view that in case of an idol the appointment of Next Friend by court under Order XXXII is not necessary.

It is emphasised by the author as under:

  •  “A Hindu idol is sometimes spoken of a perpetual infant, but the analogy is not only incorrect but is positively misleading. There is no warrant for such doctrine in the rules of Hindu Law and as was observed by Rankin, C. J. , in Suyendra Vs.  Sri Sri Bhubaneshwari,[57] it is an extravagant doctrine contrary  to the decision of the judicial Committee in such cases as Damodar Das Vs.  Lakhan Das.[58] It is true that the deity like an infant suffers from legal disability and has got to act through some agent and there is a similarity also between the powers of the Shebait of a deity and those of the guardian of an infant. But the analogy really ends there. For purposes of limitation Act the idol does not enjoy any privilege and regarding contractual rights also the position of the idol is the same as that of any other artificial person. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to suits by minors or persons of unsound mind do not in terms at least apply to an idol; and to build up a law of procedure upon the fiction that the idol is an infant would lead to manifestly undesirable and anomalous consequences. “[59]

In this treatise the eminent author summed up the points as to juristic personality of idol, filing of suits, etc. as follows: [60]

  • “(1) An idol is a juristic person in whom the title to the property of the endowment vests; but it is only in an ideal sense that the idol is the owner. It has to act through human agency and that agent is the Shebait, who is, in law, the person entitled to take proceedings on its behalf. The personality of the idol might, therefore, in one sense, be said to be merged in that of the Shebait.
  • (2) Where, however, the Shebait refuses to act for the idol, or where the suit is to challenge the act of the Shebait himself as prejudicial to the interests of the idol, then there must be some other agency which must have the right to act for the idol. In such cases, the law accordingly recognizes a right in person interested in the endowment to take proceedings on behalf of the idol.
  • (3) Where the endowment is a private one, the members of the family are the persons primarily interested in its upkeep and maintenance, and they are, therefore, entitled to act on behalf of the deity; but where the endowment is a public one, Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a special procedure when the suit is against the trustee, and the reliefs claimed fall within that Section. Such a suit can be brought only in conformity with that Section and the rights of the members of the public, who are interested in the endowment as worshipers or otherwise, to institute proceedings on behalf of the idol are, to the extent abridged. Where, however, the suit does not fall within the ambit of Section 92, the right of the worshipers or persons interested in the endowment to vindicate the rights of the idol under the general law remains unaffected.
  • (4) Once it is found that the plaintiffs, whether they be Shebaits or the founder or the members of his family, or the worshippers and members of the public interested in the endowment, are entitled to maintain the suit– and that is a matter of substantive law the further question whether an idol should be impleaded as a party to it or whether the action should be brought in its name is one purely of procedure. Such a suit is really the suit of the idol, instituted by persons whom the law recognises as competent to act for it, and the joinder of the idol is unnecessary. Indeed, it may even result in embarrassment. But where the matters in controversy in a suit would affect the interests of the deity, as for example when the trust is denied, or is sought to be altered, it is desirable that it should also be impleaded as a party.
  • (5) Where the joinder of the idol is necessary or desirable, there is a difference of opinion as to whether the provisions of Order 32 of the Civil Procedure Code could, by analogy, be applied to such a suit, and whether it is open to a person to constitute himself as the Next Friend of the idol and institute the suit on its behalf. The better opinion seems to be that the provisions of Order 32 cannot be extended to a suit on behalf the idol, as there is no real analogy between an infant and an idol, that a suit by a person other than the Shebait could be instituted on behalf of the idol only when the court grants permission therefore, and that such permission should, as a rule, be given only after hearing the persons interested.”

Ayodhya Case – Proceeded on the principle: ‘The court is the protector of all charities’.

As shown above, it is held by our Apex Court in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case) as under:

  • When a Shebait is negligent in its duties or takes actions that are hostile to the deity or improperly alienated trust property or refuses to act for the benefit of the idol or where the Shebait’s actions are prejudicial to the interest of the idol, it becomes necessary to confer on a next friend the right to bring an action in law against the Shebait; and a worshipper has an ad hoc power of representation to protect the interest of the idol.
  • The court can craft any number of reliefs, including the framing of a scheme. The question of relief is fundamentally contextual and must be framed by the court in light of the parties before it and the circumstances of each case.

It is clear that the our Apex Court has rendered the above edicts adopting the view that ‘the court is the protector of all charities’.


[1]    See: Pramatha  Nath  Mullick Vs. Pradumna Kumar Mullick: AIR 1925 PC 139; Yogendra  Nath  Naskar  Vs. Commr. of IT Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089; Sridhar Vs. Shri Jagan Nath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860. Gajanan Maharaj Sansthan Shegaon Vs. Ramrao Kashinath, reported in AIR 1954 Nag. 212.

[2] AIR 1968 SC 915

[3] Bimal Krishna Vs. Iswar  Radha  Balla: 1937 Cal 338: 41 Cal WN 728

[4] AIR 1976 SC 1860

[5] (1856) 6 Moors IA 393 PC

[6]    AIR 1974 Del. 228

[7] 1978 GLR 661

[8] See: Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[9]    Quoted in Sridhar Suar Vs. Jagannath Temple: AIR1976 SC 1860.

[10]   Fifth Edition: Pages: 257, 265 & 271. See Chapter: Suit against Deity: Appointment of Next Friend

[11] Quoted in Chamelibai  VallabhadasVs. Ramchandrajee, AIR 1965 MP 167.

[12]   (1874-75) 2 Ind App 145 (PC).

[13]   AIR 1969 SC 1089.

[14] AIR 1949 FC 218

[15] AIR 2002  SC 215

[16]   Thayarammal Vs. Kanakammal: AIR 2005 SC 1588; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. Mulla Alibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309.

[17]   Bai Dosabai Vs. Mathurdas Govinddas: AIR 1980 SC 1334.

[18]   AIR 1928 All 454 (FB). Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[19]   AIR 1961 All 73. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. LaxminathjiMaharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[20]   AIR 1917 PC 33. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[21]   Quoted with approval in Sridhar Vs. Sri Jagannath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860. Referred to in Bhagauti Prasad Khetan  Vs. Laxminathji  Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.

[22] Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi: AIR 1967 SC 436, Bishwanath Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1967 SC 1044; M Siddhiq, ,

[23] AIR 1967 SC 436.

[24] AIR 1925 PC 139: ILR 52 Cal 809

[25] Referred to in M Siddiq Vs. Mahanth Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case):2020-1 SCC 1.

[26]   AIR 1967 SC 1044: (1967) 2 SCR 618

[27]   Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi: AIR 1967 SC 436; Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73

[28]   Darshan Lal Vs. Shibji Maharaj Birajman, AIR 1923 All 120;

Kishore Joo Vs. Guman Behari Joo Deo: AIR  1978-All-1

[29]   Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji: AIR 1961 All 73; Vikramadas vs. Daulat Ram (1956 S.C.R. 826). Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. L. Rs of Prem Dass:  2009 3 RCR(Civ) 133; Jaganath vs. Thirthananda, AIR 1952 Orrisa 312; Sri Ram vs. Chandeshwar Prasad, I.L.R. 31 Pat.417; Lalta Prasad vs. Brahmanand, AIR 1953 All. 449; Kanakulamada Nadar vs. Pichakannu Ariyar, AIR 1954 Trav.-Cochin 254; Sapta Koteshwar vs. R.V. Kuttur, A.I.R. 1956 Bom.615). Sapta Kotheshar vs. R.V. Kuttur (AIR 1956 Bom. 615, Murti Shivji Maharaj Birajman Asthal Mohalla Vs Mathura Das Chela Naval Das Bairagi 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591, See also Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 436.

[30]   Ramchand Vs. Janki Ballabhji Maharaj, AIR 1970 SC 532; Referred to in Thakurji Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247.

[31] Thakur Dwara Sahawman v. Jivan das, 108 IC 270; Girishchandra Saw v. Upendra Nath Giridas, AIR 1931 Cal 771, Abdur Rahim v. Mohd. Barkat Ali, AIR 1928 PC 16. Pashupathi Nath Seal v. Pradyumna Kumar, 63 Cal 454; Maruthi v. Gopal Kumar, AIR 1932 Bom 305; Kazi Hassan v. Sagun Bal Krishna, 24 Bom 170; Venkatarama Ayyanagar v. Kasturi Ranga Ayyanagar, AIR 1917 Mad 112: Kisan Bhagwan v. Sri Maroti Sansthan, AIR 1947 Nag 233.

[32] Panchkari v. Amode Lal, AIR 1937 Cal 559;

Sashi Kumar Devi v. Dhirendra Kishor Roy, AIR 1941 Cal 248.

[33]  2020-1 SCC 1.

[34]  2020-1 SCC 1.

[35]   AIR 1985 All 228

[36]   AIR 1966 Pat 235

[37]   AIR 1959 Manipur 42

[38]   AIR 1952 Pat. 438

[39] AIR 1947 Cal 213

[40]   AIR 1945 Cal 376

[41] AIR 1933 Cal 295

[42]   AIR 1929 All 887

[43]   AIR 1985 All 228

[44]   AIR 1967 SC 1044

[45]    AIR 1981 Cal 259.

[46] AIR 1967 SC 436

[47]  AIR 1960 Cal 741

[48]  AIR 1955 Cal 624

[49] AIR 1952 Pat 438;

[50] AIR 1942 Cal. 99

[51] AIR 1925 PC 139

[52]    AIR 1981 Cal 259.

[53] Relied on: Sarat Chandra Vs. Dwarkanath, AIR 1931 Cal 555; Smt. Sushma Roy Vs. Atul Krishna Roy, AIR 1955 Cal 624; Sri Iswar Jew Thakur Vs. Gopinath Das, AIR 1960 Cal 741; Pramatha nath Mallick Vs. Pradyumna Mallick,  AIR 1925 PC 139.

[54] AIR 1967 SC 1044

[55] 2018 8 ADJ 843; 2018 130 AllLR 591

[56]   Fifth Edition: Pages: 257, 265 & 271.

[57]   ILR 60 Cal 54: (AIR 1933 Cal 295)

[58]   37 Jnd App 147 (PC)

[59]   Quoted in Chamelibai Vallabhadas Vs. Ramchandrajee, AIR 1965 MP 1167

[60]   Quoted in Chamelibai Vallabhadas Vs. Ramchandrajee, AIR 1965 MP 167; Parshvanath Jain Temple Vs. L.Rs of Prem Dass: 2009-3-RCR(CIVIL) 133: 2008 TL Raj 1111



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society/Trust

Legal Personality of Temples, Gurudwaras, Churches and Mosques

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Part I

Legal Persons

‘Persons’ are of two kinds: human beings and legal persons. The second class is the institutions and associations of persons upon which the law incorporates or attributes legal personality. They are formed either on registration under a statute like Companies Act, or under a particular enactment such as English East India Company, Municipal Corporations, Life Insurance Corporation, Oil and Natural Gas Commission, etc. Apart from companies, corporations etc. our system accept idols in temples also as legal persons. 

Salmond reads:

  • “Legal persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system, however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations.”(Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., Page 305).

Though the legal personality of an unregistered association may not be a matter in dispute, the legal status of registered associations under Societies Registration Act remained as a potential question for quite long time. 


Part II

Idol as Representing “Pious Purpose” of Donor Is the Juristic Person

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, concluded the rationale of conferring legal personality to Idol as under:

  • “123. The recognition of the Hindu Idol as a legal or ‘juristic’ person is therefore based on two premises employed by courts. The first is to recognise the pious purpose of the testator as a legal entity capable of holding property in an ideal sense (absent the creation of a trust-sic). The second is the merging of the pious purpose itself and the Idol which embodies the pious purpose to ensure the fulfillment of the pious purpose. So conceived, the Hindu Idol is a legal person. The property endowed to the pious purpose is owned by the Idol as a legal person in an ideal sense. The reason why the court created such legal fictions was to provide a comprehensible legal framework to protect the properties dedicated to the pious purpose from external threats as well as internal maladministration. Where the pious purpose necessitated a public trust for the benefit of all devotees, conferring legal personality allowed courts to protect the pious purpose for the benefit of the devotees.”

Idol is the Embodiment of Pious Purpose

Relying mainly upon one of the oldest decisions in this subject, Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram (1887), ILR (1888) 12 Bom 247, our Apex Court held in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that juristic personality could not be conferred upon Ram Janmabhumi.  It is held as under:

  • “138. …The decision (Manohar Ganesh Tambekar  Vs.  Lakhmiram) clarifies that an Idol as a juridical person is the ‘ideal embodiment’ of a pious or benevolent idea. The status of a juristic person was conferred on the Idol as an entity which encompasses the purpose itself in which capacity the properties and offerings vest. The observations in this case affirm the position that juridical personality was conferred on the pious purpose and the property endowed or accumulated did not itself become a juristic entity. It is not the property endowed which is a juridical person – it is the Idol which as an embodiment of a pious purpose which is recognised as a juristic person, in whom the property stands vested.”

Intention of Founder stand Constant and Definite

A temple is founded on dedication of property and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.  (It stands contradistinct to the worship of Muslims in a mosque and of Christians in a church.)

Courts Recognises ‘Legal Personality’ to Idol to Give Effect to the Dedication

The Supreme Court observed in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case: 2020-1 SCC 1) that courts recognised the legal personality of the Hindu Idol to give effect to the dedication of the founder of the endowment. The ‘recognition of juristic personality’ was ‘devised by the courts to give legal effect to the Hindu practice of dedicating property for a religious or ‘pious’ purpose’. When the founder was not alive and the shebait was not the owner of the lands, the courts (and through them, the State) give effect to the original dedication conferring the legal personality to the idol. The legal personality of the idol, and the rights of the idol over the property endowed and the offerings of devotees, are guarded by the law to (a) protect the endowment against mal-administration by the human agencies entrusted with the day to day management of the idol,and (b) protect the interests of devotees. It was also found that legal rights entitled to by the idol was not dependent on the existence of an express trust.

Doctrine on ‘Merger’ – ‘Entity of the Idol’ Is Linked With ‘Pious Purpose’

It is pointed out in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that, as established in earlier decisions, neither God nor any supernatural being could be a person in law; and it is not correct that the idol or image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated. Juristic personality of an Idol stands connected to the ‘pious purpose’ of the founder. Therefore, to give a logical proposition as to the ‘juristic personality’ of idol, the ‘entity of the idol’ has to be linked with the ‘pious purpose’. 

It is obvious that the Court brings-forth the doctrine of “merger” based on the following well accepted jurisprudential notions:

  1. Legal entity of an idol is conceived only in an ideal sense.
  2. The idol is chosen as the centre for legal relations.
  3. Idol is the embodiment of the pious purpose of its founder.
  4. A material object that represents a ‘purpose’ can be a legal person.

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta (1969): AIR 1969 SC 1089:

  • “6. …It should however be remembered that the juristic person in the idol is not the material image, and it is an exploded theory that the image itself develops into a legal person as soon as it is consecrated and vivified by the Pran Pratishta ceremony. It is not also correct that the Supreme Being of which the idol is a symbol or image is the recipient and owner of the dedicated property.
  • …The correct legal position is that the idol as representing and embodying the spiritual purpose of the donor is the juristic person recognised by law and in this juristic person the dedicated property vests. As observed by Mr. Justice B.K. Mukherjea:
    • “With regard to the debutter… It is not only a compendious expression but a material embodiment of the pious purpose and though there is difficulty in holding that property can reside in the aim or purpose itself, it would be quite consistent with sound principles of Jurisprudence to say that a material object which represents or symbolises a particular purpose can be given the status of a legal person, and regarded as owner of the property which is dedicated to it. … The legal position is comparable in many respects to the development in Roman Law.”

Beneficiaries of Endowments Are Not Idols but Worshippers

The Supreme Court, in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya case: 2020-1 SCC 1), quoted the following from Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar (1957): AIR 1957 SC 133:  

  • “6. …The true purpose of a gift of properties to the idol is not to confer any benefit on God, but to acquire spiritual benefit by providing opportunities and facilities for those who desire to worship. In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha v Ram Lal Maitra (1910) it was held on a consideration of these and other texts that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a ‘sentient being‘, and that the dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment of the owner of his dominion over them for the purpose of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J at p. 138 that “the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected” and that “the dedication to a deity” may be “a compendious expression of the pious purpose for which the dedication is designed”.
  • 7. When once it is understood that the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof.”

Destruction of Idol Does Not Affect Legal Personality

Our Apex Court, explained in M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) further as under:  

  • “127. … In the case of Hindu idols, legal personality is not conferred on the idol simpliciter but on the underlying pious purpose of the continued worship of the deity as incarnated in the idol. Where the legal personality is conferred on the purpose of a deity’s continued worship, moving or destroying the idol does not affect its legal personality. The legal personality vests in the purpose of continued worship of the idol as recognised by the court. It is for the protection of the continued worship that the law recognises this purpose and seeks to protect it by the conferral of juristic personality.”

Part III

Sri Guru Granth Sahib – Accepted as a Juristic Person

Guru Granth Sahib revered in a Gurudwara, has been held to be a juristic person by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421. The Apex Court explained that it was not necessary to equate Guru Granth Sahib with an Idol, for declaring it to be a juristic person. When belief and faith of two religions are different, there is no question of equating one with the other. In this case the Apex Court held that Guru Granth Sahib possessed all the qualities to be recognised as a Juristic Person; and observed that holding otherwise would be giving ‘too restrictive a meaning to a ‘juristic person’ and that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it’.

In Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee it was observed further that ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ was the nucleus of any Gurudwara; and that  without ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ the Gurudwara was only a building, and that therefore, ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ could be regarded as a juristic person. One of the reasons based on which Guru Grandh Sahib was not treated as a juristic person by the High Court was that if Guru Grandh Sahib was regarded as a juristic person, every copy of the same should also be regarded as a juristic person. In this context the Apex Court observed that an Idol became a juristic person only when it was consecrated and installed in a public place for the public at large. In other words, the emphasis was on the ‘installation’ of ‘Guru Grandh Sahib’ for the benefit of the public at large.

It is held in Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Amritsar v. Shri Som Nath Dass (AIR 2000 SC 1421) as under:

  • “There may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may be for an idol, mosque, church etc.. Such endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a Hindu denoting any god is merely a mode through which his faith and belief is satisfied. This has led to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
  • In Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar & Ors, AIR 1957 SC 137, this Court held:
    • In Bhupati Nath Smrititirtha Vs. Ram Lal Maitra, ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a sentient being, and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the purpoe of their being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is designed. Vide also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p. 155. In Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V. Veeraraghavacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J. dealing with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and observed:
    • As explained in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are regarded as a public trust.
  • In Som Prakash Rekhi Vs. Union of India & Anr., 1981 (1) SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any entity other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. It was stated: Let us be clear that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the conception of personalityis one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal imagination. Corporations are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.
  • This Court in Yogendra Nath Naskar Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the consecrated idol in a Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in the following passage made in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247;
    • The Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it, recognises not only incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the Corporation apart from its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis supplied} Thus, a trust is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.
  • In fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the crucial point. In Pritam Dass Mahant Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 this Court held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
    • From the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the earlier part of the judgment. There may be other rooms of the institution meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
  • Tracing the ten Sikh gurus it records:
    • They were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib. This is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
    • xx xx
    • he holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After giving his followers a central place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book. So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity. Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from the Granth.”

The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “Thus, we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.”

Part IV

Mosque and Juristic Personality

Muslims worship the God Almighty. It is difficult to pin-point a tangible-nucleus or a core-element for a Mosque (as in the case of Gurugrantha Sahib in a Gurudwara or an Idol in a temple) so as to clinch the legal personality upon (See: Shriomani Gurudwara  Vs.   Shri Som Nath Dass: AIR 2000 SC 1421). 

For Muslims, worship in accordance with the tenets is important.  (It stands contradistinct to dedication and worship in a temple. A temple is founded on dedication of property, and consecration of an Idol to indwell and reign. These intends of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the worshippers or their ardency.)

In ‘Law of Endowments (Hindu and Mohammedan)’ by A. Ghosh Quoted in: Mahmood Hussain Vs. State Of UP:  2018-10 ADJ 249; 2018-128 All LR 71 with respect to ‘Mosque’as under:

  •  “A Mosque does not belong to any particular sect; for once it is built and consecrated, any reservation for people of a particular locality or sect is void, and persons not belonging to that locality or sect are entitled to worship in it, whether or not any particular sect had contributed towards the site or the building of the Mosque and had been saying their prayers in it and every person who believes in the unity of God and the mission of Mahammad as a prophet is a Mussalman, to whatever sect he may belong, and that the Shias satisfy the test; and that there is no such thing as a Sunni or a Shia Mosque though the majority of the worshippers at any particular Mosque may belong to one or other sect either generally or at various times.”

It is also added that in Mahomedan law there cannot be any private Mosque. When once a place is dedicated to be a Mosque, it becomes public property, it is property of God. But, it is pointed out that‘there can be right of exclusion in case of Mosques belonging to a particular sect’.

The Privy Council, in Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116, neither supported nor rejected the view that a mosque is a legal person, though it observed that ‘the argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions’. The Privy Council specifically held as under:

  • “A gift can be made to a madrasah in like manner as to a masjid. The right of suit by the Mutawali or other manager or by any  person entitled to a benefit (whether individually or as a member of the public or merely in common with certain other persons) seems hitherto to have been found sufficient for the purpose of maintaining Mahomedan endowments. At best the institution is but a caput mortum, and some human agency is always required to take delivery of property and to apply it to the intended purposes. Their Lordships, with all respect to the High Court of Lahore, must not be taken as deciding that a ‘juristic personality’ may be extended for any purpose to Muslim institutions generally or to mosques in particular. On this general question they reserve their opinion.”

Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1

In Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Som Nath Dass, AIR 2000 SC 1421, the Supreme Court had (earlier) observed that it was held in ,  AIR 1940 P C 116, that a mosque was a juristic person.

After analysing, in detail, the same decision , Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. It is observed as under:

  • 195. This distinction, which highlights the features of immovable property received articulation by the Privy Council in The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar. AIR 1940 PC 116. In that case, a mosque was dedicated in 1722 by one Falak Beg Khan. By the deed of dedication, Sheikh Din Mohammad and his descendants were appointed as Mutawallis. Since 1762, however, the building together with the court-yard, well and adjacent land, was in the occupation and possession of the Sikhs. The land adjacent to the mosque became the site of a Sikh shrine. At the time of the annexation by the British in 1849, the Sikhs were in possession of both the mosque and the adjacent lands.
  • 196. Thereafter, the building was demolished ‘by or with the connivance of its Sikh custodians’. A suit was instituted in 1935 against Shiromani Gurdawara Parbandhak Committee – who were in possession of the disputed property, seeking a declaration that the building was a mosque in which the plaintiffs and all the followers of Islam had a right to worship along with a mandatory injunction to reconstruct the building. One of the 18 plaintiffs was the mosque itself – the site and the building. The Privy Council assessed the contention that the mosque and the adjoining properties were a juristic person. Rejecting the contention, Justice George Rankin held:
    • “The argument that the land and buildings of a mosque are not property at all because they are a ‘juristic person’ involves a number of misconceptions. It is wholly inconsistent with many decisions whereby a worshipper or the mutwalli has been permitted to maintain a suit to recover the land and buildings for the purposes of the wakf by ejectment of a trespasser…
    • That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships… the procedure in India takes account necessarily of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognizes certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g. that an idol may be the owner of property…
    • The decisions recognising a mosque as a ‘juristic person’ appear to be confined to the Punjab : 153 PR 1884; Shankar Das v. Said Ahmad (1884) 153 PR 1884 59 PR 1914; Maula Bux v. Hafizuddin (1926) 13 AIR Lah 372: AIR 1926 Lah 372.
    • 6 In none of those cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none except perhaps the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of decision. But so far as they go these cases support the recognition as a fictitious person of a mosque as an institution – apparently hypostatizing an abstraction. This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed out, is very different from conferring personality upon a building so as to deprive it of its character as immovable property.” (Emphasis supplied)
  • 197. The Privy Council noted that if the mosque was a juristic person, this may mean that limitation does not apply to it and that ‘it is not property but an owner of property.’ Underlying the line of reasoning adopted by the Privy Council is that the conferral of legal personality on immovable property could lead to the property losing its character as immoveable property. “

In para 421 it is pointed out as under:

  • “421. In The Mosque, Masjid Shahid Ganj v Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar AIR 1940 PC 116, the Privy Council considered whether a mosque can be considered a juristic person and can be subject to adverse possession. Sir George Rankin observed:
    •  “That there should be any supposed analogy between the position in law of a building dedicated as a place of prayer for Muslims and the individual deities of the Hindu religion is a matter of some surprise to their Lordships. The question whether a British Indian Court will recognise a mosque as having a locus standi in judicio is a question of procedure. In British India the Courts do not follow the Mahomedan law in matters of procedure [cf. Jafri Begum v. Amir Muhammad Khan [I.L.R. 7 All. 822 at pp. 841, 842 (1885).], per Mahmood, J.] any more than they apply the Mahomedan criminal law of the ancient Mahomedan rules of evidence. At the same time the procedure of the Courts in applying Hindu or Mahomedan law has to be appropriate to the laws which they apply. Thus the procedure in India takes account, necessarily, of the polytheistic and other features of the Hindu religion and recognises certain doctrines of Hindu law as essential thereto, e.g., that an idol may be the owner of property. The procedure of our Courts allows for a suit in the name of an idol or deity though the right of suit is really in the sebait [Jagadindranath v. Hemmta Kumari [L.R. 31 I.A. 203: s.c. 8 C.W.N. 609 (1605).] ]. Very considerable difficulties attend these doctrines—in particular as regards the distinction, if any, proper to be made between the deity and the image [cf. Bhupati Nath v. Ram Lal [I.L.R. 37 Cal. 128, 153: s.c. 14 C.W.N. 18 (1910).] , Golapchandra Sarkar, Sastri’s ‘Hindu Law’,  7th Ed., pp. 865 et seq.]. But there has never been any doubt that the property of a Hindu religious endowment— including a thakurbari—is subject to the law of limitation [Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das [L.R. 37 I.A. 147 : s.c. 14 C.W.N. 889 (1810).] and Sri Sri Iswari Bhubaneshwari Thakurani v. Brojo Nath Dey [L.R. 64 I.A. 203 : s.c. 41 C.W.N. 968 (1937).] ]. From these considerations special to Hindu law no general licence can be derived for the invention of fictitious persons…” (Emphasis supplied).
  • It was concluded thus:
    • The property now in question having been possessed by Sikhs adversely to the waqf and to all interests thereunder for more than 12 years, the right of the mutawali to possession for the purposes of the waqf came to an end under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act and the title derived under the dedication from the settlor or wakif became extinct under sec. 28. The property was no longer, for any of the purposes of British Indian Courts, ―a property of God by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures…”

The Rajasthan High Court in Mohamed Shafindeen Vs. Chatur Bhaj (1958), 1958 Raj. LW 461 definitely held that mosque was not a juristic person. A similar view was taken by various High Courts including the Madras High Courtin Sunnath Jamath Mosque Committee, Puliampatti Vs. Land Administration Commissioner, 1998 (1) LW 69 (See also: Babu Vs. Khudial Qayum: 2013 0 ACJ 1614; 2013 8 ADJ 259; 2013 99 AllLR 123; 2013 2 ARC 839), and Gauhatti High Court in Sahida Khatun  Vs. Secretary, Tezpur Hindustani Muslim Panchayat, 2000 3 GauLJ 485; 2000 3 GauLT 152 .

Are Shebait, Mahant, Mutawalli etc. Trustees in ‘True Sense’?

It is trite law that dedicated property of a temple will be vested with the idol as the legal owner thereof, though such vesting is qualified to be in an ‘ideal or secondary sense’ (Bhupathi Nath v. Ramlal Maitra: ILR 37 Cal. 128) and the possession and management thereof will be with some human being identified as Shebait or Manager, though in the strict legal sense, they cannot be accepted as trustees.

In Wali Mohammed v. Rahmat Bee, (1999- 3 SCC 145), to the question whether the Mutawalli of a Wakf would be a trustee, our Apex Court observed as under:

  • “35. It will be seen that the main part of Sec. 10 (Limitation Act) states that no period of limitation applies for recovery of property from a trustee in whom the property is vested for a specific purpose, unless such a person is an assignee for valuable consideration. The Explanation further states that it shall be deemed that a person managing the property of a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment is to be deemed to be a trustee in whom such property has vested for a specific purpose. We shall explain these provisions in some detail.
  • 36. In Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] the Privy Council held that property comprised in a Hindu or Mohammedan religious or charitable endowment was not property vested in trust for a specific purpose within the meaning of the said words in the main section. The reason was that according to the customary law, where property was dedicated to a Hindu idol or mutt or to a Mohammedan wakf, the property vested in the idol or the institution or God, as the case may be, directly and that the shebait, mahant, mutawalli or other person who was in charge of the institution was simply a manager on behalf of the institution. As Sec. 10 did not apply unless these persons were trustees this judgment made recovery of properties of the above trusts from donees, from these managers, rather difficult.
  • 37. The legislature therefore intervened and amended Sec. 10 for the purpose of getting over the effect of the above judgment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill of 1929 makes this clear. It says: “The (Civil Justice) Committee’s recommendation refers, it is understood, to the decisions of the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Baluswami [AIR 1922 PC 123 : ILR 44 Mad 831] and Abdur Rahim v. Narayan Das Aurora [(1922) 50 IA 84] which lay down that a dharmakarta, mahant or manager of a Hindu religious property or the mutawalli or sajjadanashin in whom the management of Mohammedan religious endowment is vested, are not trustees within the meaning of the words as used in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, for the reason that the property does not vest in them. The result is that when a suit is brought against a person, not being an assignee for valuable consideration, endowments of this nature are not protected. The Committee’s recommendation is that Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act should be amended so as to put Hindu and Mohammedan religious endowments on the same footing as other trust funds which definitely vest in a trustee.” (Quoted in: Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482).

In Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs v. Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla, 2022-12 SCR 482, the Apex Court held that the Mutawalli is not a trustee in its true sense. The Supreme Court formulated a crucial question and answered it as under:

  • “127. Thus, the Mutawalli is treated as a trustee. But would the amendment made to Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make a Mutawalli a trustee generally?
  • Our answer is an emphatic No. This is for the reason that the change in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act was effected to overcome the judgment of the Privy Council, when it held that a Mutawalli would not be a trustee and when in view of the requirement in Sec. 10 that the suit must be one against a person in whom the property has become vested in trust for any specific purpose and as a Mutawalli would not be a trustee in law per se, the legislature brought in the explanation. But what is striking are two features. Firstly, the change is brought by way of an Explanation. More importantly, the explanation begins with words “For the purpose of this section  and proceeds to declare that “any property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment shall be deemed to be properly vested in trust for a specific purpose and the manager of the property shall be deemed to be the trustee thereof.”

Therefore, apart from it being an Explanation, it also on its very terms, limits the deeming fiction to the purpose sought to be attained in Sec. 10 of the Limitation Act.”


Part V

Legal personality of Churches

Halbury’s Laws of England,[1] gives the meaning of ‘Church’, as under:

  • “Church, when used in relation to a religious body, has two distinct meanings; it may mean either the aggregate of the individual members of the church or it may mean the quasi-corporate institution which carries on the religious work of the denomination whose name it bears.”

Blacks Law Dictionary defines church as under:

  • “Church. In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate His doctrines and ordinances. It may also mean a body of communicants gathered into church order; body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith andthe observance of the same ritual and ceremonies; place where persons regularly assemble for worship; congregation; organization for religious purposes; religious society or body; the clergy or officialdom of a religious body.”

In the New International Bible Dictionary, Church is defined as under:

  • “Church. The English word derives from the Greek Kuriakos (belonging to the Lord), but it stands for another Greek word ekklesia (where “ecclesiastical’), denoting an assembly. This is used in its general sense in Acts 19:32, but had already been applied in the LXX as an equivalent for the “congregation” of the OT Stephen’s speech makes this equation (Acts 7:38), and in this sense it is adopted to describe the new gathering or congregation of the disciples of Jesus Christ”.

Juristic Personality of churches: Why Law Hesitates?

The ‘church’ being essentially associated with believers, and it is possessed with an endowment (church-building), technically, it can be recognised as a legal person. Salmond has emphasised that the law may attribute legal personality to a group of individuals; or, if it pleases (i.e. if it stands well-accepted), regard an institution also, as a legal person. But, our legal system does not uniformly accept church as a legal person. Following the Privy Council decision, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar,[2]  the Supreme Court observed in M. Siddiq (Ayodhya Case) [3]  that a mosque is not a juristic person. The same principles apply to churches also. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

The following are the apparent reasons:

  • It is difficult to point out a tangible-nucleus[4] as Gurugrantha Sahib or Idol,for a church (building), to clinch the juristic personality upon. In this respect a church resembles Mosque. Christians also worship the invisible God Almighty.
  • As in the case of Muslims, for Christians also, worship is important, rather than the place where they worship. As pointed out earlier, juristic personality is conferred to the idol for its‘identity’on installation.The intentions of the founder stand constant and definite. It is not depended upon the ardency of the worshippers.
  • Christians join together in churches in accordance with the divine command:
    • “For where two or three are gathered together in my name, I am there in the midst of them” (Mathew 18: 20).
  • The Bible elsewhere (Acts 17: 24) expresses the point more emphatically, as under:
    • “God that made the world and all things therein, since he is the Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands”

Are Churches and Dioceses Juridic persons it being so accepted in Canon Law

As shown by Salmond[5] and explained by the Supreme Court in Shriomani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass,[6] the law may, if it pleases, regard a church, a hospital, a university or a library as a legal person.

In James Chinnamma v. Joseph Abraham, ILR 1962-1 Ker 591; 1962 KLT 240, referring ‘Civil Ecclesiastical Law’ by Jerome A. Saldanha, it was pointed out that the provisions of canon depicted the diocese and church as legal or moral persons; without recording a definite finding on this point it was held by the High Court that there was no “legal impediment” to treat the parish church as a legal person. It was held that it could claim to be an ‘agriculturist’, inasmuch as the church was capable of holding property (of course, acting through human agency). The judge considered the postulation whether the church could be a voluntary association. It also referred to the theory that the church was under the authority of a corporation-sole, either Vicar or Bishop. It was pointed out that so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church, the Diocesan Bishop alone would have the right in both the spiritual and the temporal matters in respect of the church and its property. (This decision is referred to in: Daisy AP  v. Bishop Dr.  Thomas Mar Koorilose, 2015-5 KHC 914; 2016-1 KLT 268).

In Seline Fernandez v. Bernard Francis, ILR 2013-1 Ker 56; 2012-4 KHC 427; 2012-4 KLT 283, it is held that on examining the Canon as a whole, what is discernible is that the temporal goods belonging to a parish which, by law, is a public juridic person do not belong to the diocese. It is observed in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan (2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51), also that a (parish) church is a legal person.

But, in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (Ayodhya Case – 2020-1 SCC 1) our apex Court held that Mosque is not a legal person. The Apex Court rejected the the contention that mosque was held to be a juristic person by the Privy Council in Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 P C 116. In the light of the Supreme Court decision on Mosque, legally it is difficult to support the the view that churches are juristic persons.

Law may, if it pleases‘ (i.e. if it stands well-accepted) being the basis for determining a body or entity as a legal person, it is definite that the dioceses can never be treated as a juridic persons even though the Canon declares so.

Even if a (parish) church can be taken as comparable to a temple or Gurudwara (temple and Gurudwara are accepted by our law as juristic persons), a Diocese can never be taken as a juristic person; especially in the light of our Apex Court decision, Illachi Devi v. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, which authoritatively held that even a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts (as detailed below).

As detailed in the notes below (under the heading – Juristic Personality in Canon), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it should not be assumed that the courts are bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law. In the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (AIR 1958 MP 362) M. Hidayatullah, J. observed as under:

  • “In matters of property there is always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination can make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.”

In the light of this decision it is illogical to go deep to search an authority to see whether the church or diocese is a legal person for it is so described in the Canon.

Churches are Usually Arrayed as Parties to Suits

Now, we see that our courts including the Supreme Court and High Courts make pronouncements with respect to matters of churches wherein they are arrayed as parties (represented by vicars, trustees etc.). But, when this matter is raised as a specific legal point, the opinion of courts are different.

As stated above, the Kerala High Court, in James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham[7], while considering a question whether a Catholic church can claim to be ‘an agriculturist’ under a Debt Relief Act, it was observed that there was no ‘legal impediment’ in treating the church as a person.

It is also noteworthy that after analysing, in detail, Masjid Shahid Ganj Vs. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1940 PC 116,  the Supreme Court affirmed in M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das (2020-1 SCC 1) that the Privy Council ‘rejected’ the contention that a mosque was a juristic person. (See notes above – Legal personality of Mosques – View taken in Ayodhya Case.)

Church: Voluntary Association

Congregation of a church is a voluntary association in the eye of law.[8] The properties are also really vested with the congregation subject to the Bylaws or Cannons.

A Division Bench of Madras High Court in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves[9] pointed out that the Roman Catholic Church was described as a voluntary association in the English cases.

Catholic Church differs from the Church of England which is described as ‘established church’. Relying on the cases, Long Vs. The Bishop of Cape Town[10] and Merriman Vs. Williams,[11]it was observed in Gaspari Louis Vs. Gonsalves that the members who joined the church were ‘bound by any rules which it had framed for its internal discipline and for the management of its affairs’.

The Supreme Court held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma[12] as under:

  • “A church is formed by the voluntary association of individuals. And the churches in the commonwealth are voluntary body organised on a consensual basis – their rights apart from statutes will be protected by the courts and their discipline enforced exactly as in the case of any other voluntary body whose existence is legally recognised. Therefore, all religious bodies are regarded by courts of law in the same position in respect of the protection of their rights and the sanction given to their respective organisations.”

ED Devadason in his book on Christian Law in India states as under:

  • “In regard to the Roman Catholic Church the Canon Law is to be recognised by the Courts of India as customary law binding on the members. However, since 1918 when the Canon Law was codified by the Vatican Council, the Canon Law cannot be regarded as customary law. Such a set of rules which lend themselves to change from time to time by the deliberations of a competent body cannot be classified as customary law. As the Canon Law can be changed by the Vatican, perhaps under recommendations of the curia or a General Council, there is a machinery which can effect the necessary changes in the Canon Law from time to time. Therefore, such a body of rules cannot any longer be treated as customary law. They can be recognised by the Courts in India only as the rules of voluntary associations binding on the members. They are like ‘Club Rules’. When a person becomes a member of a club, he not only subscribes to the existing rules and regulations but also agrees to accept the rules as they may be changed from time to time provided the procedure prescribed for changing them has been followed. As long as a person continues to be a member of a club he is bound by the rules of the club as they are amended from time to time. The rules are binding among the members interse and also between the members of the club. In fact the rules of the club are applicable as though each member has entered into an agreement between himself and the club by which he accepts the rules of the club as terms of the contract he has entered into to become a member of the club. Similarly in accepting membership in the Church a person binds himself with the rules and the regulations of the Church concerned as though he has entered into a contract with the Church binding himself with the rules and regulations of the Church on which conditions alone he has been admitted into membership of the Church.”[13]

Church: Impressed with Principles of Public Trust

Parish churches[14] and trusts created for the benefit of a Church[15]are public religious trusts. The parishioners or members are its beneficiaries. The parishioners have no right to take away the property on the basis of a majority decision or create a new system of administration. Our Apex Court, in KS Varghese v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church,[16] held that the properties of a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for thetime immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’.

The courts in India, from the early times, took the consistent view that the religious institutions, where people worship as of right in large number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’[17] and that the properties thereof vest in the institution.[18]

S. 92 CPC Applies to Churches

Courts have jurisdiction and duty[19] to administer and enforce public trusts.[20] Interest of public is paramount in any religious trust.[21]  It is held by Privy Council in Ram Dulari Dularey Vs. Ram Lal[22] that ‘court has a duty, once it finds that it is a trust for public purposes, to consider what is best in the interest of the public’. This ruling is applied in a Church Case by our Apex Court in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[23]

As in the case of English Law, Indian Law also accepts court as the ultimate protector of all charities.[24] It is the guardian of the public charitable trusts/ institutions.[25] In In-Re, Man Singh,[26] it is held that in legal theory the Court is the guardian of charity, as it is of an infant. Courts in India, from the early times, took the view that the religious institutions, the persons who worship there as of right are large in number, have the characteristics of ‘public trust’. Sec. 92 CPC expressly authorises designated courts to give directions for administration of trusts.

But, in Major Arch Bishop Vs. Lalan Tharakan[27] Kerala High Court held that the trust attached to Catholic (parish) church considered in that case was not a public trust to attract Sec. 92 CPC. It is observed that the properties of the (parish) church were vested with church authorities, and the (parish) church was a legal person. As shown above, our Apex Court, in Varghese  v. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church it is held that Parish churches and trusts created for the benefit of a Church are public religious trusts.

Vesting of Property – Congregational and Episcopal Churches

It is held in Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan v.  Moran Mar Marthoma.[28]

  • “A Church is either Episcopal or congregational. It cannot be Episcopal in spiritual matters and congregational in temporal matters. …. That is the fundamental difference in congregational and Episcopal. In the former it vests in the parishioners. But in the latter, in endowment. …. The right to manage such property vests in the trustees under the bye-law subject to the control by the Catholicos and Metropolitan in accordance with the Constitution.”

Canon Law and Catholic Church

Canon law refers to the law internal to the church.[29] In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[30]

The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its properties; and so long as the church retains the status of a Roman Catholic Church the diocesan Bishop alone would have the right, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, in respect of the church and its properties.[31] The rights in respect of the Roman Catholic churches and its property, in both the spiritual and the temporal matters, vest in the Diocesan Bishop alone.[32]

Madras High Court, in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan,[33] held as under:

  • “Therefore we hold that once the church in question was constructed and consecrated by Arch Bishop of Trichy Diocese, the church and its properties would vest in the Pope and the fourth respondent, Arch Bishop as a delegate of the Pope, is entitled to the spiritual and temporal powers over the church and its properties. As already observed, though the church was constructed with the funds mostly provided by the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village, when the church was consecrated according to the Roman Catholic rites, the church and its properties would vest in the fourth respondent.”

It is held further as under:

  • “Therefore, on the basis of the law, particularly, the law governing the church in question, we hold that the church and its properties vest only in the fourth respondent herein and it is open to him to exercise his power through his delegates, namely, respondents 2 and 3. It is true that it would be open to the fourth respondent to authorise Villagers to administer the secular affairs of the church, but the plaintiffs have not established that they were authorised by the fourth respondent to administer the secular affairs of the church and even if they were so authorised, they would exercise the power of administration as authorised agents of the fourth defendant and not de hors the authorisation. Equally, it would have been open to the Villagers to form a trust to retain the administrative control over the church and its properties at the time of consecration of church subject to the grant of consent by the fourth respondent for retaining such a control. ….. It is, no doubt, true that it is open to the plaintiffs to show that notwithstanding the provisions of the Canon Law, the temporal affairs of the church are being governed by the custom of the Roman Catholic public of Vakkampatti Village. If the custom is established, then, the Roman Catholic people of Vakkampatti Village can claim right over the church and its properties by way of custom.”

A Division Bench of Madras High Court, as early as in the year 1915, in Michel Pillai  Vs. Rt. Rev. Bartle[34] held as under:

  • “According to Canon Law a Roman Catholic Church becomes, as soon as it is consecrated, the property of the church authorities, irrespective of the fact that any particular worshipper or worshippers contributed to its construction.  The Bishop and other church authorities have the exclusive right to the internal management of the church, whether relating to secular or religious matters, such as accommodating the congregation inside the church and prescribing the part to be taken by the congregation in the services and the ceremonies.”

Roman Catholic Churches are governed under Canon Law.[35] The Canon Law postulates a detailed procedure for the administration of the Church and its property. In disputes relating to spiritual or temporal affairs of a Roman Catholic Church, the parties should be presumed to be governed by the general law relating to the administration of churches, namely the Canon Law.[36] But, it will not nullify the law of the land.

In State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School[37] it was observed that in matters of property there was always a secular angle which is supplied by the law of the country, and that no religious denomination could make a law about its own property and thus nullify the law of the land.[38]

In Molly Joseph Vs. George Sebastian[39] it is held by the Apex Court that the personal law (Canon Law) ‘cannot have any legal impact’ in view of the enacted law – Divore Act.[40]

Juristic Personality in Canon

The Catholic Community in India is governed[41] by either ‘Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches’ (CCEC) or ‘Code of Canon Law’ (CIC).The first one is applicable to Syro Malabar Rite and Syro Malankara Rite; and the second, to the Latin Rite.  The Canon Law recognises three categories of personalities; viz., the moral person, the physical person and the juridic person. The Catholic Church and the Apostolic See have the character of a moral person (Canon 113). By baptism an individual or physical person is incorporated into the Church of Christ (Canon 208-223). Both ‘parish’ and the ‘diocese’ are public juridic persons. Canon 1256 stipulates that,‘under the supreme authority of the Roman Pontiff’, ownership of goods ‘belongs to’ that juridic person which has acquired them legitimately.

As shown above, in the light of the principles laid down in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mother Superior, Convent School (supra), merely because Cannon law declares a church or a diocese as a legal person, it cannot be assumed that the courts that deal with the matters of those entities will be bound by the assertion. It is a jurisprudential issue reigned by the common law.

In CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan[42] it is pointed out that Can.1254 and 1257 make it clear that the Catholic Church has the inherent right, independently of any secular power to acquire, retain, administer and alienate temporal goods, in pursuit of its proper objectives, and all temporal goods would be regulated by the Canons as well as by their own statutes. Sub-clause (2) of Can.1257 provides that unless it is otherwise expressly provided, temporal goods belonging to a private juridical person are regulated by its own statutes, not by these Canons.

Fundamental Rights as to Religion & Administration of Trusts

Church Could Administer Property, Only in Conformity With Law

The secular aspect of the management of the property of a religious trust is to be carried out in accordance with the law of the land. The Supreme Court in Ratilal Panach and Gandhi Vs. State of Bombay: AIR 1954 SC 388: observed that a religious denomination was entitled to own and acquire property and administer the same; ‘but only in accordance with law’ and that the State could ‘regulate the administration of trust properties by means of laws validly enacted’. Also See: Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[43] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

Right of Parishioners to Sue against Third Parties

As per the Canon Law of the Catholic Church the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar.  But, in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[44]  it is found, the parish being by law a public juridic person, that the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were competent to represent the juridic person and that they were competent to initiate civil proceedings before a Civil Court with the ultimate aim of protecting the property belonging to the church.  It is further held that by reading the Canon as a whole, the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary for initiation of such proceedings.

Registration of Church as a Society or Trust

Parish church properties vest in trust. Majority of parishioners have no right to take away the same or create a new system of administration.[45]

The functioning of a Church or other religious trust under a written (registered or unregistered) or unwritten bylaws is recognised by the Constitution of India under various Articles including Ar. 19(1)(c), 25, 26, etc. And, in various States, there is no law at all – such as Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, Madhya Pradesh Public Trust Act, 1951 and Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 – that enables or requires registration of the Church or other religious trust, as a Trust. In such States, the registration of such an already existing Church, as a society, under the Societies Regn. Act for legal recognition, is inapt and uncalled for; because,

  • Every  member of such an existing Church has the Fundamental-Right, guaranteed by the Constitutional of India, to remain as a member of the Church even if he does not join, or refuses to join, the proposed society, as a member (assuming a society is formed officially by the church); and
  • The properties of such a Church will ‘remain in trust, as it has for the time immemorial, for the sake of the beneficiaries’ as held by our Apex Court in Varghese Vs. St. Peters and Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church.[46]

The registration of a Trust Deed or bye laws at a Sub Registry, under the Registration Act, is not ‘Registration of Trust’ as such.

Part VI

Registered Societies are NOT Juridical Persons

The enquiry as to the legal personality of an association of persons is essentially the enquiry whether it has the right of perpetuity in its own name, apart from its members. The basic tests to be applied for determining the same are the following:

  • (i)   Whether it can sue or be sued in its own name.
  • (ii)  Whether its property vests in itself.

Applying these tests authoritative decisions have definitively held that even the registered societies are also not juridical persons in law.

Unani Tibia College Case

The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had unequivocally held in the celebrated Unani Tibia College Case,Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic &Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458, that a registered society was not a corporation and that the provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 gave only certain privileges to a society registered under that Act. It is held that (i) the society, being unincorporated, is unable to sue or be sued in its own name and (ii) the phrase ‘property belonging to a society’in Sec. 5 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 did not give the society a corporate status as this phrase merely described the property which had been vested in trustees or governing body.It had been held by several High Courts earlier, giving undue importance to the expression ‘property belonging to a society’ in Sec. 5, that the registered societies possess juristic personality or status.

  • See also: Benares Hindu University Vs. Gauri Dutt Joshir AIR 1950 All 196. Also see: K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook: AIR 1970 Pat 163; Inder Chand Vs. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha: AIR 1977 Del 34.

Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society

The law on this point is further expounded by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society, AIR 2003 SC 3397, as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Regn. Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22)
  • iv) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

[1]      4th Edition

[2]      AIR 1940 PC116.

[3] M.  Siddiq (D) v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1.

[4]      ShriomaniGurudwara  v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[5]      Salmond on Jurisprudence: 12th  Edition, page 307.

[6]      ShriomaniGurudwaraPrabandhak Committee, Amritsar v.   ShriSomNathDass: AIR 2000 SC 1421.

[7]      1962 Ker LT 240.

[8] CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240; Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001; Christopher Karkada Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503, Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283; Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51.

[9]      35 Mad LJ 407; referred to in CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan: 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[10]    (1863) 1 Moo. P.C.(N.S.) 411

[11]    (1882) L.R.7 A.C.484

[12]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[13] Quoted in: Major Arcbishop, Angamaly Vs. PA LalanTharakan: 2016  AIR CC 2593; ILR 2016-4 Ker 51

[14] Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhas  Vs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.

[15] Christopher Karkada, Bangalore Vs. Church of South India: ILR 2012 Kar 725: 2012-1 KCCR 503

[16]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333. 

[17] Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790; CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333; Sony Markose Vs. OusephCherian: ILR 2018-4 Ker 1056; Vinodkumar M. Malavia Vs. MaganlalMangaldasGameti: 2013-15 SCC 394; Fr.John Jacob Vs Fr.  N. I.  Paulose: AIR 2014  Ker 95; GheevargheseKoshyVsChacko Thomas: AIR 1963 Ker 191.

[18]M.M. Kathanar Vs. K.E. Kathanar: AIR 1954 TC 51; Referred to in: ThakurjiShrijiLaxmanji VS Shyama Devi: 1970 0 WLN 473

[19]    AG Vs. Pearson: (1817) 3 Mer 353; Referred to in Varghese  Vs. St. Peters and St. Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[20]    C.K. Rajan Vs. GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee: AIR 1994 Ker 179 [Appeal Judgment: GuruvayoorDevaswom Managing Committee Vs. CK Rajan: AIR 2004 SC 561: (2003) 7 SCC 546]; Fakhuruddin Vs. Mohammad Rafiq: AIR  1916 All 115 (PC);  C  ChikkaVenkatappa Vs. D Hanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; Sridhar Vs. ShriJaganNath Temple, AIR 1976 SC 1860; YogendraNathNaskar   Vs. Commr. of Income Tax Calcutta: AIR 1969 SC 1089. ChHoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009 (19) Dlh 265;  I Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate:  AIR 2007 SC 1337; Sk. Abdul Kayum Vs. MullaAlibhai: AIR 1963 SC 309. See also: Mulla’s Hindu Law (11th Ed. Page 489) Dr. B.K. Mukherjea: Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts (Fifth Ed, Page 407 and 412).

[21]    RambakeshwarDevasthan Trust Vs. President PurohitSangh: AIR  2012 SC 139.

[22]    AIR1946 PC 34.

[23]    (2017) 15 SCC 333: Para 181. Ram DulariDulareyVs. Ram Lal : Referred to in NarasimhiahVs. Y H Venkataramanappa: AIR 1976 Kar 43.

[24]    C ChikkaVenkatappaVs.DHanumanthappa 1970 (1) Mys LJ 296; Narayan   Krishnaji  Vs.  Anjuman E Islamia:  AIR 1952 Kar 14; Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier: AIR 1968 SC 915.

[25]    Ch. Hoshiar Singh Mann Vs. Charan Singh ILR 2009-19 Dlh -265. See also Thenappa Chattier Vs. KuruppanChhietier AIR 1968 SC 915; I Nelson Vs. Kallayam  Pastorate  AIR 2007 SC 1337; SubramoniaPillaiChellamPillai Vs. SubramoniaPillai: AIR 1953 TC 198;  M.G. Narayanaswami Naidu Vs. M. Balasundaram Naidu: AIR 1953 Mad 750.

[26]AIR 1974 Del. 228

[27] 2016(2) Ker LT 791

[28]    AIR 1995 SC 2001.

[29]Most Rev. PMA Metropolitan Vs.  Moran Mar Marthoma: AIR 1995 SC 2001

[30] Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[31]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[32]    CS Robert Vs. M Kanagappan:2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254; James Chinnamma Vs.  Joseph Abraham: 1962 Ker LT 240.

[33]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[34]ILR 39 Mad. 1056. Quoted in 2003-2 Mad LJ 254

[35]    Major Arch Bishop Vs. LalanTharakan, 2016(2) Ker LT 791.

[36]    Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[37]AIR 1958 MP 362

[38]    See also: Rev. Fr. Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. State of Bombay: 1960-62 Bom LR 790 (Mudholkar& VM Tharkunde, JJ.); Gnanamuthu Udayar Vs. Anthoni: AIR  1960 Mad 430.

[39] AIR  1997 SC 109

[40] See also: Saly Joseph Vs. Baby Thomas: AIR 1999 Ker 66; Varkey Vs. Thresia: AIR  1955 Ker 255

[41]    See: Seline Fernandez Vs. Bernard Francis: ILR 2013-1 Ker 56

[42]2003-2 CTC 577; 2003-3 LW 818; 2003-2 MLJ 254

[43]    62 Bom LR 790

[44]    2013(4) Ker LT 283

[45]    Varghese Vs. St. Peters and  Pauls Syrian Orthodox Church: (2017) 15 SCC 333.

[46]    Para 184-xvii: (2017) 15 SCC 333.  Churches are public religious trusts: Rev. Fr. FarcisusMascarenhasVs. State of Bombay: 62 Bom LR 790.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land Laws

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Relevant Provisions of Kerala Land Reforms Act – on Purchase Certificate,  Plantation Exemption & Ceiling Area – in a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

CONTENTS

  • Part I — Chapters II & III, KLR Act – Outline
  • Part II — Chapter II – ‘Provisions Regarding Tenancies’
  • Part III —  Plantations
  • Part IV — Vesting of Land in Govt. & Right of Govt. to Collect Rent
  • Part V — Civil Court Jurisdiction : Decisions

PART I

CHAPTERS II & III, KLR Act – Outline

Objects of Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964

It is clear that the object of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964 is –

  • to distribute excess land among landless people by taking it from landlords/persons holding beyond the ceiling limits.
  • It is also to help cultivation process in a most economic manner as well to promote agricultural growth. Needless to say that land reforms imparted drastic changes to economic and social outlook of the country.
  • (Shircy, J. in One Earth One Life V. State of Kerala : 2019 2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019 1 KLT 985)

Chapter II.

Chapter II (Sections 3 to 80G) of the KLR Act speaks about ‘Provisions Regarding Tenancies’. It deals, among other things, with:

  • fixity‘ (to tenants),
  • vesting of property in Govt.,
  • purchase of landlord’s rights by cultivating tenants,
  • issuance of ‘certificate of purchase‘,
  • rights and liabilities of Kudikidappukars.

Sec. 3(1) says that nothing in Chapter II shall apply to:

  • leases-lands belonging to or vested in the Government, Leases-of private forests, tenancies in respect of plantations exceeding thirty acres in extent, etc.

Chapter III.

Chaptr III (Sections 81 to 98A) of the KLR Act deals with ‘Restriction on Ownership and Possession of Land in Excess of Ceiling Area and Disposal of Excess Lands’.

Among other things, it procures provisions as to:

  • ceiling limit,
  • exemptions from ceiling limit,
  • filing ceiling return,
  • determining extent to be surrendered,
  • surrender,
  • taking possession by TLB,
  • effect of conversion of exempted land.

Sec. 81(1) says that the provisions of Chapter III shall not apply to –

  • lands owned or held by the Government, private forests, plantations, etc.
  • Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that the following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
    • 1. Government-lease-lands
    • 2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
    • 3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
  • 2. The effect of Chapter III on Government-lease-lands and on the lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and 72 (vest in Government) is that the tenants (both Government’s tenants and the erstwhile Private landholders’ tenants) have to pay ‘rent‘ to the Government under Sec. 72F(h).
  • 3. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.
  • 4. Under Sec. 112 (5A) of the KLR Act, on acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
    Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.

PART II

Chapter II Provisions Regarding Tenancies

S. 3(1)(viii)

  • “3. Exemptions – (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to -…. ….
    • (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
      • “Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.

Sec. 2(44)(c)

  • agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk Land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.”

Analysis of PLANTATION-Exemption under S. 3(1)(viii)

Nutshell

  • If tenant raised plantation on bare land leased –
  • Such tenants are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
  • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
    • Fixity under Sec. 13,
    • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
  • Such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72 also.

Plantation Lands & Tenancy – General

  • ‘Fixity’ to tenants to plantations below 30 acres: Provisions of Chapter II of the KLR Act, that gives ‘fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations below 30 acres (plantation put-up by tenant or by landlord).
  • ‘Plantation-tenancy’ exceeding 30 acres exempted from Chapter II: ‘Plantation-tenancy’ lands (That is, plantation put-up by land-lord; or, Plantation existed when land was leased) exceeding 30 acres are also exempted from Chapter II KLR Act. Therefore, provisions in the Lease deeds applicable, applies to termination of tenancy.
  • Landlord cannot recover ‘plantation lands’ above 30 acre: Landlord cannot recover possession of ‘plantation lands’ (where Tenant made plantation on bare land leased) above 30 acre from the tenant; because it falls under Chapter II that gives protection to tenant (Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.).
  • ‘Fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations exceeding 30 acres: Provisions of Chapter II, that gives ‘fixity’ to tenants will apply to all plantations exceeding 30 acres (if the plantation is put-up by tenant).
  • Government Lands exempted from Chapter II : Government Lands, are also exempted from Chapter II KLR Act (Chapter II grants Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.). Therefore, provisions in the Grant or Lease deeds applicable, applies to termination of grant/tenancy.
  • Landlord can recover ‘plantation-tenancy-lands’ above 30 acres: Landlord can recover possession of ‘plantation-tenancy-lands’ (plantation put-up by land-lord) above 30 acres, from the tenant, on the strength of lease deed; because it is exempted under Chapter II that gives protection to tenant (Fixity, Purchase- Certificate etc.).
  • Plantation (tenancy) lands vest in Govt: All such Plantation (tenancy) lands (put-up by tenant or by landlord) vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.
  • ‘Ceiling Limit’, not apply to Government Lands (not lease lands): Provisions of Chapter III of the KLR Act that says as to ‘Ceiling Limit’, its ‘Exemption’ etc. do not apply to (i) Government Lands (not Govt.-lease lands), (ii) plantations etc.

S. 3(1)(viii) deals with exemption of ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ (plantation, developed by the landlord), above 30 acres.

To exclude a plantation (from the benefits under Chapter II offered to Tenants) under S. 3(1)(viii), it should have been a plantation when it was leased;

  • that is, such land, above 30 acres, must have been developed as plantation by the landlord.
  • S. 3(1)(viii), exempt from Chapter II –
    • plantation-tenancy (plantation developed by the landlord) above 30 acres.
  • That is, if tenant has raised plantation on bare land leased, it is not excluded (from the benefits under Chapter II offered to Tenants) by the Exemption under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • That is, such tenants (who put up a plantation on the bare land) have the rights and benefits provided under Chapter II, such as
      • fixity under Sec. 13 and
      • vesting in the Government under Sec. 72 (Can get purchase certificate under Sec. 72B/72C within the ceiling limit.)
      • Note: There will be no benefit for it is a plantation. Because no rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, ‘exempting plantation’ property so that a purchase certificate can be obtained beyond the ceiling limit.

S. 3(1)(viii) provides benefit (fixity under Sec. 13) to

  • plantation-tenancy below 30 acres (because what is exempted from benefits of fixity is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres).
  • See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613; Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439 .
  • Therefore:
    • Contract applies to termination of tenancy, above 30 acre plantation–tenancy (land must have been a plantation when it was leased).
    • Land lord is entitled Sec. 81 exemption over such plantation.

Analysis of S. 3(1)(viii) Proviso

Proviso speaks about “agricultural lands interspersed within the plantation”. In Poddar Plantations Limited v.  Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014-1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013-4 KLJ 781; 2014-1 KLT 439, it is held:

  • “Section 2(44) (c) cannot be read in isolation of Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act. Reading the two provisions together, what can be discerned is only that if the tenant is entitled to fixity over the plantation (not being in excess of 30 acres), then, the land referred to in Sec. 2 (44)(c) of the KLR Act should also be counted and the tenant shall not be evicted from that land though he is not entitled to fixity over such land. This view is supported by the decisions in State of Kerala v. Amalgamated Tea Estates Co. (1980 KLT 728) and State of Kerala v. Hope Plantations Ltd. (1985 KLT SN 4 (Case No.6). If such an interpretation is not given, the result will be anomalous in that even if a person is liable to be evicted from the plantation, he can cling on to the land referred to in Sec.2(44)(c) of the KLR Act though not entitled to fixity. The intention of the Legislature was only to avoid eviction of the tenant from the land coming under Sec.2(44)(c) which is necessary for the proper management of area of plantation over which he is entitled to fixity.”

Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x)

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  •  “75. … Apart from that, in the light of Section 27 of the Travancore Cochin Hindu Religious Institutions Act and in the light of the settlement register and land register, the property is described as Temple puramboke and not Government puramboke. Further Government lands are covered by the exemption u/s 3(1)(x) of the Land Reforms Act and therefore he cannot claim any fixity of tenure. There is no claim by the Government here to the property.”

Fixity, Vesting in Govt. and Purchase Certificate:

  • Sec. 13 says every tenant has fixity. But, holdings held by cultivating tenants alone will vest in Govt., under Section 72(1).
  • Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of leasehold properties held by ‘cultivating tenants’ in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
  • Sec. 72 K provides that LT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.

Assignment of Purchase certificate

  • Sec. 72B provides for obtaining Purchase Certificate if applied within the period stipulated. Sec. 72C provides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit,)

The tenant who opts to avail benefits of plantation-exemption, under Sec. 81, cannot seek fragmentation (Sec. 87, Explanation II) of the plantation land so as to obtain purchase-certificate (under Sec. 72B or 72C) within ceiling limit. Still, he stands as a cultivating tenant, “entitled to assignment” of the right under Sec. 72B. As shown elsewhere, there is an option for the tenant – either to obtain purchase-certificate or to avail plantation-exemption. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)

  • Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 

Provisions as to Fixity, Purchase Certificate,  Ceiling Area, etc.

  1. Tenant & Fixity
    • Section 13(1) reads as under:
    • 13. Right of tenants to fixity of tenure.  (1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in any law, custom, usage or contract or in any decree or order of court, every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding, and no land from the holding shall be Limited except as provided in Sections 14 to 22.”
    • Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:
    • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “
  2. Cultivating Tenant & Vesting of land in Government
    • Section 72(1) reads:
    • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”
    • It provides (automatic) vesting of leasehold properties in Govt. Conditions thereof are:
      • (i) the land must be held by cultivating tenants;
      • (ii) they should be entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13.
    • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
    • cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”
  3. Issue of Purchase Certificate
    • Section 72B(1), 72C and 72K(1) & (2) read as under:
    • 72B.  Cultivating  tenant’s  right  to  assignment.  ­  (1)  The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest:
    • Provided that ­
    • (a) no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of any holding or part of a holding under this Section if he, or if he is a member of a family, such family, owns an extent of land not less than­ the ceiling area.
    • (b) where the cultivating tenant or, if he is a member of a family, such family, does not own any land or owns an extent of land which is less than the ceiling area, he shall be entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only such extent of land as will, together with the land, if any, owned by him or his family, as the case may be, be equal to the ceiling area.
    • Explanation. ­ In calculating the extent of land owned by the cultivating tenant or, where he is a member of a family, by such family, for the purposes of clauses (a) and (b) of the foregoing proviso, the portion of the land owned by such cultivating tenant or by the family, which is liable to be assigned to the cultivating tenants holding under him or such family, shall not be taken into account.
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub­section (1);
    • Provided that if no date has been notified under Section 83, the date notified under Section 72 shall be deemed to be the date notified under Section 83.
    • (3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.
    • (4) An application under Sub­section (3) shall contain the following particulars, namely:­
    • (a) the village, survey number and extent of the holding or part to which the assignment relates.
    • (b) the name and address of the landowner and intermediaries and also of every other person interested in the land and the nature of their interest so far as they are known to him;
    • (c) the particulars regarding the other lands owned or held by him or if he is a member of a family; by such family; and
    • (d) such other particulars as may be prescribed.
    • (5) Where a cultivating tenant is entitled to the assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of only a portion of the holding held by him, he may indicate in the application under Sub­section
    • (3) his choice of the portion to which the assignment shall relate.
    • 72C. Assignment where application is not made by cultivating tenantNotwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3) of Section 72B [or Section 72BB], the Land tribunal may, subject to such rules as may be made by the Government in this behalf, at any time after the vesting of the right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in tile Government under Section 72, assign such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenants entitled thereto, and the cultivating tenants shall be bound to accept such assignment.”
    • “72K. Issue of certificate of purchase. – (1) As soon as may be after the determination of the purchase price under Section 72F [or the passing of an order under Sub-section (3) of Section 72MM] the Land Tribunal shall issue a certificate of purchase to the cultivating tenant, and thereupon the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of the holding or part thereof to which the certificate relates, shall vest in the cultivating tenant free from all encumbrances created by the landowner or the intermediaries, if any.
    • (2) The certificate of purchase issued under Sub-section (1) shall be conclusive proof of the assignment to the tenant of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, over the holding or portion thereof to which the assignment relates.”
    • Note: Sec. 72F speaks as to ‘Land Tribunal to issue notices and determine the compensation and purchase price; and Sec. 72MM provides for jointly applying, by the cultivating tenant, the landowner, the intermediary, the holders of encumbrances, etc, to the Land Tribunal, for an order for ‘assignment by mutual agreement’ to the cultivating tenant.

Prohibition of future tenancies.

  • Sec. 74 provides for Prohibition of future tenancies.

In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found –

  • There should be permission (for the tenant) to use and occupation of the land by a competent person.
  • The definition of ‘tenant’ will also show that there should be an agreement to pay rent or other consideration for being allowed to “possess and to enjoy the land”, with a person who is “entitled to lease the land.”  Without interest being created in the land, nobody can claim to be a cultivating tenant.
  • If there is no demise of the land in favour of one, if at all any tenancy right can be created, the same can be done by the Devaswom Board only by appropriate proceedings
  • If no right to cultivate and raise produce of land given; but, right to take usufructs alone granted; or a mere licence, it will not mature into a tenancy.
  • Kuthakapattom licence cannot mature into a tenancy.
  • Use of word “rent” in receipt will not be conclusive to show existence of tenancy agreement,
  • Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.
  • Misfeasance or non-feasance of trustee cannot affect trust itself.
  • Court can interfere even if some years have passed and there was inaction on the part of Devaswom Board for certain period.

Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

  • On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT: Sec. 55
  • On VESTING under Sec. 72:  Sec. 72A
  • Surrendering SURPLUS LAND: Sec. 88

Compensation On Assignment to CULTIVATING TENANT

  • Sec. 53 – Cultivating tenant’s right to purchase landlord’s rights.

Sec. 55Purchase price to land owner

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees.

Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 72D(2).

  • Sec. 59 – Deposit purchase price by cultivating tenant before Land Tribunal.  Purchase Certificate is conclusive proof.
  • Sec. 64– Payment of purchase price to land owner – full discharge (from the part of land owner)

Sec. 72ACompensation to land owner for vesting under Sec. 72 in Govt. – No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.

It is 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees. Note: Same rate under Sec. 55 & 72D(2) Land above ceiling limit payment is only under Sec. 88 – on surrendering land. (It is paid by Govt.)

  • Sec. 72D – Cultivating tenant to pay purchase price (for getting assignment).
  • Sec. 72D(1A)- No purchase price is land below One Hect.
  • Sec. 72D(2)  – Purchase price to Govt. – 16 times fare rent for land plus value of structures of land owner plus half value of timber trees) Note: Same rate under Sec. 72A & 55

Surrundering SURPLUS LAND: Land Owners’s Right for Compensation

Relevant provisions are Sec. 82, 83, 85 & 88 of the KLR Act.

  • Sec. 82 – Ceiling area is fixed (for an adult unmarried person – 5 standard acres; family of 2 or more persons – 10 standard acres; more than 5 persons – 10 standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member).
  • Sec. 83 – No person to own or hold land in excess of ceiling area.
  • Sec. 85(1): Surrender excess lands. 
  • Sec. 85 (2) File a Statement before the Land Board including lands exempted under Sec. 81 indicating the land proposed to be surrendered.
  • Sec. 85 (3) Special duty on tenant – Final settlement of claims under Sec. 72(4). (Right, title and interest of the land owner vest in Govt.  But claims for resumption can be filed within six months.)   After purchasing the land under Sec. 72B or 72C by the cultivating tenant, excess with the tenant shall be surrendered. 
  • Sec. 88Persons surrendering land entitled compensation. No right remains with (erstwhile owner) thereafter.
    • Compensation is calculated at the rates specified in Schedule IV. Note: Maximum compensation is Rs. 2 Lakh.(Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the tenancy-right.  If there is dispute on title/tenancy, LT has to go into the question of possession and tenancy – Ganapathy Acharya  v. Bhaskaran,  TLV Aiyer, J., 1993(2) KLT 962.)
    • Note: When Land Board  fixes land as exempted plantation-land there is implied declaration as regards excess land and implied surrender by land owner to Govt.
    • If it is a lease-land there is implied surrender in favour of  Govt. and also to the tenant.

Sec. 127 – Act to override other loss. (It overrides Land Acquisition Acts.)

PART III Plantations

Chapter III

Excess, Ceiling Return, Surrender, Exemption Etc.

Section 81:

S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Effect of S. 81 on plantations on Government-lease-lands

  • Section 81(1) creates exemptions from Chapter III (ceiling provisions). Section 81(1)—that grants exemption to the ceiling limit—is not made applicable (“shall not apply”) to Government lands.
  • The Proviso to s. 81(1) says as under: 
    • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”
  • Section 81(1), by itself, stands as a bar to availing the benefits (on ceiling exemption) to plantations in Government lands. But, the “exemption” in the Proviso makes it clearthe bar in Section 81(1) “does not apply” (to the tenants on) the lease-lands owned by the Government. Therefore, the benefits of ‘plantation-exemption’ apply to the Government-owned-lease-lands.

Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1)The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
  • (a) lands owned or held by the Government of Kerala or
  • the Government of any other State in India or
  • the Government of India or
  • a local authority [or the Cochin Port Trust] [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] 
  • or any other authority which the Government may, in public interest, exempt, by notification in the Gazette, from the provisions of this Chapter.
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.] [Inserted by Act 17 of 1972.]
  • [Explanation I. [Numbered as Explanation I by Act 35 of 1969.] – “Lands owned by the Government of Kerala” shall, for the purposes of this clause, have the same meaning as “Government Lands” under Sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960; [but lands escheated to the Government and held by tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 shall not be deemed to be lands owned by the Government of Kerala.]]
  • [Explanation II. [Inserted by Act 35 of 1969.] – Lands, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Sub-section (9) of Section 66 or Section 72, shall not be deemed to be “lands owned by the Government of Kerala” for the purposes of this clause;]
  • [Explanation III. [Inserted by Act 25 of 1971.] – For the purposes of this clause, “other authority”, shall include a corporation owned or controlled by the Government of Kerala or the Government of any other State in India or the Government of India;]
  • (b) lands taken under the management of the Court of Wards:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (c) lands comprised in mills, factories or workshops and which are necessary for the use of such mills, factories or workshops;
  • (d) private forests;
  • (e) plantations;
  • (f)[ cashew estate [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.]
  • Explanation. – For the purpose of this clause “cashew estate” shall mean dry land principally cultivated with not less than 150 cashew trees per hectare.]
  • (g)[***] [Omitted by Act 35 of 1969.]
  • (h) lands mortgaged to the Government, or to a co-operative society (including a co-operative land mortgage bank) registered or deemed to be registered under the Co-operative Societies Act for the time being in force, or to the Kerala Financial Corporation, or to the Kerala Industrial Development Corporation or to the State Small Industries Corporation, as security for any loan advanced by the Government or by such Society or Corporation, so long as the mortgage subsists:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply at the end of three years from the commencement of this Act;
  • (i)lands purchased by the Kerala Co-operative Central Land Mortgage Bank or a Primary Mortgage Bank under Sec Lion 18 of the Kerala State Co-operative Land Mortgage Banks Act, 1960, or by the Kerala State Co-operative Bank Ltd., or by a primary agricultural credit co- operative society or by a scheduled bank as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 so long as such lands continue in the possession of the bank;
  • (j)lands purchased by the Kerala Financial Corporation or lands the management of which has been taken over by that Corporation, under Section 32 of the State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, so long as such lands remain in the ownership, or continue under the management, as the case may be, of the said Corporation:
  • [Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply in the case of lands the management of which has been taken over by the Corporation on or after the 1st day of April, 1964;] [Added by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (k)lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking:
  • Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply if such land is not actually used for the purpose for which it has been set apart, within such time as the District Collector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify in that behalf;
  • (l)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (m)[ house sites, that is to say, sites occupied by dwelling houses and lands, wells, tanks and other structures necessary for the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling houses.] [Substituted by Act No. 17 of 1972.]
  • Explanation. – For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that a compound wall shall not he deemed to he a structure necessary for the convenient enjoyment of a dwelling house, if the land on which the dwelling house is situated and enclosed by the compound waif is more than the (and necessary (or the convenient enjoyment of the dwelling house.
  • (n)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (o)sites of temples, churches, mosques and cemeteries and burial and burning grounds:
  • (p)sites of buildings including warehouses;
  • (q)commercial sites;
  • (r)land occupied by educational institutions including land necessary for the convenient use of the institutions and playgrounds attached to such institutions;
  • (s)lands vested in the Bhoodan Yagna Committee;
  • (t)lands owned or held by -(i)a University established by law; or(i)the entire income of such lands is appropriated for the University, institution or trust concerned; and(ii)where the University, institution or trust comes to hold the said lands after the commencement of this Act, the Government have certified previously that such lands are bona fide required for the purposes of the University, institution or trust, as the case may be; and(u)lands granted to defence personnel for gallantry.(ii)a religious, charitable or educational institution of a public nature; or(iii)a public trust which expression shall include a wakf;
  • Provided that-
  • (2)[***] [Omitted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (3)[ The Government may if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest -(a)on account of any special use to which any land is put; or(b)on account of any land being bonafide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose:
  • Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is intended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and, where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to he in force.] [Substituted by Act No. 35 of 1969.]
  • (4)[ Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force of in any contract or other documents or in any judgement, decree or order of any Court or Tribunal or Taluk Land Board or Land Board or other authority, a person holding plantation and lands ancillary thereto or interspersed within such plantation, [may, subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be prescribed, use] [Inserted by Act No. 6 of 2012.] not exceeding five per cent of the extent of such holding for floriculture or for the cultivation of Vanila or medicinal plants or other [agricultural crops or for conducting dairy farms] [Substituted ‘agricultural crops’ by Act No. 6 of 2015.] or for establishing hotels or resorts or other tourism projects and for purposes ancillary or connected therewith.]

Section 82 & 83:

S. 82 & 83 deal with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed. Sec. 82 reads as under:

  • 82. Ceiling area. – [(1) The ceiling area of land shall be,
  • (a) in the case of an adult unmarried person or a family consisting of a sole surviving member, five standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall riot be less than six and more than seven arid a half acre in extent;
  • (b) in the case of a family consisting of two or more, but not more than five members, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling area shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.
  • (c) in the case of a family consisting of more than five members, ten standard acres increased by one standard acre for each member M excess of five, so however that the ceiling area shall not he less than twelve and more than twenty acres in extent; and
  • (d) in the case of any other person, other than a joint family, ten standard acres, so however that the ceiling are shall not be less than twelve and more than fifteen acres in extent.]

Section 83

Sec. 83 reads as under:

  • “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”

Section 85(1) reads as under:

  • 85. Surrender of excess land. (1) Where a person owns or holds land excess of the ceiling area on the date notified under Section 83, such excess land shall be surrendered as hereinafter provided: …. ….”

Section 2 (3) defines ceiling area as under:

  • Ceiling area” means the extent of land specified in section 82 as the ceiling area”.

Plantation: Definition

  • “S.2.(44)” plantation” means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘plantation crops’) and includes.-
    • (a) land used by the said person for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of plantation crops or for the preparation of the same for the market;
    • [(b) xxxx]
    • (c) agricultural lands interspersed within the boundaries of the area cultivated by the said person with plantation crops, not exceeding such extent as may be determined by the Land Board [or the Taluk land Board, as the case may be] as necessary for the protection and efficient management of such cultivation.
  • Explanation:- Lands used for the construction of office buildings, godowns, factories quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and play grounds shall be deemed to be lands used for the purposes of sub-clause (a).

Relevant Provisions: Excess, Ceiling Return, Surrender, Exemption Etc.

  • Sec. 85 (1) provides for Surrender excess.
  • Sec. 85 (2) provides – Owners and Tenants of plantation (who owns and hold properties) should furnish statement (ceiling return) to Land Board before March 31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
  • Sec. 85 (3) provides – Excess shall be surrendered.
  • Sec. 85 (5) provides – LAND BOARD shall DETERMINEextend to be surrendered
  • Sec. 85 (7) provides – Whereon a person fails to file statement (ceiling return) under 85(2), LAND BOARD shall intimate Taluk Land Board (TLB), TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
    • “The statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit and if such a person fails to file the statement in accordance with law, the Board is enjoined to proceed against such person.” State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
    • [TLB not to do, suo motu, without direction from LB. State Of Kerala Vs Idiculla, 1980 KLT 120, referred to Shircy, J. in One Earth One Live Vs. State of Kerala, 2019(1) KLT 985.]
    • The effect of not filing ceiling return can be equated to ‘not applying for assignment’ of purchase certificate, See: Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283.
  • Sec. 85A provides – File ceiling return/statement within March  2, 1973 before Land Board.
  • Sec. 86(1) provides – On determination of the extent to be surrendered (by LB) under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • Sec. 86(3) provides – Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession.
  • Sec. 86(4) provides – Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
  • Sec. 86(6) provides – Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
  • Sec. 87 Exp. II  provides – If CONVERTED TO ANY OTHER CLASS and the person (who gets the property) owns excess of ceiling area – the excess shall be deemed to be land acquired (and fall under Sec. 87) .
  • Sec. 87(1A) provides – Person referred to above (transferee) also should file statement (Return).
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Analysis of S. 81, 82 and 83

CHAPTER III of the KLR Act deals with Ceiling Area and Excess Lands.

Sec. 81 provides for ‘Exemptions’ (See: Sec. 81 in the End Notes). Sec. 81 reads as under:

  • Exemptions: (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to –
    • (a) lands owned or held by the Government ….
    • …. …..
    • (e) plantations;
    • …………

But, Exemption apply to lease-lands (with lessees) owned by the Government.

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

Plantation: Under Sec. 2, clause (44), plantation means any land used by a person principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon.

Ceiling area 

  • Sec. 82 provides for ceiling.
  • Sec. 83 provides – No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  
  • It is a total bar. 
    • Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB),
    • The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137) – quoted in 2008(1) KLJ 571 (State Vs. Puliyangattu). Followed in State vs Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16; Bhikoba S. Vs. ML Punchand Tathed, AIR 1982 (SC) 865.

Does Exemption of Plantation Cover Exemption of ‘Plantation LAND‘?

No.

It is for the following reasons –

  • 1. The exemption is to the ‘plantation‘, and not to the ‘LAND‘.
  • 2. Exemption is conditional – for it exists (only) as long as the plantation exists or continues;
  • Because,
    • S. 2(44) defines ‘plantation’ as land used principally for the cultivation of a specific ‘plantation crop‘ like tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber etc.
    • Section 87, Explanation II states that if a plantation for which exemption is given on recognition of a specific ‘plantation-crop’ is converted into any other ‘plantation-crop’ or the plantation activity is not continued, the exemption may be lost; and the land will be taken for considering the ceiling limit.

Explanation II of Sec. 87 reads as under:

  • “Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.”

Purport of Sec. 87 and the Explanations in S.87(1)

Section 87 reflects the legislative intention in protecting plantations. The protection is on economic grounds. That is, certain crops and cultivations that made the land of Kerala renowned from ancient times were to be protected. Section 87 and the Explanations are to be read and interpreted in the light of their intentions. The Kerala High Court aptly appreciated these provisions in this background in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

In State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur v. State of Kerala, 2009(3)KLJ 110, it is held as under:

  • “19.There is no restriction on alienation of lands exempted under Section 81 (1)(a) of the Land Reforms Act ,since such lands are exempted from the operation of Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act dealing with ceiling on holding. It is not the excess land that is alienated but the exempted land………”

It was further held in para 21-  

  • ”……Any exemption from ceiling provision under the Kerala Land Reforms Act has a purpose and the purpose in the present case is public interest and that public interest is the use of land for industrial purpose. Since under the Kerala Land Reforms Act there is no restriction on alienation of the exempted category of lands and since the transferee is subjected to the acid test of eligibility and entitlement for exemption in terms of use of the land, the transfer made by the HMT will also be subjected to the same test, namely use of the transferred land for industrial purpose. In other words, HMT is legally entitled to transfer 100 acres of land notified under Ext.R1(i) notification, but the transferee will have to use that land for industrial purpose and that purpose only. Therefore, the transfer is not vitiated in any way; but the transferee will have to use the land only for industrial purpose. That is a covenant on the land.” (Quoted in: One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985)

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, District Collectorate, Kannur (Anil K. Narendran, J.), 2020-6 KHC 289, it is held as under:

  • “Therefore, Ext.P13 prohibitory order issued by the 1st respondent District Collector, during the pendency of suo motu proceedings under Section 87 of the Act, cannot be said to be one issued without reasonable grounds to believe that any document relating to transfer of land of the land owned by the petitioner, which may be presented before the 3rd respondent registering officer, is intended to defeat the provisions of the said Act. The said order warrants no interference in this writ petition, invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

For Plantation Exemption, Tenant must have Approached LT

As shown above –

If the tenant had raised a plantation on bare land leased –

  • Such plantations are not excluded (from Chapter II) by the ‘Exemption’ clause under S. 3(1)(viii).
    • Therefore, tenants of such tenancy-land are entitled for benefits under Chapter II such as
      • Fixity under Sec. 13,
      • purchase certificate within ceiling limit etc.
    • Though the tenant has fixity, he is not the owner of such (entire) land. Because such lands vest in Govt. under Sec. 72. And, a purchase certificate cannot be obtained for the extent above the ceiling limit.

Land Tribunal is the only authority to determine “lease”

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.
  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

That is, for getting the Exemption under Chapter III, the tenant must have approached the Land Tribunal for getting the tenancy ‘declared’.

  • Note: Under the Scheme of the KLR Act, the Land Tribunal is the only authority to determine “lease”. Even the Civil Court has to send the matter to LT for determing ‘tenancy’. (Mathevan Padmanabhan @ Ponnan v. Parmeshwaran Thampi, 1995 SCC (SUPP) 1-479).

Sec. 73B(3) of the KLR Act reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

It is definite: the principle applied in the Balanoor case (that it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant to apply to the Land Tribunal) is the following –

  • It is for adjudicating the ‘tenancy right’.
  • The reason is that the Land Tribunal is the only authority that can decide on the “tenancy right.”
  • Under Sec. 72A, the Landlord is entitled to Compensation and under Sec. 72D a tenant is bound to pay the Purchase Price. The Scheme of the KLR Act requires that there should be proceedings under Sec. 72 B or 72C.
  • Suo Motu proceedings may not be taken by the Government in favour of a Plantation Tenant (entitled to purchase certificate within the ceiling limit)
  • Note: A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).  In Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962, it is pointed out:
    • “If there is dispute on any of these points necessarily the Land Tribunal has to go into the question of possession and the alleged tenancy”.

Landlords Entitled Compensation

Section 72A reads as under:

  • 72A.  Compensation to landlords for vesting of their rights in Government. (1) Every landowner and intermediary whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government under Section 72 shall be entitled to compensation as provided in Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4).
    (2) The compensation payable to the landowner and intermediaries under Sub-section (1) shall be the aggregate of:-(a)sixteen times the fair rent of the holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government;
    (b) the value of structures, wells and embankments of a permanent nature belonging to the landowner and the intermediaries, if any; and
    (c) one-half of the value of timber trees belonging to the landowner and the intermediaries, if any:
    Provided that where the aggregate of the value of structures, wells and embankments and one-half of the value of the timber trees referred to in clauses (b) and (c) exceeds sixteen times the fair rent in respect of the holding or part thereof, as the case may be, such aggregate value shall, for the purpose of calculating the compensation under this Sub-section, be limited to sixteen times such fair rent.
  • Explanation I. – For the purposes of this Section and Section 72 D, “fair rent” means the fair rent under this Act as amended by the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969.
  • Explanation II. – For the purposes of this Section, where the rent is payable in kind, the money value of the rent shall be commuted at the average of the prices of the commodity for the six years immediately preceding the year in which the right, title and interest of the land owner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government, and in calculating the average of the prices, the prices, if any, published under Section 43 may also be taken into account.
    (3)Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2), where the total compensation due to a landlord in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants, after deducting the value of encumbrances and claims for maintenance or alimony, is more than twenty thousand rupees, the compensation payable to such landlord shall be limited to the amount specified in the Table below:-
  • Table
  • Scales of Compensation : Total Amount Of Compensation : Rate
    On the first Rs. 20,000 : 100 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 95 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 90 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 85 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 80 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 75 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 70 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 65 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000: 60 per cent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 : 55 percent
    On the next Rs. 10,000 and above: 50 percent
  • (4)Where the landowner or intermediary of a holding or part of a holding is entitled to receive fifty per cent of the compensation in respect of that holding or part in a lump under Section 72H, the compensation payable to such landowner or intermediary, as the case may be, in respect of that holding or part shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be 75 per cent of the amount calculated under Sub-section (2).

Tenant Liable to Pay Purchase Price

Section 72D reads as under:

  • 72D. Purchase price. 
  • (1)The cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any.
  • (1A)[ Where the total extent of land held as tenant by a cultivating tenant is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay purchase price under Sub-section (1).
  • Explanation. – For the removal of doubt it is hereby clarified that the benefit conferred to a cultivating tenant until r this Sub-section shall not affect the eligibility of the landowner or intermediary, if any, to receive compensation to which he is entitled under the Act.

What is the Position if the Tenant holds Maximum Within the Ceiling

As shown above, before proceeding to the Land Board or Taluk Land Board as regards the ‘exemption’, the tenant has to “Purchase of the Right, Title and Interest of the Landowner under Sec. 73B(3). What is the position if the tenant already holds the maximum amount of property allowed by the ceiling limit (and no additional property can be purchased)?

  • In such a situation, it is legitimate to say that the tenant has to approach the Land Tribunal and obtain a Certificate stating that (i) he is a tenant of the property under consideration and (ii) he is already in possession of the maximum amount of property allowed by the ceiling limit.

Plantation Exemption, Fixity & Purchase Certificate for a Tenant below 30-acres-plantation

  • By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant (below 30-acres-plantation) will get fixity (Sec. 13) and can continue possession.
    • And, under Chapter III, Sec. 81(1)(e), he can also avail benefits of exemption for plantation (without being affected by the ceiling limit – Sec. 82 & 83).
    • Note: For getting benefits under Sec. 81 exemption, the tenant should have filed ceiling return (under Sec. 85(2); 85A).
  • Purchase Certificate being provided within ceiling limit alone under Sec. 72B or 72C, it is legitimate to state that a tenant cannot get Purchase Certificate on the plantation land, under Sec. 72B or 72C. (Note: No rider to Sec. 72B and 72C, by way of proviso or otherwise, exempting plantation.)

Combined Impact of Sec. 3(1)(viii) and Sec. 81 on Plantation-Tenancy-land

  1. Below 30 acres – Chapter II applies
    • By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii)Chapter II applies to all tenancies (both above and below 30 acres. It stands contradistinct to ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the tenant above 30 acres.
    • Such tenants also get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return (Sec. 85(2); 85A). should have been filed.
  2. Above 30 acres ‘Plantation-Tenancy’– KLR Act will not Apply
    • S. 3(1)(viii) being exclude (from Chapter II) ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ (i.e. ‘leased-lands-upon-which-plantation-was-put-up’ by the landlord) above 30 acres, provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such plantations.
    • Hence, No ‘fixity’ under Sec. 13, for the tenants of ‘Plantation-Tenancy’ above 30 acres.
    • Contract applies to termination of tenancy, above 30 acre plantation–tenancy. But, until evicted lawfully, such tenants get benefit of exemption under Sec. 81 and they can continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • Land lord is entitled Sec. 81 exemption over such plantation.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption, ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A] should have been filed.
  3. If tenant raised plantation on bare land leased: S. 3(1)(viii) does not apply.
    • S. 3(1)(viii) does not deal with plantations put up on bare land leased by the tenants. (Such property is not excluded from Chapter II, also.)
    • That is, the protection or benefits given to tenants (fixity) can be availed by such tenants (who put up plantation on land leased).
    • No purchase Certificate can be obtained, for, fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed (Sec. 87 Expl. II).
    • Under Sec. 81, such tenants can avail exemption and they can also continue without being affected by the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 and 83.
    • Such lands also vest in Government under Sec. 72.
    • For getting benefits of Sec. 81 exemption ceiling return [Sec. 85(2); 85A]. should have been filed.

Liability of Certain Planters to Pay Rent

(1) Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Government according to the KLR Act.

  • (1) Tenants in Govt. land.
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of the Govt. lands to pay rent; and such Govt. lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..
  • (2) Tenants of Plantation lands who have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.
    • Because, the legislature had conferred the benefit of the fixity of tenure to such tenants; and such lands (over and above the land to which purchase certificate is given) vest in Govt. under Sec. 72.

(2) Following Plantation-Tenants are liable to pay rent to the Land-owner (or the Land-owner) according to the KLR Act.

  • The tenants of those Plantations (i) above 30 acres and (ii) the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing (that is, plantation existed when land was leased).
    • Because, no provision in the KLR Act affects the liability of the tenants of such lands to pay rent to the land owners; and such lands are exempted from Chapter II (that deals with ‘fixity’, Purchase Certificate, vesting, etc..                               

Relevant provisions in the KLR Act:

Section 3(1)(viii):

  • Provisions of Chapter II (that deals with fixity, Purchase Certificate, vesting of leased land in Govt., etc.) do not apply to tenements of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing).

Section 13:

  • There will be fixity to cultivating tenants.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing) do not have the right of fixity (for. provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 72:

  • It provides – automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating-tenants, in Govt.
  • But, (1) Plantation-tenants in Govt. land and (2) The tenants of Plantation above 30 acre (where the land-owner had put up the plantation before leasing) do not vest in Govt. (for. provisions of Chapter II do not apply to such tenements.

Section 81:

  • S. 81, the first Section in Chapter III, deals with exemption from ceiling limit of plantation, industrial land, etc.

Section 82 & 83:

  • S.82 & 83 deals with ceiling area and bars holding land excess of ceiling fixed.

Section 85(1):

  • S. 81 mandates surrender of excess land (to Govt). But it is not applicable to the plantations (as they are exempted)

Can the Govt. enact new Act for ensuring ‘Proper Rent’ (if it finds 1980 Act not effective)?

Yes; because,

  1. As the KLR Act does not affect rights of such land-owners/landlord  (including Govt.) for rent.
  2. The matter of fixation of rent is a State subject (subject to further discussion). 

The State Legislature is free, therefore, to make a proper enactment on public interest.  Here, it may also be noted that a large extent of Govt. land is in the possession of mighty and wealthy planters. 

In N. K. RAJENDRA MOHAN Vs. THIRVAMADI RUBBER CO.  LTD, AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6, it is held as under:

  • “That the legislature had construed it to be unfair and improper to deny the benefit of the fixity of tenure to a lessee who might have taken the lease of extensive parambus or waste lands and in course of time by hard toil had developed those into plantations.

Analysis

Plantation leased
(Plantation existed when land was leased).
Land leased
Tenant made plantation.
Sec. 81 (exemption from ceiling limit) applies.
Plantation above 30 Acre. 
Will there be 
fixity to tenant?
No. 

Sec. 3 (1)(viii) (reversely) applies. (Poddar Plan. Ltd v. Thekkemariveettil Madhavi Amma, 2014 1 ILR(Ker) 813; 2013 4 KLJ 781; 2014 1 KLT 439,)
Yes. (Note: Ceiling limit (in Sec. 82) is not mentioned in Sec. 13 – as given in Sec. 72B and 72C.)
(Sec. 13 fixity is there for every tenant, if tenant toiled a plantation – See: Rev. Fr. Jerome Fernandes Vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.)
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Plantation below 30 Acre.  Can a tenant get purchase certificate for 5 or 10 acres?
May be.
No specific provision. So, by virtue of Chapter II, a tenant can get Purchase Certificate; but, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 under Sec. 72B, 72C.
(See notes just below also)
No. 
No specific provision.
Fragmentation of plantation will not be allowed so as to get pur. certi. within ceiling limit (Sec. 87).
Plantation below 30 Acre. Will there be fixity to tenant?
Yes.
By virtue of S. 3(1)(viii), a Tenant has fixity (Sec.13). It is reasonable to say, a tenant cannot claim fixity and Purchase Certificate, simultaneously.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Yes.
(Because what is exempted is Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres)

Sec. 13 fixity, applies.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Who gets Sec. 81 exemption – land-owner or tenant – above 30 acre.
Land owner – For, plantation itself was leased.Tenant
Can landlord recover possession –
above 30 acre – from the tenant?
.
Yes.
No express provision.
But, contract holds the field (because no protection to tenant, under Chapter II).
No. (Because Plantation-Tenancies exceeding 30 acres is exempted, and therefore no protection to tenant)
Sec. 13 fixity, applies. See:
N. K. Rajendra Mohan Vs Thirvamadi Rubber Co.  Ltd.: AIR 2015 SC 2556; 2015-4 KLT 6
Will a tenant get Fixity (S. 13) or Purchase Certificate (S. 72) on “tenancies…”, ‘interspersed within the plantation’ S. 3(1)(viii)

(Not applicable)
Yes. But, within ceiling limit – Sec. 13 under Sec. 72B, 72C.
Proviso refers to a special category on independent-tenancy [from the plantation-tenancy, mentioned in the main Section, S. 3(1)(viii)].
Will there be vesting of land below 30 acres in Govt?

Yes.
Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant? Relation that is recognised by the Statute. That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F
Yes (for both above and below 30 acres).

Then what is the relation between Govt. and the original tenant? Relation that is recognised by the Statute .That is, fixity in the land vested in Government.
Such tenants should pay rent to Govt. under Sec. 72 E & 72F

Effect of Conversion of A Portion of Exempted Land into a Non-exempted Category

Section 87 reads as under:

  • “S.87. Excess land obtained by gift, etc. to be surrendered – (1) Where any person acquires any land dafter the date notified under Section 83 by gift, purchase, mortgage with possession, lease, surrender or any other kind of transfer inter vivos or by bequest or inheritance or otherwise and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, such excess shall be surrendered to such authority as may be prescribed.
  •        Explanation 1 – Where any land is exempted by or under Section 81 and such exemption is in force on the date notified under Section 83, such land shall, with effect from the date on which it ceases to be exempted, be deemed to be land acquired after the date notified under Section 83.
  •        Explanation II – Where, after the date notified under Section 83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under Section 81 from the provisions of this Chapter is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date.

No Total Prohibition in using Exempted Land for a Different Purpose

Explanation II does not make a total bar. It only causes to lose benefit of the exemption to a certain extent. That is, if a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit; and the Taluk Land Board can proceed upon that (excess) land. In short, the exemption will be lost for that portion. In this premises, in Wayanad Granites v. District Collector, 2023-4 KLT 874, it is held that ‘fragmentation is per se not illegal’. similarly, in District Collector v. Sajith Lal, 2023-4 KLJ 851, it is held that ‘there is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non-exempted purposes as well’.

In Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024, in the light of earlier decisions, observed that there is no total prohibition in using an exempted land for a different purpose under the Kerala Land Reforms Act. The impediment or restriction is (only) the following –

  • If a portion of the exempted land is utilised for any other purpose, that would fall within his ceiling area and the authorities may be able to initiate ceiling proceedings.

The Full Bench decision, Mathew K. Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority [AIR 2019 Ker. 67, affirmed by the Supreme Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, 2020-14 SCC 126] held as under:

  • “We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further.”

In District Collector v. Sajith Lal (2023-4 KLJ 851; 2023 KLT OnLine 1225) it is held as under:

  • “5. There is no embargo under law in using any exempted land for non- exempted purposes as well. If the land is used for non-exempted purposes, the holder of the land will lose the qualification for exemption, thus giving authority to the Land Board to initiate ceiling proceedings.” (Quoted in: Mathew K.T v. State of Kerala, 19 April, 2024)

No Embargo to Transfer Plantation Land

In R. V.  Devassia v. Sub Registrar, Idukki, 2015-1 ILR(Ker) 1047; 2015-1 KHC 805; 2015-2 KLJ 17, it is held as under:

  • “9. On promulgation of the KLR Act in the State, the entire landed property in the State is subjected to State control as envisaged under the provisions of the KLR Act. No piece of the land escapes the clutches of the KLR Act including exempted land for ceiling purposes. The ceiling proceedings is a continuing proceedings and can be reopened in any of the circumstances, if so warranted, as contemplated under Section 87 of the KLR Act. Exemption granted from ceiling is the qualification to use the land in a particular manner, which means a burden is imposed on the land. The moment the qualification for exemption is vanished by conversion of the land, the protection from ceiling will also be extinguished to bring the land within the fold of the ceiling area. The exemption is in the nature of a burden on the land to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted. The eminent domain power of the State can be exercised for acquiring land without consent and also to regulate the use of land in public interest. The eminent domain is power inherent in any Sovereign State. This burden would bind the holder of the land as on 01/01/1970 and the successor-in-interest. The Division Bench of this Court in the State Human Rights Protection Centre, Thrissur and another v. State of Kerala and others [2009 (3) ILR 695] held that exemption granted under S.81(1)(a) is for the land and would continue to operate irrespective of change of ownership of the exempted land and the transferee would have to use the land for the purpose for which exemption is granted.”

In Everest Stone Crusher and Granites v. District Collector, Kannur, 2020-6 KHC 289, it is observed as under:

  • “16. In Devassia R.V. this Court noticed that, the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act do not place any embargo on transfer. The transfer of registry is for fiscal purposes. The power of the competent authority to reopen the ceiling proceedings to include the land exempted for the purpose of ceiling is not lost on account of effecting mutation. Therefore, the Revenue Officials cannot refuse to effect mutation of the property purchased by the transferee.”

Effect of Fragmentation for Non-exempted Category

The decision in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985, arose from the Writ Petition filed for a declaration that the fragmentation and sale of a Rubber Plantation for non-plantation purposes was illegal as it defeated the purpose of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. When the matter was placed before the Taluk Land Board under Sec 87, KLR Act, it found that there was no change in classification of the land and therefore dropped the proceedings. The Court held as under:

  • “34. Section 81 of the KLR Act is in pith and substance a special provision, with its main objective of giving exemption to certain lands including the lands maintained as plantations is to prevent fragmentation of the land and to keep it as plantation itself to improve the economy of the state for welfare of people as a whole while the Act creates a regime, the State is under an obligation to safeguard, the intended purpose of the provisions of the Act in its spirit. ….. …… It could be gathered from the records that the proposal to transfer 1.03 acres of land to each workers in discharge of their service or retrenchment benefits will definitely divide the plantation into separate slots and that would definitely change the character/nature of the plantation, which could be termed as ‘conversion’ and that will be against the provisions of the Act.”

Read Blog: Plantation Exemption in Kerala Land Reforms Act–in a Nutshell

Can a Tenant of Plantation Transfer his Rights, Fragmenting the Plantation

Possession is a heritable and transferable right. [See: Nallammal v. Ayisha Beevi, 2017-5 Mad LJ 864; Phirayalal Kapur Vs. Jia Rani, AIR 1973 Delhi 186]. Therefore, a tenant of plantation having rights of fixity (Sec. 13) may have the right to transfer it to another. In any case, the change of character or nature of the plantation by fragmentation being amount to ‘conversion’ (as Provided in Sec. 87 Expl. II) that will be against the provisions of the Act, as pointed out in One Earth One Life v. State of Kerala, 2019-2 KHC(SN) 10; 2019-1 KLT 985.

In Secretary, TDB v. Mohanan Nair (T.R. Ramachandran Nair & A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, JJ.), ILR 2013-2 Ker 883; 2013-3 KLT 132, an important decision on Kerala Land Reforms Act, it is found that Purchase Certificate issued by Land Tribunal, for land belonging to Government Devaswom (exempted category under S.3(1)(x) of the Act), will be in total violation of Rules, and will be a nullity.

PART – IV VESTING OF LAND IN GOVT. & RIGHT OF GOVT. TO COLLECT RENT

According to the provisions of the KLR Act, lands held by individuals (or associations of persons) vest in Govt. under two provisions. They are-

  • First, Sec. 72 – Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. (Obviously it applies to tenancy-land alone.)
  • Second, Sec. 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government.
    • Note: Sec. 86 does not apply to Plantations, for (i) they being already vest in Govt. under Sec. 72, and (ii) if Govt. land, no question of vesting arises.

Section 72(1) reads:

  • 72. Vesting of landlord’s rights in Government: (1) On a date to be notified by the Government in this behalf in the Gazette, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under Sub-section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon the said date”

Sec. 81 exemptions do not apply to Govt. lands; But, Exemption apply to lease-lands

Government lands are exempted under Sec. 81(1)(a).

81(1)(a) Proviso says –

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease“.

This proviso is introduced in 1971. By virtue of this amendment (introducing Section 81(1)(a) Proviso) “Plantation-Exemption” takes effect on Government-lease-land (with tenants).

But it must be noted that a ‘valid lease’ must exist. That is, the person in possession of government land should be a “lessee”; he must not be trespasser or a person who forfeit the title of Government.

Section 81(1)(a) Proviso reads as under:

  • “Provided that the exemption under this clause shall not apply to lands owned by the Government of Kerala and held by any person under lease whether current or time expired or otherwise.”

The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation

In MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28, it is held-

  • “Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 81 by which “Government lands held under a lease current or time expired or otherwise” can be understood only as referring to such lands which are held by persons in permissive possession. The word “otherwise” must be understood as a permissive occupation otherwise than under a lease. The word “otherwise” has no wider meaning in the context. So understood, the exemption to Clause (a) of that Section is perfectly legal and in that limited sense we uphold that provision as valid.”

Tenant is defined in Sec 2 (57) as under:

  • (57) tenant moans any person who has paid or has agreed to pay rent or other consideration
  • for his being allowed to possess and to enjoy any land by a person entitled to lease that land, and includes- …. ….. ….. “

Section 86 reads:

  • 86. Vesting of excess lands in Government. (1) On the determination of the extent and other particulars of the lands, the ownership or possession or both of which is or are to be surrendered under Section 85, the ownership or possession or both, as the case may be of the land shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances and the Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
  • (2) On receipt of [the order of the Taluk Land Board under Sub-section (1)] such person shall make the surrender demanded, in such manner as may he prescribed.
  • (3) Where any person fails to make the surrender demanded, the [Taluk Land Board] may authorise any officer to take possession or assume ownership of the land in such manner as may be prescribed.
  • [(4) Where the ownership of any land vests in the Government under Sub-section (1), the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of the land shall stand extinguished, and where possession of any land which was in the possession of a cultivating tenant vests in the Government under that Sub-section, the ownership of such land shall vest in the Government and the rights of the intermediary, if any, in respect of such land shall stand extinguished.]

Who is the OWNER of Exempted (Private-Leasehold) Plantation Lands in Kerala?

It is Government, though by virtue of Chapter II (Sec. 13) the tenant has ‘Fixity’. 

  • 1. Plantation (lease) Lands VEST in GOVT, automatically
  • Because,
  • Sec. 72 provides for 
    • mandatory and involuntary vesting in Government
    • of leasehold lands that is held by cultivating tenants entitled to fixity of tenure under Sec. 13 (even if the extent exceeds ceiling limit).
    • See: Perumal Smaraka Nidhi vs M/S Harrisons Malayalam Ltd., 31. 01. 2013.
  • 2.  ‘Vesting’ in Govt. is ‘Vesting of Ownership
  • It is for the reasons –
    • Declared to be ‘vested’ in Government (Sec. 72).
    • Such a tenant is liable to pay ‘rent’ (Sec. 72E) to the Government for the unassigned land, like plantation-exempted-land, vested in Govt. under Sec. 72.
  • 3. ‘Exemption’ in Chapter III Cannot be read into Sec. 72B(2)
  • The provision of law for giving Purchase-Certificate under Sec. 72B specifies that the provisions of Sec. 82 (as to ceiling limit) shall apply for the calculation of the ceiling area (alone).
  • Sec. 72B(2) reads-
    • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1)
  • The exemption provision in Sec. 81 (Chapter III), which excludes plantation lands from the ceiling limit, cannot be brought-forth or read-into Sec. 72B (provision for assignment of purchase-certificate) in Chapter II.
    • In other words, purchase-certificates cannot be given for land above ceiling-limit, rigging the exemption provisions (for plantations etc.).
  • Because,
    • Sec. 72B(1), in Chapter II shows – Sec. 72B(1) is an independent provision (though the Proviso says –  no cultivating tenant shall be entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest … (more than) … the ceiling area, mentioned in Sec. 82 in Chapter III)
    • When a provision in a latter Chapter of an Act (here, Sec. 82 that deals with extent of ceiling limit, in Chapter III) is referred to in an independent provision in an earlier Chapter (here, Sec. 72B, as regards issuing purchase certificate, in Chapter II), for a specific purpose (here, to state the limit in area alone), it cannot be said – the attributed colour or smell of the provision in the latter chapter (by virtue of other provisions, i.e., entire characteristics or attributions added to Sec. 82 by virtue of other provisions in Chapter III), would stand reflected on the earlier provision (here, Sec. 72B).
  • Further –
    • Chapter II of the KLR Act (dealing with ‘Tenancy’) is exclusive and exhaustive as to ‘fixity’, and ‘vesting’ of land in Government.
    • It is not stated anywhere in the Act – the right and title of the (leased-plantation) land legitimately vested in Government under Sec. 72, will be divested in any manner (in favour of the previous owner, or of the tenant or anybody else), in any circumstance.
    • Sec. 72E provides for collection of ‘rent‘ from the holders of the plantation (for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) and Sec. 72F(5)(h) authorises the Land Tribunal to fix the rent. (It goes without saying saying that it is for the reason that the ownership of the land vests in Govt.)
    • Note: Proceedings initiated by Taluk Land Board under Chapter III (in respect of plantation) do not confer title.
    • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).
  • 4. Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, if Acquired
    • For the above (plantation land vest in Govt.), the Government Need Not Pay ‘Land-Value‘, as such, to the tenant, or the former owner, if such Lands are Acquired.
  • 5. Tenant cannot ‘Sell’ Plantation Land as his absolute property
    • A tenant who got ‘fixity’ over such land cannot ‘sell’ this land as his absolute (ownership) property.

Rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, after vesting the land with Govt.? It is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’

  • It is not Tenancy – For no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt.
  • Not Grant or Licence/Permission – For Grant as well as Licence/Permission arise from a contract (express or implied).
  • Therefore, it can termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • What are the Stipulations attached to that “Legal Right”?
    • Subject to the condition – not to “convert” it for any other use, other than the specific plantation (Sec. 87).
  • When Such a land is Required for Govt., Should it be Acquired?
    • The ownership being vested in Govt. it need not be ‘strictly’ “acquired”.
    • But no provision In Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’, if and when Govt. needs it.
  • Sec. 112 of the KLR Act
    • But, Sec. 112 of the KLR Act says as to ‘Apportionment of land value in cases of acquisition’.
    • Because of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“ upon the former tenants of the plantation, they are entitled for certain compensation, when that land is required for the Govt..
    • In cases falling under Chapter II (pertaining to, tenants entitled for fixity, issuance of purchase certificate etc.) Section 72 deals with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants; and says -the land will be free from encumbrances created by the land-owners and intermediaries.
    • However, insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment (within ceiling limit) subject to the payment of purchase price – as stated in Section 72D. (See: Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439.)
    • No ‘authority’ is also named in any law to fix the compensation to be given to the former tenants, when the Govt. requires it.
  • Therefore, it is said – Apportionment of land value in cases of ‘acquisition’.
    • Note:  It makes no difference (SUBSTANTIALLY, IN DETERMINING COMPENSATION) whether such a plantation land is “acquired” or not. Because, even if the land is not ‘acquired’, Govt. has to pay compensation for improvements to the former tenants (who holds the land by virtue of the “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act).

Apportionment’s of land value in cases of Acquisition

Sec. 112 of the KLR Act reads-

  • “112. Apportionment’s of land value in cases of acquisition – (1) Where any land is acquired under the law for the time being in force providing for the compulsory acquisition of land for public purposes, the compensation awarded under such law in respect of the land acquired shall be apportioned among the landowner, intermediaries, cultivating tenant and the kudikidappukaran in the manner specified in this Section.
  • (2) The compensation for any building or other improvements shall be awarded to the person entitled to such building or other improvements.
  • (3) The kudikidappukaran shall be entitled to the value of the land occupied by his homestead or hut subject to a minimum of-
    • three cents in a city or major municipality; or
    • five cents in any other municipally; or
    • ten cents in a panchayat area or township.
  • (4) The difference between the value of three cents or five cents or ten cents, as the case may be, and the value of the extent of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1961, be borne by the Government or the local authority or the company or other person on whose behalf the land is acquired.
  • (5) The balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in Sub-section (2) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut shall he apportioned among the landowner, the intermediaries and the cultivating tenant in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land acquired immediately before such acquisition.
    • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to (i) in the case of a landowner, the rent which he was entitled to get from the tenant holding immediately under him; (ii) in the case of an intermediary, the difference between the rent which he was entitled to get from his tenant and the rent for which he was liable to his landlord; and (iii) in the case of a cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income and the rent payable by him; and the rent payable by the cultivating tenant and the intermediary for the purposes of this Explanation shall be as calculated under the provisions of this Act.
  • (5A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (2) and (5), where there the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries in respect of the land acquired have vested in the Government under Section 72, –
    • (a) the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to such landowner and intermediaries shall be awarded to the Government; and
    • (b) the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.
  • Explanation. – “Profits derivable from the land” shall be deemed to be equal to-
    • in the case of the cultivating tenant, the difference between the net income immediately before the acquisition and the rent which he was liable to pay immediately before the date on which the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries have vested in the Government; and
    • in the case of the Government, such rent.
  • (7) In this Section, “homestead” includes a dwelling house occupied by a person who is deemed to be a kudikidappukaran under Explanation IIA to clause (25) of Section 2.”

Apportionment depends upon rights on the date of acquisition

  • Valia Raja v. Veeraraghava Iyer, 1961 Ker LT 103, it was held that the question of apportionment of compensation has to depend upon the rights of the parties on the date of the acquisition. Referrd to in: Varkey Thomas Vs. Annamma Abraham,  1969 Ker LT 903.

Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

  • In Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439, the question as to ‘rival claims raised by the cultivating tenant and landlord for compensation on acquisition’ arose. The land was leased out by landlords. The lease-rights came in the cultivating tenants by transfer. The Government contended that the tenant was a cultivating tenant and the land vested upon the Govt. under Sec. 72 KLR Act. Hence tenant alone would be entitled to get compensation for the improvements to be determined under the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958, in view of Section 20(1) of the KLR Act.
  • The landlords argued that the land was a plantation (over 30 acres) when it was (originally) leased, and therefore, they are entitled to claim exemption and benefits in the light of the exemption under clause (viii)  of Section 3 (1) of the KLR Act. Since there would be no fixity of tenure, it being a plantation, there would not be vesting of rights of the land owner in the Government. Hence, there should be the apportionment of the compensation between the lessor and the lessee and it should be decided in the acquisition proceedings.
  • The single Judge dismissed the writ petition, ‘leaving open the liberty of the lessee as well as the landlords, to approach the civil court seeking relief against the Government, and also to resolve the inter se dispute by and between the tenant and the landlords’.
  • The Division Bench, in appeal held that ‘land acquisition’ proceedings are to be initiated. It is pointed out that (even if it is a land vested in Govt.) there is no provision in Sec. 72 for ‘resuming’ if and when Govt. need it. The court also observed as under –
    • “31. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 72(1) of the Act, 1963, it is clear that when the Government notified the said provision with effect from 01.01.1970, all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyirippus and holders karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13, and in respect of which certificates of purchase under sub-Section (2) of Section 59 have not been issued, vested in the Government.
    • 32. Therefore, it is clear from Section 72 that what is vested with the Government is the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants. It is nothing but a legal fiction by which the interest held by a cultivating tenant in a property of a landlord or intermediary is protected from 01.01.1970 .
    • 34. On a conjoint reading of Sections 72 and 72A, it can be seen that vesting of rights in the Government contained under Section 72 is the rights held by the landlord and the intermediary in respect of holdings held by the cultivating tenants. However, the same will not, in any manner, interfere with the rights enjoyed by a cultivating tenant in contemplation of the provisions of the Act, 1963.”
    • 42. Therefore, we have no doubt in our mind to hold that Section 72 of Act, 1963 would only deal with the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of the holdings held by the cultivating tenants free from encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries. However, the legal provisions discussed above would make it clear that insofar as the cultivating tenant is concerned, an absolute right is vested with him to seek assignment subject to the payment of purchase price in contemplation of Section 72D of the Act, 1963.
  • While considering the right of landlord, it is pointed out (basing on the principle, or scheme of the KLR Act**) that the landlord may have right for compensation under Section 72BB. The Division Bench said-
    • “36. So also, sub-Section (1) of Section 72BB dealing with ‘the right of landlord to apply for assignment and compensation’ specifies that any landowner or intermediary, whose right, title and interest in respect of any holding have vested in the Government, may apply to the Land Tribunal for the assignment of such right, title and interest to the cultivating tenant and for the payment of the compensation due to him under Section 72A.”
  • **Note: 1. If plantation-lease-(leasing a land when plantation existed)-above-30-acre-
    • Sec. 72, 72 BB etc. will not apply (such land being excluded from Chapter II, under Sec. 3(1)(viii), KLR Act).
  • 2. In case of a plantation-lease-above-30-Acre-
    • on termination of the lease period, the land lord can resume the land, on the basis of his title; for, the tenant will not have fixity in such case, the land being exempted from the benefits of Chapter II (as per Sec. 3(1)(viii) of the KLR Act).
  • 3. The landlords of such plantation will get the benefits (under Sec. 81) and protection from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
  • 4. In such a case, the right of landlord may be on a higher level or footing than the tenant (to get compensation).
  • 5. It cannot be compared with a plantation that is put up by the tenant. The tenants of such plantation will-
    • get fixity under Sec. 13 (though they will not get Purchase Certificate),
    • get the benefits and protection (under Sec. 81) from ceiling limit that is stipulated under the provisions of Sec. 82, 83 etc. (that is, there will be no ceiling limit).
    • In such a case, the right for compensation, if any, of the landlord will be nil or negligible.
  • The Division Bench, inter alia, on the above observations directed ‘the State and its officials to take proceedings for the acquisition of the land’.

Criticism on Glen Leven Estate (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2022-6 Ker LT 439

The Division Bench failed to consider–

  • The right, title and interest of the land (above ceiling limit) ‘vest’ with the Government under Sec. 72. It is absolute. It is not a ‘fiction.
  • In K. Jayaprakashan v. State of Kerala, 2023-3 KLT 541, it is observed as under:
    • “Section 72 of the Act deals with vesting of landlord’s rights in Government. As per sub-section (1) of Section 72 ….  all right, title and interest of the landowners and intermediaries in respect of holdings held by cultivating tenants (including holders of kudiyiruppus and holders of karaimas) entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 … shall, subject to the provisions of this section, vest in the Government free from all encumbrances created by the landowners and intermediaries and subsisting thereon on the said date”.
  • In V.N. Narayanan Nair v. State of Kerala (P.T. Raman Nayar, T.C.Raghavan, K.K.Mathew, JJ.) , AIR 1971 Ker 98, it is held as under:
    • “By Section 72 the rights of landlords whose rights have not been purchased by cultivating tenants vest in the Government free of all encumbrances on a date to be notified by the Government in that behalf -the date has been notified as the 1st January, 1970”
  • The absolute nature of vesting is further clear from Sec. 72E and Sec. 112(5A).
  •  The nature of this statutory ‘vesting in Govt’ (under Sec. 72) is further clear from – Sec. 72E (tenant has to pay rent for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72). Such payments are required in two occasions – (i) after vesting in Government for there is cultivating tenant and fixity of tenure and the tenant has not got his rights purchased under ‘Purchase Certificate’ and (ii) holding exempted-plantation land excess of ceiling limit.
  • In Lakshmi v. Rama Iyer, 1992-1 ILR-Ker 398; 1991-2 KLT 897it is pointed out:
    • “Consequently the title and interest of the land-lord would vest in the Government on the appointed day that is, on 1-1-1970. Then as per S. 72Q the land owner would be entitled to recover rent accrued till 1-1-1970 only”.
  • In Aru v. Nakunni (Padmanabhan, J.), 1987-1 KLT 177, it is held as under:
    • “Under S.72 of the Act all the right, title and interest of the land owners and intermediaries in respect of a holding held by a cultivating tenant entitled to fixity of tenure under S.13 shall, subject to the various provisions of S.72, vest in the Government free of all encumbrances created by the land owners and intermediaries and subsisting on the date notified by the Government. ….. When once vesting has taken place there cannot be any further rights in any body. …. By assignment all such rights vest in the tenant”.
  •  Sec. 112(5A) deals with unassaigned land (that is, no purchase certificate is given). Under this sub section land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • This provision is applied to lease-lands vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 and no purchase certificate is given (to the tenant)., in case of acquisition).
  • Sec. 72B(2) KLR Act spells-out that a cultivating tenant will get Purchase Certificate for the extent below the ‘ceiling limit’ alone. That is, the tenant has no “absolute rights” above the ceiling limit.
  • Plantation-lands, usually, involve Hundreds or Thousands of Acres of “excess” land. The assignment-possible-land (within ceiling limit) may be miniscule (7.5 acres or 15 acres). Therefore, the analogy drawn by the Bench (tenant has a right seek assignment) is not apt at all.
  • When land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 is acquired, in the light of Sec. 112(5A) land-value need not be given to the land-owner or the tenant, over and above the “value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut” – that is, the actual area where the ‘homestead or hut’ is situated; whatever may be the area of land outside it.
  • The aforesaid provision of law in the KLR Act is legislated following Proviso to Article 31A(1) of the Constitution which says that the State need not pay compensation to the land owners (when land is acquired) above the ‘ceiling limit‘.
  • The rights of ‘tenants’ of Plantations, to continue in the land till the plantation exists, after vesting the land with Govt., is a ‘Legal Right conferred by Statute’. It is not Tenancy – for no landlord-tenant relation with the Govt. It is not a Grant or Licence/Permission – for such rights arise from a contract (express or implied). Therefore, it can be termed only as a “Legal Right conferred by Statute“, the KLR Act.
  • It goes without saying – If no compensation is payable to the land-owners above the ceiling limit, it need not be given to tenants.
  • It is most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation-tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to Maharaja of Travancore (whose 191 acres of lands in Thiruvananthapuram – above the ceiling limit, 15 acres – in the City was ‘mercilessly’ taken under the Orders of the Land Board Trivandrum, No. LB(B)2-18919/70, dated 15.01.1972). It is a sheer fact that lands of thousands of middleclass property owners was also harshly taken by under the provisions of the Act. (Note: Only limited right to continue the specified plantation-crop alone is given by the ‘exemption’; and, according to law, in case the land is ‘converted’, the exemption-benefit would be lost.)

No Land value to be given for the “excess” land (Beyond Ceiling Limit)

From the following words in Sect. 112, it is beyond doubt that no Land value to be given for the entire land and it is limited to a portion.

  • building or other improvements
  • land occupied by the homestead or hut”
  • any building or other improvements“.

It is true, “exemption” is given to plantation, to hold land over and above ceiling limit. It is only a statutory permission to continue, subject to conditions. It will be lost when it is “fragmented” or the crop is abandoned. As stated elsewhere, it is also most unjustifiable to confer undue rights or benefits to the plantation owners or tenants (majority are BIG Companies) which had not been given to thousands of middleclass property owners whose property had been harshly sized or expropriated under the provisions of the KLR Act.

The Govt. is Entitled Reasonable ‘Rent and Land Tax (for previous leasehold land)

The land being vest in Govt., it can collect reasonable ‘rent’ (for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) . Sec. 72E reads as under:

  • 72E. Rent of holdings vested in Government but not assigned to cultivating tenants. – Where in respect of any holding or part thereof, the right, title and interest of the landowner and intermediaries have vested in the Government under Section 72 and the cultivating tenant is not entitled to the assignment of such right, title and interest by virtue of Sub-section (1) of Section 72, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay to the Government the rent payable under this Act from the date of vesting under Section 72.

With respect to payment of tax it is stated as under in Sec. 72S:

  • 72S. Liability for assessment alter the date of vesting under Section 72. (1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Kerala Land Tax Act, 1961, or in any other law for the time being in force, or in any contract, where the right, title and interest of the landowner and the intermediaries, if any, in respect of a holding have vested in the Government under Section 72, the cultivating tenant of that holding shall be liable to pay the basic tax payable in respect of that holding under the said Act and other taxes and cesses due in respect of that holding.
  • (2) In the case of a holding or part of a holding in respect of which an application for resumption under the provisions of this Act is rejected, the cultivating tenant shall be liable to pay the basic tax and other taxes and cesses in respect of such holding or part of the holding, as the case may be, with effect on and from the date notified under Sub-section (1) of Section 72.

CAN AN AN EXEMPTED PLANTATION LAND BE SOLD AS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVATE PROPERTY?

No.

  • In the event – plantation activities cease or are discontinued, that land would also be treated as ‘excess land’.
  • Hence, it is indisputably explicit – NO VESTED RIGHT or OWNERSHIP is conferred on LAND by the ‘plantation-exemption’.
  • It is beyond doubt – the legislature never intended (where a large extent of land had been forcibly got surrendered from other land owners), to bring an inequitable and discriminatory disparity, while ‘plantation-exemption’ was conferred under Sec. 81 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

Sec. 82 and 83 apply to Plantation Lands also

  • Sec. 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act deals with ceiling area.
  • Sec. 83 mandates that no person shall be entitled to own or hold lands in excess of the ceiling area.
    • Sec. 83 reads – “83. No person to hold land in excess of the ceiling area. With effect from such dates as may be notified by the Government in the Gazette, no person shall be entitled to own or hold or to possess under a mortgage lands in the aggregate in excess of the ceiling area.”
  • Sec. 85 directs that excess land shall be surrendered to Government (accepting the compensation fixed under Sec. 88).
  • Though Sec. 81 (generally?) exempts plantations from the provisions of Chapter III, Sec. 87 directs that the protection of plantation is available only so long as the plantation subsists.

PART – V Civil Court Jurisdiction : Decisions

Supreme Court Decision – Plantation put up by tenant on land leased.

The Supreme Court held in Rt. Rev. Jerome Fernandez vs. Be Be Rubber Estate, 1972 KLT 613.  It is observed as under:

  • “It may well be that the legislature thought that it will not be fair or proper to deny the benefit of fixity of tenure to lessees who might have taken on lease extensive parambas or waste land and might have in course of time by their hard toil developed them into plantations.”

When Civil Court can Interfere

  • Even when a tribunal is provided for redressal of remedies, the civil courts will have jurisdiction to examine the allegation of non-compliance of the provisions of the statute or of any of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. If the challenge is only as to the ‘erroneous’ character of the order, other than ‘jurisdictional error’, the suit will not be maintainable. (South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Today Homes and Infrastructure Pvt.  Ltd.  2019-4 CivCC 150 (SC); 2019-3 CurCC 370(SC); 2019-11 Scale 33).
  • When an order is passed by a statutory Land-Tribunal violating a mandatory provision, the order will be illegal, without jurisdiction and a nullity. The civil courts which are courts of “general jurisdiction” can decide whether a tribunal or authority exercising statutory jurisdiction has acted in excess or beyond the statutory powers. The civil courts can interfere when the order of the statutory tribunal or authority is really not an order under the Act conferring jurisdiction on it. In other words, if a tribunal abuses its power or does not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions (Firm Seth Radha Kishan v. Ludhiana Municipality AIR 1963 SC 1547), the jurisdiction of the civil court will not be excluded. The ultimate decision can be challenged, in spite of finality and exclusionary clauses (or provision for appeal/revision), since the jurisdiction had been assumed by the tribunal, where it did not exist, and the decision was not a decision under the Act, but a nullity(Muhammad Haji v. Kunhunni Nair, AIR  1993 Ker 104).

A purchase certificate shall not bind one who was not party to the proceedings

In Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023) held as under:

  • “Doubtlessly, a purchase certificate shall not bind a party, who is not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate.”

Civil court to declare and decide on title

Civil court alone has the jurisdiction to make the declaration and decide on title.  

  • In Joginer Singh v. Pushpa, AIR 1969 P& H 397 it was pointed out – all civil matters have to be settled by the civil Courts unless their jurisdiction is taken away either expressly or by necessary implication.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Taluk Land Board cannot initiate action of its own, otherwise than directed by Land Board

  • State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR1996 SC 1009:
  • “Section 85(7) provides that where any person fails to file the statement, the Land Board shall intimate the fact to the Taluk Land Board and thereupon the Taluk Land Board shall, after necessary enquiries, determine the extent and other particulars of the land or lands which is or are to be surrendered. In other words, the statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit and if such a person fails to file the statement in accordance with law, the Board is enjoined to proceed against such person.”

Whether Private Land or Government Land – Outside jurisdiction of TLB

  • The Kerala High Court, in Jagadeesachandran Nair Vs. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584, refused to call for the TLB proceedings in the Writ Petition filed by the State of Kerala before the High Court for calling for the records of the Taluk Land Board constituted under the Kerala Land Reforms Act to quash certain proceedings, claiming that the large extent of land held by the respondent was liable to be forfeited under the Kerala Escheats and Forfeitures Act, 1950. The State contended that there was gross violation of the land laws and FERA. The State also asserted a fraud on the Constitution of India, warranting immediate action in public interest and based on public policy as enjoined under Article 296 of the Constitution.
  • Analysing this decision it is pointed out in Harrisons Malayalam Ltd, v. State of Kerala, 2018 (2) Ker LT 369, that in Jagadeesachandran’s case it was noticed that the question whether the land was a private land or a government land was totally outside the scope of the proceedings pending before the TLB.
  • Title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54).

Ancillary relief could also be granted by the civil court

In law, when the main relief, title declaration, is cognisable by civil court the ancillary relief would be immaterial for determination of proper forum; and in such cases the ancillary relief could also be granted by the civil court (Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526). 

In Gurucharansingh v. Gurdayal Kaur, AIR 1982 Raj  91, it is held as under:

  • “Once the suit is maintainable for the main relief in the civil court then there is no bar for the civil court to grant all possible reliefs flowing from the same cause of action. The determination of the question as to which out of the several reliefs arising from the same cause of action is the main relief will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.”

The High Court quoted the following principles laid down in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526, FB:

  • “(1) Where, on the basis of a cause of action, the main relief is cognizable by a revenue court, the suit would be cognizable by the revenue court only. The fact that the ancillary reliefs claimed are cognizable by civil court would be immaterial for determining the proper forum for the suit;
  • (2) Where, on the basis of a cause of action, the main relief is cognizable by the civil court, the suit would be cognizable by the civil court only and the ancillary reliefs, which could be granted by the revenue court may also be granted by the civil court.”

Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar, 1969 All. 526 is referred to several decisions. It include the following recent decisions –

  • Jagir Singh v. Kulwant Kaur, 2023-1 CurCC 291;
  • Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Jitendra Pratap Singh, 2021-7 ADJ 651;
  • 2021-6 AllLJ 91; Vijay Pal v. Rajendra Kumar, 2021-4 ADJ 182; 2021-4 AllLJ 351;
  • Shanti @ Satiya v. Phoolan Dullaiya, AIR 2016 All  137

Is the Tenant of a Plantation a Cultivating Tenant?

  • Yes.
  • Sec. 2(8) defines cultivating tenant as under:
  • Cultivating tenant means a tenant who is in actual possession of, and is entitled to cultivate, the land comprised in his holding.”

Can Purchase-Certificate be given to Plantation-Land, over & above Ceiling-Limit?

  • No.
  • Because, under Sec. 72B(2) a cultivating tenant is entitled to get assigned the area within the ceiling limit under Sec. 82 alone.

Sec. 72B reads as under:

  • “72B. Cultivating tenants right to assignment. – (1) The cultivating tenant of any holding or part of a holding, the right, title and interest in respect of which have vested in the Government under Section 72, shall be entitled to assignment of such right, title and interest: ….. ….
  • (2) The provisions of Section 82 shall, so far as may be, apply to the calculation of the ceiling area for the purposes of the proviso to Sub-section (1);
  • (3) (4) (5)

Is Purchase Certificate (inaccurate on its face, or fraud, for excess of the ceiling area) Conclusive Proof?

  • No.

Our Apex Court considered this matter in Chettian Veetil Ammad v. Taluk Land Board, AIR 1979 SC 1573; 1980 1 SCC 499 (P.N. Shinghal & O. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.) where Purchase Certificate was issued, excess of the ceiling area, as under:

  • “27. It would thus appear that even though the certificate of purchase issued under sub-section (1) of Section 72-K is conclusive proof of the assignment of the right, title and interest of the landowner in favour of the holder in respect of the holding concerned under sub-section (2), that only means that no contrary evidence shall be effective to displace it, unless the so called conclusive proof is inaccurate on its face, or fraud can be shown (Halsburys – Laws of England, fourth edition, Vol. 17, page 22 paragraph 28), It may be stated that “inaccuracy on the face” of the certificate is not as wide in its connotation as an “error apparent on the face of the record.” It will not therefore be permissible for the Board to disregard the evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase merely on the ground that it has not been issued on a proper appreciation or consideration of the evidence on record, or that the. Tribunals finding suffers from any procedural error. What sub-section (2) of Section 72-K provides is an irrebuttable presumption of law, and it may will be regarded as a rule of substantive law. But even so, for reasons already stated, it does not thereby take away the jurisdiction of the Taluk Land Board to make an order under Section 85 (5) after taking into consideration the “conclusive” evidentiary value of the certificate of purchase according to Section 72-K (2) as far as it goes.”

It is also noteworthy (as stated above) that a purchase certificate shall not bind one, who was not party to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, having better title over the property covered by the purchase certificate (Thayukutty v. Manikandan, the Kerala High Court (2023).

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala – Based on the Principle: LT to fix Tenancy’; TLB to Fix Plantation Exemption.

In Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it is pronounced that the tenants who have not approached the Land  Tribunal and established rights as “cultivating tenant” are not entitled to avail benefits on “Fixity of Tenure”, under Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963.

It is pointed out – when a title claim is raised by the Government or the Devaswom, the person who claims to be a cultivating tenant –

  • will have to first prove their claim of being a cultivating tenant, entitled to fixity of tenure, under the provisions of the KLR Act through a proper process of law.

It is held as under:

  • “This is pertinent because, under Section 72B(3) of the KLR Act, it is legally obligated on every cultivating tenant, entitled to assignment of right, title and interest in respect of any property, to apply to the Land Tribunal, within whose jurisdiction that the property is situated, within two years from the date of vesting of such title and interest.”

It is based upon the following principles of law:

  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and claim benefits under KLR Act.
  • Land Tribunal is the sole authority to determine if someone is a Cultivating Tenant or not.
  • The TLB, deals with exemption on the ground of plantation, excess land issues etc., and determines the land to be surrendered.

Cultivating Tenants (‘Entitled to Assignment’) are Obligated to Apply LT

Balanoor Plantations & Industries Ltd. v. State of Kerala, 2018(3) KLT 283, it was laid down that only cultivating tenants, entitled to fixity of tenure under Section 13 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, would be “entitled to hold possession over the property and to resist action under the KLC Act”.

Sec. 72B provides for cultivating tenant’s rights to get assignment by purchase certificate (through LT) – within ceiling area. A Tenant was “obligated to apply” for the purchase certificate within 2 years from 1-1-1970.

Sec. 73B(3) reads as under:

  • “(3) Any cultivating tenant entitled to assignment of the right, title and interest in respect of a holding or part of a holding under Sub­section (1) may apply to the Land Tribunal within whose jurisdiction such holding or part is situate within two years from the date of vesting of such right, title and interest in the Government under Section 72, or such further time as may be allowed by the Government in this behalf, for such assignment to him.”

The Legal Basis of Balanoor Plantations case

  • A tenant cannot declare himself to be a cultivating-tenant and avail benefits – the competent statutory authority (for the same) under the KLR Act is the Land Tribunal.

It is similar to the principle – title to the property is not decided by the TLB (Harikumar v. State of Kerala, 2013 (2) KLT 44 (Para 9) Jagadeesachandran Nair v. Mamomohanan Pandarathil, 2013 (4) KLT 584 (para 11); Both decisions were referred to in Harrisons Malayalam Limited v. State of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, 2018-2 KHC 719; 2018-2 KLT 369 (para 54). [See also: Ganapathy Acharya v. Bhaskaran (TLV Iyer, J.), ILR 1993-3 (Ker) 736; 1993 2 KLT 962.]

Extent of Land that for which a Purchase Certificate can be issued by LT

If a cultivating tenant (of a plantation land) possessed land at or above the ceiling limit, no purchase certificate can be issued to him, from the plantation property in question. 

If a tenant holds some land, he will receive a Purchase Certificate for the extent – equal to the Ceiling Limit minus the land he already possesses.

If such a tenant holds land at or above the ceiling limit (and, for that reason,  no purchase certificate can be given with respect to the plantation property), proceedings are to be promulgated, or an order is to be issued, by the Land Tribunal  to that effect, if it finds that he is a cultivating tenant of that plantation. This proceedings also has to be presented with the lease-agreement and other documents, before the Taluk Land Board, for getting the order of exemption.  

Tenant has to pay Rent to the Government

In any case, the tenants who are found to be cultivating tenants entitled to hold the plantation tenancy land, under exemption, have to pay rent to the Government as provided under Sec. 72E for the unassigned land(e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72 (and the Land Tribunal has to fix the rent under subsection (5)(h) of Sec. 72F).  If such land is acquired by the Government  compensation for improvements alone need be paid to the tenant [and no land-value be given, under Sec. 112(5A)]. 

Effect of Travancore Govt. Leases after Royal Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061

The Proclamation of 1040 reads thus:

“PROCLAMATION

By His Highness the Maha Rajah of Travancore, issued under date the 2nd June 1865, corresponding to the 21st Edavam 1040.

Whereas we earnestly desire that the possession of landed as well as other property in Our territory should be as secure as possible; and whereas We are of opinion that, with this view, Sirkar Pattom lands can be placed on a much better footing than at present so as to enhance their value; We are pleased to notify to Our ryots

  • Istly- that the Sirkar hereby and for ever surrenders, for the benefit of the people all optional power over the following classes of lands, whether wet, garden or dry, and whether included in the Ayacut accounts or registered since:
  • Ven Pattom, Vettolivoo Pattom, Maraya Pattom, Olavoo Pattom, Mara Pattom, and all such Durkast Pattom the tax of which is understood to be fixed till the next Survey and Assessment;
  • 2ndly. that the ryots holding these lands may regard them fully as private, heri-table, saleable, and otherwise transferable, property;
  • 3rdly. accordingly, the sales, mortgages, & e., of these lands will hence-forward be valid; may be effected on stamped cadjans and will be duly registered; the lands may be sold for arrears of tax, in execution of decrees of Courts and such other legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted as security by the Sirkar as well as by private individuals;
  • 4thly. that the holders of the lands in question may rest assured that they may enjoy them undisturbed so long as the appointed assessment is paid;
  • 5thly. that the said holders are hence-forth at full liberty to lay out labour and capital on their lands of the aforesaid description to any extent they please, being sure of continued and secure possession;
  • 6thly. that the aforesaid description of lands will be resumable by the Sirkar like Jenmom and other private lands only for purely public purposes, as for instance, for making roads, canals, public buildings, & e., and when resumed for such purposes compensation will be paid by the Sirkar not for improvements only as here to fore, but equal, to the full market value of such lands;
  • 7thly. that the foregoing concessions are not however to be understood to affect in any way the rights of the Sirkar to regulate the land tax, to resume escheats, to confiscate the property of criminals, and generally such rights as have heretofore been exercised upon all property in general;
  • 8thly. that it is to be understood that when Pattom land being a portion of a holding, is transferred to a pauper, with the view of defrauding the Sirkar of the tax due to it, the Sirkar will have the right of apportioning the tax so as to prevent loss of revenue; and,
  • 9thly. (Repealed by Proclamation dated the 5th Karkadakam 1059). (Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86 : Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez Vs Albert Fernandez, AIR 1971 Ker 168; 1971 Ker LT 1.)

Royal Proclamation of 1061 (1886) Brings in Further Radical Changes

Paragraph 9 of the Proclamation of 1061 says, with reference to Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, as regards Pandarapattam lands, as under:

  • “these lands were originally the absolute property of Government, and the tenants were mere tenants-at-will; but, by the Royal Proclamation of the 21st Edavam 1040, Government generously waived all right to these lands, and declared them to be the private, hereitable, saleable property of the holders.”

Section 22 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 (1886) made radical changes in land tenure.

Those changes were:

  • (1)   no debt shall be recognised as due to the holder;
  • (2) no interest shall be deducted from the Pattom on such debt;  
  • (3) no reduction of debt or a corresponding enhancement of the Sirkar demand shall be made when such properties were transferred by sale.
  • The properties held on the tenures in question shall be recognised as so many favourably assessed lands or Inams and confirmed to the holders as such.

Clause 7 of Section 24 of the Proclamation provided as under:

  • “There shall be no further interference on the part of the Government with these free holds, except such as might be necessary for the punctual realization of the quit rent payable”.(Quoted in: Padmanabharu Govindaru  v. The State of Kerala, AIR 1963 Ker 86.)

Now a question arises: What is the impact of 1040 and 1061 (1886) Proclamations over the ‘Government Land Leases’ made after 1061 (1886)? Do such leased lands qualify as “estate” under Article 31A of the Constitution?

The legitimate answer is that the lands leased out (by the Government) after 1061 (1886) do not acquire the rights of ‘permanency of tenure’ or attain the ‘proprietary interest’ conferred by the Pattom Proclamations of 1040 and 1061. If such rights are axiomatically conferred as a matter of course, the result would be that the Government cannot ‘lease’ lands (after the Proclamations), for, the lease character would be lost at the moment it is made.

In Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (five Judge Bench), 1971 Ker LT 1, AIR 1971 Ker 168 (Per PT Raman Nayar, CJ, T Krishnamoorthy Iyer, P Unnikrishna Kurup, JJ.), concluded that the land covered by the Royal Proclamations of 1040 and 1061 were “estates” falling under Art. 31A of the Constitution. It was on the finding that the Proclamation “secured permanency of tenure”, and “proprietary interest” in the soil. It was observed as under:

  • “7. It is impossible to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in this case that,even after the Proclamation of 1040, the holders of these lands had no proprietary interest whatsoever in the soil and remained tenants in the strict sense of that term, with only the right of enjoyment, the only difference being that they secured permanency of tenure, the Government still remaining the full and absolute proprietor of the soil.”

Therefore, there is a clear difference between leases made before and after the Proclamations, and the rights conferred by the Proclamations do not apply to leases made after them.

‘Pandarappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) were Recorded as “Thettoms

The ‘pandaravakappattoms’ before 1061 (1886) to which benefits of proprietary rights were conferred under the Proclamations (1040 and 1061) were recorded in 1910 Travancore Settlement Register as “Thettoms” (such as Devaswom Thettom, Namboori Thettom etc.)

  • Note: When those properties (upon which Brhamins or Devaswoms had pandarappattom rights) were sold or leased, they were termed in the transfer-deeds as “Devaswom Thettom”, “Namboori Thettom”.

Also Read: Plantation-Tenants Not Approached The Land Tribunal are Ineligible for Plantation-Exemption-Orders from the Land Board

End Notes

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II 
3(1)
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7 EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Hec. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51BLandlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply LT.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT, after enquiries, passes orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings.
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BProvides for ‘cultivating tenants’ rights to get assignment  – purchase certificate (through LT) within ceiling area as provided under sub-section (2) ; (apply within 2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-applying – See: Balanur Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch tenant is liable to pay rent to the Government (for the unassigned land (e.g. exempted plantation land) vested in Government under Sec. 72) .
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chap. III 
81
Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertaking etc.
Proviso – There will be exemption (as plantation, land given to educational institution, trust etc.) on Government lands, given under grant, lease etc.
See: HMT (Machine Tools) Limited v. Taluk Land Board, 2009 (3) KLJ 110; MT Joseph v.  State of Kerala, AIR 1974 Ker 28.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB), Raghunath Laxman Wani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants of plantation (who owns and hold properties) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
(Before 1. 1. 1970)
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
(After 1. 1. 1970)
S. 72B – cultivating tenant to apply to the LT, for Purchase Certificate.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government [fixed by the LT] on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
S. 72F(5) – Land Tribunal shall issue notice to consider the claims and objections from the land owner or intermediaries, and pass an order specifying, inter alia, the rent [under S. 72F(5)(h) ] payable by the cultivating tenant to the Government.
S. 72F(6) & (7) – LT shall pass Orders on encumbrance or charge for maintenance or alimony and compensation payable to the landowner or that intermediary.
It is not lawful to initiate Suo Motu proceedings (under Section 72C) by the Government for the benefit of a Plantation Tenant (entitled, within the time allowed, to purchase a certificate below the ceiling limit), because Explanation II to Section 87 disfavours the fragmentation of the plantation land.
Still, because of subsection (3) of Section 85, the tenant could have obtained a purchase certificate (under Section 72B) within the statutory period.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2), LB shall intimate TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also have to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suomotu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. and Taluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing applies to property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person gets a portion of plantation-land on converion/ fragmentation (sale/transfer) of an exempted-plantation-land, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for that portion. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)

Read Connected Blogs:



Read in this Cluster (Click on the Topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

State-Interference in Affairs of Societies & Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Introduction
  • 2.      Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’
  • 3.      Management and Vesting of Property of Societies, Separate
  • 4.      TN So. Regn. Act Provides for Compulsory Election
  • 5.      Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Supervisory in Nature
  • 6.      Art. 19 (1)(c) & Takeover – Considerations: Public interest
  • 7.      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State
  • 8.      Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down
  • 9.      Parliament Cannot Infringe Constil. Rights:  Damyanti’s Case
  • 10.    Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases
  • 11.    Authorities Required To Record Reasons
  • 12.    Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned
  • 13.    Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute
  • 14.    A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:
  • 15.    Take-over and Appointment of Administrator
  • 16.    Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest
  • 17.    Take Over: Management of Property, for a limited period
  • 18.    Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel
  • 19.    Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary
  • 20.    Formation of Assons. – Different From Running Business
  • 21.    Escheat

1. Introduction

Article 19(1)(c) of our Constitution guarantees freedom and right ‘to form associations or unions’. The right to ‘form’ association includes in itself the right for effective functioning of the association so as to enable it to achieve its lawful objectives.  Article 19 lays down

  • Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc. – 
  • (1) All citizens shall have the right. –
    • (a)….  (b) …. 
    • (c) to form associations or unions, co -operative societies; 
    • (d) … (e) … (f) … (g) . … 
  • (2) ….
  • (3) … 
  • (4) Nothing in Sub -clause (c) of the said clause shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub clause.
  • (5) … 
  • (6) ….”

2. Article 19(1)(c) ‘Reasonable Restrictions’

The right to form associations is not absolute. It is not incapable of regulation; because, it is subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’, which the State can impose, as laid down in clause (4) of Article 19.[1] In A. Umarani Vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies[2] the Apex Court has observed that except playing supervisory role, the State has no administrative control over the day-to-day affairs of a co-operative society. 

Following are the important Apex Court rulings on this point:

  • Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd Vs. State of Kerala.[3]
  • Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India.[4]
  • SP Mittal V. Union of India.[5]
  • LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development Vs. State of Bihar.[6]
  • Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab.[7]
  • Kamareddy Suryanarayana Vs. District Co-operative Officer[8]
  • All India Bank Employees’ case.[9]
  • The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic and Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs. The State of Delhi.[10]
  • State of Madras v. V.G. Row.[11]

3. Management and Vesting of Property of Societies[12], Separate

In Pamulapati Buchi Naidu College Committee, Nidubrolu Vs. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh[13] it is observed in para 27:

  • “If what is vested in the College Committee or its governing body is a right of management simpliciter, there is no question of the members of the society or the members of the governing body being beneficially interested in its property. It necessarily follows that by the fact of appointment of a treasurer, there can be no deprivation of the society of its rights in property. The consequence, which would flow on the appointment of a treasurer by the Government under the provisions of the Charitable Endowments Act, would be that he will take charge of the management of the properties held by the society. There is no divesting of the rights of the society in its properties. As already stated, what all the society is deprived of would be right of management which cannot be equated to any right in the property.”[14]

In Rev. Father Farcisus Mascarenhas Vs. The State of Bombay,[15] it was contended that the Roman Catholic Churches were governed by the canon law and that the provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act which mandated registration  under the provisions of the Act contravened the fundamental rights of the Catholics; but, it was observed in the judgment that the provisions of the Bombay Act did not affect the fundamental rights of the Roman Catholics to hold property but they could only administer the property of the Church in conformity with law.

4. T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

No Violation of ‘Fundamental Right to Form Association’

No Constitutional Guarantee – Without Interference by Law

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(3) and 15(4) provide that the office of any member of the Committee cannot ensure beyond a period of three years and thereafter the election process has necessarily got to be adopted. S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, Trichy Vs. State of TN[16] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

5. Co-op. Registrar’s Powers Regulatory or Supervisory in Nature

Our Apex Court in Thalappalam Ser. Co-op. Bank Ltd. Vs. State of Kerala[17] observed as under:

  • “34. … Powers exercised by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and others under the Co-operative Societies Act are only regulatory or supervisory in nature, which will not amount to dominating or interfering with the management or affairs of the society so as to be controlled.”[18]

6. Art. 19 (1)(c) & TakeoverConsiderations: Public interest[19]

Within its sphere of activity, an association has the right of internal management. Nevertheless, if its functioning is deleterious to the interests of its members or the general public,[20] the association-right in the Constitution of India [Art. 19 (1)(c)] does not render the institution immune from take-over of management by the State or the executive agencies invoking the powers given in the statute concerned,[21] or by proper legislation.[22] The existence of the association-right, ipso facto, is no guarantee that if the functioning of  the  institution  is  not  conducive  to  its  objects,  it  would nevertheless be left alone.[23] 

The Supreme Court, in LN Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar,[24] upheld the Constitutional validity of an Ordinance (later replaced by an Act) under which an Institute (Lalit Narain Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna – started by a Society with the same name) was taken over by the State Government ‘to ensure a high level of educational and training facilities and the co-ordination of the training with important industrial and business units’. The Ordinance had been challenged alleging mala fides, and on the ground of infraction of fundamental right to form an association under Article 19(1)(c). It is held:

  • “The fundamental right guaranteed under Art.19 (1)(c) does not extend to or embrace within it the objects or purposes or the activities of an association. In other words, it does not carry with it a further guarantee that the objects or purposes or activities of an association so formed shall not be interfered with by-law except on grounds as mentioned in Article 19 (4), viz., sovereignty and integrity of India or public order or morality.”

Our Apex Court, in Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India,[25] summarised the finding in L.N. Mishra Institute as under:

  •  “All assets and properties were vested in the State Government, and the Commissioner was deemed to have taken charge of the Institute. As all incidence of ownership and management were taken over by the State, what was left to the Society was paper ownership and management. Turning down the challenge, this Court held that the impugned Ordinance and the Act merely took over the Institute. Although, the name of the Society and of the Institute are the same, they were two different entities. The impugned legislations took over the Institute and not the Society. No restriction whatsoever was imposed on the functioning of the Society. The provisions of the Act referred to the Institute. The Institute constituted one of the activities of the Society. The petitioner-Society had constituted itself into an association in exercise of the fundamental right conferred by Article 19(1)(c). That right of that Society remains unimpaired and un-interfered with by the impugned Act and Ordinance.”

In OK Ghose Vs. EK Joseph[26] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held that the restriction placed on Government Servants to form unions infringed the fundamental right of the Government servants to form associations or unions guaranteed under Art.19 (1) (c) and could not be justified as a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of public order under Art.19 (4). But, the Court reiterated what had been said by other Constitution Benches earlier that the rule prohibiting Government Servants from striking was valid as there was no fundamental right to strike.

7. Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs. State

In this celebrated decision[27] our Apex Court upheld the right of State Legislature to enact The Tibia College Act, 1952 with respect to the management of a registered society. The enactment was necessitated when the College had been mismanaged and struggle ensued between the trustees. 

8. Take-Over: Enactment Struck Down

As Failed to Make Provision for Restoration of Elected Body

In Asom Rastrabhasa Prachar Samiti Vs. State of Assam,[28] the impugned Act was enacted to meet a contingency for taking over of the management of the Prachar Samiti, temporarily. However, it failed to make any provision for the restoration of the elected body in due course. Not only were new members introduced into the Samiti, no norms were laid down for nominating the government nominees (who could be any one), and the elected members were kept away from the control of the Samiti. On the facts of the case and the implications of the provisions contained in the impugned enactment, the Court concluded that the right of association was virtually taken away; and in the name of temporary control and management on the affairs of the society, what was done was a permanent deprivation. In response to a query raised by the Court it had been stated by the State that the State had no desire to restore the Samiti. The impugned legislative provision was, therefore, struck down as violative of Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

9. Parliament Cannot Infringe Constitutional Rights:  Damyati’s Case

The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act considered in Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India,[29] compulsorily altered the composition of the Sammelan, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Our Apex Court held that the Act was a breach of the ‘right to form association’; because, it violated the composite right of forming an association and the right to continue it as the original members desired. The Parliament had enacted the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act under which outsiders were permitted to become members of the Sammelan, without the volition of the original members.

It was held that the Parliament cannot alter the composition of the society itself. The members, who voluntarily formed the Association, cannot be compelled to act in that Association with other members who have been imposed as members by the Act and in whose admission to membership they had no say. The Constitution confers an association and its members the right to refuse membership to those who are not acceptable to the existing body of members.

The alteration in the composition of the Association itself clearly interferes with the right to continue to function as members of the Association which was voluntarily formed by the original founders.

The Court held further:

  • “The right to form an association, in our opinion, necessarily implies that the persons forming the Association have also the right to continue to be associated with only those whom they voluntarily admit in the Association. Any law, by which members are introduced in the voluntary Association without any opinion being given to the members to keep them out, or any law which takes away the membership of those who have voluntarily joined it, will be a law violating the right to form an association”.[30]

10. Damyanti’s Case Distinguished in Subsequent Cases

Damyanti’s case is distinguished in several cases, including the following cases, pointing out that the Government had, in that case, interfered in the management of the Society:

  • Rajasthan Cricket Association case;[31]
  • Delhi Police, NKG Sangh case;[32]  
  • Bhandara Distt. Central Co-op Societies case;[33] and 
  • Dharam Dutt’s case.[34]

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab,[35] Damyanti’s case was distinguished on the ground that it was a case where an unregistered society was, by statute, converted into a registered society which bore no resemblance whatever to the original society; and that the new members could be admitted in large numbers so as to reduce the original members to an insignificant minority. In State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd[36] it was pointed out that the Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Act, considered in Damyati’s case, was violative of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, as it stood then.

The composition of the society itself was transformed by the Act and the voluntary nature of the association of the members who formed the original society was totally destroyed. And, it contravened the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(l)(f).[37]

11. Authorities Required To Record Reasons

It has been held in Km. Neelima Misra Vs. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal[38] and S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India[39] that an administrative order which involves civil consequences must give reasons. S.N. Mukherjee’s case it was observed:

  • “For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision”.

In Union of India Vs. E.G. Nambudiri[40] it is observed:

  • “Where an administrative authority is required to act judicially it is also under an obligation to record reasons. But every administrative authority is not under any legal obligation to record reasons for its decision, although, it is always desirable to record reasons to avoid any suspicion. Where a statute requires an authority though acting administratively to record reasons, it is mandatory for the authority to pass speaking orders and in the absence of reasons the order would be rendered illegal. But in the absence of any statutory or administrative requirement to record reasons, the order of the administrative authority is not rendered legal for absence of reasons. If any challenge is made to the validity of an order on the ground of it being arbitrary or mala fide, it is always open to the authority concerned to place reasons before the court which may have persuaded it to pass the orders. Such reasons must already exist on records as it is not permissible to the authority to support the order by reasons not contained in the records. Reasons are not necessary to be communicated to the Government servant. If the statutory rules require communication of reasons, the same must be, communicated but in the absence of any such provision absence of communication of reasons does not affect the validity of the order”.

12. Take-Over: Bad, Where No Provision in the Acts Concerned

In IIT College of Engineering Vs. State of HP[41] our Apex Court did not approve the take-over of the management of an unaided private college by the Administrator as there was no provision in the AICTE Act or the H.P. Education Act or the University Act authorizing such an action. The Court observed that the imposition of an Administrator to take over the reins of administration for an indefinite period[42] would undoubtedly amount to interference with the right of administering and managing a private educational institution which is now recognised to be a part of the fundamental right under Article 19(l)(g) as held by this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of Karnataka.

13. Co-operative Societies – Created by Statute

Co-operative societies being creatures of the statute, once a Co-operative Society is formed and registered, the rights of the society and that of its members stand abridged by the provisions of the Act. The activities of the societies are controlled by the statute. Therefore, there cannot be any objection to statutory interference with their composition or functioning merely on the ground of contravention of individual’s right of freedom of association by statutory functionaries.[43]

14. A Member Cannot Assail Statutory Interference:

In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab[44] it is held, distinguishing Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India, [45] as under:

  • “In the cases before us we are concerned with Co-operative societies which from the inception are governed by statute. They are created by statute, they are controlled by statute and so, there can be no objection to statutory interference with their composition on the ground of contravention of the individual right of freedom of association.”[46]

Our Apex Court further held that once a person becomes a member of a Co-operative Society, he loses his individuality qua the Society and he has no independent rights except those given to him by the statute and the bye laws. This view has also been approved in State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd.[47] wherein our Apex Court has held that no individual member is entitled to assail the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act, rules and the bye-laws as he has his right under the Act, rules and the bye-laws and is subject to its operation. The stream cannot rise higher than the source.

15. Take-over and Appointment of Administrator: Allowed Prayer

For No Action by Authorities, in spite of Mismanagement.

In a Public Interest Litigation in Sanjay Gupta Vs. State of M.P.[48] it was pleaded that due to irregularities and mismanagement of the society the future of near about 1200 students who were getting education in the college and schools run by a Society was in dark. The petitioner prayed to takeover the society and to appoint an administrator. The Court found that in spite of the adverse reports, no action had been taken by the authorities. Observing that the right to receive proper education is a part and parcel of Article 21 of the Constitution and considering the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal Vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal[49] it was held that a writ petition in the shape of PIL was maintainable.

The Court appointed the Additional Collector, Gwalior as Administrator of the Society and gave directions for election and investigation in regard to financial irregularities in the light of Sec. 32 and 33 of the M.P. Societies Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973.

16. Take-over: Balance Between Institutional and Public Interest

In Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India[50] the impugned legislation was held to be a reasonable legislation enacted in the interest of the general public and to govern an institution of national importance, and therefore, it was found to be valid.

It is held in this decision:

  • “The new body takes over the activities of the pre-existing society by running the Institution which too is known as ICWA. So far as the society ICWA is concerned, it has been left intact, untouched and un-interfered with. There is no tampering with the membership or the governing body of the society. The society is still free to carry on its other activities. No membership of the old society has been dropped. No new member has been forced or thrust upon the society. The impugned legislation nominates members who will be members of the council, the new body corporate, different from the society. The pith and substance of the impugned legislation is to take-over an institution of national importance and an individual activity which would fall outside the purview of these Articles.”

Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education,[51] arose when the management of a school was taken over under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973, after issuing show cause notice, pointing out confrontation between the management of the school and a section of the teaching staff as also .the conflict between the management of the school and the authorities. It was observed that taking over of management of the school would involve a conflict between individual or institutional interest on the one hand, and public interest, which is sought to be served by the takeover, on the other. There is the imperative need to balance the two requirements. It was observed:

  • “While it is not possible to put the conditions which may justify a takeover of a management in the strait-jacket of a judicially evolved definition, there could be no doubt that the takeover of a management of an institution would, ordinarily, be resorted to where other measures to deal with the affairs of an institution complained of, have failed to achieve the desired result.”

17. Take Over Management of Property, for a limited period:

In SP Mittal Vs. Union of India,[52] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court held, inter alia, that assuming but not holding that the Society or Auroville were a religious denomination, the Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Act,  which took over the management of Auroville, for a limited period, was not hit by Article 25 or 26. It did not curtail the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. It was observed in this case that ‘the right of management in matters of religion of a religious denomination’ under Article 26(b) was not taken away by this enactment; what was taken away was the right of management of the property of Auroville which was a secular matter. So also the Act did not curtail the right of any section of citizens to conserve its own language, script or culture conferred by Article 29. An activity, secular in nature, though assumed to be of the Society or the organization to be of religious denomination, did not adversely affect the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice and propagate one’s own religion. The Constitution Bench has drawn a distinction between such activities of the institution which would necessarily fall within the purview of Articles 25, 26 or 29.

It is observed: The disciples and devoted followers of Sri Aurobindo formed the Aurobindo Society in Calcutta and got it registered as a Society with the object of preaching and propagating the ideals and teachings of Sri Aurobindo and the Mother. The Society for its Auroville project received grants and subventions from UNESCO and also from the Government of India. However, after the death of the Mother, complaints started pouring in with the Central Government which, on enquiry, revealed mismanagement of the affairs of the Society, misuse of the funds thereof and diversion of the funds meant for Auroville to other purposes. There was in-fighting between the groups of members and the situation went out of control. The Auroville (Emergency Provisions) Ordinance, 1980, was promulgated followed by an Act, whereby the management of Auroville was taken over, though for a limited period. The constitutional validity of the Act was challenged on the ground that Articles 25, 26 29 and 30 and also Article 14 were infringed; and that the Parliament had no legislative competence to enact the said Act.

18. Admission of New Members: State Cannot Compel

What is in the interest of the society is primarily for the society alone to decide and it is not for an outside agency to say.[53]

The bye laws of a Society or a Club prescribe the qualifications of the Members to be admitted. They are in the nature of contract between the members. Therefore the right of admission of new members also remains at the will and option of the members.[54] The State or an enactment cannot compel admission of members, contrary to the bye laws of a Society.[55]

It is held in A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy[56] as under:

  • “It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. This doctrine of arbitrariness is not restricted only to executive actions, but also applies to legislature. Thus, a party has to satisfy that the action was reasonable, not done in unreasonable manner or capriciously or at pleasure without adequate determining principle, rational, and has been done according to reason or judgment, and certainly does not depend on the will alone. However, the action of legislature, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, should ordinarily be manifestly arbitrary. There must be a case of substantive unreasonableness in the statute itself for declaring the act ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution …. The constitutional right to freely associate with others encompasses associational ties designed to further the social, legal and economic benefits of the members of the association. By statutory interventions, the State is not permitted to change the fundamental character of the association or alter the composition of the society itself. The significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified on the basis of any interest of the Government. …  However, when the association gets registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, it is governed by the provisions of the Act and rules framed thereunder.”

It held further: 

  • “Importing the fiction to the extent that the societies registered under the Act 1995, could be deemed to have been registered under the Act 1964 tantamount to forcing the members of the society to act under compulsion/direction of the State rather than on their free will. Such a provision is violative of the very first basic principles of cooperatives. More so, the Act is vitiated by non-application of mind and irrelevant and extraneous considerations.”

19. Action of Legislature: If Violative of Article 14, Arbitrary

When the association/society has an option/choice to get it registered under a particular (Co-operative Societies’) statute, [57] if there are more than one statute operating in the field, the State cannot force the association/society to get itself registered under a statute for which the association/society has not applied. If the State does so, it will ‘violate Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India’.  It is not permissible in law to do something indirectly, if it is not permissible to be done directly.’[58]

20. Formation of Associations Is Different From Running Business

The right of the citizens to form the association is different from running the business by that association. Therefore, right of individuals to form a society has to be understood in a completely different context. A fundamental right to form the association cannot be coupled with the fundamental right to carry on any trade or business. [59]  After an Association has been formed and the right under Art. 19(1)(c) has been exercised by the members forming it, they have no right to claim that its activities must also be permitted to be carried on in the manner they desire.[60]

In TK Rangarajan Vs State of Tamil Nadu[61] the Supreme Court has held that the right to form an association does not carry with it the right to strike work.

21.  Escheat

If a club or society is defunct and no one claims that the club or society functions, the principles and law on escheat allows the vesting of property in Government. But in case of dispute, the onus will be heavy on the State to make out a case of escheat or bona vacantia. Though only a few members of the society  have shown any interest in matters pertaining to the society for 36 years or so, it might  still not be presumed that the society was defunct that would warrant dissolution under the So. Rgn. Act.[62]


[1]      Darius Rutton Kavasmaneck Vs. Gharda Chemicals: 2014 AIR (SCW) 6441, 2015-188 Comp. Cases 291

[2]      AIR 2004 SC 4504 

[3]      2013 (16) SCC 82: 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683

[4]      AIR  2004 SC 1295

[5]      AIR 1983 SC 1

[6]      AIR 1988 SC 1136

[7]      AIR 1985 SC 973

[8]      AIR 1976 SC  340

[9]      AIR 1962 SC 171

[10]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[11]    AIR 1952 SC 196

[12]    See Chapter: Vesting of Property.

[13]    AIR 1958 AP 773

[14]    Quoted in: Chief Controlling Revenue Authority Vs. H Narasimhaiah: AIR 1991 Kar 392.

[15]    62 Bom LR 790

[16]    AIR1988 Mad 27

[17]    Thalapalam Service Co Operative Ltd Vs. Union of India: AIR 2010 Ker  6.         Appeal Judgment: Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Vs. State of Kerala: 2013 (16) SCC 82; 2013 Sup AIR (SC) 437; 2013 AIR (SC) (CIV) 2758, 2013 AIR(SCW)  5683.

[18]    See Chapter: Effect of Registration & Incorporation

[19]    See: Tika Ramji’s case: AIR 1956 SC 676;          P. Balakotaiash’s case: AIR 1958 SC 232; All India Bank Employees’ case: AIR 1962 SC 171;           Balmer Lawrie Workers Union’s case: AIR 1985 SC 311;          Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973.

[20]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135.

[21]    By virtue of Article 12.

[22]    The Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic And Unani Tibia College Vs. The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; S.P. Mittal vs. UOI: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[23]    P K Dash, Advocate Vs. Bar Council of Delhi: AIR 2016 Del 135; Daman Singh  Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985 SC 973. Also see: L.N. Mishra Institute of Econ.Development Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1988 SC 1136; Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295:  S.P. Mittal Vs. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 1: Gandhi Harijan Ucchar Madhyamik Vidyalay Vs. Director of Education:  AIR  1977 Del 240.

[24]    AIR  1988 SC 1136

[25]    AIR 2004 SC 1295. It followed SP Mittal V. Union of India: AIR 1983 SC 1.

[26]    AIR 1963 SC 812

[27]    AIR 1962 SC 458

[28]    AIR 1989 SC 2126.

[29]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[30]    Quoted in A P Dairy Development Corpn Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[31]    Rajasthan Cricket Association Vs. State of Rajasthan:   AIR 2005 Raj 144.

[32]    Delhi Police Non Gazetted Karmachari Sangh Vs. Union Of India: AIR 1987 SC 379

[33]    AIR 1993 SC 59

[34]    Dharam Dutt Vs. Union of India: AIR  2004 SC 1295

[35]    AIR  1985 SC 973.         See also: Sumangalam Hous. Soty Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;        Zoroastrian Co Operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar: AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[36]    AIR 1997 SC 1413

[37]    See also: L.N. Mishra Institute of Economic Development and Social Change, Patna Vs. State of Bihar:  AIR 1988 SC 1136.

[38]    AIR  1990 SC 1402

[39]    AIR  1990 SC 1984

[40]    AIR 1991 SC 1216

[41]    (2003) 7 SCC 73)

[42]    See also: Shri Rangaswami Vs. The Sagar Textile Mills:AIR 1977 SC 1516;         State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Jogendra Singh:  AIR 1963 SC 1618.

[43]    A P Dairy Development Corporation Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298

[44]    AIR 1985 SC 973

[45]    AIR 1971 SC 966.

[46]    Quoted in Sumangalam Co-op Housing Society Ltd Vs. Suo Motu High Court of Gujarat: AIR  2007 SC 671;         State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413;         Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR 2005  SC  2306.

[47]    AIR 1997  SC  1413:         Followed in Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co-op. Societies AIR 2005  SC  2306;        Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;        Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[48]    2014-2 MPLJ 520

[49]    (2010) 3 SCC 402

[50]    AIR  2004 SC 1295

[51]    AIR  1977 Del 240

[52]    AIR 1983 SC 1.

[53]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvanagar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295;        Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[54]    Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966;        Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973

[55]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Vs. District Registrar AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[56]    AIR 2011 SC 3298

[57]    A P Dairy Development Corn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[58]    See: Sant Lal Gupta Vs. Modern Co-op. Group Housing Society: JT 2010 (11) SC 273

[59]    Tata Engineering & Locomotives Vs. The State of Bihar:  AIR 1965 SC 40;        AP Dairy Devlopnt. Corpn. Vs. B Narasimha Reddy: AIR 2011 SC 3298.

[60]    Smt. Damyanti Naranga Vs. The Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966

[61]    AIR 2003 SC 3033

[62]    Mrigan Maity Vs. Daridra Bandhab Bhandar: 2011-4 Cal LT.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

Election & Challenge in Societies and Clubs

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Principles of General Election: Extended in General
  • 2.      “Democracy” and “Free and Fair Election”
  • 3.      Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not
  • 4.      Permanent Gov. Body and Right of Vote to Life-Members
  • 5.      No Fundamental Right or Common Law Right to Contest
  • 6.      Candidature:  An Individual Membership Right
  • 7.      Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote
  • 8.      Non-Payment of Subscription & Right to Vote in Election
  • 9.      T.N. So. Regn. Act Provides for Compulsory Election
  • 10.    Strict Pleading and Standard of Proof
  • 11.    Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts
  • 12.    Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction
  • 13.    Right To Vote or Stand as a Candidate, Not a Civil Right
  • 14. Right to Challenge an Election Is Not a Common Law Right
  • 15.    Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election
  • 16.    Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 
  • 17.    Individual and Corporate Membership Rights
  • 16.    Election Process
  • 17.    Powers of a Returning Officer
  • 18.    Duties of Returning Officer
  • 19.    Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere withElection Process
  • 20.    Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ‘Rather Limited’: Principles
  • 21.    Standard of Proof in Election Matters:
  • 22.    Temporary Injunctions
  • 23.    Technicalities of Election Petitions
  • 24.    Instances of Courts Interference before Completion
  • 25.    Court Interfere for Fair and Impartial Election
  • 26.    No Question of Estoppel if inherent illegality
  • 27.    Nomination Paper Rejected: Writ Petition not Maintainable
  • 28.    Electoral Roll:  Illegality in Preparation: Remedy
  • 29.    Electoral Roll:  Illegality in Preparation: Courts Interfere
  • 30.    Electoral Rolls: Non-inclusion: Courts Will Not Interfere
  • 31.    Electoral Roll: Preparation on Invalid Provisions
  • 32.    Electoral Roll: Election on Nonexistent Rules
  • 33.    Acceptance of List of Gov. Body District Registrar – Effect
  • 34.    Section 25 of So. Regn. Act as Amended by State of U.P
  • 35.    Non-convening of the Meetings and Acquiescence
  • 36.    Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers
  • 37.    If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities
  • 38.    Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • 2. Memorandum of association: The memorandum of association shall contain the following things, that is to say, the name of the society; the object of the society; the names, addresses, and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee, or other governing body to whom, by the rules of the society, the management of its affairs is entrusted. A copy of the rules and regulations of the society, certified to be a correct copy by not less than three of the members of the governing body, shall be filed with the memorandum of association.
  • 4. Annual list of managing body to be filed: Once in every year, on or before the fourteenth day succeeding the day on which, according to the rules of the society, the annual general meeting of the society is held, or, if the rules do not provide for an annual general meeting, in the month of January, a list shall be filed with the Registrar of joint-stock Companies, of the names, addresses and occupations of the governors, council, directors, committee or other governing body then entrusted with the management of the affairs of the society.
  • 15.Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act, no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.

1. Principles of General Election Extended to Elections in General

The principles of law under the Representation of People Act, 1951 have been extended by our courts to elections in general[1] including that in Societies and Educational Institutions.[2]

2. “Democracy” and “Free and Fair Election”

‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins. If no other authority is expressly or impliedly constituted by the bye laws of an association, the responsibility to conduct the election vests with the managing body that be in power.

In Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India,[3] our Apex Court held as under:

  • “…Therefore, the well recognised position in law is that purity in the electoral process and the conduct of the elected representatives cannot be isolated from the constitutional requirements. ‘Democracy’ and free and fair election’ are inseparable twins. There is almost an inseverable umbilical cord joining them. In a democracy the little man-voter has overwhelming importance and cannot be hijacked from the course of free and fair elections…….”

In KihotoHollohanVs.Zachillhu[4] it is held by the Supreme Court:

  • “Democracy is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution; and rule of law and free and fair elections are basic features of democracy. One of the postulates of free and fair elections is provision for resolution of election disputes as also adjudication of disputes relating to subsequent disqualifications by an independent authority.”

In NimbaRajaram Mali Vs. Collector, Jalgaon[5] held as under:

  • “In a democratic society what is important is the Will of the majority and the elected representatives must honour the will of the majority. It is immaterial to analyse and debate on the reasons behind the will of the majority or the specific reasons for such will being expressed. The will of the majority is of paramount importance and it must be respected by all elected representatives responsible for the governance of such democratic institutions. … Unless it is shown that while passing such a resolution of No Confidence Motion, there was flagrant violation of any of mandatory procedure laid down, such a resolution cannot be interfered with by the Court or statutory authorities adjudicating such disputes.”

3. So. Regn. Act: Holding Annual General Meeting is Statutory; Election Not

Sec. 4 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 postulates holding of Annual General Meeting. These provisions (also the Memorandum and Articles of Association of the society) as to holding Annual General Meetings, are mandatory; and not directory.[6]As per Sec. 2 of the Societies Registration Act the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted with the governing body.  The rules of the society have to direct the details of such entrustment.

It is pertinent to note that the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not specifically direct ‘election’ of the governing body. But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same. The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is determinedly left,under Sec. 16, to the ‘Rules and Regulations of the society’.

Sec. 16 reads:

  • Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

Article 243ZK of the Constitution Mandates Election in Co-operative Societies

Part IXBof the Constitution of India,that deals with the Co-operative Societies, is incorporated by the 97th Amendment of the Constitution. Article 243ZK, under Part IXB, reads as under:

  •  “243ZK. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law made by the Legislature of a State, the election of a board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the board so as to ensure that the newly elected members of the board assume office immediately on the expiry of the office of the members of the outgoing board.
  • (2) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to a cooperative society shall vest in such an authority or body, as may be provided by the Legislature of a State, by law:
  • Provided that the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for the procedure and guidelines for the conduct of such election.”

4. Permanent Governing Body and Right of Vote to Life-Members

Holding election in a society (not Co-operative Societies) being not statutory, it can be demonstrated that the requirements in the definition of a member in Section 15 (payment of subscription and signature in the roll/list of members) do not control the right to vote in an election and to stand as a candidate (an individual membership right). It is also noteworthy that the definition of ‘Member’ (in Sec.15) is not exhaustive; and it is limited to ‘for the purposes of this Act’ alone. It is clear that it is a matter left for the bye laws. 

Sec. 15 reads as under:

  • Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members:…. …

If the provisions in the bye laws of a Society gives right of vote to the life-members or honourary-members, who have not signed the roll/list of members, or even members in arrears, they may be valid. It can as well be argued that in case the bye laws of a society provide for permanent governing body, without an election, the same (so also nomination of governing body by an ‘outsider’) will not be illegal; and it may not be legitimate to argue that the provisions of such bye laws are unreasonable or opposed to ‘public policy’[7] on the premise that bye laws of a society or a club is a contract[8] amongst its members.

The above argument may be countered by urging that when a person becomes a member of the society, he would have no independent rights, and lose his individuality[9] qua the society except those that are given to him by the statutes concerned and bye laws;[10] and the rights of members merge in the rights of the society.[11] In State of UP Vs. CD Chheoki Employees Co-operative Society,[12] our Apex Court explicated it with the analogy that the stream cannot rise higher than the source.

7. Disqualified Members

As shown above, the definition of ‘Member’ (in Sec.15) in the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is not exhaustive, as it is ‘for the purposes of this Act’alone.

The second limb of Section 15 reads as under:

  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act, no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months.

The words in the second limb of Section 15, refers to ‘all proceedings under this Act’.Therefore, the disqualifications (in votingand counting as a member)are confined[13] to the activities enjoined in the Act alone –that is, to take part in the meeting (i) to make bye laws (S. 9), (ii) to amend the ‘purposes’ (S. 12), (iii) to take decision to ‘amalgamate’ with another society (S.12), and (iv) for dissolution (S. 13).

The wording, ‘whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months’, may also support the view that there can be ‘permanent members’.

5. No Fundamental Right or Common Law Right to Contest Election

 The rights of a person to contest an election or to challenge it is neither a fundamental right nor a common law right; but are statutory rights[14]or rights originate from the bye laws of an association.[15]

6. Candidature:  An Individual Membership Right

Right to stand as a candidate for election as a Director of the Company is well accepted as an individual membership right.[16] Our courts have held that the general principles governing the individual membership rights, and right of suit, of an individual share holder (or a member) of the company would apply to the members of societies or clubs also.[17]

8. Non-Payment of Subscription & Right to Vote in Election

Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act does not direct expulsion or removal of member from the society for nonpayment of subscription; in any case, unless an opportunity of hearing is given to the member.[18] Section 15 of the Societies Registration Act only lays down that such member cannot be entitled to vote or participate in the meeting. However, that does not mean that notice of the meeting itself should not be issued to him.

9. T.N. Societies Registration Act Provides for Compulsory Election

Deviating from the (Central) So. Registration Act, 1860, T.N. Societies Registration Act, 1975, Sections 15(4) provides that ‘the term of office of the members of the committee shall not exceed three years from the date of their appointment’.S. 26(4) enables the Registrar to depute an officer to be present at the general meetings of the Institution and the Charitable Society.

In Periyar Self-respect Propaganda Institution, TrichyVs. State of TN[19] the constitutional validity of these provisions were upheld observing the following:

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society arid certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. …..  As rightly contended by the learned Advocate General appearing for the State, neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, nor the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterised as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. This is not a case where the composition of the association is being altered. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

10.Strict Pleading and Standard of Proof

An election petition is a strict statutory proceeding.[20]In JaganNathVs.Jaswant Singh[21] it is observed:

  • “The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and the Court possesses no common law power.”[22]

In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election. The election proceedings are akin to criminal proceedings.[23]

It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[24] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

11.Validity of Election: Jurisdiction with Courts; not with Registrar.

            Though Section 36(1) of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975 empowers the Registrar, either of his own motion or on the Application of a majority of the members of the committee of management or on the Application, of not less than one third of the members of the Society to hold an enquiry into the Constitution, working and financial condition of a registered Society, it is held in S. Thamil Arasan President of Chennai Vyasarpadi Nadar Nagar Progressive Association Chennai Vs. R. Narayanan[25] that the Registrar is not competent to enquire into the validity of an election, while performing a mere ministerial function; the jurisdiction is vested with the Courts.

12.Courts Sparingly Exercise Jurisdiction

The decision taken by the concerned authority during the course of election is not open to judicial review except on the ground of mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[26]Courts will not interfere with discharging duties by the elected office bearers of an organization, without cogent and compelling grounds. A simple breach of any Rule will not give rise to a cause of action for any member unless there is manifest illegality, or act or omission that goes to the root of the matter.  In other words, the alleged violation should be so grave that it could not be condoned by the general body.[27]

13.Right To Vote or Stand as a Candidate, Not a Civil Right

Right to Challenge an Election Is Not a Common Law Right

It is observed in S Thamil ArasanVs. R Narayanan[28] that since there is no specific provision permitting the challenge of an election to the society, the only remedy for challenging such election is by means of a civil suit.

NP PonnuswamiVs. Returning Officer, Namakkal[29] it was observed:

  • “The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it.”

The rights arising out of elections including the right to contest or challenge an election are not common law rights but are creatures of the statutes which create, confer or limit those rights; and, therefore, for deciding the question whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the Courts have to function within the framework of that law and not travel beyond it.[30] It is a special right conferred under a self contained special law. Right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right, but is a creature of a statute or a special law and must be subject to the limitations imposed by it. It will, therefore, be advantageous to look into the scheme of the Act.[31]

13.Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election

In TejBahadurvsShriNarendraModi[32] the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

  • “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[33]:

  • A voter could challenge the election.
  • Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
  • A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any latches and must be non-suited only on that account.

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action.[34] He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, PanchamMandal[35] it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections.[36]

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases[37] it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions[38] observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, AryaKanyaPathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P.[39] The Division Bench observed as under:

  •  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..”[40]

14.Individual Can MaintainCause of the Collective Body 

Where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, and where there are no vitiating circumstances such as delay, latches, etc., the cause of the collective body will be maintainable at the instance of an individual.[41]

15. Individual Membership Rights and Corporate Membership Rights

The Kerala High Court in Joseph Vs. Jos[42] observed as under:

  • “…  There are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual membership right, and the other the corporate membership right. So far as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the shareholders. An individual membership right is a right to maintain himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to that status. …”

16.Election Process

Elections in associations are conducted in accordance with their Rules. If it is warrented, the court may intervene. In Hardeo Singh Vs. Union of India[43] the High Court of Uttarakhand being found it necessary that there should be a duly elected Management Committee for a Gurudwara for its proper management and administration, inter alia, following directions were issued with respect to election:

  • “The Election Officer for the purposes of the completion of the election process including
    • de-limitation/re-determination of wards,
    • preparation of electoral rolls,
    • verification of electors,
    • qualification of members,
    • election process,
    • publication of results,
    • first meeting of elected committee,
    • election of office bearers,
    • first meeting of the committee,
    • constitution of sub-committees etc.,
  • may constitute a committee not exceeding five members, whom the Election Officer finds suitable. Such five persons should be respectable and educated persons with no criminal record and no history of association with election of Gurudwara Sri Nanakmatta Sahib. These persons should have no interest or association with any candidate or group. They will also give an undertaking to the Election Officer that they have no interest in the election and they will not participate in canvassing or election etc. in any manner. The Election Officer shall follow such procedure, which is reasonable and on the basis of the principles of natural justice and in accordance with the Sikh principles and values.”

ElectionNorms and Procedure

In Food Corporation of India Staff Union Vs. Food Corporation of India[44] the Supreme Court laid down‘norms and procedure’to be followed for assessing the representative character of trade unions. A detailed and exhaustive election procedure is laid down therein. It reads as under:

  •        “(i) As agreed to by the parties the relative strength of all the eligible unions by way of secret ballot be determined under the overall supervision of the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) (CLC).
  •        (ii) The CLC will notify the Returning Officer who shall conduct the election with the assistance of the FCI. The Returning Officer shall be an officer of the Government of India, Ministry of Labour.
  •        (iii) The CLC shall fix the month of election while the actual date/dates of election shall be fixed by the Returning Officer.
  •        (iv) The Returning Officer shall require the FCI to furnish sufficient number of copies of the lists of all the employees/works (category III and IV) governed by the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971 borne on the rolls of the FCI as on the date indicated by the CLC. The list shall be prepared in the proforma prescribed by the CLC. The said list shall constitute the voters list.
  •        (v) The FCI shall display the voters list on the notice boards and other conspicuous places and shall also supply copies thereof the each of the union for raising objections, if any. The unions will file the objections to the Returning officer, within the stipulated period and the decision of the Returning Officer shall be final.
  •        (vi) The FCI shall make necessary arrangement to:
    •        (a) give wide publicity to the date/dates of election by informing the unions and by affixing notices on the notice board and also at other conspicuous places for the information of all the workers;
    •        (b) print requisite number of ballot papers in the proforma prescribed by the CLC incorporating therein the names of all the participating unions in an alphabetical order after ascertaining different symbols of respective unions ;
    •        (c) the ballot papers would be prepared in the proforma prescribed by the CLC in Hindi/English and the concerned regional language;
    •        (d) set up requisite number of polling stations and booths near the premises where the workers normally work; and
    •        (e) provide ballot boxes with requisite stationery, boards, sealing wax etc.
  •        (vii) The Returning officer shall nominate Presiding Officer for each of the polling station/booth with requisite number of polling assistants to conduct the election in an impartial manner. The Presiding Officers and the polling assistants may be selected by the Returning Officer from amongst the officers of the FCI.
  •        (viii) The election schedule indicating the dates for filing of nominations, scrutiny of nominations papers, withdrawal of nominations, polling, counting of votes and the declaration of results, shall be prepared and notified by the Returning Officer in consultation with the FCI. The election schedule shall be notified by the Returning Officer well in advance and at least one month’s time shall be allowed to the contesting unions for canvassing before the date of tiling the nominations.
  •        (ix) To be eligible for participating in the election, the unions must have valid registration under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 for one year with an existing valid registration on the first day of filing of nomination.
  •        (x) The Presiding Officer shall allow only one representative to be present at each polling station/booth as observer.
  •        (xi) At the time of polling, the polling assistant will first score out the name of the employee/workman who comes for voting, from the master copy of the voters’ list and advise him thereafter to procure the secret ballot paper from the Presiding Officer.
  •        (xii) The Presiding Officer will hand over the ballot paper to the workman/employee concerned after affixing his signatures thereon. The signatures of the workman/employee casting the vote shall also be obtained on the counterfoil of the ballot paper. He will ensure that the ballot paper is put inside the box in his presence after the voter is allowed to mark on the symbol of the candidate with the inked rubber stamp in camera. No employee/workman shall be allowed to cast his vote unless he produces his valid identity card before the Presiding Officer concerned In the event of non production of identity card due to any reason, the voter may bring in an authorisation letter from his controlling officer certifying that the voter is the bona fide employee of the FCI.
  •        (xiii) After the dose of the polling, the Presiding Officer shall furnish detailed ballot paper account in the proforma prescribed by the CLC indicating total ballot papers received, ballot papers used, unused ballot papers available etc. to the Returning Officer.
  •        (xiv) After the close of the polling, the ballot boxes will be opened and counted by the Returning Officer or his representative in the presence of the representative of each of the unions. All votes which are marked more than once, spoiled, cancelled or damaged etc. will not be taken into account as valid votes but a separate account will be kept thereof.
  •        (xv) The contesting unions through their representatives present at the counting place may be allowed to file applications for re- counting of votes to the Returning Officer. The request would be considered by the Returning Officer and in a give case if he is satisfied that there is reason to do so he may permit recounting. However, no application for recounting shall be entertained after the results of the votes are declared.
  •        (xvi) The result of voting shall the compiled on the basis of valid votes polled in favour of each union in the proforma prescribed by the CLC and signatures obtained thereon from the representatives of all the unions concerned as a proof of counting having been done in their presence.
  •        (xvii) After declaring the results on the basis of the votes polled in favour of each union by the Returning Officer, he will send a report of his findings to the CLC.       (xviii) The union/unions obtaining the highest number of votes in the process of election shall be given recognition by the FCI for a period of five years from the date of the conferment of the recognition.
  •        (xix) It would be open to the contesting unions to object to the result of the election or any illegality or material irregularity which might have been committed during the election. Before the Returning Officer such objection can only be raised after the election is over. The objection shall be heard by the CLC and dispose of within 30 days of the filing of the same. The decision of the CLC shall be final subject to challenge before a competent court, if permitted under law.”

17. Powers of a Returning Officer

In the absence of express or implied regulations to the contrary,[45] the returning officers, domestic tribunals, syndicate of a university, enquiry committees, etc. are also free to evolve and follow their own procedure as they are ‘masters of their own procedure’;[46] but, they must ensure natural justice in their proposed actions.[47] Lord Denning, Master of Rolls, in the Court of Appeal in England observed, in the matter of a non-statutory domestic tribunal, as under:[48]

  • “Is a party who is charged before a domestic tribunal entitled as of right to be legally represented, much depends on what the rules say about it. When the rules say nothing, then the party has no absolute right to be legally represented. It is a matter for the discretion of the tribunal. They are masters of their own procedure: and, if they, in the proper exercise of their discretion, decline to allow legal representation, the Courts will not interfere….”[49]

It is held in Guru Nanak University Vs. Iqbal Kaur Sandhu[50] as under:

  • “It is not the province and the function of this Court to lay down either the time or the mode and manner in which autonomous and high-powered bodies like the Syndicate of the appellant-University are entitled to conduct their business in the meetings. They are equally masters of their own procedure and unless there is an infraction of the clear statutory rules in carrying out their duties and in conforming to the procedure prescribed by law, this Court would be ill-advised to render any gratuitous advice to them in their autonomous field in dealing and disposing of their business.”

The election schedule (fixing the dates for filing of nominations, scrutiny of nominations papers, withdrawal of nominations, polling, counting of votes and the declaration of results etc.)is, usually, made and announced by the Returning Officer in consultation with the authority responsible to conduct the election.

A Returning Officer merely conducts the election and has no power to consider the question as to whether a member is eligible to vote or not.[51] He cannot also cancel the membership of a person. After the declaration of the result, the Returning Officer becomes functus officio and he has no power or jurisdiction to change the declaration or to make any other declaration or to make an order to recount or to reconsider the result of election. The returning officer who makes the scrutiny of nominations has the power to reject nomination on proper grounds and he can decide on the eligibility of a candidate.

18.Duties of Returning Officer

The Returning Officer has to be perform his duties with detachment and impartiality.[52] Our Apex Court, in Food Corporation of India Staff Union Vs. Food Corporation of India,[53]  propounded norms and procedures to be followed for assessing the representative character of the trade union.

19. Ordinarily, Courts will not Interfere with Election Process

In Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik[54]  our Apex Court held:

  • “Since 1952 this Court has authoritatively laid down that once election process has started the courts should not ordinarily interfere with the said process by way of granting injunction.”

In JaganNathVs.Jaswant Singh[55] it is observed:

  •  “… It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law.”

Remedies with respect to the disputes as to elections will have to be sought for after elections are over. This time-honoured principle is emphasised in the following decisions also.

  • Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[56]
  • N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[57]
  • Nanhoo Mal and Others Vs. Hira Mal[58].
  • Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commr.[59]:
  • Boddula Krishnaiah Vs. State Elec. Commissioner, A.P.[60]
  • ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra[61]
  • AnugrahNarain Singh Vs. State of U.P.[62]
  • Election Commissioner of India Vs. Ashok Kumar[63]
  • Abdulla Khan Vs. State of Orissa[64].
  • Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa[65]
  • Medical Council of India Vs. Regar/Returning Officer, TN[66]
  • Avtar Singh Vs. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Mgmnt. Comtee,[67]
  • C. Subrahmanyam Vs. K. Ramanjaneyullu[68]
  • Ashok Kumar Jain Vs. NeetuKathoria[69]
  • K.K. Shrivastava Vs. Bhupendra Kumar Jain[70]

It is observed in Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath[71] while considering election to Dental Council of India under Section 3 (a) of the Dentists Act, 1948:

  • “So far as the issue with regard to eligibility of Respondent no.1 for contesting the election is concerned, though prima facie it appears that Respondent No.1 could contest the election, we do not propose to go into the said issue because, in our opinion, as per the settled law, the High Court should not have interfered with the election after the process of election had commenced. The judgments referred to herein above clearly show the settled position of law to the effect that whenever the process of election starts, normally courts should not interfere with the process of election for the simple reason that if the process of election is interfered with by the courts, possibly no election would be completed without court ‘s order. Very often, for frivolous reasons candidates or others approach the courts and by virtue of interim orders passed by courts, the election is delayed or cancelled and in such a case the basic purpose of having election and getting an elected body to run the administration is frustrated. For the aforestated reasons, this Court has taken a view that all disputes with regard to election should be dealt with only after completion of the election.”

In K.K. ShrivastavaVs.Bhupendra Kumar Jain[72] with respect to election to the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under the Advocates Act our Apex Court held:

  • “Where there is an appropriate or equally efficacious remedy the Court should keep its hands off. This is more particularly so where the dispute relates to an election. Still more so where there is a statutorily prescribed remedy which almost reads in mandatory terms.”[73]

In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

Though not specifically sought for in relief, in proper cases, Courts order election and appoint receivers.

The courts interfere and grant relief in a given situation[74]disregarding the technicalities. For example:

  • (i)   where the issue was not properly expressed and it was of formal nature;[75]
  • (ii) when a larger relief was prayed for and the claim for the same was not duly established but the evidence justified grant of smaller relief;[76]
  • (iii) where the relief, as originally sought, has become obsolete or unserviceable or a new form of relief will be more efficacious on account of developments subsequent to the suit or even during the appellate stage;[77] and
  • (iv) to promote substantial justice; subject, of course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances where equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is violated – as procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process.[78]

Kerala High Court, in KP Muhammed Vs.  M Abdurahiman,[79]held that when there was no validly elected committee for the proper management of an association, the civil courts would have jurisdiction to order election of the committee even if it was not sought for by the parties.

20.Jurisdiction of Civil Courts is ‘Rather Limited’: Principles

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs

21.Standard of Proof in Election Matters:

The election of a returned candidate will not be set aside unless there are cogent and convincing reasons.[80] In election matters the standard of proof is high and burden is on the election petitioner. The court proceedings on election disputes are akin to criminal proceedings.[81] It is held in Gajanan Krishnaji Barat Vs. Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe[82] that in an election petition, based on allegations of commission of corrupt practice, the standard of proof required is, generally speaking, that in a criminal trial.  The onus lies heavily on the petitioner to establish the charge of corrupt practice and in case of doubt the benefit goes to the returned candidate.

It is pointed out in Seth Gulabchand v. Seth Kudilal[83] that the rules applicable to circumstantial evidence in criminal cases would not apply to civil cases. The ordinary rules governing civil cases of balance of probabilities will continue to apply. Mere preponderance of probabilities or presumptions cannot be the basis to challenge an election.

22.Temporary Injunctions

Interference of courts after election-process commenced [84]and stopping an electionare very much against public policy.[85]  But, there is no absolute restriction upon court; it is only limited.[86]

Election Tribunals under the Representation of Peoples Act are not conferred with power to grant temporary injunctions.When granting injunction is subject to the declaration sought for, in election matters it will be proper not to grant temporary injunction.[87]The success of a winning candidate at an election cannot be lightly interfered with; more so when no fault of his.[88] If ultimately, the suit is dismissed, the court cannot compensate for granting a temporary injunction.[89]

23.Technicalities of Election Petitions

In UmeshChalliyill Vs. K.P. Rajendran[90] our Apex Court ruled that the election petitions should not be dismissed at the threshold on technical defects which were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter. It is observed: 

  • “However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter  and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.”[91]

24.Instances of Courts Interference before Completion of Election:

  1. Election process was not in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions.[92]
  2. Election Meeting not in conformity with Articles.[93]
  3. Conduct of elections was not in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association.[94]
  4. Voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules.[95]
  5. Violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act and validity of the entire election is in challenge.[96]
  6. Mala fide or arbitrary exercise of power.[97] Court interferes for fair and impartial election.[98]
  7. Where validity of the entire election is in challenge beyond the election of a particular candidate, on the ground of the violation of the essential provisions of the Election Rules and the Act [99]
  8. Where alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law.[100]

When the challenge of whole election is such that the alternative remedy is no remedy in the eye of law to cover the challenge; or, in any event, is not adequate and efficacious remedy, then the remedy of writ petition to challenge the whole election is available. In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[101] the Court interfered since the Election Tribunal would have found itself incompetent to declare the proviso to R. 3 (3) of the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules ultra vires and that being so the alternative remedy provided in R. 34 (8) was no remedy at all.The illegalities made the entire election void and the statutory rulesunder which the election was conducted was invalid.

25.Court Interfere for Fair and Impartial Election

In proper cases the courts appoint Returning Officers or administrators for societies. The Calcutta High Court in East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee[102] appointed an impartial special officer to hold the election under his supervision for ensuring fair and impartial election of the club. In Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society[103] the court appointed Retired Chief Justice of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh to be the Administrator of the Society and gave him directions for convening GB and election.

26.No Question of Estoppel if Inherent Illegality

If a member participated in a meeting or election knowing the illegality of the same he would be deemed to have acquiesced or concurred in the election and would be estopped from challenging its validity.[104]

But, neither the principle of estoppel nor the principle of approbation and reprobation can be pressed into service in case of an election which is liable to be set aside by a court. Therefore,evena defeated candidates can challenge an election on its inherent illegality.[105]

27.Nomination Paper Rejected: Writ Petition not Maintainable

In N.P. Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer[106] the nomination paper of the appellant for election to the Madras Legislative Assembly was rejected by the Returning Officer. The appellant challenged the rejection of the nomination paper by filing a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the Returning Officer on account of Article 329(b) of the Constitution, which says that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature. In appeal, our Apex Court with a Bench of six learned Judges examined the question whether the writ petition would be maintainable at the initial stage against an order rejecting the nomination paper.

It was observed in this decision:

  • “The law of elections in India does not contemplate that there should be two attacks on matters connected with election proceedings, one while they are going on by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (the ordinary jurisdiction of the courts having been expressly excluded), and another after they have been completed by means of an election petition. Any matter which has the effect of vitiating an election should be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriate manner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at an intermediate stage before any court.”

28.Electoral Roll:

Illegality in Preparation: Remedy is Election Petition

Even as to alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll, courts will not interfere in the election process, once it is started.[107]

With regard to elections in a society registered under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, the Supreme Court[108] observed in ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra as under:

  • “In view of our finding that preparation of the electoral roll being an intermediate stage in the process of election of the Managing Committee of a specified society and the election process having been set in motion, it is well settled that the High Court should not stay the continuation of the election process even though there may be some alleged illegality or breach of rules while preparing the electoral roll. It is not disputed that the election in question has already been held and the result thereof has been stayed by an order of this Court, and once the result of the election is declared, it would be open to the appellants to challenge the election of the returned candidate, if aggrieved, by means of an election petition before the election Tribunal.”

29.Electoral Roll: 

Illegality in Preparation: Courts Interfere

If the electoral roll itself has been challenged on the ground that the members enrolled are in violation of the provisions of the Scheme of Administration then in such cases the courts can interfere. A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[109]

In Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Vs. RadheyShyamDani,[110] the Constitution Bench of our Apex Court upheld the decision of the Chief Commissioner on the ground that the electoral roll prepared was invalid as it was prepared in accordance with some invalid rules.[111]

In RamgulamShriBaijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna[112]it was observed that when election held on the basis of rolls which had not been prepared in accordance with law, the petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of delay.

In Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra[113] it is held by our Apex Court that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of non-existent Rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs. Babu Ram Rewti Mal[114], it is held that if the very foundation of the election, namely, the electoral roll was illegal, no election on its basis could be proceed or be allowed to stand, but that did not mean that any kind of defect in the roll, however technical in its nature, would be suffice to reach such a conclusion.[115]

Courts Interferes if Result Materially Affected

Following Chief Commissioner, Ajmer Vs. Radhey Shyam Dani,[116]the Supreme court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[117]  that the question as to whether a writ petition on the ground of illegal preparation of the electoral roll would be maintainable or not depends upon the nature and the intensity of the error committed in the preparation of the electoral roll and its effect on the whole election. It is held:

  • “10. The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to Rule 3(j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld. There is no question of the result being materially affected in such a case.”

30.Electoral Rolls

Non-inclusion: Courts Will Not Interfere

In MARVS Sai Baba Vs. Commissioner and Registrar of Co-Op. Societies,[118] held as under:

  • “7. . . It is pertinent to mention that the issue relating to the validity of membership of a society including that of wrong admission of a member or non-inclusion of a valid member in the rolls of the society is an issue to be decided before the election process begins and that can be a valid ground to invoke Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act to set right the things and then proceed for the elections and appoint a Person-in-charge to manage the affairs of the society in the interregnum. But, once a decision is taken to hold the elections and the election process commences by issue of notification, Section 32 (7) (a) of the Act has got no role and any dispute in connection with the election, be it of the nomination, of improper electoral roll and other aspects, have to be settled only by way of a judicial adjudication contemplated in Section 61 (3) of the Act. “

31.Electoral Roll:

Preparation on Invalid Provisions, Court Interferes

In Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[119] it was found by our Apex Court that the electoral roll prepared on the basis of invalid provisions resulted in vitiating the entire election, and that the writ petition for setting aside the election of the Bar Council of Delhi was maintainable. The Supreme Court while considering the validity of an electoral roll of Delhi Bar Council, omitting as many as 2000 Advocates on the basis of an invalid Rule framed by that Council, observed:

  • “9. We, therefore, hold that the impugned proviso to R. 3 (j) to the Delhi Bar Council Election Rules is ultra vires and invalid and the electoral roll prepared by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the same resulting in the exclusion of the names of about 2000 Advocates from the said roll was not valid in law. We are further of the opinion that the whole election was invalid on that account and it could be challenged as such in a writ petition. It was not a case of challenging the preparation of the electoral roll on the factual basis of wrong exclusion of a few names. For the said purpose R.4 occurring in Chapter I of the Bar Council of India Rules could come into play. But here, because of the invalidity of the Rules itself, the preparation of the electoral roll was completely vitiated-a matter which cannot be put within the narrow limit of the said rule. 10. The illegal preparation of the electoral roll by the Delhi Bar Council on the basis of the invalid proviso to R. 3(j) goes to the very root of the matter and no election held on the basis of such an infirmity can be upheld. There is no question of the result being materially affected in such a case.” [120]

32. Electoral Roll:

Court Interfere when Election on Nonexistent Rules

In N Thippanna Vs. State of Karnataka[121] Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court by its interim order directed to hold the election but withheld the results. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeeth Singh[122] the Karnataka High Court in its final Judgment held that the electoral rolls prepared by the University, omitting a very large number of registered graduates, was not in conformity with the Act, the statutes and the general principles for preparation of electoral rolls, and that it was void in law.  A valid electoral role is the basic requirement of a fair election.[123]

Though it is observed by our Apex Court in ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra that when the process of election has been commenced it would be impermissible for the court to go into the questions as to breach of the Rule in the preparation of the voters’ list, it observed that where the voters’ list had been prepared on the basis of nonexistent rules, it would be illegal and the Court could interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution.

In Ahmednagar Zilla SDV and P Sangh Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra[124] though the appeal was dismissed following the principles of law laid down in Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra,[125]the Court directed the District Collector, Ahmednagar, to conduct fresh election of the Board of Directors to the appellant Society, forthwith.

33.Acceptance of List of Governing Body District Registrar – Effect

If a dispute arises as to whom among the two sets were the lawful members of the Governing Committee, the Registrar has the power to decide upon such a dispute under the Societies Registration Act as an incidental or consequential power in itself.The Registrar has to prima facie satisfy from the materials and evidences. There may not be an elaborate enquiry. However, such an enquiry made by the Registrar and the decision taken from it does not become final and the aggrieved party can take up the matter before a competent court for a decision as to who are the members of the governing body.[126]

34.Section 25 of So. Regn. Act as Amended by State of U.P[127]

Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act as amended by State of U.P. endows the ‘prescribed authority’ with the right to hear and decide in a summary manner disputes in respect of the election or continuance in office of office-bearers of societies.

Section 25 of the Societies Registration  Act as amended by State of U.P. reads as under:

  • “25(1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the registrar or by a least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office -bearer of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit:
  •       Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied –
  • (a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or               
  • (b) that the nomination of an candidate has been improperly rejected; or
  • (c) that the result of the election in so far it concerns such office bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non -compliance with the provisions of any rules of the society.
  • Explanation I. – …………….. ………… …
  • Explanation II. – ………………… ……..
  • Explanation III. –  ……………. ………..

But, when disputed questions of fact are involved, summary proceedings under Section 25 of the Act, 1860 will not be a bar for seeking remedy before the Civil Court as the summary proceedings under Section 25 is not an efficacious remedy.[128]

35.Non-convening of the Meetings: Acquiescence and Estoppel

Non-convening of Annual General Meetings is a serious allegation against the office-bearers of a Society.  But in proper cases courts can invoke doctrine of acquiescence and estoppel.

In TJ Thomas Vs. CS Joseph[129] reliefs were claimed under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 read with 3 and 4 of the Kerala Non-Trading Companies Act, 1961 alleging, inter alia, that the respondents were not convening the Annual General Meetings regularly. The prayers were, among other grounds, rejected  because it had come out in evidence that the non-convening of the meetings was due to the inaction on the part of petitioners; that the petitioners, if they were really interested in the affairs of the Sangam, should have taken appropriate steps at the appropriate time and seen that the Annual General Meetings were convened without fail; and that the conduct of the petitioners in this regard would show that they had without demur, acquiesced in the various activities of the respondents.

36.In Proper Cases Courts Order Election and Appoint Receivers

In K.P. MuhammedVs. M. Abdurahiman[130] both sides did not want an election to be conducted; and both were aiming at the administration or control of the Society, and for that purpose they were not so eager or anxious to have an election conducted in the manner suggested by the Court. The Kerala High Court, in order to resolve stalemate, orderedelection and appointed Receivers to manage its affairs.

37.If Violation of Bye laws Court Sets Right the Illegalities

In V. ArulkumarVs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association[131] it is held that the court has to necessarily see as to whether the conduct of elections was in accordance with the Bye laws of the Association. If the same was in total violation of the Bye laws of the Association the court was certainly empowered to set right the illegalities and put the election process in motion to be performed in accordance with the Bye laws. Therefore it was held that the suit was maintainable.

38.Effect of Failure to File Documents u/s 4& Court Interference

Non-renewal of the registration of a society may be a bar to avail the benefits offered to registered societies, but the same by itself will not lead the inference that the society is not in existence.[132] 

It is held in Nand Deo Pandey Vs. Committees of Management[133] that properly constituted committee of management was required to continue the proceedings of inquiry against the Principal of a Vidyalaya. The Managing Committee had ceased to be valid due to non-renewal of the registration of the society and non-holding of periodical elections under the provisions of the Societies’  Registration (U.P. Amendment) Act, 1960.

But in Nelson Vs. Kallayam Pastorate[134] it is held that the courts cannot set aside elections on the sole ground of non compliance of certain statutory provisions by it, and that in the event of becoming a society defunct, or failure to file documents under Sec. 4 of the So. Regn. Act, there is no bar for its members to revive its activities and to conduct the election of the office bearers.


[1]      See: Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[2]      Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-99

[3] AIR 2006 SC 980

[4] AIR1993 SC 412

[5]   AIR 1999 Bom 335

[6]      Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts & Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585.

[7]    See Contract Act, Sec. 23.

[8]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Siddheshwar Sahkari Sakhar Karkhana Vs. Commissioner of I T: AIR 2004 SC 4716;Hyderabad Karnataka Edn. Society Vs. Registrar of Societies: AIR 2000 SC 301;Co- op. Central Bank Vs. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, AP: AIR 1969  SC 245; Naresh Chandra Sanyal Vs. Calcutta Stock Exchange Assn Ltd. : AIR 1971  SC 422;Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973.Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[9]      Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab: AIR 1985  SC 973; DamyantiNarangaVs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966.

[10]    Syed MunirHoda Vs. Bader Sayeed: TLMAD-2012-0-2262; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: : (2011) 13 SCC 774; State of UP Vs. COD Chheoki Employees’ Coop. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413.

[11]    Zoroastrian Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC 2306

[12]    AIR 1997  SC  1413: Quoted in Zoroastrian Co-op. H. Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar: AIR 2005  SC  2306; Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. BD Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774; Chandigarh Housing Board Vs. Devinder Singh: AIR 2007 SC 1723.

[13]    See: Sec. 9-14, 17 and 20

[14]    JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal AIR 1982 SC 983

[15]    SatyaNarainTripathiVs. State of UP: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222; 2008-71 All LR 698.

[16]    NagappaChettiar Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;         C L Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;         Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254

[17]    A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundarum: AIR 1941 Bom 312;         SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516;         Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831;        ShridharMisraVs.Jihandra, AIR 1959 All 598. 

[18]    ShriSarbjit Singh Vs All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society : ILR (1989) 2 Delhi 585.

[19]    AIR1988 Mad 27

[20]    P NallaThampyThera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR1984 SC 135

[21]    (1954) SCR 892

[22]    Referred to in Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggerwal: AIR 2010 SC 1227; Ram PhalKundu Vs. Kamal Sharma : AIR 2004 SC 1657; IndrajitBarua Vs. Election Commission Of India: AIR 1986 SC 103;  P NallaThampyThera Vs. BL Shanker AIR 1984 SC 135; Samant N Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez ; AIR 1969 SC 1201; Kumaranand Vs. Brij Mohan Lal; AIR1965 SC 628; Mahila Krishna Kumari Vs. MahilaSakunBhatnagar: AIR 1972 MP 155; Jagannath Dalai Vs. Rama Chandra Nahak: AIR 1959 Ori 26.

[23]    Md. MajidHussain Vs. MdAqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: TanajiRamchandraNimhan Vs. Swati VinayakNimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[24]    1995-5 SCC 347

[25]   2005 (1) CTC 399 : 2005 (2) MLJ 102. Referred to in TheniMelapettai Hindu NadarkalUravinmuraiVs. The District Registrar: 2007 6 MLJ 1528.

[26]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[27]    A. S. Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram: A. I. R. 1941 Bom. 312,         See also: ShridharMisra Vs. Jaihandra, AIR 1959 All 598;        SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516 ;        NagappaVs. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831.

[28]    2005-1 CTC 399, (2005) 2 Mad LJ 102.        See also: V. ArulkumarAndOrs.  Vs. Tamil Nadu Government Nurses Association (Government Recognised): 2015-5 CTC 17: (2015) 5 Mad LJ 673.

[29]    (1952) SCR 218; AIR 1952 SC 64.

[30]    CharanLalSahu v. GianiZail Singh: AIR 1984 SC 309; Referred to in Mithilesh Kumar Sinha Kaka Joginder Singh Vs. Returning Officer for Presidential Election: DrShankerDayal Sharma: AIR1993 SC 20; P NallaThampyThera Vs. B L Shanker: AIR  1984 SC 135. Also See: SatyaNarain Vs. Dhuja Ram: AIR 1974 SC 1185; U S Sasidharan Vs. K Karunakaran: AIR1990 SC 924; JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR 1982 SC 983: Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR 1998 Ker 332; Ram Shankar Chaudhary Vs. Rama Shankar Singh: 1978 JLJ  401.

[31]    Sukumarakurup Vs. District Judge: AIR  1998 Ker 332

[32]AIR 2021 SC 217

[33]AIR 1980 SC 1612

[34]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99.        Referred to: Ram PyareLal Vs. State of U.P. 2015 3 ADJ 577;        Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secretary to Government, UP: AIR 1951 All 1;        Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University, 1997 1 UPLBEC 415;        Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[35]   2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14

[36]    Referred to in SatyaNarainTripathiVs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698.

[37]Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; BhagwanKaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009-75 All LR 29

[38]Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170;Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262 (DB).

[39]2011-2 ADJ 65

[40] See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014 9 242, AWC 2014 5 4382, LBESR 2014 3 415

[41]    Committee of Managt.AryaKanyaPathshala Inter College Vs. State of UP: 2011- 2 ADJ 65; Gopal Y Unkal Vs. Karnataka VidyaVardhakaSangha, Dharwad, Dist: KarCCR 2018 2 1880

[42]    AIR 1965 Ker 68.         Quoted in Rajeev Saumitra Vs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[43]    2016 3 UAD 656

[44]AIR 1995 SC 1344

[45]    See: ShyamNarainShukla, Committee of Management Vs. State of UP: 1995-25 All LR 100; 1995-1 LBESR 174.

[46]    Kurukshetra University Vs. Vinod Kumar: AIR 1977 Pj&Hr 21;        Sarup Singh Vs. State of Punjab: 1990-1 LLJ 285.        See with respect to statutory tribunal: AnnamalaiVs. R Doraiswamy: 1982 ACJ 371.

[47]    Ramesh Kapur Vs. Punjab University:  AIR 1965 Punj 120; Rakesh Kumar Vs. J & K State Board of School Education: AIR 1992 J&K 22.

[48]    Enderby Town Football Club Ltd. Vs. Football Association Ltd. (1971 Chancery Div. 591)

[49]    Quoted in J K Aggarwal Vs. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation:  AIR 1991 SC 1221.

[50]    AIR  1976 P & H 69.

[51]    K V Vijayakumar Vs. Joint Registrar of Co Operative Societies: AIR  1996 Ker 150

[52]    Pritam Singh Vs. S. Ranjit Singh: AIR 1965 Punjab 39.

[53]    AIR 1995 SC 1344.

[54]    (2011) 13 SCC 774

[55]    (1954) SCR 892. Also See: JayantaSamal Vs. KulamaniBehera: 2004 13 SCC 552

[56]    AIR  2016 SC 1094.

[57]    AIR 1952 SC 64

[58]    (1976) 3 SCC 211

[59]    AIR 1978 SC 851.

[60]    AIR 1996 SC 1595

[61]    AIR 2001 SC 3982;        Followed in AhmednagarZilla SDV P Sangh Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 1 SCC 133

[62]    (1996) 6 SCC 303

[63]    AIR 2000 SC 2977

[64]    2008 (Supp.) O.L.R. 251

[65]    2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[66]    AIR 2014 Mad 34

[67]    (2006) 8 SCC 487.

[68]    (1998) 8 SCC 703.

[69]    (2004) 12 SCC 73; Also see: Harcharan Singh Vs. Mohinder Singh: AIR 1968  SC 1500; Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner: AIR 1978  SC 851; JyotiBasu Vs. Debi Ghosal: AIR  1982  SC  983; HarikrishnaLal Vs. BauLalMarandi: 2003-8 SCC 613; Shyamdeo Pd. Singh Vs. Naval Kishore Yadav: 2000-8 SCC 46; Election Commission of India Vs. Ashok Kumar : AIR 2000 SC 2977

[70]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[71]    AIR  2016 SC 1094: Referred: Ponnuswami Vs. Returning Officer: AIR 1952 SC 64;  ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2001 (8) SCC 509 Nanhoo Mal and others Vs. Hira Mal: 1976 (3) SCC 211.

[72]    AIR 1977 SC 1703.

[73]    See also: Abdul Latheef C.K. Vs. K.M. Haneefa:  2015-3 Ker LT 299.

[74]    UP State Brassware Corporation Ltd. Vs. UdaiNarainPandey: AIR 2006 SC 586

[75]    Manugobinda Vs. BrajabanduMisra – AIR 1986 Orissa 281

[76]    Lavu Sri Krishna Rao Vs. Dr. MoturiNagendraRao: AIR 2007 A P 25

[77]    Rameshwar Vs. Jot Ram:  AIR 1976 SC 49

[78]    PasupuletiVenkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders:  AIR 1975 SC 1409.

[79]LAWS(KER) 2013 3 137

[80]Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760

[81]    MdMajidHussain Vs. MdAqueel, AIR 2015 AP 21, that See also: TanajiRamchandraNimhan Vs. Swati VinayakNimhan: AIR  2006 SC 1218.

[82]1995-5 SCC 347

[83][1966]3 SCR 623

Referred to in Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Vs. K S Gandhi: 1991 AIR-SCW 879.

[84]    Shaji K. Joseph Vs. V. Viswanath AIR  2016 SC 1094

[85]    In Re: T BalajiRao Naidu Garu Vs. State: AIR 1933 Mad 103 (PC).

[86]    Daver Vs. Lodge Victoria No. 363 SC Belgaum, AIR 1963 SC 1144;        ShridharMisraVs.JaichandraVidyalankar:   AIR 1959 All 598.

[87]    RaghubarDayalMisra Vs. Shankar Lal: AIR  1934 All 876.

[88]    Kalyan Kumar Gogoi Vs. AshutoshAgnihotri:AIR 2011 SC 760. Referred to in:Ashok Vs. RajendraBhausahebMulak: 2012-12 SCC 27;  Ravinder Kumar Rawal Vs. V.K. Sood: ILR 2011-2  P&H 704.See also: JaganNath Vs. Jaswant Singh (1954) SCR 892;JayantaSamal Vs. KulamaniBehera: 2004-13 SCC 552

[89]    Saheed Sporting Club Vs. Kalyan Ray Choudhury : 2008 CLT Supp 338. AIR 1963 All 518 referred to.

[90]    (2008) 11 SCC 740.

[91]Quoted in G.M. Siddeshwar Vs. Prasanna Kumar: AIR  2013 SC 1549.

[92]    ChandrakantMahadevPatole Vs. State of Maharashtra: 2010 All MR 457

[93]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585:

[94]    V. Arulkumar Vs. TN Government Nurses Association: 2015-5 CTC 17

[95]    Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 2001 SC 3982;  Ahmednagar Zilla SDV.  Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004-1 SCC 133; Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746;  Dev Prakash Balmukund Vs .Babu Ram Rewti Mal: AIR 1961 Punj 429 referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: DevassyVs. Asst. Regtr.: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95. See also: Ajmer Vs. RadheyShyamDani: AIR 1957 SC 304; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828. See Contra view Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;  Shri Sant SadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, Sahakari Samiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. AyuktaSahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187.[96]    Umakant Singh Vs. Bindra Chaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459;        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[97]    Manish Kansal Vs. State of U P: LAWS(ALL)-2015-5-194

[98]    East Bengal Club Vs. Paltu Mukherjee : 2011-1 Cal HN 184

[99]    Umakant Singh Vs. BindraChaudhary AIR 1965 Pat 459;        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.        Also: ParmeshwarMahaseth Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 149:        Referred to in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[100]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612.

[101]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[102]  2011-1 Cal HN 184

[103]  ILR 1989-2 Del 585

[104] MaksudanRaut Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1983 Pat 186. Followed in SatyaNarain Singh Vs. State of Bihar: AIR 1984 Pat 26. See also: R. NanjundegowdaVs Revenue Secretary-Ii, Bangalore: AIR 2006-6 (Kar)(R) 523; NandParkashVohra Vs. State of H P: AIR 2000 HP 65.

[105]  Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612; KangluBaulaKotwal Vs. Chief Executive Officer, JanpadSabha, Durg: AIR 1955 Nag 49; RamgulamShriBaijnath Prasad Vs. Collector, Guna, AIR 1975 MP 145 (Oza J.)  referred to.

[106]  AIR 1952 SC 64

[107]  See: Supreme Court Bar Association Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774;   ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982; Radheshyam Vs. Chairman, SahakariSamiti, : AIR 1976 MP 156; 2008 (4) MPLJ 353 (Ram Singh Vs. State of MP and others); Ram Swaroop, Dohare Vs. AyuktaSahkarita: AIR 1996 MP 187

[108]  ShriSantSadguruJanardan Swami Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2001 SC 3982

[109]  Laxman Singh Vs. State of U P: 2014 – 9 ADJ 242

[110]  AIR 1957 SC 304

[111]  Referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612

[112]AIR 1975 MP145 (Oza J.)

[113] AIR 2005 SC 3746

[114]  AIR 1961 Punj 429; referred to in Bar Council Of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh: AIR 1980 SC 1612. Electoral Roll is a fundamental factor: DevassyVs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95.

[115]  See also: Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828

[116]  AIR 1957 SC 304

[117]  AIR 1980 SC 1612. Referred: Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 1975 MP145; Bhupendra Kumar Jain Vs. Y. S. Dharmadhikari, AIR 1976 MP 110.

[118]  1999(2) ALD 319 (DB)

[119]  AIR 1980 SC 1612

[120]  Relied on in: Sanjeev Kumar and Vs. Registrar of Co-Operative Societies LAWS(DLH)-2015-8-175.

[121] 1982-2 Kant LJ 313

[122]AIR 1980 SC 1612

[123]DevassyVs. Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies: ILR 1976 (1) Ker. 95; Gopalan Vs. Joint Registrar of Cooperative Societies 1985 Ker LT 446; Joseph Vs. Kothamangalam Co-op. M. Society Ltd: 1994 (1) Ker LT 828).

[124]  AIR 2004 SC 1329; followed in  Pundlik Vs. State of Maharashtra: AIR 2005 SC 3746

[125]  AIR 2001 SC 3982

[126]  AP AboobakerMusaliarVs. Dist. Registrar (G), Kozhikode: (2004) 11 SCC 247.See also:  CMZ Musliar Vs. Aboobacker: ILR 1998-2 Ker 76. GyanBhartiShikshaSadan Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2014 5 ADJ 263

[127]  See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

[128]  NagriPrachariniSabha Vs. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi: 1991 Supp (2) SCC 36

[129]  ILR1988-1 Ker 429

[130]  LAWS (KER)-2013-3-137

[131]  2015-5 CTC 17

[132]  Committee of Management  Vs. Commissioner, Kanpur Region: 2008 -1 AWC 695; 2008 -1 ADJ 706; 2008-70 All LR 368.

[133]  AIR 1991 SC 413

[134]  AIR 2007 SC 1337.



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society/Trust

Rights & Liabilities of Members of Clubs and Societies

Saji Koduvath, Advocate

Synopsis

  • 1.      Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote
  • 2.      State-Acts Empower Registrar to Call Elections
  • 3.      Membership in a Society, not a Fundamental Right
  • 4.      ‘Subscription in Arrears’: Afford Opportunity of Payment
  • 5.      Individual Membership Rights
  • 6.      Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 
  • 7.      Individual and Corporate Membership Rights
  • 8.      When Minority can File Suits Without Sanction of Majority
  • 9. Exceptions to the rule in Foss Vs. Harbottle
  • 9.      No Personal Liability on Members & Gov. Body
  • 10.    Co-op: Society has Corporate Personality & Its Liability
  • 11.    Elected Representatives of a Church can Protect Property
  • 12.    No Taxing When Members Avail the Facilities
  • 13.    Admission of New Members
  • 14.    Instances When Court Interferes

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • 15. Member defined: For the purposes of this Act a member of a society shall be a person who, having been admitted therein according to the rules and regulations thereof, shall have paid a subscription, or shall have signed the roll or list of members thereof, and shall not have resigned in accordance with such rules and regulations;
  • Disqualified members: But in all proceedings under this Act no person shall be entitled to vote or be counted as a member whose subscription at the time shall have been in arrears for a period exceeding three months

1. Definition of ‘Member’ & Right to Vote

Norms & Formation of Governing Body is Left to Bye Laws.

The definition of ‘Member’ in the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (in Sec.15) is not exhaustive, as it is ‘for the purposes of this Act’ alone. Therefore it is legitimate to say that the disqualifications specified in the second limb of Section 15 (restriction to vote; and not to count as a member, because of subscription-arrears) is confined[1] to the activities enjoined to the ‘members’ in the So. Registration Act: ie. to take part in the meeting to make bye laws (S. 9), amend the ‘purposes’ (S. 12), take decision to ‘amalgamate’ with another society (S.12), dissolution (S. 13), etc.

So. Regn. Act does not specifically deal with or direct ‘election’ of the governing body.[2] The mode and modalities of formation of the governing body is resolutely left, under Sec.16, to the ‘rules and regulations of the society’.

Sec.16 reads:

  • Governing body defined: The governing body of the society shall be the governors, council, directors, committee, trustees, or other body to whom by the rules and regulations of the society the management of its affairs is entrusted.

It cannot be understated as an omission in the Act. Pointing out the fundamental right guaranteed (Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India) to form associations, and that the bye laws bind the members as a contract, even if it can be argued that the founders of a society are free to make bye laws which provide for permanent governing body, without an election, it appears that such a society cannot be recognised under the Societies Registration Act in our country which values democratic principles as paramount. Bye laws of a society or a club is a contract amongst its members; and therefore, it must be reasonable.[3]

It is also possible to demonstrate that the right to vote can be conferred upon the life-members or honorary-members even in a registered society (who have not signed the roll/list of members or are in arrears). In Periyar Self-Respect Propaganda Institution Vs. State of Tamil Nadu[4] it is observed: 

  • “By putting an end to the life membership or life offices, there is no putting an end to the right to form an association as such. The holding of an office for a particular tenure or for that matter for life is a matter of internal arrangement amongst members constituting the Institution or the Charitable Society and certainly it cannot assume the colour of a fundamental right. Neither the Institution nor the Charitable Society, or the present incumbents of the life offices could claim that they could form associations only with the life offices engrafted in the rules, or if they had already formed, they must be allowed to continue to have that set up and any disturbance thereof would amount to violation of the right to form an association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c). If at all, such a right could be characterized as a peripheral or concomitant right which may facilitate the fulfillment of the objectives of the founders of the Institution and the Charitable Society. But, there is no constitutional guarantee that every association formed shall effectively achieve its objectives without interference by law. Neither the members nor the association of members could claim that they have a fundamental right to have office for life.”

2. State-Acts Empower Registrar to Call Meeting for Elections

Societies Registration Act, 1960 as amended by the State of UP empowers the Registrar to call a meeting of the General Body of a society for electing its office bearers. In such cases, it is legitimate to say that the Registrar has to resort the definition in the Act to determine the members entitled to attend the meeting and to vote.

3. Membership in a Society, not a Fundamental Right

It is settled law that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India to become a member of a society, though it is a Co-operative Society established under a statute.[5]

The Hindi Sahitya Sammelan Vs. Jagdish Swamp[6] is the authority for the proposition that the right to form an association enjoins with it a right to continue to be associated with it as well as to ensure that only those persons are admitted to the association whom they voluntarily admitted.

In Satya Narain Tripathi Vs. State of UP[7] it is observed as under

  • “But a right to form an association on the one hand and the right to be elected to an office of such association or to participate in the elections on the other hand have been held to be distinct rights and the latter can be claimed only in accordance with the provisions of the bye-laws of the association or under a statute while the former can be claimed also as a fundamental right.”

Vide 97th Amendment to the Constitution of India[8] the right to form Co-operative Societies has been made a fundamental right. But the same would not alter the principle of membership in such societies; because, the right to form a Co-operative Society is different from the right to become a member therein which continues to be governed by the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye laws.[9]

4. ‘Subscription in Arrears’

Affording Opportunity of Making Payment

Non-payment of subscription will not amount to relinquishment of membership, unless the person had been afforded a specific opportunity of making payment by calling upon him to pay the arrears or face the consequences.  The Societies Registration Act does not provide for automatic expulsion or removal/termination of membership for non-payment of subscription fees.

While considering Section 2 (b) of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act (similar provision to Sec. 15 of the Societies Registration Act), the High Court of Karnataka (R.P. Sethi, G. Patri Basavana Goud JJ.), in Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies[10] after referring to dictionary meaning of ‘resignation’ and various Supreme Court decisions[11] it is held as under:

  • “In view of what we have noted hereinabove, it cannot be said that mere non-payment of the subscription would amount to resignation within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act. Non-payment of subscription would also not amount to relinquishment of membership, unless a person is afforded a specific opportunity of making payment by calling upon him to pay the arrears or face the consequences. The society may be justified and the respondents may prescribe any such rule which provides for affording an opportunity to the defaulting member to make the payment of the arrears of subscription and upon failure, without valid reasons, declare the defaulter to cease to be the member for the purposes of the Act and the Rules. A reference to the proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 6 of the Act clearly indicates that save as otherwise provided by the Act, no rule or regulation of the society can exclude any member from being entitled to vote.”

In Lingappa Police Patil Vs. Registrar of Societies[12] it is also held that the Rule of the Society which declared a person would cease to be a member merely on his default to make the subscription, without even providing him an opportunity to show cause[13] for not making the payment within a specified period appeared ‘to be very harsh’; and that ‘confiscatory and deprivatory provisions made, resulting in civil consequences, should not have been allowed’ to be incorporated in the bye laws. The Division Bench struck down the impugned Rule it being contrary to the provisions of the Act.

5. Individual Membership Rights

(See Chapter: Individual Membership Rights)

With respect to the individual membership rights of a member of a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the general principles governing the rights of an individual share holder or a member of a company would apply.[14]

Following are recognised by Courts as ‘individual membership rights’ in a company[15]

  • (i)  Right to vote,
  • (ii) right to stand as a candidate as a director and 
  • (iii) set-right illegal acts.

These rights can be asserted by a member in his personal capacity without the sanction of the majority or without impleading the company as a co-plaintiff or defendant.

In the often quoted decision, Nagappa Chettiar Vs. Madras Race Club[16] it is observed:

  • “A share-holder is entitled to institute a suit to enforce his individual rights against the Company such as his right to vote or his right to stand as a director of a company at an election ……….. It is open to a majority always to set right a thing which was done by the majority either illegally or irregularly if thing complained of was one which the majority of the company were entitled to do legally and was within the powers of the company, by calling a fresh meeting.  That is the reason why in such cases the court refuses to interfere at the instance of a share-holder even in a representative action brought by him. If the majority, however, acts in an oppressive manner, it is not as if the minority are without a remedy. …… From this it follows that a share-holder or share-holders are entitled to bring an action:
    • (1) In respect of matters which are ultra vires the company and which the majority of share-holders were incapable of sanctioning (See Burland Vs. Earl, 1902 AC 83);
    • (2) Where the act complained of constitutes a fraud on the minority and
    • (3) Where the action of the majority is illegal“.

6. Individual Can Maintain Cause of the Collective Body 

Where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, and where there are no vitiating circumstances such as delay, latches, etc., the cause of the collective body will be maintainable at the instance of an individual.[17] 

7. Individual Membership Rights and Corporate Membership Rights

The Kerala High Court in Joseph Vs. Jos[18] observed as under:

  • “…  There are two kinds of rights for a member of the company, one the individual membership right, and the other the corporate membership right. So far as the corporate membership rights are concerned, a shareholder can assert those rights only in conformity with the decision of the majority of the shareholders. An individual membership right is a right to maintain himself in full membership with all the rights and privileges appertaining to that status. …”

8. When Minority can File Suits Without Sanction of Majority

Exceptions to the rule in Foss Vs. Harbottle

See Chapter: How to Sue Societies & Clubs

9. Liability of So: No Personal Liability on Members & Gov. Body

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

10. Co-op: Society has Corporate Personality; Liability It’s Own

Merely because of a person having been its president for some time will not be liable for payment of the dues of a Co-operative Society; because, a Co-operative Society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act is a legal entity invested with a corporate personality which makes it distinct and different from the various members constituting it. The liability of the society is its own and not that of its members or office bearers, and has to be met by the society itself.[19] It is held in State of Punjab Vs. Amolak Ram Kapoor[20] as under:

  • “Since the Board was a society registered under the Societies Registration Act and as per rules and regulations it could acquire and sell property, the recovery of arrears of sales tax imposed on the Board could only be recovered from the property of the Board and not from the members of the Board.”

Ninety Seventh Amendment of our Constitution provided constitutional status to the Co-operative Societies and it has brought out radical changes in the concept of Co-operative Societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a Co-operative Society.

11. Elected Representatives of a Church can Protect Property

In Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[21] the question came whether the plaintiffs were competent to represent the parish and claim rights against the third party defendants. The third parties (though were also parishioners of the very same Church), by the nature of the claim set up by them, as against the Church, with reference to the property, stood as rival claimants with the Church.

The court found that the suit having been initiated and prosecuted with the ultimate aim of protecting the Church property (as per the Canon Law Church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar and clearly mandates a consent from either of these two personalities for initiating a litigation) the sanction of the ordinary was not necessary; and that the plaintiffs who were the elected representatives, entrusted with the administration of the Church, were competent to initiate civil proceedings before the Civil Court. And that under the Canon law, the temporal goods belong to the parish (which, by law, was a public juridic person) and every administrator was bound to protect the property of the Church with the diligence of a good house holder; and also that the plaintiffs, individually, being the parishioners of the Church, were competent to represent the ‘juridic person’.

  The right of worshippers to file suits, for reliefs outside S. 92 CPC, is well accepted.[22] It has been clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar[23]  that the worshippers have a ‘beneficial interest’ (not the ‘proprietary interest’ or interest pertaining to owners). A worshipper has his own right to institute a suit to protect his right to worship and for that purpose to protect the debuttar property and that he can do so in his personal capacity as worshipper and not as a next friend of the deity. [24] Even in matters where Indian Trusts Act applies, Section 63 of the Indian Trusts Act is not exhaustive of remedies available to a beneficiary. Where the trustee has improperly alienated trust property the beneficiary can sue third parties for more effective reliefs than those contemplated by Section 63.[25]

When the Shebait acted adversely to the interest of the idol and fails to take action to safeguard its interest, it was held by our Apex Court in Bishwanath Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji[26] that there was no justification for denying the right to a worshipper to file suit to seek appropriate reliefs. The Supreme Court observed that it had been held in a number of decisions[27] that worshippers may file a suit praying for possession of a property on behalf of an endowment. It was also observed that an idol was in the position of a minor and when the person representing it leaves it in a lurch, a person interested in the worship of the idol could certainly be clothed with an ad hoc power of representation to protect its interest.  In Ramchand Vs. Janki Ballabhji Maharaj[28] the Supreme Court held that a person, who has made large donations for the maintenance of the temple, has clearly a substantial interest to maintain a suit for possession of the temple and its property against the Pujari or Manager, on behalf of the deity to protect the property from mismanagement or misappropriation.

12. No Taxing When Members Avail the Facilities

In Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Darjeeling Club Ltd.[29]  a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court observed that there was a long line of decisions in which it had been held that supplies made by a club to its members or the facilities afforded by a club to its members for a price would not amount to business activity of the club, even though there might be surplus of revenue over expenditure and the surplus could not be taxed as business profits if the sales were confined to the members of the Club only. There cannot be any distinction, with respect to this matter, between a temporary member and an honorary member. Any surplus contribution will be held for the benefit of the members. The benefit of the surplus fund must go back to the members as a class.

Where facilities including accommodation is provided to the members through the instrumentality or agency of the Club, neither the Club is the landlord, nor the members – during their stay – are the tenants of the Club. The members by virtue of their membership are entitled to avail of the facilities of their Club (accommodation) according to its rules, as of right. What is paid by the members for their accommodation cannot be treated as rent and the income cannot be regarded as income from the house-property under the Income Tax Act.[30]

13. Admission of New Members

The bye laws of a Society or a Club prescribe the qualifications of the Members to be admitted. They are in the nature of contract between the members. Therefore the right of admission of new members also remains at the will and option of the members.[31] The State or an enactment cannot compel admission of members, contrary to the bye laws of a Society.[32] What is the ‘interest’ of the Society or a Club is to be determined by the society.[33]

14. Instances When Court Interferes

See Chapter: Court’s Jurisdiction to Interfere in the Internal Affairs.

15. Disqualification of Members

Section 21(1)(g) of the Telangana Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, provides that a person shall be disqualified for being a member if he fails to attend two consecutive annual General Body meetings without leave of absence. Proviso to sub-Section (3) of Section 21 states that “no member shall be removed under this sub-Section unless he had an opportunity of making a representation against the proposed action of removal and a copy of resolution removing the member shall be communicated to such person and on such communication, he shall be deemed to have ceased to be a member of the  society”.

In Bollineni Ravindranath Vs. Sate of Telangana[34] the The High Court of Telangana held that exclusion of members of the society from the voters list of eligible voters for not attending two consecutive General Body meetings of the society was patently illegal. It was pointed out that there was no material to show that they followed the procedure in Section 21(3) proviso to disqualify any member who did not attend two consecutive Annual General Body meetings without leave of absence, by giving him an opportunity of being heard as mandated by the proviso thereto, and thereafter such member was removed by the General Body of the society.

In Arun Laxman Ashan Vs. Jeevan C Idnani[35]  details furnished by respondents as to forming front were rejected on the ground that the same were not in accordance with the requirement under the rules. Though steps were taken by respondents within time limit, certain documents were not filed within the time limit. No opportunity was given to respondents to cure such defects. The Bombay High Court held that the provisions of Rule 5, directing time-limit to furnish (proper) application, was directory and not mandatory.

Whether the edict in a statute is mandatory or directory is to be determined with reference to the nature and circumstance in which it is given. In Pratap Singh Vs. Krishna Gupta[36] the Supreme Court has observed that some rules are vital and go to the root of the matter; that they cannot be broken; that others are only directory and breach of them can be overlooked provided there is substantial compliance with the Rules read as a whole and provided no prejudice ensues; and that it is a well settled general rule that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly but it is sufficient if a directory enactment is obeyed or fulfilled substantially. In Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs. Ahmad Ishaque[37]  it is stated as under:

  • “It is well-established that an enactment in form mandatory might in substance be directory and that the use of the word shall does not conclude the matter. The question was examined in length in Lulius v. Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214 and various Rules were laid down for determining when a statute might be construed as mandatory and when as directory. They are well-known and there is no need to repeat them. But they are all of them only aids for ascertaining the true intention of the Legislature which is the determining factor and that must ultimately depend on the context.”

[1]      See: Sec. 9-14, 17 and 20.

[2]  But various States’ amendments (and State-Acts) provide for the same.

[3]     Alty Vs. Farrell: (1896) 1 QB 638;      Kruse Vs. Johnson: (1898) 2 QB 91,      Scott Vs. Pilliner: (1904) 2 KB 855,      Repton School Governors Vs. Repton Rural District Council:(1918) 2 KB 133;      Chester Vs. Bateson: (1920) 1 KB 829;      Attorney General Vs. Denhy: 1925 Ch 596:      All referred to in: Municipal Board Vs. Rizwan Beg: AIR 1964 All 544.

[4]    AIR 1988 Mad 27

[5]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306;        State of U.P. Vs. C.O.D. Chheoki Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd : AIR 1997  SC  1413;        Supreme Court Bar Association and Ors. Vs. B.D. Kaushik: (2011) 13 SCC 774. 

[6]      AIR 1971 SC 966

[7]      2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 All LR 698

[8]      Implemented with effect from 15th February, 2012

[9]      Lok Sevak Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. Vs. S.P. Goyal: 1997 (1) RCR(Civil) 14

[10]    ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[11]    J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of UP: AIR1990 SC 1808;        Union of India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra: AIR 1978 SC 694

[12] ILR 1997 Kar 3127

[13]    Sarbjit Singh Vs. All India Fine Arts and Crafts Society: ILR 1989-2 Del 585: AIR 1990 NOC 26(Del).

[14]    Satyavart Sidhantalankar Vs. Arya Samaj, Bombay: AIR 1946 Bom 516;         Nagappa Vs. Madras Race Club: AIR 1951 Mad 831;        Shridhar Misra Vs. Jaihandra: AIR 1959 All 598.

[15]    See also: CL Joseph Vs. Jos: AIR 1965 Ker 68;        Star Tiles Works Vs. N. Govindan: AIR 1959 Ker  254

[16]    AIR 1951 Mad 831

[17] Committee of Management Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College Vs. State of U P: 2011- 2 ADJ 65.

[18]    AIR 1965 Ker 68.

Quoted in: Rajeev Saumitra Vs. Neetu Singh: 2016-198 Comp Cases 359.

[19]    Baby Mathew Vs. Agricultural Income Tax Officer: 1994-207 ITR 967: 1996-131 CTR 214: 1994 (1) KLT 786.

[20]    [1990] 79 STC 315 (P & H); ILR1991- 2 (P&H) 218

[21] 2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[22]    Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddi Vs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi, AIR 1967 SC 436;        Bhagauti Prasad Khetan Vs. Laxminathji Maharaj: AIR 1985 All 228.         In this case distinguished (pointing out actual worship of the idol sans right to worship) Sri Thakur Krishna Chandramajiu Vs. Kanhayalal, AIR 1961 All 206.        See also: Jangi  Lal Vs. B. Panna Lal, AIR 1957 All 743;        Behari Lal Vs. Thakur Radha Ballabhji, AIR 1961 All 73

[23]    AIR 1957 SC 133

[24]    Sri Ishwar Vs. Gopinath Das: AIR 1960 Cal 741:        See also : Samit Pani Brahmachary Vs. Mayapur Chaitanya Math: AIR1999 Cal  132;        Thakurji Maharaj Vs. Dankiya: AIR 1986 All 247.

[25]    See: Janakirama Iyer Vs. Nilkanth Iyer: AIR 1962 SC 633

[26]    AIR 1967 SC 1044.

[27]    Radhabai Vs. Chimnaji: (1878) ILR 3 Bom 27,        Zafaryab Ali Vs. Bakhtawar Singh: (1883) ILR 5 All 497;        Chidambaranatha Thambirarn Vs. P. S. Nallasiva Mudaliar: AIR 1918 Mad 464,        Dasondhay Vs. Muhammad Abu Nasar: AIR 1917 Mad 112  (FB),        Radha Krishnaji Vs. Rameshwar Prasad Singh: AIR 1934 Pat 584;        Manmohan Haldar Vs. Dibbendu Prosad Roy: AIR 1949 Cal 199.        Following two decisions of the Privy Council were also referred to:        Pramatha Nath Mullick Vs. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick: 52 Ind App 245: AIR 1925 PC 139        Kanhaiya Lal Vs. Hamid Ali: 60 Ind App 263: AIR 1933 PC 198 (1).

[28]    AIR 1970 SC 532.  See also Kt. N. Ram Thenappa Chettiar Vs. N. S. Kr. Karuppan Chettiar: AIR 1968 SC 915

[29]    1985 (153) ITR  676:  Referred to in Saturday Club Vs. Asst. Commr. Service Tax: 2005-1 Cal LT 575.

[30]    Saturday Club Vs. Asst. Commissioner Service Tax Cell Calcutta : 2005-1 Cal LT 575

[31]    Damyanti Naranga Vs. Union of India: AIR 1971 SC 966; Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1985 SC 973

[32]   Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306.

[33]    State of Maharashtra Vs. Karvenagaar Sahakari Griha (2000) 9 SCC 295:  Zoroastrian Co -operative Housing Society Ltd. Vs. District Registrar, Co -operative (Urban) AIR  2005 SC 2306

[34] LAWS(TLNG) 2021 1 2

[35] 2018-5 MHLJ 59A

[36] AIR 1986 SC 140

[37] AIR 1955 SC 233



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion

How to Sue Societies, Clubs and Companies

Saji Koduvath, Advocate.

Synopsis

  • 1.      Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860
  • 2.      How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club
  • 3.      Decision Binds all Represented
  • 4.      Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members
  • 7.      How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision
  • 8.      Suit shall be in the Name of President, Chairman
  • 9.      Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’
  • 10.    Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society
  • 11.    When Society need not be Necessary Party?
  • 12.    Is Society, a Necessary Party?
  • 13.    Personal Liability of Members and Governing Body
  • 14.    Sec. 6 is Not Strictly Followed by our Courts
  • 15.    Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

Provisions of the Societies Registration Act, 1860:

  • “6. Suits by and against societies – Every society registered under this Act may sue or be sued in the name of the president, chairman, or principal secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society, and, in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion.
    •    Provided that it shall be competent for any person having a claim or demand against the society, to sue the president or chairman, or principal secretary or the trustees thereof, if on application to the governing body some other officer or person be not nominated to be the defendant.
  • 7. Suits not to abate -No suit or proceeding in any Civil Court shall abate or discontinue by reason of the person, by or against whom such suit or proceedings shall have been brought or continued, dying or ceasing to fill the character in the name whereof he shall have sued or been sued, but the same suit proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person.
  • 8. Enforcement of judgment against society – If a judgment shall be recovered against the person or officer named on behalf of the society, such judgment shall not be put in force against the property, movable or immovable, or against the body of such person or officer, but against the property of the society. The application for execution shall set forth the judgment, the fact of the party against whom it shall have been recovered having sued or having been sued, as the case may be, on behalf of the society only, and shall require to have the judgment enforced against the property of the society.
  • 9. Recovery of penalty accruing under bye laws – Whenever by any bye laws duly made in accordance with the rules and regulations of the society, or, if the rules do not provide for the making of bye laws, by any bye laws made at a general meeting of the members of the society convened for the purpose (for the making of which the concurrent votes of three-fifths of the members present at such meeting shall be necessary), any pecuniary penalty is imposed for the breach of any rule or bye laws of the society, such penalty, when accrued, may be recovered in any court having jurisdiction where the defendant shall reside, or the society shall be situate, as the governing body thereof shall deem expedient.
  • 10. Members liable to be sued as strangers – Any member who may be in arrear of a subscription which according to the rules of the society he is bound to pay, or who shall possess himself of or detain any property of the society in a manner or for a time contrary to such rules, or shall injure or destroy any property of the society, may be sued for such arrear or for the damage accruing from such detention, injury, or destruction of the property in the manner hereinbefore provided.
  • Recovery by successful defendant of costs adjudged – But if the defendant shall be successful in any suit or other proceedings brought against him at the instance of the society, and shall be adjudged to recover his costs, he may elect to proceed to recover the same from the officer in whose name the suit shall be brought, or from the society, and in the latter case shall have process against the property of the said society in the manner above described.
  • 11. Members guilty of offences punishable as strangers – Any member of the society who shall steal, purloin, or embezzle any money or other property, or willfully, and maliciously destroy or injure any property of such society, or shall forge and deed, bond, security for money, receipt, or other instrument, whereby the funds of the society may be exposed to loss, shall be subject to the same prosecution, and, if convicted, shall be liable to be punished in like manner, as any person not a member would be subject and liable to in respect of the like offence.”

Introduction:

Societies, Clubs and Companies are formed by the teamwork and co-operation of the people associated with them, at its beginning.

  • A Company is a Juristic person. Hence it can sue or be sued in its name.
  • Proceedings in a suit by or against a registered society is different from that of an unregistered society or a club. 

How to Sue an Unregistered Society or a Club

An unregistered society or a club is not a legal person;[1]and therefore, it has to sue or be sued only in the names of all its members. It can be done invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC which enables the society to sue, or be sued, in a representative character.

When a suit is filed by a member seeking reliefs concerning the society or a club, relating to a matter common to all members, he has to file it (also) as representing other members of the society, other than the defendants (usually office-bearers); and if it is a personal matter of the plaintiff, seeking relief against all other members, the plaintiff has to sue against one or two members (usually office-bearers) as representatives of others.

Objective of Order I Rule 8 CPC and Manner of its Publication

The objective of Order I Rule 8 CPC, which is an enabling provision, is avoidance of multiplicity in litigation; and the decision in such a suit binds both present and future members.[2] Such a suit can be proceeded with even where the person sought to be made a representative refuses to do so.

In Sukadev Tapaswai v. Sri Sidheswar Mahadev Bija Silod[3] it is pointed out that Order I Rule 8 CPC ‘notice of the institution of the suit’ should include the names of the persons who have been permitted to represent others, so that the persons interested may have an opportunity of knowing who have been selected to represent them.

Decision Binds all Represented, and Constitutes Res Judicata

To bring an action under Order I Rule 8 CPC, the persons on whose behalf the suit is brought must have the same interest. The decision in such a representative suit will bind all the persons sought to be represented; and it will constitute res judicata, under Section 11, CPC.[4]

Registration does not Confer Juristic Personality

Registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status.[5] In Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India[6] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • i) The mere fact of registration will not make a society distinct from association of persons. (Para 20)
  • ii) A Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a body-corporate as is the case in respect of a company registered under the Companies Act. In that view of the matter, a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act is not a juristic person.  (Para 21)
  • iii) A society, whether registered or unregistered, may not be prosecuted in criminal court, nor is it capable of ownership of any property or of suing or being sued in its own name. (Para 22) Vesting of property does not take place in the Society. Similarly, the society cannot sue or be sued. It must sue or be sued through a person nominated in that behalf. (Para 26)

‘Suit By or Against a Regd. So.’ is Virtually Suit By or Against Entire Members

A society or a club, both registered and unregistered, is the compendium of its members. When it sues or is sued all its members should be made parties. As shown above, registration of Societies under the Central or State Societies Registration Act does not give the society a corporate status. [7]

Expressions in the Societies Registration Act, ‘property belonging to a society[8] and ‘property of the society’,[9] do not give the society a corporate status; and it “merely describes the property which vests in trustees or Governing Body”.[10]

Following the above propositions, it can be legitimately concluded that the common expression, ‘suit by or against a society’, legally and virtually denotes suit by or against its entire members.

How Sec. 6 is an Enabling Provision

The earlier view taken by various courts in India was that the registered societies were legal persons and they could sue or be sued in their own name;[11] and that Sec. 6 was only an enabling (or added) provision to sue or be sued ‘in the name of the president, secretary’, etc. This view does not hold good in the light of Unani Tibia College case[12]and Illachi Devi case.[13]

Suing entire members of the society, either in person or invoking Order I Rule 8 CPC, is the normal rule. But, Sec. 6 enables to sue (or be sued) every registered society (i.e., all its members) in the name of its president, secretary, etc., as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society (or through such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion).

Suit shall be in the Personal Name of President, Chairman, etc.

From the expression in Sec. 7 of the Societies Registration Act, that ‘proceedings shall be continued in the name of or against the successor of such person’, it is clear that the words in Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act, ‘sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or Trustees,’ refers to filing suit by or against the President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees in their ‘personal name’; and not in their ‘official status’ “as” President, Chairman, Principal Secretary or Trustees.

Person who Signs Pleadings must be Authorised by the Bye­laws

The Supreme Court, in  P. Nazeer Vs. Salafi Trust, AIR 2022 SC 1580, held:

  • (i) A society registered under the Societies Registration Act is entitled to sue and be sued, only in terms of its bye­laws.
  • (ii) The bye­laws may authorise the President or Secretary or any other office bearer to institute or defend a suit for and on behalf of the society,
    • since section 6 of the Societies Registration Act, provides that ‘every society registered under the Act may sue or be sued in the name of President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary, or trustees, as shall be determined by the rules and regulations of the society and,
    • in default of such determination, in the name of such person as shall be appointed by the governing body for the occasion’.
  • (iii) Unless the plaintiff, which claims to be a society, demonstrates that it is a registered entity and that the person who signed and verified the pleadings was authorised by the bye­laws to do so, the suit cannot be entertained
    • The fact that the plaintiff in a suit happens to be a local unit or a Sakha unit affiliated to a registered society is of no consequence, unless the bye­laws support the institution of such a suit.

Suits by a Company

Proper authorisation is essential for signing a plaint on behalf of a Company.  Though, the Secretary or any Director or other Principal officer can sign pleadings by virtue of their office, as per Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, the view taken in some decisions was that neither the directors nor the managing director would have the right to represent the Company, in a suit unless they were duly authorised by a resolution taken by the Board of Directors at a meeting duly constituted for the said purpose.[14]

The Delhi High Court, in Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. (1991),[15] it is observed, with regard to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

  • “25. It is well-settled that under Section 291 of the Companies Act except where express provision is made that the powers of a company in respect of a particular matter are to be exercised by the company in general meeting-in all others cases the Board of Directors are entitled to exercise all its powers. Individual directors have such powers only as are vested in them by the Memorandum and Articles. It is true that ordinarily the court will not unsuit a person on account of technicalities. However, the question of authority to institute a suit on behalf of a company is not a technical matter. It has far-reaching effects. It often affects policy and finances of the company. Thus, unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. Needless to say that such a power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard.”

It was observed by in Nibro Limited that a director or a secretary of a Company could certainly give the authority to institute a suit to another person, as provided under Order III Rule 1 CPC, if the director or secretary was authorised by law to file a suit on behalf of the company.

Order III Rule 1 provides that ‘any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognised agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf. Provided, that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person’. 

If an authority is given to a pleader or a recognised agent, under Order III Rule 1, that recognised agent or pleader can, certainly, file an appearance as authorised.

The Bombay High Court, in Alcon Electronics Pvt. Ltd Vs. Celem (2015),[16] observed, with respect to the source of power of the Directors, as under:

  • “The essential requirement of this provision is that the Company which is a juristic person must itself decide to sue. Once that is done, it would authorise one of its Directors who is the agent of the Company or its principal officers the Secretary of the Company or the Managing Director to file the Suit. The suing in each case is a separate act. The Company acts only through its meetings. Hence the Board of Directors in the day to day management of the company must decide and resolve to sue or not to sue. A blanket authority cannot be given to a particular Managing Director or Director to sign the papers and document/s, including the power to sue. The power to sue requires application of mind upon the particular cause of action. It requires the Company to pay the requisite Court fee. It requires the Company to be represented by a legal officer being an Advocate of the Court. It is an act which, therefore, is not a part of the day to day management of the Company. A Company would decide in a given case upon legal advice or otherwise whether or not it would sue upon a given cause of action. Such exercise is imperatively required to be performed if the intention of the Company, which is only a juristic person, is to be deciphered. That act, of course, may be undertaken even after the filing of the Suit and ratified by the Board as all other acts of management. However, the seminal requirement is to see the act of the Company though its Board or members (dependent upon whether the resolution is passed in the Board meeting or a general meeting) or is given by the Company itself (under its Articles of Association).”

The Delhi High Court pointed out in Radico Khaitan Limited Vs. JD Wines (2020),[17] that the impropriety, if any, in signing the pleadings by the officers of a Company can be ratified.

It is held in Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia[18] (in a Sec. 138, NI Act – criminal – proceedings) that there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director is stated first followed by the post held in the Company; and that the format itself cannot be said to be defective though it may not be perfect (The Apex Court followed: Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshavanand, (1998-1 SCC 687).

Locus Standi of a Member to Challenge Election

In Tej Bahadur vs Shri Narendra Modi[19] the Apex Court considered the question of the validity of the appellant’s nomination since that had a direct bearing on the question whether he had a right to question the election. After finding that the appellant was not a duly nominated candidate, it is held as under:

  • “We find that the averments in the petition do not disclose that the appellant has a cause of action which invest him with right to sue. It is settled that where a person has no interest at all, or no sufficient interest to support a legal claim or action he will have no locus standi to sue. The entitlement to sue or locus standi is an integral part of cause of action. In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal (1977) 4 SCC 467, V.R. Krishna Iyer J., speaking for this Court held that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing.”

The Apex Court held in Bar Council of Delhi Vs. Surjeet Singh[20]:

  • A voter could challenge the election.
  • Merely because he took part in the election by standing as a candidate or by exercise of his right of franchise he cannot be estopped from challenging the whole election when the election was glaringly illegal and void on the basis of the obnoxious proviso. There is no question of approbation and reprobation at the same time in such a case.
  • A voter could come to the High Court even earlier before the election was held. But merely because he came to challenge the election after it was held it cannot be said that he was guilty of any laches and must be non-suited only on that account.

A member of a Society does not have the right to challenge Election unless his rights are personally affected by the impugned action.[21] He should have been a candidate or acquired the right to vote.

In Committee of Management, Sri Kachcha Baba inter College, Varanasi Vs. Regional Committee, PanchamMandal[22] it was held that a group of members of the General Body (and not by a rival committee of management) had no locus standi to challenge the result of the elections.[23]

There were divergent views, in UP, on the right of an individual member to file a writ petition. In certain cases[24] it was held that an individual member had no right to file the writ petition. The other set of decisions[25] observed that the writ petition could be maintained, subject to the existence of efficacious alternative remedy, when there was a breach of right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which was a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution, or there was a breach of the Statute. Both the divergent views had been considered by a Division Bench in Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar v. State of U.P.[26] The Division Bench observed as under:

  •  “There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management….. It is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of Committee of Management depends on facts of each case…..”[27]

Right of an individual member to Challenge

In Jagdambika Prasad Pandey Vs. State of UP[28] it is held that where an individual is aggrieved by an action of Authorities, such individual has the right to approach the Court in writ jurisdiction. It is observed as under:

  • “33. With regard to the arguments regarding maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of the petitioners, this Court has perused the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Ratan Kumar Solanki Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2010 (1) ADJ 262. This Court finds that after considering two Division Bench judgments rendered in Dr. P.P. Rastogi Vs. Meerut University and Others reported in 1997 (1) U.P.LBEC 415 and Umesh Chandra Vs. Mahila Vidyalaya and others, 2019 (8) ADJ 536, as well as two Single Judges’ decisions in Smt. Vimla Devi Vs. Dy. Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, reported in 1997 (3) ACC 1807 and Bhagwati Vs. State of U.P. and Others reported in 2006 (2) ADJ 361; the Division Bench observed that a writ petition at the instance of an individual member of the Society would be maintainable, since, recognition of illegally constituted committee affects the democratic rights of the individual Member of the Society and his Fundamental Right to form an association. The Division Bench observed that no doubt it is true that an individual Member cannot represent the Committee of Management and challenge the order or action of any Authorities whereby the Committee of Management is allegedly affected and if an action or order affects the Committee of Management, the Collective Body, the Body itself can challenge the same or may authorize an individual to represent it and to challenge such an action or order of the Authorities. However, where the individual is aggrieved by an action of the Authorities, such individual has locus-standi, to approach this Court in Writ jurisdiction.” [29]

Review by members

In Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University[30] it was observed that an individual member of a Committee of Management had no locus standi to file Review Petition and it was only the Committee of Management alone which could appear as a party in the case; and that to permit individual members of the Committee of Management to appear would create a lot of problems because any individual member or several members may file applications at any time through his/their own separate counsel, would result in confusion.

Procedural Defects Should Not Defeat a Just Cause

It is trite law that one should not be non-suited for technical reasons, and that the procedural defects or procedural irregularities which are curable, or which do not go to the root of the matter, should not be permitted to defeat a just cause.[31]  It is pointed out in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar[32] by our Apex Court that there is sufficient power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any party who has a just case.

Suit in the name of ‘wrong’ plaintiff, out of inadvertent mistake – Effect

In Varun Pahwa v. Renu Chaudhary, AIR 2019 SC 1186, original Plaintiff has filed the suit as Director of a Private Limited Company.  Supreme Court [after referring State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 and Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75], permitted the Private Limited Company to correct the mistake (and allowed to continue the suit as Plaintiff) – finding that the director had filed the suit, as plaintiff, out of an inadvertent mistake.

In State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Limited, (2010) 4 SCC 518, Supreme Court held as under:-

  • “17. Insofar as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) is concerned, Order 6 Rule 17 provides for amendment of pleadings. It says that the court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties.
  • 18. The matters relating to amendment of pleadings have come up for consideration before the courts from time to time. As far back as in 1884 in Clarapede & Co. v. Commercial Union Assn. (1883) 32 WR 262 (CA)  – an appeal that came up before the Court of Appeal, Brett M.R. stated:
  • “… The rule of conduct of the court in such a case is that, however negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. There is no injustice if the other side can be compensated by costs; but, if the amendment will put them into such a position that they must be injured, it ought not to be made….”

In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 869 our Apex Court held as under:

  • “5. …. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction of the Rules of procedure. The court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and, however late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side.”
  • “7. …The power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations.”

In Uday Shankar Triyar v. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh, (2006) 1 SCC 75, our Apex  Court held that procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice by any oppressive or punitive use. The Court held as under:-

  • “17. Non-compliance with any procedural requirement relating to a pleading, memorandum of appeal or application or petition for relief should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the relevant statute or rule so mandates. Procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not be allowed to defeat substantive rights or to cause injustice. Procedure, a handmaiden to justice, should never be made a tool to deny justice or perpetuate injustice, by any oppressive or punitive use. The well-recognised exceptions to this principle are:
  • .(i) where the statute prescribing the procedure, also prescribes specifically the consequence of non- compliance;
  • (ii) where the procedural defect is not rectified, even after it is pointed out and due opportunity is given for rectifying it;
  • (iii) where the non-compliance or violation is proved to be deliberate or mischievous;
  • (iv) where the rectification of defect would affect the case on merits or will affect the jurisdiction of the court;
  • (v) in case of memorandum of appeal, there is complete absence of authority and the appeal is presented without the knowledge, consent and authority of the appellant.”

Supreme Court Expanded Powers of Authorities of Companies in Filing Pleadings

Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC

Under Order 29 Rule 1 of the CPC, Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer can sign pleadings by virtue of his office. A Company being a juristic entity, Board of Directors can authorise any person to sign pleadings, by passing a resolution or giving a power of attorney, by virtue of Order 6 Rule 14 read with Order 29 Rule 1 CPC. If pleadings have been signed by one of its officers, the Company can ratify it. Such ratification can be express or implied.

In Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta Versus Union of India[33] it is held by Our Apex Court that the ratification would relate back to the date of the act ratified.

It is held by our Apex Court in the aforesaid decision of Naresh Kumar (1997)[34] that a Court can, after taking all the circumstances of the case, come to the conclusion that the Company must have ratified the act of signing the pleading. It is pointed out that the courts below must have, in any case, directed the company to produce a proper power of attorney, or they must have allowed a competent person to be examined to prove the apparent ratification. The Court’s own words in United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar (1997)[35] read as under:

  • “10. It cannot be disputed that a company like the appellant can sue and be sued in its own name. Under Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure a pleading is required to be signed by the party and its pleader, if any. As a company is a juristic entity it is obvious that some person has to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company. Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, provides that in a suit by or against a corporation the Secretary or any Director or other Principal Officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case might sign and verify on behalf of the company. Reading Order 6 Rule 14 together with Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure it would appear that even in the absence of any formal letter of authority or power of attorney having been executed a person referred to in Rule 1 of Order 29 can, by virtue of the office which he holds, sign and verify the pleadings on behalf of the corporation. In addition thereto and de hors Order 29 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as a company is a juristic entity, it can duly authorise any person to sign the plaint or the written statement or its behalf and this would be regarded as sufficient compliance with the provisions of Order 6 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A person may be expressly authorised to sign the pleadings on behalf of the company, for example by the Board of Directors passing a resolution to that effect or by a power of attorney being executed in favour of any individual. In absence thereof and in cases where pleadings have been signed by one of its officers a Corporation can ratify the said action of its officer in signing the pleadings. Such ratification can be express or implied. The Court can, on the basis of the evidence on record, and after taking all the circumstances of the case, specially with regard to the conduct of the trial, come to the conclusion that the corporation had ratified the act of signing of the pleading by its officer.”

In a subsequent decision, in State Bank of Travancore Vs. Kingston Computers (2011)[36] it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “14. In our view, the judgment under challenge is liable to be set aside because the Respondent had not produced any evidence to prove that Shri Ashok K. Shukla was appointed as a Director of the company and a resolution was passed by the Board of Directors of the company to file suit against the Appellant and authorized Shri Ashok K. Shukla to do so. The letter of authority issued by Shri Raj K. Shukla, who described himself as the Chief Executive Officer of the company, was nothing but a scrap of paper because no resolution was passed by the Board of Directors delegating its powers to Shri Raj K. Shukla to authorise another person to file suit on behalf of the company.”

In this decision (of Kingston Computers) there had neem no scope to ponder on the doctrines as to ‘technical or procedural defects’ as done in the earlier decision in Naresh Kumar (1997).[37] The decision, in Kingston Computers may be distinguishable from Naresh Kumar on the ground that there was no evidence in Kingston Computers to show that the signatory was a Director of the Company, and no resolution of the Board of Directors was produced to prove that the signatory was authorised to file the suit.

Effect of Complaint in the (Personal) name followed by ‘MD

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (2022) 2 SCC 355, in a Criminal Complaint under Sec. 138 of the NI Act, (personal) name of the Managing Director was stated first; followed by official status, ‘Managing Director’ (he held in the Company). An affidavit was filed by the Managing Director stating that the Company had authorised him to file the complaint. A copy of the Board Resolution was also presented. In the body of the complaint it was not stated that he was the MD. The respondent contended that the complaint was filed in the personal capacity not on behalf of the Company. The Supreme Court held as under:

  • “The body of the complaint need not be required to contain anything more in view of what has been set out at the inception coupled with the copy of the Board Resolution.”
  • “It would be too technical a view to take to defeat the complaint merely because the body of the complaint does not elaborate upon the authorisation. The artificial person being the Company had to act through a person/official, which logically would include the Chairman or Managing Director. Only the existence of authorisation could be verified.”

Our Apex Court  explained that a Manager or a Managing Director ordinarily by the very nomenclature can be taken to be the person in-charge of the affairs Company for its day-to-day management and within the activity would certainly be calling the act of approaching the court either under civil law or criminal law for setting the trial in motion.

Any Authorised Person Can Continue the proceedings for the Company

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (supra) held further as under:

  • “If a complaint was made in the name of the Company, it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court and the court looks upon the natural person for all practical purposes. It is in this context that observations were made that the body corporate is a de jure complainant while the human being is a de facto complainant to represent the former in the court proceedings. Thus, no Magistrate could insist that the particular person whose statement was taken on oath alone can continue to represent the Company till the end of the proceedings.”

Even if Initially No Authority, the Company Can Rectify the Defect

In Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasiya, (supra) held further:

  • “Not only that, even if there was initially no authority the Company can at any stage rectify that defect by sending a competent person.”

Our Law Does Not Favour ‘Corporation Sole’

Our law does not favour characterising a ‘Corporation Sole’ as a Juristic Person,[38] except officials such as President of India, District Collectors, Secretaries/Office-Heads of various Departments of Government, Village Officers, etc.

But, under the specific provision in Order XXX, rule 7 CPC, read with Order XXI rule 50 (1)(b) CPC, it appears that ‘a person having the control or management of the partnership business’ can appear before the court otherwise than “in his own name” (that is, in the official capacity in the firm).

Order XXX, rule 7 CPC postulates as under:

  • “No appearance except by partners: Where a summons is served in the manner provided by rule 3 upon a person having the control or management of the partnership business, no appearance by him shall be necessary unless he is a partner of the firm sued.”        

Order XXI rule 50 (1)(b) CPC posits as under:

  • “(b) against any person who has appeared in his own name under rule 6 or rule 7 of Order XXX or who has admitted on the pleadings that he is, or who has been adjudged to be, a partner.”       

Sec. 6 Impliedly Bars Filing a Suit in the Name of Society

As already stated, our Apex Court has repeatedly[39]made it clear that Sec. 6 of the Societies Registration Act provides that a registered society must sue or be sued through the office bearer or a nominee, as provided in that section.  Therefore, it can be concluded that Sec. 6 impliedly bars filing a suit in the name of the society, otherwise than through its President, Secretary or the nominated person.

When Society (or All Its Members) need not be Necessary Party?

Suit to protect or recover property.

As held by the Privy Council in Jagadinadra Nath Vs.  Hemanta Kumari Debi[40] and our Apex Court in Vemareddi Ramaraghava ReddiVs. Kondaru Seshu Reddi,[41] Shebait of a temple has the authority to institute a suit in his own name to protect and recover property belonging to the deity.[42] By various authoritative decisions, it is made clear that when the trust is admitted, or where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, the deity will not be a necessary party, in suits for protection of the property and the rights of the trust.[43] Same is the case for framing a scheme.[44]In Monindra Mohan Vs. Shamnagar Jute Factory[45]  a Division Bench held that the deity is not a necessary party in a suit filed on behalf of the Hindu public for declaration that the land in question was a debasthan of the idol and that it is a public place of warship.

It is appropriate to import this analogy to matters of societies also. Where the right or title over the property is not in dispute, and the suit is filed by a person who is bound to protect the property of a society, it can be concluded that the suit is not liable to be dismissed holding that the society as such (that is, all its members) is a necessary party. The ‘necessary party’ is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. But from the judicial dicta it may be laid down that there are two tests. Firstly, there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of the matter involved in the proceedings in question, and secondly it will not be possible to pass an effective decree in the absence of such a party.[46]

It is observed in Latin Archdiocese of Trivandrum Vs. Seline Fernandez[47] that, though, as per the Canon Law the church property vests in the hands of the Bishop or the Vicar, the parish being by law a public juridic person, and the plaintiffs (the elected representatives of the parishioners entrusted with the administration of the church) were entitled to represent the juridic person, the plaintiffs were competent to initiate civil proceedings (with the ultimate  aim of  protecting  the  property belonging  to  the church) before a Civil Court. 

Is Society, a Necessary Party?

Kania, J., in AS Krishnan Vs. M. Sundaram,[48] laid down (earlier view) as under:

  • “In my opinion as the position of the members of this society is similar to that of the share holders of the company and as the acts of the defendants which are challenged are in respect of the society it is necessary that the society should be a party to this litigation. I do not think it is competent to the plaintiff either alone or representing himself and the other members of the society other than defendants to bring a suit. …… In the absence of the society as a party to this litigation, I am of opinion that the suit as framed is not maintainable and the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in the absence of the society.”

Since it is unequivocally held by our Apex Court in Illachi Devi case[49] that a society cannot sue or be sued in its name, it is peremptory that the suit by or against a society should be brought as provided under Sec. 6 of the So. Regn. Act.

As regards the internal management of the society, whether the society as such, and not its individual members, has to sue is considered in Ram Charan Agarwala Vs. Shridhar Misra.[50] It was held as under:

  • “There have been a large number of cases both in India as also in England where courts has to consider whether a suit can be brought in respect of the internal management of a company otherwise than in the name of the company itself, by individual members thereof. There is good authority for the proposition that the case of society registered under the Act is similar to that of a club or a joint-stock company, (See A. S. Krishnan v. M. Sundaram, AIR 1941 Bom 312). A Full Bench of this Court in the case of 1947 All LJ 637 (AIR 1948 All 146) (supra), has held that the same principles apply to a club which applied to a joint-stock company. In the leading case on the subject Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, it was held that the normal rule is that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character, or in the name of some one whom the law has appointed to be its representative. Mozley v. Alston, (1847) 16 LJ Ch 217, is an authority for the proposition that ordinarily individual share-holders cannot sustain a Bill in their own names in respect of a matter common to all or relating to the internal management of the company. In the case of Mac Doughall v. Gardiner (1875) 1 Ch D 13, the Court held that it could not interfere in the internal management of a company and dismissed an action brought by one Share-holder on behalf of himself and all other share-holders excluding the Directors, against the Directors and the company complaining against certain matters decided at a meeting. To the same effect is the decision of the Bombay High Court in Bhajekar v. Shinkar, AIR 1934 Bom 243 and of the Madras High Court in Nagappa v. Madras Race Club, AIR 1951 Mad 831. The Bombay High Court took the same view in S. Sidhantalankar v. Arya Samaj Bombay, AIR 1946 Bom 516, which was a case of a registered society. This general rule however has got an exception as pointed out in the Madras and Bombay cases referred to above. The exception is that a share-holder can bring an action even with regard to an internal management of a company if (1) the action of the majority is ultra vires the company; (2) where the act complained of constitutes a fraud on the minority; (3) where the action of the majority is illegal and (4) where a special resolution is required by the Article of the Company and the assent of the majority to such special resolution is obtained by a trick, or even where a Company authorised to do a particular thing only by a special resolution does it without a special resolution duly passed.”

Sec. 6 is Not Strictly Followed by our Courts

If Sec. 6 is strictly followed:

  • no  suit can be filed  the name of the society (even if it is a registered one);
  •  in the absence of provisions in the bye-laws empowering the president/ secretary or anybody else to file a suit or writ-petition,and in the absence of due appointment by resolution by the General/Governing Body, the suit or writ-petition filed by the president/secretary or anybody else would not be maintainable;[51]
  • if the rules and regulations of the society do not determine the person against whom a suit is to be filed, any person having a claim or demand against a society can sue the president, secretary or the trustees thereof (in their name), only if in-spite-of-an-application to the governing body, some other officer or person is not nominated (to be the defendant); and
  • a general statement in the bylaw[52]authorising an office-bearer to ‘represent the society in any legal proceedingdoes not enable him to file a suit on behalf of the society; because, this provision, in the bye laws, would only authorise such office bearer to represent the society in a properly instituted suit; and the authority to file a suit is quite different from the authority to represent the society in a suit which has been validly instituted.

Doctrine of Substantial Representation

It is noteworthy that the diktats in Sec. 6 are not invariably followed by our courts; but, adopted the doctrine of ‘substantial representation’.[53] In Singhai Lal Chand Jain Vs. Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh, Panna[54] our Apex Court observed as under, with respect to an unregistered association, Rashtriya Swayam-sewak Sangh (RSS):[55]

  • “Procedure is the handmaid to the substantive justice. …. It is true that no permission of the Court was taken to be sued in a representative capacity by or on behalf of the Sangh. But Clause (b) of Order 1, Rule 8 indicates that it may sue or be sued, or may defend such suit, on behalf of, or for the benefit of all persons so interested. Clause (b) clearly applies to the facts in this case. The President of the Sangh, the Manager of the Sangh and a Member have duly represented the Sangh and defended the suit for the benefit of all the persons so interested in the Sangh.”

In this decision the following passage from Surayya Begum Vs. Mohd. Usman[56] was quoted:

  • “The principle of representation of the interest of a person, not impleaded by name in a judicial proceeding, through a named party is not unknown. A karta of a Joint Hindu Family has always been recognised as a representative of the other members of the Joint Hindu Family, and so has been a trustee. In cases where the provisions of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code are attracted a named party in a suit represents the other persons interested in the litigation, and likewise a receiver appointed in one case represents the interest of the litigating parties in another case against a stranger. Similarly the real owner is entitled to the benefits under a decree obtained by his benamidar against a stranger and at the same time is also bound by the decision. Examples can be multiplied. It is for this reason that we find Explanation VI in the following words in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure: ‘Explanation VI. – Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of a public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating’.”

Notice to a Society, Notice to all Members

The notice to a Co-operative Society will be deemed as notice to all its members. In Daman Singh Vs. State of Punjab and Haryana[57]  it is pointed out by our Apex Court, with respect to a Co-operative Society, that S. 13(9)(a) provides for the issue of notice to the societies and not to individual members and that S. 13(9)(b), however, gives the members an opportunity to be heard.

It is legitimate to maintain that,in appropriate cases, it may be proper to extend these principles as to service of notice,to both registered and unregistered societies,and a club also, with regard tothe matters-touching-rights-or-duties of the society ‘as a body’; for example, notice as to nonpayment of tax or revenue.The notice to the society or a proper office bearer will be deemed as notice to all its members.


Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India


[1]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic & Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[2]      TN Housing Board Vs. TN Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Jamiat Ulama Vs. Maulana Mahmood Asad Madni: ILR 2008-17 Dlh 1950

[3]      AIR 1986 Ori 100; Anang Pal Vs. UOI: 2010-1 CivCC 168, 2009-164  DLT 10; Veerabhadrappa Dandappa Hanchinamani Vs. Nannesab Goususab Pathan: 2006-5 AIR KarR 354,CIVCC 2007 1 147; Jogiram Mohapatra Vs. Sibaram Pradhan: 2005-1 Ori LR 612; K. Devi Vs. Laishram Ningol Leinambi Devi: 1995-3 GauLT 367.

[4]      Mahboob Sahab Vs. Syed Ismail: AIR1995 SC 1205; T N Housing Board Vs. T N Ganapathy, (1990) 1 SCC 608: AIR 1990 SC 642; Venugopala Naidu Vs. Venkatarayulu: (1989) Supp 2 SCC 3 56: AIR 1990 SC 444. Ahmed Adam SaitVs. M. E. Makhri AIR 1964 SC 107. Arumughathan Vs. S Muthusami Naidu: 1993-1 CivCC 79: 1992-1 Mad LJ 532

[5]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[6]      AIR2003 SC 3397

[7]      Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458. Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India: AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata, AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[8]      Societies Registration Act: Sec. 5

[9]      Societies Registration Act: Sec. 8 and 10

[10]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458

[11]    Shanti Sarup Vs. RadhaswamiSatsangSabha, Dayalbagh Agra: AIR 1969 All. 248; K.C. Thomas Vs. R.B. Gadaook, AIR 1970 Pat 163;  Khiri Ram Gupta and Another versus Nana Lal:  AIR 1964 Pat. 114, SatyavartSidhantalankar Vs. AryaSamaj, Bombay : AIR 1946 Bom. 516; NabadwipBhajanAsram Vs. Commissioner of Nabadwip Municipality : AIR 1959 Cal 361; Sonar Bangala Bank Vs. Calcutta Engineering College: AIR 1960 Cal 409.

[12]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458.

[13]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[14]B. MookerjeeVs State Bank of India: AIR1992 Cal 250; Nibro Limited Vs National Insurance Co:  AIR 1991  Del 25

[15]AIR 1991 Delhi 25: Quoted in: United India Periodicals Pvt. Ltd.  Vs. CMYK Printech Ltd. : 2018-248 DLT 227

[16]2015-1MhL852

[17]2020-2 AD(Del)  421.

[18] 2022-2 SCC 355

[19] AIR 2021 SC 217

[20] AIR 1980 SC 1612

[21]    Ram Pal Singh Vs. State of U P: LAWS (ALL)-2015-5-99. Referred to: Ram PyareLal Vs. State of U.P. 2015 3 ADJ 577;  Indian Sugar Mills Association Vs. Secretary to Government, UP: AIR 1951 All 1; Dr. PP Rastogi Vs. Meerut University, 1997 1 UPLBEC 415; Vimla Devi Vs. Deputy Director of Education, 1997-3 ESC 1807;  2010 (1) ADJ 262

[22]   2007-7 ADJ 414; 2007-3 All LR 14

[23]    Referred to in SatyaNarainTripathi Vs. State of U P: 2008 – 2 ADJ 222, 2008-71 ALLLR 698.

[24] Dr. P.P. Rastogi v. Meerut University, Meerut, 1997-1 UPLBEC 415; Smt. Vimla Devi v. The Deputy Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, 1997-3 ESC 1807; Bhagwan Kaushik v. State of U.P., 2006-2 UPLBEC 1372; Amanullah Khan v. State of U.P. and others, 2009-75 All LR 29

[25] Kamla Kant Agrawal v. State of U.P., 2008-7 ADJ 601; Committee of Management, Janta Inter College, Sultanpur, District Haridwar v. Joint Director of Education, I Region, Meerut, 1999-1 UPLBEC 170; Ratan Kumar Solanki v. State of U.P., 2010-1 ADJ 262 (DB).

[26] 2011-2 ADJ 65

[27] See: Laxman Singh Vs. State of UP, ADJ 2014 9 242, AWC 2014 5 4382, LBESR 2014 3 415.

[28] 2019 (8) ADJ 536

[29] Quoted in: Dr. Dheeraj Singh Vs. State Of U.P.Thru Addl.Chief Secy./ Prin.Secy. Finance: 2021-3 AWC 2776.

[30] 1997-1 UPLBEC 415

[31] United Bank of India Vs. Naresh Kumar:AIR 1997 SC 3; Uday Shankar Triyar Vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh: AIR  2006 SC 269; VarunPahwa Vs. Mrs. RenuChaudhary: AIR  2019 SC 1186: 2019-3 JT 109

[32]AIR 1997 SC 3

[33] AIR 1973 SC 2389. See also: Punjab University Vs. VN Tripathi: AIR 2001 SC 3672

[34]AIR 1997 SC 3

[35]AIR 1997 SC 3

[36]2011-11 SCC 524

[37]AIR 1997 SC 3

[38]    Samatha Hyderabad Abrasives And Minerals Vs. State of AP: AIR 1997 SC 3297; T.K. SanthanagopalaChettiar Vs. Thimmi M. SeetharamaChettiar 1968-2 Mad LJ  41; S GovindaMenon Vs. Union of India: AIR 1967 SC 1274; S C Sreemanavikraman Raja Vs. Controller of Estate Duty: 1957-2 Mad LJ  226.

[39]    Board of Trustees, Ayurvedic&Unani Tibia College, Delhi Vs.The State: AIR 1962 SC 458; Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397; Tata Vs. Tata,  AIR 2010 SC 2943.

[40]    (1904) 31 Ind App 203 (PC); AIR 1983 All 202

[41]    AIR 1967 SC 436: Referred to: PramathanathNathVs.Pradyumna: AIR 1925 PC 139.

[42]    Kishore Joo Vs. GumanBehariJooDeo: AIR  1978  All  1. Referred to: JagadindraNathVs. HemantaKumari, (1904) 31 Ind App 203.

[43]    Hangi Mal Vs. PannaLal:  AIR 1957 All 743

[44]    Bimal Krishna Vs. IswarRadhaEalla:  AIR 1937 Cal 338.

[45]   AIR 1939 Cal 699

[46]    The Banaras Bank Ltd. Vs. Bhagwan Das: AIR 1947 All 18.

[47]    2013(4) Ker LT 283.

[48]    AIR 1941 Bom. 312

[49]    Illachi Devi Vs. Jain Society Protection of Orphans India AIR 2003 SC 3397

[50] AIR 1962 All 610

[51]    Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar and Registrar of Societies: AIR 2006-4 Kar R 218: 2006-4 Kar LJ 526;  Relied on: Muddappa Vs. Panchaksharaiah: ILR1985 Kar 1230; Inamdar Vs. BF Swamy: ILR1991 Kar 1654

[52]    See: Inamdar Vs. BF Swamy, ILR1991 Kar 1654. Referred to in Advocates Association Vs. District Registrar : 2006-4 AIR Kart 218

[53]    SubramaniaPillai Vs. Masterly: AIR1976 Mad 303

[54]    AIR1996 SC 1211

[55]    Note: RSS was a defendant; and not plaintiff.

[56]   (1991) 3 SCC 114

[57]    AIR 1985 SC 973



How to Subscribe ‘IndianLawLiveFree’? Click here – “How to Subscribe Free


Read in this Cluster  (Click on the topic):

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Kerala Land Reforms Act – Provisions on Plantation-Tenancy and Land-Tenancy in a Nutshell

Saji Koduvath.

Relevant provisions of KLR Act, in a Nutshell

KLR Act

Section Provisions in a Nutshell
Chap. II
Sec. 3
Exemptions – (i) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to – (viii) Tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres.
“Provided that the provisions of this chapter, other than sections 53 to 72S, shall apply to tenancies in respect of agricultural lands which are treated as plantations under sub clause (c) of clause (44) of Section 2”.
7EPersons acquired lands (before 2005 amendment in KLR Act) for consideration below 1 Hec. 61 Are 87 Sq.m. (4 acre) will be deemed to be tenants .
13Fixity: “Every tenant, shall have fixity of tenure in respect of his holding.”
22Landlord desiring to resume any land shall apply to the Land Tribunal.
31Fair rent determined by Land Tribunal.
51A
51B
Landlord not to enter on land surrendered or abandoned by the tenant. 
Contravention is made punishable.
54(1)
55
57
57 (3)
57 (6)
61
54(1). A cultivating tenant (to purchase the right) has to apply Land Tribunal.
55. Purchase price is fixed by LT (on fair rent u/s. 31) to be paid u/s. 59
57. The LT after enquiries, pass orders determining purchase price.
(3). The Land Tribunal allows the purchase of the land it determines.
(6). The Land Tribunal forwards  orders to the Land Board.
61. Tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT) pending proceedings
59When Sec. 54 application is allowed (by the LT), the purchase price (determined u/s. 57 by the LT) shall be deposited with the Land Tribunal to the credit of the Land Board and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
72
Sec. 72 provides for automatic vesting of lease-properties held by cultivating tenants in Govt.  ILR 2010(2) Ker. 845. 
72(1) says: Holdings upon which tenanat entilted fixity under sec. 13 vest in govt.
72BCultivating-tenant “shall be entitled to assignment” of land vested in Govt. under Sec. 72 –within ceiling area and get purchase certificate (through LT) (2 years from 1-1-1970). Effect of non-filing (See Balanoor Plantations case. 2018(3) KLT 283.)
72DThe cultivating tenant has to pay the purchase price to the Government on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
72ESuch a tenant is liable to pay rent to the Govt. for the unassigned land – under Purchase Certificate (E.g., exempted-plantation-land). The Land Tribunal fixes the rent under Sec. 72F(5)(h).
72CProvides for suo moto action by LT. (No time limit). Rule 5 of the Vesting & Assignment Rules provides – LT may suo moto – notwithstanding no application – assign to cultivating tenant. (See  S.72C also). 
72KLT shall issue purchase certificate.  It shall be conclusive proof of assignment.
74Prohibition of future tenancies.
Chp. III Sec. 81Exemption from ceiling and excess for Govt. lands, private forests, plantations, industrial or commercial undertakings, etc.
Note: 1. Section 81(1) exempts Government lands from the provisions of Chapter III. The Proviso says that the following Government lands will not stand exempted. 
1. Government-lease-lands
2. Lands that fall under Section 13 (Fixity) and
3. Lands that fall under Section 72 (Lease lands vest in Government).
4. Section 81(4)permits use of the land not exceeding 5% of the extent of such holding for floriculture, dairy farms, hotels, restaurants, etc.
82Ceiling area – 5/10 standard acres.
83No person can hold or possess excess of ceiling area. (Holding is by tenant.)  It is a total bar. (Note:  plantations, industrial area etc. are exempted.)
Apply to tenant also. 1980 KLT 259 (Gopalan Nair Vs. State), 1976 KLT 306  (Thomas Mariamma Vs. TLB); RaghunathLaxmanWani v. The State of Maharashtra (AIR 1971 SC 2137)
The policy of the Act – no person –“be permitted to hold any land in excess of the ceiling area.” Raghunath Laxman Wani v. State of Maharashtra, 1971-3 SCC 391, Bhikoba Shankar Dhumal v. Mohan Lal Punchand Tatbed, 1982-1 SCC 680, State of U.P v. Civil Judge, Nainital, AIR 1987 SC 16, State Vs. Puliyangattu, 2008(1) KLJ 571.
84Certain transfers – void.
85(1)Surrender excess.
85(2)Owners and Tenants (in excess of the ceiling area) should furnish ceiling return to Land Board before March 31, 1971, before the Land Board (including lands exempted under S. 81).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanoor Plantations case – 2018(3) KLT 283.State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
 According to S. 3(1) (viii), “tenancies of plantations exceeding 30 acres” is exempted from Chapter II. Therefore, the landlord can recover such plantation lands after the period of tenancy. Such landlords also had to file a ceiling return within the time stipulated.
85(3)Excess shall be surrendered.
Note: Tenant must have approached the LT (with respect to each plantation, if he has more plantations) (He cannot declare himself a tenant)
It is clear from the following provisions:
(Before 1. 1. 1970)
S. 54(1) – A cultivating tenant has to apply to LT(for the purchase of right, title and interest.)
S. 55 – Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT
S. 57 – LT after giving notice and enquiries, pass orders (on the application for the purchase of right, title and interest).
S. 57(3) – LT allots the purchase land it determines.
S. 57(6) – The Land Tribunal forwards a copy of orders to the Land Board.
S. 61 – Cultivating tenant to pay rent (under orders of LT)
S. 59 – The purchase price shall be deposited with the LT (to the credit of the Land Board) and issue of certificate – to cultivating tenant.
(After 1. 1. 1970)
S. 72B – cultivating tenant to apply to the LT, for Purchase Certificate.
S. 72D. The cultivating tenant has to pay purchase price to the Government [fixed by the LT] on the assignment to him of the right, title and interest of the landowner. (If the extent of land is one hectare or below, he shall not be liable to pay.)
S. 72F(5) – Land Tribunal shall issue notice to consider the claims and objections from the land owner or intermediaries, and pass an order specifying, inter alia, the rent [under S. 72F(5)(h) ] payable by the cultivating tenant to the Government.
S. 72F(6) & (7) – LT shall pass Orders on encumbrance or charge for maintenance or alimony and compensation payable to the landowner or that intermediary.
It is the principle applied in the Balanoor case. Note: (i) The sub-section (3) itself says as to the settlement of claims for resumption and purchase of the right, title, and interest of the landowner by the cultivating tenant, (ii) LT is the only authority to determine tenancy (Land Board cannot determine it), and (iii) it is clear that even if it is a plantation-exemption-land (beyond ceiling limit), the tenant has to file petition under Section 54 – for fixing Purchase price and fair rent fixed by LT and for allotting the land under section 57(3) and for effecting the payments of ‘rent’ and ‘purchase price’(to the credit of the Land Board)  under sec. 61 and 59.
85(3A)The person bound to file a statement under sub-section (2) (that is, Owners and Tenants – having land in excess of the ceiling area)  shall, within a period of three months from the date of final settlement or purchase, file a statement before the Land Board, and the provisions of the said Sub-section shall, as far as may he, apply in regard to the particulars to be contained in such statement, the calculation of the excess land and for the procedure for the surrender of the same.
85(5)On receipt of the statement under Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (3A), the Land Board shall transfer the statement to such Taluk Land Board and such Taluk LandBoard shall determine the extent and identity of the land to be surrendered.
85(7)Whereon a person fails to file statement under 85(2), LB shall intimate TLB  –  TLB shall determine land to be surrendered.
It is obvious – The LB can intimate TLB as to non-filing, on the basis of the records it obtained under Sec. 57(6) and 59. That is, those tenants who are not entitled to get a purchase certificate also have to file an application under Sec. 54(1) and 85(2) or (3A).
Effect of non-filing: See – Balanur Plantations case (With respect to Sec. 72B application) – 2018(3) KLT 283. Statute prescribes liability on the person who owes or hold the land in excess of the ceiling limit to file a statement:  State of Kerala Vs. Varkey Mathew, AIR 1996 SC 1009.
[TLB not to do, suomotu, without direction from LB. 1980 KLT 120, referred to in 2019(1) KLT 985.]
85AFile ceiling return within March  2, 1973 before Land Board..
86(1)On determination of the extent to be surrendered under S. 85- Excess vests in Govt. andTaluk Land Board shall issue an order accordingly.
86(3)Where any person fails to surrender as demanded, the TLB may order an officer to take possession
86(4)Where any land, vests in the Govt, under s. 86(1) (including that of cultivating tenant) the ownership of such land shall vest in the Govt.
86(6)Nothing appliesto property of Govt. under KLC Act.
87
Exp. II
If a person converts any portion of his exempted land to any other class, that converted extent will be added to his account in determining his ceiling limit. That is, the exemption will be lost for that portion. (Mathew K Jacob v. District Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2018-4 KLT 913)
Sec. 112 (5A)On acquisition, the cultivating tenants are entitled to compensation for improvements (only) for the land vested in the Government under Sec. 72.
Sec. 112 (5A)(a) says that the compensation for any building or other improvements belonging to the landowner shall be awarded to the Government; and clause (b) says that the balance remaining after deducting the compensation referred to in clause (a) and the value of the land occupied by the homestead or hut, if any, shall be apportioned between the cultivating tenant and the Government in proportion to the profits derivable by them from the land.


READ CONNECTED BLOGS (CLICK):



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Evidence Act

Constitution

Contract Act

Easement

Club/Society

Trusts/Religion