Photographs and Videos: Admissibility, and Proof Invoking Presumptions and ‘Silent Witness’ Theory

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • 1. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence—having been produced along with the certificate required under Section 63(4) of the Bharathiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA)—
  • the court can rely upon it as a piece of evidence,
    • (i) based on the general (and reliable) evidence’ (such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, time, etc.)
    • (ii) as substantive evidence,
    • (iii) invoking the discretionary presumption under Section 119, BSA,
    • (iv) without insisting on any further independent proof.
  • 2. The presumption under Section 119, BSA, is rebuttable.

Key Points at a Glance

  • The only statutorily recognised mode of proof of a Computer Output (copy) is the production of a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA .
  • This certificate is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged.
  • A photograph or a copy of video stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory presumptions that the court can invoke.
  • The court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording, under the silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. Upon its due admission in evidence, the court can rely upon it, on the basis of general (and reliable) evidence’, such as the identity of the persons seen in the photograph/video, the place, the time, or the occasion in which the photo or video was taken, without insisting upon further formal or technical proof.
  • The person who refutes the correctness of the photograph or video has the duty to adduce proper and admissible evidence, to discredit the presumption as to its correctness (This presumption under Section 119, BSA is ‘rebuttable’ for the word “may” in that Section).

Presumptions on Photographs and Videos: Discretionary and Rebuttable

Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (Section 114 of the Evidence Act) allows the Court to

  • ‘presume the existence of any fact ….. regard being had to the common course of natural events‘.

A photograph or a video, by its very nature, speaks for itself. They are “silent witnesses. It may be the most effective evidence in the peculiar nature of a case. (For example, the photograph that represents the scene of an accident.) It is on the supposition – photographs do not lie (Rajesh Khaitan v. State of WB, 1983 CrLJ 877; Anurag Sharma v. Manushi Sharma, 2017 AIR(CC) 332; 2016-234 DLT 530).

Invoking the legal presumptions under Section 119 of the BSA, a court can begin with an assumption as to the correctness of a photograph or video, casting the onus on the opposite party to rebut that presumption by placing on record material sufficient to dislodge or shift it. The presumption under Section 119 is discretionary and rebuttable. Consequently, the law does not oblige the proponent of the photograph or video to negate every theoretical possibility of manipulation.

However, it must have been fairly and accurately depicted. Where the rebuttal evidence creates a reasonable doubt regarding the authenticity or integrity of the photograph or video—whether on the ground of tampering, manipulation, fabrication, or otherwise—or where the court considers that further clarification is necessary to assess its probative value, the court may insist on further proof.

  • Note: The court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove even documents admitted (by the opposite side). Besides Section 53, BSA (facts admitted need not be proved: S. 58, IEA) and the powers of the court under Section 168, BSA (S. 165, IEA), the scheme of the Procedural Acts (CPC and BNSS/CrPC) also shows it. See – 
    • Order VIII Rule 5, CPC
    • Order XII, Rule 2A(1) [Proviso], CPC and 
    • S. 330, BNSS (S. 294 of the CrPC).

Invoking the general presumption (Section 119 of the BSA), as regards the video properly admitted in evidence, the courts in India have consistently held –

  • ‘A mere bald denial of the contents of a video recording is insufficient‘; but, ‘there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed [State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129.]
    • See also: Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1 [The court proceeded, observing – ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence‘].

Photographs – In many cases, a Corroborative Piece; It Can be the Best Evidence also

A photograph, being a document, ordinarily requires proof through a proper witness to establish its authenticity and relevance. However, it need not invariably be proved by examining the photographer, and may be proved through any competent witness capable of speaking to the facts depicted or the circumstances of its production. Once duly admitted, a photograph may constitute primary or substantive evidence, though in many cases it is used to corroborate other evidence.

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is held that CCTV footage can be a ‘Best Evidence‘. The court said it as under:

  • “Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence– CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.”

In short, a photograph or copy of a video, once duly admitted in evidence, may constitute substantive and even the best evidence. The court can rely upon it by invoking the statutory presumptions, without insisting on further independent proof.

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

According to Rule 63(4) of the  of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’, it is pointed out in Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718, that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [See: End Notes ].

The probative value of a document is a matter for the Court

Though in many cases a photograph or video is relied upon only as a corroborative piece of evidence, it can be substantive and independent evidence. It may also be a ‘best evidence‘, as shown above.

It is also important – the determination of the probative value of a document is a matter for the court. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Silent Witnesses Theory – Photograph /Video Speaks for Itself

In State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, the Madras High Court explained the “silent witness” theory, stating as under:

  • “115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray.”

The following two foreign decisions were specifically dealt with by the High Court:

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, [145 P 3d 1008 (2006)]: The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He [2017 ONCJ 790]: The Ontario Court of Justice in Canada opined to the following effect:
    • The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility: (i) The video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial; and (ii) the video is authentic — that it accurately represents the events depicted.
  • Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He [2017 ONCJ 790] referred R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251, Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal).

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

The appellants in R. v. Bulldog (2015 ABCA 251, Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal) challenged the authenticity and admissibility of the DVD. They relied on R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1197.    The Court considered whether the Crown was bound to prove that the video recording had not been altered or changed. The appellants argued that R. v. Nikolovski mandated a two-fold test (i) requiring proof that the video accurately depicted the facts and (ii) proof that it had not been altered or changed. The Alberta Court of Appeal disagreed. It held (paragraphs 26 to 33):

  • 1. As long as other evidence satisfied the accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of alteration was necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal as long as the Crown had proven that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.
  • See: End Notes

Bald Denials are Insufficient to Discredit the Authenticity of Video Footage

The Madras High Court, in this decision (State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi), also observed as under:

  • “113. It is true that the cameraman can zoom or minimize an image. It is also true that trick photography is possible. In Suo Motu taken up (PIL) WP Chief Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu v. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others (WP 3335 etc. of 2009) decided on 29.10.2009, a Division Bench of this Court (F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla and R. Banumathi, JJ) held that bald denials are insufficient to discredit the authenticity of video footage. In her lead judgment, Banumathi, J (as she then was) has opined as under:
    • ‘349. That a bald denial of the contents of a videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that the video clippings are doctored or morphed.
  • The Division Bench proceeded to look into the video tape as a corroborative piece of evidence and held as under:
    • ‘350. The respondents have not disputed that the video clippings filed by the petitioners relate to the occurrence. Even though video clippings filed by the petitioners do not have the running time, we have watched the videos and looked into the photos as corroborative piece of evidence’.”

In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1, the conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels, that ‘there is no room for doubting the authenticity and accuracy of the electronic evidence produced by the petitioner’, was accepted by the Apex Court, holding as under:

  • “The petitioners despite grant of opportunity had declined to watch the recorded interview. It is one thing to watch the interview, point out in what manner the recording was not genuine but instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioners preferred to adopt the course of vague denial.”

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, while dealing with a ‘trap case’, after laying down the importance of digital evidence, it is cautioned as under:

  • “Qualified and trained expert should test the samples. The report should contain the procedure adopted for testing the samples. The equipments used should be duly calibrated and updated periodically. The electronic device should be tested for editing and tampering in order to establish its genuineness and authenticity.
  • Digital evidence form be created for every memory card/chip used in the trap case containing the unique identification features of the memory chip/card used. The defence should be provided with a cloned copy or a mirror image of the electronic device.”

Distinct Evidentiary Position of a Section 63(4) Certificate

Once the Section 63(4) certificate accompanies the computer output (copy), the computer output becomes admissible in evidence, and it is not mandatory to examine the CCTV operator, or the person who snapped the photograph, for the purpose of its admission.

  • See: Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473,
  • Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1.

The Person who Signed Section 63/65B Certificate Need Not be Examined: Having regard to the special features of the photographs and videos (that is, visual depictions of facts), even if the Section 63(4) certificate is not that given either by the plaintiff or by the defendant, but by another, the photograph or video can be marked in evidence through the plaintiff or the defendant.

Unless the authenticity or correctness of the certificate issued under Section 63(4) is specifically disputed, oral evidence has no role to play in proving (for the purpose of marking) that the computer output is the exact copy of the (original) electronic record. Therefore, the photographer who issued the certificate under Section 63(4) need not be examined if the correctness of the certificate is not specifically disputed.

In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, our Apex Court further affirmed as under:

  • “50. … However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.”

Definition of Document Includes Photographs and Videos

Section 2(1)(d) of the Bharat Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), defines ‘document’ as under:

  • “ (d) ‘document’ means any matter expressed or described or otherwise recorded upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or any other means or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter and includes electronic and digital records.”

By virtue of Section 63 of the BSA, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (computer output) shall be ‘deemed to be also a document’.

Section 3(18), General Clauses Act, 1897, defines document as under:

  • Document shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter.”

Section 2(8) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, defines ‘document’ as any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, and includes electronic and digital record, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter.

Going by the definitions, ‘document‘ includes not only all materials or substances upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other species of conventional mark or symbol, but also records of information of some sort (Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State, 2014 KerHC 31).

Electronic Record is Documentary Evidence

It is well established — under Section 3 of the Evidence Act (Sec. 2(1)(d) of the BSA), the electronic record produced for the inspection of the Court is documentary evidence (Anwar PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473).

In P. Gopalakrishnan v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1, it is observed that the following were “documents” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act-

  • (i) tape records of speeches (See also: Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, 2010-4 SCC 329; Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra(1976) 2 SCC 17 ) and
  • (ii) audio/video cassettes (See: Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, 1976-2 SCC 17) including compact disc (See also: Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016-15 SCC 485).

Presumption on Computer Output (copy) Admitted under Sec. 63

A computer output (copy) of a CCTV footage or video, or of a photograph captured on a mobile phone, can be admitted in evidence in place of the original — if it is produced with a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

  • Note: Section 63(1), BSA says about admissibility of copy — “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Proof by Certificate under Section 63(4)

In view of the non-obstante clause (“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam”) in Section 63 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the evidence through a certificate under Section 63(4).

  • Therefore, even in cases where formal proof of the digital photos or videos is dispensed with (for the opposite party admits it), a certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA is necessary.

Admission and Proof of Computer Output (copy): Independent Matters

(i) Admitting a copy of a computer output (such as copy of a statement of accounts) in evidence (with a certificate under Section 63), and (ii) the formal proof thereof at the time of trial, are two distinct and independent matters.

The burden of Impeaching the Certificate is upon the Party who Disputes it

The presumption arising under Section 63—by which a computer output is deemed to be a document—is rebuttable and does not render the contents of the electronic record conclusive.

If such a challenge on the certificate is overruled by the court, it can draw a presumption as to the genuineness and authenticity of the photographs or videos contained in the computer output (copies).

S. 63 deals with Admissibility of computer output or copy, and not Proof

The questions as to substantive proof — whether the computer output or copy is relevant, and how it should be proved — are not determined by Section 63 of the BSA. They are to be established independently, as in the case of any other class of documents.

  • However, the court can draw presumptions as to the genuineness and authenticity of such photographs or videos, as stated earlier.

Once Copy Admitted by S. 63 Certificate, Oral Evidence has No Place in Marking

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1, is an authority on the following matters –

  • (i) The certificate under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to admissibility of the computer output (copy);
  • (ii) The certificate is meant to replace the oral evidence of the device-handler or operator.
  • (iii) Once the certificate is produced, oral evidence has no place (for the purpose of marking it).

However, the person who issued the certificate (operator) has to be examined if:

  • the authenticity or correctness of the certificate is specifically disputed;
  • allegations of fabrication, manipulation, or false certification are raised;
  • the issuer’s control over the device/system is seriously questioned; or
  • the court needs clarification to assess probative value, not admissibility.

Pictorial Testimony Theory and Silent Witness Theory

  • Pictorial Testimony Theory — Photograph Need Not Be Proved.
  • Silent Witness Theory — Photograph Must Be Proved.

Pictorial testimony theory

  • It is applied when a photograph is used merely as an aid to a witness in explaining or illustrating his testimony—for example,
    • a doctor explaining injuries with reference to a photographs,
    • witness identifying a scene/person with a photograph,
    • identification of a deceased through a photograph,  
    • accident site photos to explain the incident by a witness.
  • In these cases, the primary evidence is the oral testimony of the witness and not the contents of the photograph itself. The photograph is admitted merely as an aid to enable the witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived (and the photograph itself is not relied upon as substantive evidence). Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the photographer, provided the witness could affirm that the photograph fairly and accurately represents what he saw. In such cases, the photograph does not constitute substantive evidence, and therefore, no certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is required.

Silent witness theory or Communication theory

  • It is invoked when the photograph itself constitutes substantive and probative evidence of what it depicts, speaking for itself without supporting oral testimony—for instance,
    • an X-ray film showing a fracture,
    • a photograph depicting the accused in a crowd holding a weapon (though the photographer did not notice him),
    • a photograph of the scene of occurrence of a crime.
    • CCTV footage.
    • speed camera photographs.
  • In these cases, the reliability and authenticity of the photographs or video must be proved, for the court relies upon what is depicted by the camera, CCTV, etc., in the mechanical/ electronic process, and not what the human witness who operated the process perceived.

In Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State (2014 Ker HC 31), these two theories, governing the proof and authenticity of photographs, were explained.

Examination of the Photographer may not be insisted (In silent witness theory)

As stated above, in silent witness theory cases, photographs or videos are required to be proved. However, such proof need not necessarily be by way of formal proof through the examination of the photographer or the person who captured the image.

Court to Draw a Prima Facie Presumption of Correctness

The law does not proceed on any presumption that electronic or visual evidence is to be viewed with constant suspicion.

The party producing a photograph or video is required only to establish foundational facts sufficient for its admissibility and relevance. Once this burden is discharged and the document is duly admitted, the Court can draw a prima facie presumption of correctness under Section 119 of the BSA (Section 114 of the IEA).

If S. 63/65B Requirement is fulfilled, CD is admissible, Like a Bocument

In Kailas v. The State of Maharashtra: 2025 INSC 1117, our Apex Court held as under:

  • “19. … However, strangely, the High Court opined that the video would become relevant only if it is played during deposition of each witness so that the witness could explain its contents in his own words resulting in a transcript of the video. In our view, this is a strange and unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section 65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence, like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to contents of a document which can be seen and heard to enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s). No doubt, there may be an occasion where to appreciate contents of a video an explanatory statement may be needed, but that would depend on the facts of a case. However, it is not the requirement of law that the contents of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video or is noticed in the video. Besides that, in the instant case, the search and seizure operation was sought to be proved by oral evidence of witnesses. The video, therefore, was perhaps to corroborate the oral testimony. …”

General Evidence on Factual Features through a ‘Proper’ Witness Sufficient

Besides admission of the other side as regards the authenticity, the photographs or videos may instead be proved through a ‘proper’ witness capable to furnish general (and reliable) evidence’ (to invoke the ‘general presumption‘ under Section 119, BSA) regarding the factual features depicted therein, such as the identity of the persons in the photograph, the place, the time, or the surrounding circumstances.

The following legal principles are relevant in this matter:

  • 1. The relevance of the photograph or video can be established by general evidence’ regarding the identity of the persons seen in the photograph, the place, etc.
  • 2. The admissibility of a photograph or copy of a video (under the Section 63(4) certificate) and its formal proof are two distinct and independent matters.
  • 2. Even in cases where formal proof of the photographs or copies of videos is dispensed with, the certificate under Section 63(4) of the BSA (Section 65B of the IEA) is necessary — in view of the non-obstante clause in Section 63 of the BSA.
  • 3. A photograph or a copy of video, admitted in evidence on the strength of a certificate under Section 63(4), stands on a distinct footing (in contradistinction to a statement-of-account) by reason of the statutory (general) presumptions that the court can invoke (under Section 119 BSA), it being direct visual depictions of facts.
  • 4. The certificate under Section 63(4) is accepted unless its correctness is specifically challenged. The oral evidence of the person who issued the certificate becomes relevant (for the purpose of admitting the document) only where the certificate itself is specifically and successfully challenged by the party who disputes its authenticity or correctness.
  • 5. Therefore, the court is entitled to infer that a photograph or video, once duly admitted in evidence, correctly represents the scene or object as it existed at the time of recording. It is doctrinally recognised as the ‘silent witness’ theory – the document “speaks for itself”.
  • 6. Once a photograph or a copy of a video is duly admitted in evidence, the court cannot discard it, equating it to hearsay or corroborative evidence. The court cannot, as an invariable rule, insist upon further direct proof of the facts depicted in the photo or video. That is, the court has to accept it as a piece of (substantive) evidence.
  • 7. The presumption attached to a photograph or a video admitted in evidence being one rebuttable, the opposite party can rebut it by placing appropriate evidence to show that the photograph or video does not correctly represent the scene, object, or occurrence as it existed at the relevant point of time, or that the factual position had materially changed.

Photo Identification falls under the Pictorial Testimony Theory

Photo identification falls under the Pictorial testimony theory. Because the court has nothing to perceive from the photograph by itself; it only serves as an aid to the witness. The material and substantive evidence is the personal knowledge of the witness, and not what is depicted in the photograph.

The Kerala High Court (KT Thomas, J.), in Ponnappan v. State of Kerala, ILR 1994(3) Ker 370, confirmed the conviction, holding that Chacko was the person who was killed. It was on a photo identification. The Court held as under:

  • “PW I identified the person in M.O. 9 photo as the person who was killed. There is no doubt that M.O. 9 is the photograph of Chacko, the film representative. It was contended that since P. W. 1 himself admitted that he had not observed the features or facial peculiarities of the person when he was inside the car, the identification made by him with the help of the photo is not of any use. We are of the view that even without noticing any translatable mark or feature of a person, it would be possible to identify him later.”

Read also:

Pictorial Testimony Theory: No Enacted Law; Only Judicial Exposition

The pictorial testimony theory rests on judicial exposition rather than statutory codification. It finds only indirect support, in principle, from Section 162 (Refreshing Memory), BSA. Section 162 is to be understood as one not exhaustive in its operation.

Section 162 of the BSA reads as under:

  • Refreshing memory: (1) A witness may, while under examination, refresh his memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the time of the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon afterwards that the Court considers it likely that the transaction was at that time fresh in his memory:
    • Provided that the witness may also refer to any such writing made by any other person, and read by the witness within the time aforesaid, if when he read it, he knew it to be correct.
  • (2) Whenever a witness may refresh his memory by reference to any document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of such document:
    • Provided that the Court be satisfied that there is sufficient reason for the non-production of the original:
    • Provided further that an expert may refresh his memory by reference to professional treatises.”

R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157

In R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, the Apex Court summarised the earlier decision, Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720, (which considered the evidentiary value of tape recording, compared to that of a photograph) as under:

  • “In Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720) the appellant offered bribe to Sheikh a Municipal Clerk. Sheikh informed the Police. The Police laid a trap. Sheikh called Nagree at the residence. The Police kept a tape recorder concealed in another room. The tape was kept in the custody of the police inspector  Sheikh gave evidence of the talk. The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae. It is also comparable to a photograph of a relevant incident. The tape recorded conversation is therefore a relevant fact and is admissible under section 7 of the Evidence Act.” (Referred to in: K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275)

After summarising Nagri’s case (Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720), the Supreme Court continued as under:

  • “The Court will take care in two directions in admitting such evidence. First, the Court will find out that it is genuine and free from tampering or mutilation. Secondly, the Court may also secures scrupulous conduct and behaviour on behalf of the Police. The reason is that the Police Officer is more likely to behave properly if improperly obtained evidence is liable to be viewed with care and caution by the Judge. In every case the position of the accused, the nature of the investigation and the gravity of the offence must be judged in the light of the material facts and the surrounding circumstances.”

Conclusion

  • The only Mode of Proof of a computer output (copy) is the certificate under Section 63(4).
  • Where formal evidence is required to establish the relevance or authenticity of a photograph or video, it is sufficient for the party concerned (under the silent witness theory) to adduce general evidence’ relating to the factual aspects depicted therein—such as the identity of the persons depicted, the place, the time, or the circumstances depicted.
  • As pointed out in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P.  Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019 -1 LW(Cri) 421; 2019-1 LW(Cri) 481; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, a bald denial of the contents of the videotape is not adequate to doubt its authenticity; there should be material to show that they are doctored or morphed.
  • The photograph or video constitutes substantive evidence. Though in many cases it is relied upon as corroborative evidence, in an appropriate case it may, by itself, establish the fact in issue, independently and without the aid of other evidence. It may also be from the ‘best evidence‘ in certain cases (Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178). In any case, the probative value of a document is a matter for the court.
  • The photograph admitted merely as a non-probative aid to enable a witness to explain or illustrate what he personally perceived need not be proved by a ‘proper’ witness; and, no certificate is required for such photographs under Section 63(4) of the BSA.

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End Notes — 1

Electronic Evidence — Indian Law in Comparative Perspective to Other Jurisdictions

Electronic Evidence – Cannot be Ignored on any Technicality

In Shafhi Mohammad s. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 2018 SC 714; 2018-2 SCC 801, , our Supreme Court, stated as under:

  • “21. We have been taken through certain decisions which may be referred to. In Ram Singh vs. Ram Singh [Ram Singh vs. Ram Singh, 1985 Supp SCC 611] , a three-Judge Bench considered the said issue. English judgments in R. v. Maqsud Ali [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1966) 1 QB 688] and R. v. Robson [R. vs. Robson, (1972) 1 WLR 651] and American Law as noted in American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol. 29) p. 494, were cited with approval to the effect that it will be wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. Electronic evidence was held to be admissible, subject to safeguards adopted by the Court about the authenticity of the same. In the case of tape-recording, it was observed that voice of the speaker must be duly identified, accuracy of the statement was required to be proved by the maker of the record, possibility of tampering was required to be ruled out. Reliability of the piece of evidence is certainly a matter to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. However, threshold admissibility of an electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any technicality if the same was relevant”. (Quoted in: Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1)

Proof on Video – UK, US and Canada 

The following are the well-accepted UK authorities on proof of electronic evidence.

  • (i) R. v. Maqsud Ali [1966] 1 QB 688) – on tape recordings,
  • (ii) R v. Clare and Peach (1995] 2 Cr App R 333) – on photograph,
  • (iii) R v. Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876 – on CCTV.

The following is the important US authority on proof of videos.

  • State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006) – Supreme Court of Nevada (a U.S. state)

The following are the well-accepted Canadian authorities on proof of videos.

  • (i)  R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251 – Alberta Court of Appeal(Western Canada).( It is followed in  Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 –  Ontario Court of Justice in Canada)
  •  (ii) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 –  Ontario Court of Justice in Canada.

These decisions consistently laid down the following as to the admissibility of a video in evidence:

  • (a) The video must be relevant to the issues at trial.
  • (b) The video must be authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.

Madras High Court Relied on the above Canada Decisions

While considering the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence, the Madras High Court, in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129, relied on the aforesaid decisions –

  • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006);
  • (b) Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790.

 The Madras High Court held as under:

  • 115. We may also incidentally notice the developments in the law on video and photographic evidence in the West where the “silent witness” theory is deployed to admit video and photographic evidence. The theory proceeds on the footing that photographic and video evidence are “silent witnesses” which speak for themselves. They are substantive evidence of what they portray. Two examples may be noticed.
    • (a) State of Nevada v. Archanian, 145 P 3d 1008 (2006) was a murder case before the Supreme Court of Nevada, where, a key piece of evidence was the digital video recorded by the store’s surveillance system. The accused attacked the authenticity of the video footage on the ground that the VHS tape given to the police video technician was not the original and that the technician had isolated the relevant camera view and highlighted certain portions of the video. It was this composite videotape that was shown to the jury. In the trial, the prosecution acknowledged that they had no way of knowing whether the images were accurately transferred from the original digital recording to the VHS version but testified that they appeared to be the same. The Supreme Court of Nevada admitted the video evidence under the silent witness theory and held as under:
    • “There is no evidence suggesting that the composite videotape was inaccurate, that any relevant or exculpatory information had been deleted from it, or that the modifications made to it adversely affected or obscured the content.”
    • (b) More recently, in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790 Kenkel, J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in Canada formulated a test, very similar to our own and that has been alluded to by us in para 105 (supra). The Court opined:
    • “The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility:
    • They must prove the video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial.
    • They must prove the video is authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.”

Halsbury’s Laws of England

In Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, 2006 reissue, Vol. 11(3) Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure, it is stated while dealing with “Documentary and Real Evidence”, as under:

  • “1471. Audio and video recordings. – An audio recording is admissible in evidence provided that the accuracy of the recording can be proved, the recorded voices can be properly identified, and the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, R v. Ashiq Hussain [1966] 1 QB 688, 49 Cr. App. Rep 230, CCA. For the considerations relevant to the determination of admissibility see R. v. Stevenson, R. v. Hulse, R. v. Whitney [1971] 1 All ER 678, 55 Cr. App. Rep 171; R. v. Robson, R. v. Harris [1972] 2 All ER 699, 56 Cr.App. Rep 450. See also R. v. Senat, R. v. Sin (1968) 52 Cr. App. Rep 282, CA; R. v. Bailey [1993] 3 All ER 513, 97 Cr. App. Rep 365, CA. Where a video recording of an incident becomes available after the witness has made a statement, the witness may view the video and, if necessary, amend his statement so long as the procedure adopted is fair and the witness does not rehearse his evidence: R. v. Roberts (Michael), R. v. Roberts (Jason) [1998] Crim. LR 682, 162 JP 691, CA.]. However, that evidence should always be regarded with caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances [R. v. Maqsud Ali, (1965) 2 All ER 464, R. v. Ashiq Hussain [1966] 1 QB 688, 49 Cr.App. Rep 230, CCA. As to the use of tape recordings and transcripts see R. v. Rampling [1987] Crim. LR 823, CA; and see also Buteria v. DPP (1986) 76 ALR 45, Aust. HC. As to the tape recording of police interviews see para 971 et seq ante; and as to the exclusion of a tape recording under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 s. 78 (as amended) (see para 1365 ante) as unfair evidence see R. v. H [1987] Crim. LR 47, Cf R. v. Jelen, R. v. Karz (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep 456, CA (tape recording admitted despite element of entrapment).].
  • A video recording of an incident which is in issue is admissible [Taylor v. Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225, 84 Cr.App. Rep 191, DC.]. There is no difference in terms of admissibility between a direct view of an incident and a view of it on a visual display unit of a camera or on a recording of what the camera has filmed. A witness who sees an incident on a display or a recording may give evidence of what he saw in the same way as a witness who had a direct view [Taylor v. Chief Constable of Cheshire [1987] 1 All ER 225, 84 Cr.App. Rep 191, DC. As to the admissibility of video recordings as evidence identifying the defendant see also R. v. Fowden and White [1982] Crim. LR 588, CA; R. v. Grimer [1982] Crim. LR 674, CA; R. v. Blenkinsop [1995] 1 Cr.App. Rep 7, CA. A recording showing a road on which an incident had occurred was admitted in R. v. Thomas [1986] Crim. LR 682. As to the identification of the defendant by still photographs taken by an automatic security camera see R. v. Dodson, R. v. Williams [1984] 1 WLR 971, 79 Cr.App. Rep 220, CA; as to identification generally see para 1455 ante; and as to the admissibility of a copy of a video recording of an incident see Kajala v. Noble (1982) 75 Cr.App. Rep 149, CA.].” (Quoted in: P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161)

R. v. Maqsud Ali

R v. Maqsud Ali, (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division [1966] 1 QB 688), considered the admissibility of secret tape recordings. It is a foundational case on audio recordings. It was cautioned that such evidence should be relevant and reliable, and also be a legitimate exhibit.

R v. Clare and Peach

R v. Clare and Peach (Court of Appeal, England and Wales, Criminal Division [1995] 2 Cr App R 333)  is an authority concerning the admissibility of photographic identification evidence under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 (UK). It is held that the production of photographs to witnesses amounts to a “recognition” rather than aformal identification” procedure.

R v. Atkins

R v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) ), England and Wales, is a modern locus classicus on the visual evidence (CCTV) and identification testimony and expert opinion in criminal proceedings. The Court of Appeal held that expert evidence, in cases involving CCTV footage and photographic comparisons, could be admissible when it assisted the jury beyond their ordinary experience. However, the Court emphasized that such evidence must be based on a demonstrably reliable methodology.

R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251

This decision of the Alberta (Western Canada) Court of Appeal is the leading authority on the following:

  • (i) A video can be proved by any one of the following –
    • (1) the camera operator;
    • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
    • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
    • (4) an expert witness.
  • (ii) What is required is the proof as to authenticity of the video; and not the evidence that the video is ‘not altered’.

Two questions came for consideration in this case. They were –

  • .1. “Can a digital video only be authenticated by an eyewitness”?
  • 2. Should there be proof – video was not altered or changed?

Both questions were answered negatively in R. v. Bulldog.

Can a digital video only be authenticated by an eyewitness”?

One of the main questions in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness.

It held as under:

  • “[20] [The appellants argue] that Nikolovski sets two preconditions to the admissibility of video recordings – specifically, proof that the video accurately depicts the facts, and that it has not been altered or changed. The appellants refer to the process of establishing these facts as ‘authentication,’ and we are content to adopt that term, since ‘authentication’ simply refers to the process of convincing the court that certain tangible evidence matches the claims made about it . . .
  • [21] The second proposition, which relies on R v Doughty, 2009 ABPC 8 (CanLII) at para 37 (citing Elliot Goldstein, Visual Evidence, A Practitioner’s Manual, Vol 1 (Thomson-Carswell, 2007) at 2-19 to 2-20), is that there is an exclusive list of classes of witnesses who can authenticate a video in a manner that meets these two putative Nikolovski preconditions:
  • (1) the camera operator;
  • (2) an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw;
  • (3) a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or
  • (4) an expert witness.
  • [22] Based on these two propositions, the appellants argue that the Crown’s evidence in this case could not authenticate the DVD. They submit (but do not really argue) that the authenticating witness was Reddick, who did not create the DVD tendered, did not know who created it, did not know whether the person who did create it used or might have used options which changed the content of the source video footage, was not an expert in the software and in the format changes entailed in copying the DVD and, accordingly, could not give the expert evidence of the effect of format changes which the appellants say is necessary to authenticate the DVD: R v Penney, 2002 NFCA 15 (CanLII), 2002 NFCA 15 at para 24, 210 Nfld& PEIR 209.
  • [23] In short, the appellants say that, absent evidence from a particular class of qualified person verifying that the video recording had not been altered or changed in the course of undergoing various format changes, the DVD was inadmissible.
  • . . . . . .
  • [34] It will be recalled that the appellants say that, because Reddick does not fit into any of the four categories identified by Goldstein
    • [at para. 21 of the judgment and consisting of: the camera operator; an eye-witness present when the video is taken who can testify that the video accurately represents what he or she saw; a person qualified to state that the representation is accurate; or an expert witness.]  
  • as persons capable of authenticating video evidence, it follows that the Crown could not authenticate the video recording. We assume that the appellants also maintain that none of the other Crown witnesses would fit into those categories, although we observe that Hodge would have fallen into Goldstein’s second category as an eyewitness, had he viewed the video in court and testified that it accurately depicted what he saw. In any event, these categories are not exhaustive in the sense that, if the Crown does not call one of these four kinds of witnesses, the video recording is inadmissible. Rather, other kinds of evidence or different combinations of witnesses may be employed to satisfy a court of the video recording’s substantial accuracy and fairness.”

Should there be Proof – Video not been Altered or Changed?

Another main question in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, was whether a digital video can only be authenticated by an eyewitness. The appellants argued that R. v. Nikolovski, [1996] 3 S.C.R. mandated a two-fold test: that is  –

  • .(i) requiring proof that the video accurately depicted the facts and
  • (ii) proof that it had not been altered or changed.

The Alberta Court of Appeal (R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251) disagreed with the appellant finding, in a nutshell, as under:

  • 1. When accuracy of the video is satisfied, evidence regarding the absence of alteration was not necessary.
  • 2. The mere fact of alteration did not automatically render a video recording inadmissible.
  • 3. The Crown’s failure to establish that the DVD was not altered was not fatal if it is proved that the DVD was a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purported to show.

The Alberta Court of Appeal (R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251) said it as under:         

  • “[26]  . . . the appellants say that Nikolovski creates a two-part test which must be met before admitting video evidence, requiring the Crown to show not only that the video recording accurately depicts the facts, but also that it has not been altered or changed. This is incorrect.
  • [27]  It must first be borne in mind that Nikolovski was not a case about the admissibility of a video recording (which had been conceded), but rather about identity (specifically, whether a trier of fact could identify the accused beyond a reasonable doubt as the offender by relying solely upon that video recording). The critical passage from Nikolovski, para 28 upon which the appellants rely, is found under a heading discussing ‘Use That Can Be Made of Photographs or Videotapes,’ which clearly presupposes admissibility.
  • [28]      Further, the passage itself fails to support the appellants’ contention. It reads as follows: 
  • Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.
  • This statement does not state a necessary condition for admission, but rather a sufficient condition. It does not, even implicitly, preclude admission of video recordings under other circumstances. Indeed, where an alteration enhances a video recording, its accuracy might well be served by such an alteration: R v Jamieson, [2004] OTC 369 at paras 36-37, [2004] OJ No 1780 (QL) (SCJ).
  • [29] We do agree with the appellants, however, that in some cases Nikolovski has been taken as requiring the tendering party to show an absence of alteration or change: PenneyR v. MacNeil, 2008 QCCS 915 (CanLII) at para 11, [2008] QJ No 1784 (QL); R v Chevannes, 2011 ONCJ 754 (CanLII) at para 16, [2011] OJ No 5937; R v Ellard, 2004 BCSC 780 (CanLII) at para 11, [2004] BCJ No 2914. In Penney, for example, the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal (at para 17) cited Nikolovski as authority for the statement that ‘[e]vidence establishing that the video has not been altered or changed is a precondition to its admission as evidence.’ With respect, we do not read Nikolovski as stating so broad a proposition, and we see no principled reason to support it. Indeed, taken to its extreme, it could render almost any DVD left unattended next to a computer inadmissible . . .
  • [30]  Other courts have taken a different view of Nikolovski, to the effect that a video recording may be admitted into evidence, even if it has been altered in some way, so long as it is shown to be a substantially accurate depiction of the event in question. In R v Brown, [1999] OTC 213, [1999] OJ No 4865 (CJ), where the Crown sought to tender at trial a security surveillance videotape and enhanced copies, the court stated (at para 3) that, when a videotape has been altered, the test for admissibility is: one of substantial accuracy . . . [T[he Crown must … prove on a balance of probabilities the substantial accuracy of the original tape and the enhancements of it to obtain the permission of the court to tender them in accordance with [Nikolovski] ….
  • [31] Similarly, in R v Crawford, 2013 BCSC 2402 (CanLII) at para 48, [2013] BCJ No 2879 (emphasis added), the court said that Nikolovski should be interpreted in a ‘purposive’ manner, such that a video recording’s admissibility is not precluded, even if ‘complete accuracy’ no longer subsists, so long as ‘the alteration of the recorded event is not so substantial as to be misleading’ or ‘if the image is distorted or otherwise changed in a material way.’ What matters, said the court in Crawford, is that the video recording ‘accurately and fairly presents he information that it is to convey.’ Other courts, including this Court, said much the same thing prior to Nikolovski . . .
  • [32] There is an important distinction between recordings (video or audio) and other forms of real evidence (such as a pistol or an article of clothing found at a crime scene) which supports a test of ‘substantial’ accuracy over the appellants’ preferred test of ‘not altered.’ It will be recalled that ‘authentication’ simply requires that the party tendering evidence establish (to the requisite standard of proof, which we discuss below) the claim(s) made about it. What authentication requires in any given instance therefore depends upon the claim(s) which the tendering party is making about the evidence. In the case of most real evidence, the claim is that the evidence is something – the pistol is a murder weapon, or the article of clothing is the victim’s shirt. Chain of custody, and absence of alteration will be important to establish in such cases. In the case of recordings, however, the claim will typically be not that it is something, but that it accurately represents something (a particular event). What matters with a recording, then, is not whether it was altered, but rather the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which satisfies the trier of fact of the requisite degree of accuracy, no evidence regarding the presence or absence of any change or alteration is necessary to sustain a finding of authentication.
  • [33] Put simply, the mere fact of alteration does not automatically render a video recording inadmissible. It follows that the Crown’s failure to establish that this video recording was not altered should not be fatal, so long as the Crown proves that it is a substantially accurate and fair representation of what it purports to show. All this is, of course, subject to the standard framework for admission, under which a video recording may be excluded on the basis of irrelevance (Penney), where its prejudicial effect exceeds its probative value (R v Veinot, 2011 NSCA 120 (CanLII) at paras 24-27, 311 NSR (2d) 267), or where there is reasonable doubt that the video identifying the accused is a fabrication.”

Circumstantial Evidence be Used – No Particular Evidence or Class of Witness

Referring to the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in R. v. Bulldog, 2015 ABCA 251, the Ontario Court in Her Majesty v. Jaiyhi He, 2017 ONCJ 790, KENKEL J., said:

  • Introduction
  • [1] Constable Sebastian found a white Mercedes stopped in the roadway and a man lying unconscious on the grass nearby. Mr. He was subsequently charged with having care or control of a vehicle while his ability to operate that vehicle was impaired by consumption of alcohol. The next day, another officer went to a business near the scene of the incident and saw two surveillance cameras that could have captured the events on video. He spoke with a manager who had access to the surveillance video system, watched the videos from those cameras and found that one captured this incident. The manager copied the video from their system to a DVD the officer had brought for that purpose. At issue is whether the Crown has proved the surveillance video admissible where no person from the business was called to authenticate the copy.
  • Surveillance Video Authentication
  • [2] The party seeking to tender a video in evidence must show two things to meet the threshold test of admissibility:
    • They must prove the video is relevant, showing the crime scene or other evidence linked to the issues at trial.
    • They must prove the video is authentic – that it accurately represents the events depicted.
    • The test is satisfied on a balance of probabilities – R v Bulldog 2015 ABCA 251 at paras 39-40.[1]
  • [3] The defence refers to a statement in R v Nikolovski, [1996] SCJ No 122 at para 28 as setting the test for authentication, “Once it is established that a videotape has not been altered or changed, and that it depicts the scene of a crime, then it becomes admissible and relevant evidence.” The defence submits that while there is eye witness evidence that can authenticate a portion of this video, there is no witness who can identify the initial events so there’s no evidence that portion of the video is an accurate representation. Second, the Crown has failed to prove that the video has not been altered or changed. The Crown has not called anyone from the company that kept the surveillance system so the video has not been authenticated and should not be admitted.
  • [4] The argument that Nikolovski sets out a two-step test for video authentication was rejected by the Alberta Court of Appeal in R v Bulldog supra. The court noted that Nikolovski was not a case about video admissibility as that had been conceded at trial.[2] They found that the passage cited above does not state a test or necessary condition for authentication, but rather a sufficient condition – Bulldog at para 28. What matters with video evidence is the degree of accuracy of its representation. So long as there is other evidence which shows the video is accurate, no evidence regarding the absence of any change or alteration is necessary – Bulldog at para 32.
  • [5] Constable Lewis went back to the scene during business hours the day after the accused’s arrest. He spoke to the people at the company and was referred to a manager who had access to the surveillance video equipment. Constable Lewis saw the video recording system, he viewed the surveillance video at the relevant time and found that it showed this incident. He watched the manager make a digital copy directly onto a DVD that the officer had brought for that purpose.
  •  [6] Circumstantial evidence may be used to authenticate real evidence – Bulldog at para 35. There is no particular evidence or class of witness that must be called to authenticate a video provided the whole of the evidence establishes that the video in question is substantially accurate[3] and a fair depiction – Bulldog at para 37.
  • The surveillance system described by the officer operates automatically. The copying of a digital record as described by the officer is a simple and now familiar procedure. A side by side comparison of the two videos is not necessary to prove the reliability of the copy in that context. There’s nothing in the evidence that casts doubt on the integrity of this record. I find the circumstances described by the officer and his direct observations establish the integrity and accuracy of the video on the balance of probabilities. The testimony of a company representative to confirm the officer’s observations about the video system and the fact that a direct digital copy was made would add little to the officer’s evidence. The absence of a company witness does not render the video inadmissible.
  • “7. While the circumstantial evidence is sufficient, in this case, there is further direct evidence that independently shows the video is accurate. The surveillance video is in sync with all of the other evidence at trial. The officers’ testimony as to the scene when they arrived, the times the various officers arrived, their actions, the position of the accused, the departure of other parties, the arrival of the ambulance is all consistent with this video. The two police in-car videos are also consistent with this surveillance video.
  • [8] On this point, the defence submits that the evidence of the officers and the police in-car videos may confirm the accuracy of the surveillance video after they arrived, but it cannot confirm the accuracy of the video prior to that time. I disagree. The fact that every part of the video that could be confirmed by independent evidence is consistent with that evidence is a circumstance which strongly supports the accuracy of the entire video including those minutes before the police arrived. I find the surveillance video is also admissible on that basis.”

Quoting the para 6 and 7 above, the Madras High Court, in State Represented by the Inspector of Police, Chennai v. V. P. Pandi @ Attack Pandi, 2019-2 CTC 391; 2019-3 CTC 391; 2019-2 MLJ(Cri) 129), said as under:

  • “We have referred to these decisions in order to reiterate that a pragmatic and purposive interpretation of the law governing the admission of electronic evidence is consistent with the development of the law in international jurisdictions as well.
  • 116. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the photos and videos in M.Os.45,49,50,51,52 and 53 were taken contemporaneously when the attack was taking place and have not been doctored and can be read in evidence.”

 “Balance of Probabilities”

In R v Penney, (2002) 163 CCC (3d) 329, the court considered the ‘falsification of evidence’ and pointed out that the members of a jury ‘can be expected to have, if not experience with, knowledge of the possibilities for manipulating the content of photographs and videotapes’, and concluded that the ‘standard by which the trial judge is to determine the question is on the balance of probabilities’

Conclusion

The following are the distinctive features of Indian law that significantly relax the strict burden of proof governing electronic evidence:

  • (i) Section 63(4) of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 stipulates that a computer output (i.e., a copy of an electronic record) is ordinarily admissible upon the production of the prescribed certificate, thereby facilitating the mode of proof of secondary electronic evidence; and
  • (ii) Section 119 of the Adhiniyam enables the Court to presume the accuracy of electronic records, including photographs and video recordings, with the result that the evidential burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut such presumption by placing cogent material on record.

In contrast, UK law adopts a more common law–driven and cautionary approach. While electronic and video evidence is readily admissible upon proof of relevance and authenticity, the courts have consistently emphasised the risks inherent in visual identification, particularly from CCTV footage. The leading authority in this regard is R v Atkins. It emphasises careful judicial scrutiny, especially where the quality of the images is poor or where identification rests on inference.

Thus, Indian law tends to ease the evidentiary burden at the threshold of admissibility. The UK law places comparatively greater emphasis on rigorous scrutiny at the stage of evaluation and weight, particularly in cases involving identification from video recordings

A similar facilitative approach is discernible in Canadian law. Both the Canada Evidence Act and the Ontario Evidence Act recognise a presumption as to the “integrity of an electronic documents system”, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In this respect, Indian law aligns more closely with the Canadian model, in that it employs statutory presumptions to ease the evidentiary burden, rather than relying predominantly on case-by-case judicial calibration (as it prevails in the UK).

End Notes – 2

International Criminal Proceedings: No strict Requirement – Photographs be Corroborated

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ say about the discretion of a Chamber to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility. From the above, it is clear that there should be reliable information as to

  • the date,
  • location and
  • events depicted   

for determining the

  • relevance,
  • probative value and
  • admissibility of the photograph-evidence.

Rules 63 and 64 of the ‘International Criminal Proceedings (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence’ read as under:

“Rule 63: General provisions relating to evidence

  • .1. The rules of evidence set forth in this chapter, together with article 69, shall apply in proceedings before all Chambers.
  • 2. A Chamber shall have the authority, in accordance with the discretion described in article 64, paragraph 9, to assess freely all evidence submitted in order to determine its relevance or admissibility in accordance with article 69.
  • 3. A Chamber shall rule on an application of a party or on its own motion, made under article 64, subparagraph 9 (a), concerning admissibility when it is based on the grounds set out in article 69, paragraph 7.
  • 4. Without prejudice to article 66, paragraph 3, a Chamber shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in particular, crimes of sexual violence.
  • 5. The Chambers shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other than in accordance with article 21.”

“Rule 64: Procedure relating to the relevance or admissibility of evidence

  • .1. An issue relating to relevance or admissibility must be raised at the time when the evidence is submitted to a Chamber. Exceptionally, when those issues were not known at the time when the evidence was submitted, it may be raised immediately after the issue has become known. The Chamber may request that the issue be raised in writing. The written motion shall be communicated by the Court to all those who participate in the proceedings, unless otherwise decided by the Court.
  • 2. A Chamber shall give reasons for any rulings it makes on evidentiary matters. These reasons shall be placed in the record of the proceedings if they have not already been incorporated into the record during the course of the proceedings in accordance with article 64, paragraph 10, and rule 137, sub-rule 1.
  • 3. Evidence ruled irrelevant or inadmissible shall not be considered by the Chamber.”

According to Rule 63(4) of the  International Criminal Courts (ICC) Rules of Procedure and Evidence, it is pointed out that there is no strict legal requirement that a photograph has to be corroborated by other evidence for the Court to be able to rely on it and establish a specific fact [Prosecutor v Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842,14 March 2012, TC I-718 ].

In Prosecutor v Lubanga it is observed as under:

  • “644. The prosecution relies on a number of video excerpts to establish that some of the UPC/FPLC recruits were “visibly” under the age of 15. The defence argues that it is impossible to distinguish reliably between a 12 or 13 year-old and a 15- or 16-year-old on the basis of a photograph or video extract alone. The Chamber accepts that for many of the young soldiers shown in the video excerpts, it is often very difficult to determine whether they are above or below the age of 15. Instead, the Chamber has relied on video evidence in this context only to the extent that they depict children who are clearly under the age of 15.”

(See: Prosecutor v. Ntaganda: Decision on Prosecution’s request for admission of documentary evidence,  ICC-01/04-02/06-1838 (28 March 2017) (TC VI) [68]. Prosecutor v Oussama Achraf Akhlafa, ECLI: EN: RBDHA: 2019: 7430, the Dutch District Court in Hague noted that “determining the date on which a particular image was taken is potentially an interesting element in the context of a criminal investigation”.)

Specific Presumptions on Elc. Record in S. 81 & 93, BSA

Specific presumptions relating to electronic records are contained in Sections 81, 85, 86, 87, 90 and 93 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. Two of them are very important. They are given below.

S. 81 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 reads as under:

  • 81. Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic or digital record: The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic or digital record purporting to be the Official Gazette, or purporting to be electronic or digital record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic or digital record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section and section 93 electronic records are said to be in proper custody if they are in the place in which, and looked after by the person with whom such document is required to be kept; but no custody is improper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render that origin probable.

Section 93 BSA reads as under:

  • “93. Presumption as to electronic records five years old: Where any electronic record, purporting or proved to be five years old, is produced from any custody which the Court in the particular case considers proper, the Court may presume that the electronic signature which purports to be the electronic signature of any particular person was so affixed by him or any person authorised by him in this behalf.
  • Explanation.—The Explanation to section 81 shall also apply to this section.”

End Notes — 3

Photograph-Evidence: In a Nutshell

Photographs are admissible in evidence as documents.  P.  Gopalkrishnan @ Dileep v. State of Kerala, AIR 2020 SC 1; 2020-9 SCC 161
While considering a case on dowry death, the prosecution argued that a photograph was not admissible in evidence as neither the person who took the photograph nor its negative was produced in evidence. But, the court accepted the photograph as ‘no dispute was raised by the prosecution witnesses’.Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2024 SC 4551
A large number of photographs were marked and considered in this case.
In para 525, it is stated – the witness “was confronted with photographs of the inscription”
There were three sets of albums containing photographs taken by the State Archaeological Department pursuant to an order dated 10 January 1990 (Para 533).
In para 538, the Court considered the evidence of a witness as to the “photographs placed within the structure in 1990”.
M.  Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, 2020-1 SCC 1 (Ayodhya case)
The factum of photo identification (of an accused) by PW 2, as witnessed by the officer concerned, is a relevant and admissible piece of evidence.Rabindra Kumar Pal v.  Republic of India, 2011-2 SCC 490
Nothing prevented the appellant-State Government from producing the relevant photographs of the purported pucca pond existing at some spots.State of Rajasthan v. Ultratech Cement Ltd. , 2022-12 Scale 606; 2022-13 SCR 1
A statement about the photograph made by any expert would not be admissible before examining the photographer.Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785
Photographs, tape-records of speeches [Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17] are documents.Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, 2016 15 SCC 485;
Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2011-4 SCC 143
Photo identification of an accused during the investigation, who was seen by the witness at the relevant time.Umar Abdul Sakoor Sorathia v. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic  AIR 1999 SC  2562, 2000-1 SCC 138; Rabindra Kumar Pal v. Republic of India, AIR  2011 SC 1436; 2011 2 SCC 490
Inventory, photographs and the list of samples certified by the Magistrate are admissible as primary evidence. It is a substitute for the production of physical evidence of seized contraband samples.Nisar Ahmed Bhat, v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir 2024 0 Supreme(J&K) 187  
The tape record corroborated his testimony, as a photograph taken without the knowledge of the person photographed can become relevant and admissible so does a tape record of a conversation unnoticed by the talkers. A contemporaneous tape record of a relevant conversation is a relevant fact and is admissible under section 8 of the Evidence Act. It is res gestae.K. K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011-11 SCC 275;
R.M Malkani v. State of Maharastra, AIR 1973 SC 157;
Yusaf Ali lsmail Nagri v. The State of Maharashtra, 1967- 3 S.C.R. 720

End Notes — 4

Decisions on Electronic Records

  • CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015-7 SCC 178)
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Conclusion of the Speaker on CDs received from TV News Channels:
    • Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phonesin:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 )

End Notes — 5

Decisions on Photo/Audio/Video

Audio/Video cassettesZiyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdas Mehra, (1976) 2 SCC 17
Tape records of speechesTukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate, (2010) 4 SCC 329
Photo or videoMohammed Rafiq v. Madhan, 2018-1 Mad LJ(CRI) 641;
Moti Rabidas v. The State of Bihar, 2015-145 AIC 435;
Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan 2014-1 Raj Cri C 31;
State of MP v. Shankarlal, ILR 2010 MP 717;
P Rajagopal v. Inspector of police 2009-2 Mad LJ(Cri) 161;
Santhosh Baccharam Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 All MR (Cri)997, 2003 BCR (Cri) 120.
CD  Shamsher Singh Verma v. State of Haryana, (2016) 15 SCC 485
Photographs including photographs of tombstones and houses Lyell v. Kennedy (No.3) (1884) 50 L.T. 730
Video recordings  State of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053
Audio and videoState of Maharashtra v. Praful B.Desai, AIR 2003 SC 2053;
Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya v. State :2014 KHC 31;
Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire:1987(1) All.ER 225
CassettesTukaram S.Dighole v. Manik Rao Shivaji Kokate (2010)4 SCC 329
Moving cinematographSenior v. Holdsworth, Ex parte Independant Television New Ltd. (1976) Q.B. 23)
Film  Rex v. Daye ((1908)2 K.B. 333, 340)
Floppies, CCTV footages, CDs, DVDs, Chips, Hard discs, Pen drives North West Airlines v. Union of India 2007 (214) ELT 178 (Bom.)

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

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Negotiable Instruments Act

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Contents of a Document are to be Proved in Court by Producing Original or Secondary Evidence

Jojy George Koduvath

Also Read: Oral Evidence on Contents of Document, Irrelevant

Abstract.

1. The contents of a document cannot be proved by oral evidence. The document itself must be produced. (Sections 61 and 62 of the Evidence Act).

2. Secondary evidence can be given if permitted under Sections 65 of the Evidence Act, read with Section 63.

3. Section 91 expressly bars oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, disposition of property, etc., by oral evidence if they are reduced to writing.

4. Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

5. If the original document is not produced, right to adduce Secondary Evidence is not automatic. Loss, non-availability, etc., are to be proved under Sec. 65; and no oral statement about its contents is inadmissible. Secondary evidence of a document’s contents cannot be admitted unless the non-production of the original is first accounted for.

6. Withholding the best evidence attracts adverse inference. When a party relies on a document but does not produce it, the Court must presume it would have gone against that party. A party in possession of the best evidence must produce it; otherwise, the court is entitled to drawadverse inference’.

7. No amount of oral evidence can substitute documentary evidence, where the law requires the document itself to be produced.

8. A document which is not proved (even if produced) in accordance with law cannot be relied upon by the court for deciding the rights of the parties.

9. Documents which are not proved (even if produced) in accordance with the law cannot be taken into consideration.

PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS

A document to be used in court has to pass through three steps. They are:

  1. Production of documents in court
  2. Admittance and exhibition
  3. Proof (formal proof and truth of contents).

Modes of Proof of Documents

Modes of Proof of Documents (as to, both, ‘formal proof’ and ‘truth of the contents’) include the following:

  • Admission of the person who wrote or signed the document (Sec. 17, 21, 58, 67, 70).
  • Evidence of a person in whose presence the document was signed or written – ocular evidence (Sec. 59).
  • An attesting witness (Sec. 59).
  • Opinion of a person who is acquainted with the writing of the person who signed or wrote (Sec. 47).
  • Admission made by the person who signed or wrote the document made in judicial proceedings (Sec. 32, 33).
  • Evidence of a handwriting expert-opinion evidence/scientific evidence (Sec.45).
  • Evidence of a person who in routine has been receiving the document; or a document signed by such a person in the ordinary course of his business or official duty, though he may have never seen the author signing the document (Sec. 32, 34, 35 or 114).
  • Invoking (specific) presumptions under Sec. 79 to 90A.
  • Presumptions (general) under Sec. 114.
  • Circumstantial evidence: on probability or inferences (Sec. 114).
  • Court-comparison (Sec. 73).
  • Facts judicially noticeable (Sec. 56 and 57).
  • A fact of common-knowledge. (It does not require proof. See: Union Of India Vs. Virendra Bharti: 2011-2 ACC 886, 2010  ACJ 2353; Rakhal Chakraborty Vs. Sanjib Kumar Roy: 1998-1 GauLR 253, 1997-2 GauLT 705)
  • Internal evidence afforded by the contents of the document; a link in a chain of correspondence; recipient of the document. (Mobarik Ali Ahmed Vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857)

Rule of Best Evidence

The Evidence Act project the rule of best evidence and it directs that the contents of the document are to be proved by the original document itself, unless secondary evidence is provided under Sec. 65. (See: Bimla Rohal v. Usha, 2002-2 HLJ 745; 2002-2 Shim LC 341)

Oral Evidence on Contents of Documents

No Use, Unless Secondary Evidence Permitted

Sec. 22 and 144 of the Evidence Act postulate that the oral admissions or assertions as to contents of documents are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under Sec. 65, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22 emphasises that oral evidence as to contents of documents , even if adduced, will be of no use, as it will be ‘irrelevant’. By virtue of Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act, the adverse party may object to giving oral evidence as to contents of the same until such document itself is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.

Sec. 22A says as to oral admissions as to contents of electronic records as under:

  • 22A. When oral admissions as to contents of electronic records are relevant
  • Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing.—Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation.—A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.
  • Illustration. The question is, whether A assaulted B. C deposes that he heard A say to D—”B wrote a letter accusing me of theft, and I will be revenged on him”. This statement is relevant as showing A’s motive for the assault, and evidence may be given of it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.

Documentary Evidence becomes meaningless if oral evidence Allowed

In Bhima Tima Dhotre v. The Pioneer Chemical Co. (1968) 70 Bom LR 683,  it is observed as under:

  • Documentary evidence becomes meaningless if the writer has to be called in every case to give oral evidence of its contents. If that were the position, it would mean that, in the ultimate analysis, all evidence must be oral and that oral evidence would virtually be the only kind of evidence recognised by law. That, however, is not the position under the Evidence Act. … Section 59 of the said Act enacts that all facts, except the “contents” of documents, may be proved by oral evidence. This provision would clearly indicate that to prove the contents of adocument by means of oral evidence would be a violation of that section.”

Read Blogs:

The contents of a document are to be proved by producing it

To prove the contents of a document, it must have been produced before the court.

  • Sections 61 & 62 of the Evidence Act require proof of the contents of a document by the production of the document itself (or its secondary evidence).

If the document is not produced, its contents are legally non-existent for the Court. Following are the well-accepted principles in this regard:

  • Oral evidence cannot substitute documentary proof.
  • Court cannot decide rights on “assumed” contents

Principles of Law – in a Nutshell

The Principles of Law in this regard can be discerned from the following decisions of our Apex Court:

1. It is held in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, that Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act bar amendment, variation, etc. of a document; oral variations—whether by the party or the opposite side—are barred. The Court laid down as under:

  • “Wherever written instruments are appointed, either by the requirement of law, or by the contract of the parties, to be the repositories and memorials of truth, any other evidence is excluded from being used either as a substitute for such instruments, or to contradict or alter them.”(Quoted in: Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd., 2024-4 SCC 1; V. Anantha Raju v. T. M. Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)
  • “The grounds of exclusion of extrinsic evidence are (i) to admit inferior evidence when law requires superior would amount to nullifying the law, (ii) when parties have deliberately put their agreement into writing, it is conclusively presumed, between themselves and their privies, that they intended the writing to form a full and final statement of their intentions, and one which should be placed beyond the reach of future controversy, bad faith and treacherous memory.” (Quoted in Placido Francisco Pinto v. Jose Francisco Pinto, 2021-10 SCR 676; V Anantha Raju v. T M Narasimhan, AIR 2021 SC 5342)

2. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413, para 5, it is held that in a case where one party withholds a document, the court takes an adverse inference under Section 114(g). The Court said as under:

  • Even if the burden of proof does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts at issue..”

3. The Constitution Bench of our Apex Court laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt.  of N. C. T.  of Delhi), AIR 2023 SC 330; 2023-4 SCC 731, as under:

  • 47. Section 61 deals with proof of contents of documents which is by either primary or by secondary evidence.
  • When a document is produced as primary evidence, it will have to be proved in the manner laid down in Sections 67 to 73 of the Evidence Act.
  • Mere production and marking of a document as an exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence. On the other hand, when a document is produced and admitted by the opposite party and is marked as an exhibit by the court, …  (sic – no objection can be raised at any later stage with regard to proof of its contents).
  • The contents of the document must be proved either by the production of the original document i.e., primary evidence or by copies of the same as per Section 65 as secondary evidence.
  • So long as an original document is in existence and is available, its contents must be proved by primary evidence.
  • It is only when the primary evidence is lost, in the interest of justice, the secondary evidence must be allowed.
  • Primary evidence is the best evidence and it affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.
  • Thus, when a particular fact is to be established by production of documentary evidence, there is no scope for leading oral evidence.
  • What is to be produced is the primary evidence i.e., document itself. It is only when the absence of the primary source has been satisfactorily explained that secondary evidence is permissible to prove the contents of documents.
  • Secondary evidence, therefore, should not be accepted without a sufficient reason being given for non-production of the original.”
  • 48. ……. Once a document is admitted, the contents of that document are also admitted in evidence, though those contents may not be conclusive evidence.
  • Moreover, once certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.
  • There is a prohibition for any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence and the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive.”

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Civil Suits: Procedure & Principles

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Principles and Procedure

PROPERTY LAW

Title, ownership and Possession

Recovery of Possession: 

Adverse Possession

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Land Reform Laws

Power of attorney

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Law on Documents

Documents – Proof and Presumption

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Criminal

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Divergent Views – Whether S. 43, Evidence Act Includes S. 13; Whether Judgment not Inter Parties is Admissible under S. 13  

Taken from: Relevance of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  • The relevancy of a previous judgment (in a subsequent case) is governed by Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
  • Section 43, inter alia, permits the production of earlier judgments that are deemed “relevant under other provisions of this Act.”
  • There are divergent views on the applicability of Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13, Evidence Act, under this clause in Section 43.
    • First view—Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13 being delineate the general provisions, and the relevance of prior judgments is primarily governed by Sections 40 to 43, the previous judgments will not be liberally permitted (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”).
    • Second view—The phrase “relevant under some other provisions of this Act” as stated in Section 43, must be interpreted to encompass its complete and comprehensive significance.
  • Differences of opinion also exist as to the admissibility of a judgment not inter parties, under Section 13.
  • The legitimate view, it appears, is the following –
    • (i) Previous judgments can be admitted in evidence (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”) if they fall under Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13. Nevertheless, the admissibility of the previous judgments being essentially governed by Sections 40 to 43, they cannot be allowed to be freely imported, invoking the general provisions.
    • (ii) The probative value of the previous judgment has to be determined by the court, even if such a previous judgment is marked in evidence as ‘relevant’.
    • (iii) In any case, the use of the previous judgment is definitely relevant in certain contexts. For instance:
      • To show motive for an offence (Section 8) – i.e., to find whether the judgment provoked anger in the accused.
      • To determine the sentence or damages to be imposed – i.e., to see whether there would be double jeopardy.

First View: Other Provisions of this Act” in S. 43 Will Not Cover S. 13

A three-Judge Bench, in State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Syed Murtaza Fazalali, A. Varadarajan, V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.) held as under:

  • “We are, however, of the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call into aid other general provisions to make a particular document admissible. In other words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of s. 43. Otherwise, it cannot be relevant under s. 13 of the Evidence Act. The words “other provisions of this Act” cannot cover s. 13 because this section does not deal with judgments at all.”

Second View: Judgment not Inter Parties is Admissible under Section 13

But, a contra-view is taken in a Two-Judge Bench in Tirumala Tirupati Devsthanam v. K. M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132; 1998-3 SCC 331 (S.P. Bharucha & M. Jagannadha Rao, JJ.), which reads as under:

  • “9. In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 379, speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that a judgment not inter parties is admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those falling under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected.
  • Again B.K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned Judges in Sital Das v. Sant Ram & Ors., AIR 1954 SC 606, held that a previous judgment not inter partieswas admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a ‘transaction’ in which a right to property was ‘asserted’ and ‘recognised’.
  • In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1902) ILR 29 Cal. 190 (PC), that a previous judgment, not inter partes** was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Dinamoni v. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh, 1895 ILR 22 Cal. 533 (PC), by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931, P 181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157.”
  • **inter partes‘: meaning – between the parties

This view (Judgment not Inter Parties is Admissible under Section 13) is also in:

  • Ahale Sunnathwal Jamath Jogi Madam, Majid v. Haji Syed Irfan Hussain Sahib, 2024-2 CTC 27; 2023-5 LW 775; 2024-1 MLJ 202
  • Tiruvannamalai Karuneekar Sangam v. Saradambal Ammal 2023-5 CTC 138; 2023-3 LW 289,
  • S. Govindarasu Udayar v. Pattu, 1999 – 2 – L.W. 184,
  • Daular Ram v. Keshav Smarak Samiti, 2011 SCC Online Del 4472,
  • Raman Pillai Krishna Pillai v. Kumaran Parameshwaran, AIR 2002 Ker 133
  • Andhra Pradesh Waqf Board v. Syedm Jalaluddin Sha, AIR 2005 AP 54.
  • Dinamoni v. Brajmohini, (1992) ILR 29 Cal 190 (PC – Lord Lindley)
  • Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sunder, AIR 1934 PC 157: 61 IA 286.

Also see:

  • Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Aba Shedage (2002-2 SCC 85),
  • Ram Bhool and Another v. Bhudev Prasad and Another (2013-11 ADJ 276) &
  • Nisar Husain & Another v. Board of Revenue Uttar Pradesh at Allahabad & Others (2016 -34 LCD 2672).
  • Collector of Gorakhpur vs. Ram Sundar Mal, AIR 1934 PC 157
  • Maharaja Sir Kesho Prasad Singh vs. Bahurin Musammat Bhagjogna Juer, AIR 1937 PC 69.

Conclusion

  • 1. Even though State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, is rendered by the larger bench, it is seen that the High Courts preferred to follow Tirumala Tirupati Devsthanam v. K. M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132, as shown above.
  • 2. The apparent inconsistency between State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684, and Tirumala Tirupati Devsthanam v. K. M. Krishnaiah, AIR 1998 SC 1132, is not yet resolved by the Supreme Court.

End Notes:

What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43

Following provisions are pointed out frequently, in this regard –

  • Sec. 5 (Facts in issue);
  • Sec. 8 (which refers to motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct);
  • Sec. 11 (which says when facts not otherwise relevant become relevant);
  • Sec. 13 (when existence of right or custom is in question then any transaction or particular instances where the right or custom is claimed, recognized etc. become relevant),
  • Sec. 54 Explanation (2), when a previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character), etc.
  • Sec. 58 (Admitted Facts)

Judicial Discipline & Application of Per Incuriam Rule

Propositions:

  • 1. Decision of a Bench of larger number of Judges prevails over the decision of a smaller number of Judges – Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1933.
  • 2. If a Bench of the same number of Judges disagrees with a decision of the same number of Judges, then the matter has to be referred for decision to a larger Bench of the Supreme Court.  Even if a later decision is given without referring to the earlier decision, yet it is the earlier decision which will hold the field – Union of India v. S.K. Kapoor (2011) 4 SCC 589

Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in a Criminal Case – Abstract Propositions

1. Independent evidence/finding needed.

  • M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 (Vivian Bose, J.)
  • State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2823,
  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87 (MB Shah, J.)
  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370  (G.P. Mathur, J.)
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765,
  • Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

2. It is not correct to say – a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court.

  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
  • Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)

3. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court, either in civil or criminal proceedings, shall be binding between the same parties (even) while dealing with the same subject-matter.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370,
  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713 (R.F. Nariman, J.)

4. Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act deal with relevancy alone (Not conclusive except as provided in Section 41).

  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713

5. Criminal liability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while civil liability is based on preponderance of probabilities; different principles and different standards of proof.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

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Sakshya Adhiniyam Mandates Hashing the Original; Established Jurisprudence Requires Hashing the Copy Also.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Abstract

  • 1. Sec. 63 of the BSA mandates the hash certificate for the original electronic record alone.
    • However, to fulfill the intended purpose, the HASH value certificate for the copy (computer output) must also be provided.
  • 2. Sec. 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate that hashing must be done at the time of copying.
    • But the judicial precedents require recording the hash values at the time of ‘copying’.

Part I

Established Jurisprudence Varies from the Enacted Law

HASH Certificate Under Sec. 63 (BSA)

The (earlier) Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sec.  65B mandated only a simple certificate, as provided under Sec. 65B(4), when ‘computer output’ (copy) was produced before a court. But, the new Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,  2023, requires, in Sec.  63(4), the HASH value certificate, also.

Also Read: Sec. 65B (Electronic Records) and Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Act speaks as to copy (computer output)  as under:

  • 63. Admissibility of electronic records– (1) “… any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper….  or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied …..”

Section 63(4)(c) of the Act reads as under:

  • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.

HASH Value Certificate

The Certificate required in Sec. 63(4)(c) of the Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA) must be “in the form specified in the Schedule”. It is laid down in the schedule (not expressly stated in the body of the section-text) that this certificate (HASH value certificate) is needed in addition to the Certificate that is required in sub-section (4) as regards the matters enumerated in sub-section (4).

HASH Value Certificate: Form in the Schedule

The Form in the Schedule directs to state the following:

  • “I state that the HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s is …… ……… …… , obtained through the following algorithm –
  • SHA1:
  • SHA256:
  • MD5:
  • Other …….. …….. …….. (Legally acceptable standard)
  • (Hash report to be enclosed with the certificate)”

What is (Literally) required is the Certificate concerning the Original

From the above form, it is evident that what is required is a certificate as regards the original ‘electronic/digital record(s)’, not any copy thereof.

Besides clause (c) of sub-section (4), clauses (a) and (b) also refer to the ‘original’ and not to a ‘copy’. Clauses (a) and (b) read as under:

  • “(a) identifying the containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).”

The expression “identifying the electronic record containing the statement” in clause (a) of sub-section (4) further emphasises that the “statement” should pertain to that found in the ‘computer,’ indicating the statement within the physical device itself.

This interpretation aligns with the evidentiary logic that authentication must relate or refer to the source.

Moreover, the words “where it is desired to give a statement in evidence” in Sec. 63(4) can be understood to refer to the “statement” as it exists in the electronic form in the (original) computer or in its digital storage (rather than the ‘copy’ or reproduction of that statement introduced later in court).

Relevant words in Sec. 63(4) reads as under:

  • “Where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate… shall accompany the electronic record…”

The term “electronic record,” as used in this context, appears incongruent because the statute seems to treat the original electronic source and the document produced from it (such as a printout or soft copy) under the same terminology. This conflation could lead to multiple confusions, including what exactly is being certified, the original data in the system, or the document derived from it.

Further Discordant Notes

1. The law compulsorily requires the HASH certificate. But, the requirement for the HASH certificate is unnecessary, especially in situations where there is no dispute regarding the computer output (copy or print-out).

2. It is not made clear in Sec. 63, BSA –

  • (i) What is the precise purpose of ascertaining the hash value of the (original) ‘electronic or digital record’ and not a copy (computer output) that is actually produced before the court?
  • (ii) This raises also another question: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s hash is referenced?
  • (iii) Why does the requirement of including HASH value appear only in the Schedule (certificate format) and not in the main body of Sec. 63 itself?
  • (iv) The lack of explicit mention in the section text also creates uncertainty about whether hash values are mandatory or directory (merely illustrative of best practices).

Established Jurisprudence

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 (although it was delivered before the introduction new Adhiniyam of 2023), is regarded as the most authoritative decision on this matter.

Read: Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.

The enacted law (Sec. 63, BSA) requires the HASH value ‘certificate’ as regards the original ‘electronic or digital record(s)’, the prevailing consensus among the courts in India is the following –

  • The primary objective of the certificate being verification of the authenticity of the copy (CD, pen drive, etc.), the certificate must refer to the copy (computer output), as well as to the original (electronic record) from which the copy was derived.

As regards the HASH value in Sec. 63(4), BSA, the following matters requires consideration –

  • The main text of Section 63(4) does not use the term “hash value”.
  • The ‘HASH value/s of the electronic/digital record/s‘ is required to be given under the ‘Form’ scheduled.
  • Even though it is not specifically stated, the ‘HASH values’ of both the original and the copy of the record must be provided (otherwise, the intended purpose will not be served).

Part II

The Law Does Not Mandate Hashing at the Time of Copying

As shown above, the Court decisions refer to the HASH value of the copy (computer output) produced in court, and not the original (electronic or digital record).

It is also worth noting that the Section does not clarify when hashing must be done—whether during copying from the original or at the time of presentation before the court.

It is true that the hash value of the copy of the CCTV footage (or any other digital evidence) should ideally be generated at the time the copy is made, and not merely at the time when the pen drive or other storage device is produced in court.

Hash Value Is Insisted at Four Stages even under Evidence Act

Madras High Court, in Yuvaraj v. State, 2023-4 Mad LJ (Cri) 238, observed as under:

  • “206. To ensure that what is collected as an evidence in the source is exactly reflected or produced at the time of marking the electronic evidence before the Court, particularly when it comes to CCTV footages, a standard operating procedure must be followed. Such a practice will guarantee that nothing gets altered/deleted/added by the time the evidence is tendered before the Court. Hence, the concept of hash value is insisted at four stages and this value must be the same on all those four stages to ensure authenticity. When the CCTV footage gets stored in the hard disk, that is the first stage where the hash value must be noted down when it is received by the analyst from the Court on requisition made by the prosecution. Thereafter, the analyst creates a copy/mirror image of what is contained in the hard disk and this must also have the same hash value. As the next step, the forensic examination starts and ultimately, it is concluded and a report is given by the forensic analyst. In all those four stages, the hash value must be the same.”
  • 207. For convenience, after the examination is completed by the forensic analyst, the footage can be downloaded to a DVD/CD and the same hash value will be reflected without any change. Since the extraction from the hard disk to the DVD/CD makes such DVD/CD as a secondary evidence, it goes without saying that such a DVD/CD must be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate. Copies taken and given to the accused persons under Section 207 of CrPC. regarding the CCTV footages should also be accompanied with Section 65-B certificate.”

Hash Value Must Be Recorded – Guidelines of Govt. in Tax Matters

In the “Digital Evidence Investigation Manual, 2014, Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), Department of Revenue Ministry of Finance Government of India, reads, in Para 6.8, as under:

  • “6.8 Forensic Imaging/Cloning: If on previewing, important data is found either in deleted or in active form, the storage medium is required to be cloned for evidence purpose. Otherwise a normal data backup can be taken. The following steps should be taken at the time of cloning:
  • • Preparation-
  • ….. In cases where very high capacity disks/ servers (Over 200 GB) are found at the search premises, separate Hardware imaging devices, which are up to ten times faster, would be needed. These hardware devices have in-built authentication engines. On completion of the imaging process, the device displays the hash value of the cloned hard disk. The image/clone has to have the same hash value as that of the target hard disk. The Hash value should be recorded in the Panchnama and the assessee can be given the option of seeking a copy of the imaged/cloned hard disk by paying the copying charges.”

Para 6.8 also requires the following under the heading ‘Report’:

  • • Report: Take printout of report generated by the imaging tool which contains the details of imaging attributes, details of Hard Disk Drives imaged, date and time and the most important thing the hash value of the Hard Disk Drive. Attach the report along with panchnama as an annexure to it.

In M/S. Saravana Selvarathnam Retails v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024-463 ITR 523: 298 Taxman 319: 339 CTR 10 (Mad)(HC), the main grievance of the petitioner was that the digital data evidences were collected by the respondents from unknown locations without any valid search warrant and without following the guidelines issued by the CBDT vide Digital Evidence Investigation Manual. The Madras High Court addressed the contention in detail and held as under:

  • “The Digital Evidence Investigation Manual has been issued by the CBDT by virtue of powers available under Section 119 of the IT Act and hence, the Income Tax Authorities and all the other persons employed in the execution of this Act are bound to observe and follow such orders, instructions and directions issued by CBDT. ….. Hence, it is mandatory for  W.P. Nos. 9753, 9757, 9761 & 11176 of 2023 respondents to follow the Digital Evidence Investigation Manual issued by CBDT while conducting search and seizure and it is not optional.”

Directives of Maharashtra and Kerala Govts.

In Umesh v. State of Karnataka, 2023-2 KarLJ 397, it is pointed out –

  • “In fact, the Government of Maharashtra has already implemented the practice of collecting hash value of electronic evidences and collecting the memory component of the device it is recorded on at the first instance since 2016. A reference can also be made to the Standard Operating Procedures issued by the Government of Kerala for collection of digital evidence related to crimes against women and children, since 2021. In fact, guidelines on extraction of hash value are also given in Digital Evidence Investigation Manual Central Board of Direct Taxes Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Government of India.”

Hash Values of the Original and Copy at the Time of Copying, Required

Though Sec. 63(4)(c) of the BSA does not specifically mandate

  • (i) that hashing must be done at the time of copying, and (ii) that the hash value must pertain to the copy (computer output), also,

established jurisprudence, through long-standing legal precedents, requires recording the hash values of both the original and the copy at the time of copying, to demonstrate that the data is protected against tampering.

Part III

Section 63(4)(c), BSA

Section 63(4)(c), BSA reads as under:

  • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”

A question may arise –

  • Because the term “hash value” is not explicitly used the main body of Section 63(4)(c) BSA, can it be argued – Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory but directory (or merely illustrative of the best practices)?

An argument is possible (“hash value” certificate is not mandatory) for two matters –

  • 1. The requirement in the Certificate stated in Section 63(4)(c) is laid down in the sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. The “Part A” Certificate in the schedule contains all things in sub-section (2) of Sec. 63. So the “Part B” Hash Value Certificate is not mandatory as per the “Section”.
  • 2. The words “sufficient for a matter to be in the sub-section make it clear – the ‘verbatim adherence’ to the certificate format is not mandatory;*.* no doubt, the substance or contents thereof (particularly, the phraseology – “best of the knowledge and belief”) must have been placed in some (other) form. The particulars in the Certificate being the matters enumerated in the sub-section (2) of Sec 63 (and nothing is stated as regards Hash Value), the ‘Part B’ Hash Value Certificate cannot be a mandatory one.
    • *.*Note:
    • 1. See the difference between (i) reading Sec. 63(4)(c) without the words – sufficient for a matter to be and (ii) reading with these words. Relevant portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) is given below:
      • “(c) ….. for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”
    • 2. The beginning portion of Sec. 63(4)(c) emphasises that it pertains to the matters enumerated in sub-section(2) alone, and not to hash-value. Sec. 63(4)(c) begins as under:
      • “(c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate…”
    • 3. It appears that the hash value(s) of the original record are expected to be stated, rather than those of the copy (or “computer output”) actually produced before the court. This raises several questions, including: how is the court to verify the authenticity of the copy, if only the original’s HASH is referenced?

Possible Counter Arguments (This author does not subscribe)

  • First: The “form A” itself requires Hash Value Certificate.
  • Second:  Section 63(4)(c) says, “a certificate specified in the Schedule”. The phrase “specified in the Schedule” explicitly ties the main section to the Schedule and makes it mandatory.
  • Third:  The Schedule provides a single, Certificate, divided into two parts – “Part A and “Part B”. It is not presented as two separate certificates, one mandatory and one optional.
  • Fourth: Legislative Intent (i.e., for ensuring the digital integrity of electronic records) reflects the mandatory nature.

Conclusion

The ‘Hash Value Certificate’ in the BSA is shrouded in several potential ambiguities. To dispel these uncertainties, a legislative amendment or a definitive ruling by an authoritative court that takes into account all pertinent arguments in this matter is imperative.

It is a fact that Section 65 of the old Act and Section 63 of the new Act were introduced as enabling provisions, designed to simplify the admissibility of electronic records.

  • However, due to poor and rigid drafting, they have paradoxically had the opposite effect.

In practice, it may be more feasible for many litigants to physically produce the original device—such as a computer, laptop, or mobile phone—before the court, rather than to obtain a certified hash value through a forensic expert.

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End Notes:

Section 63, Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam

(Changes introduced in the New Adhiniyam – from the Evidence Act – are emphasised.)

  • 63. Admissibility of electronic records –
    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Adhiniyam, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media or semiconductor memory which is produced by a computer or any communication device or otherwise stored, recorded or copied in any electronic form (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence or any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
    (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer or communication device during the period over which the computer was used regularly to create, store or process information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer or communication device;
    (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer or communication device was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
    (3) Where over any period, the function of creating, storing or processing information for the purposes of any activity regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by means of one or more computers or communication device, whether—
    (a) in standalone mode; or
    (b) on a computer system; or
    (c) on a computer network; or
    (d) on a computer resource enabling information-creation or providing information—processing and storage; or
    (e) through an intermediary
    all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
    (4) In any proceeding where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things shall be submitted along with the electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for admission, namely:—
    (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer or a communication device referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3);
     (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the computer or communication device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief  of the person stating it in the certificate specified in the Schedule.
     (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer or communication device if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    (b) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer or communication device whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment or by other electronic means as referred to in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3).

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Public Records under Sec. 35 Evidence Act: Presumption of Truth and Probative Value

Jojy George Koduvath

Introspection

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act speaks as to ‘relevancy’ of entry in public record, or an electronic record, made in performance of an official duty.
Can ‘truth of its contents’ be presumed under Sec. 114?

Answer: Yes.

But, Note: ‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption (correctness or truth), we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc.
‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) can also be taken as an aid in such an evaluation.

Presumption in Evidence Act under S. 114

Besides direct evidence and admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc. under S. 114, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.  Sec. 114 Evd. Act reads as under”

  • S. 114. Court may presume existence of certain facts The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.”

Under Sec. 114 the court can  presume existence of truth or correctness (a fact) which ‘it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business’.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases. 

‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc.

General (Sec. 114) and Specific (Sec. 79 to 90A) Presumptions in Evidence Act

Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act allows the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Sec. 79 to 90A of the Evidence Act speaks as to specific instances of invoking presumptions.

Relevancy, Admissibility and Presumptions on Truth under Sec. 16, 34, 35

Sec. 16, 34, 35, etc. of the Evidence Act speaks only on ‘relevancy’ of documents. It directs towards the ‘admissibility’. The ‘truth or otherwise’ attached to its contents can be ‘presumed’ under Sec. 114.

Documents in the Course of Business – Relevant Fact under Sec. 16 

Sec. 16 of the Indian Evidence Act: Sec. 16 reads as under:

  • 16. Existence of course of business when relevant: When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally would have been done, is a.

Illustrations to Sec. 16 make it clear that (a) when a question arises whether a particular letter was dispatched, the facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant; and that (b) when a question arises whether a particular letter reached A, the fact that it was posted in due course, and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.

In Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkat Ramanaa, AIR 1976 SC 869, the Apex Court found that a letter sent by registered post, with the endorsement “refused” on the cover, could be presumed to have been duly served upon the addressee without examining the postman who had tried to effect service and it was observed that there was presumption under Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act that, in the ordinary course of business, it was received by the addressee and actually refused by him.

Illustration (f) of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act speaks that the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. Under this Illustration, it can be presumed the common course of business has been followed in particular cases. A registered postal receipt along with a copy of the letter containing the court notice and bearing correct address raises presumption that it was duly received by the addressee, in spite of the absence of a return of acknowledgement (Anil Kumar vs. Nanak Chandra: AIR 1990 SC 1215). but, the addressee can rebut it (Radha Kishan vs. State: AIR 1963 SC 822).

Sec. 34 – Entries in Books of Account, in the Course Of Business, Relevant

Section 34 enjoins that entries in books of account, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant. But, they by themselves, cannot create any liability.

In Dharam Chand Joshi v. Satya Narayan Bazaz, AIR 1993 Gau 35, it was pointed out that unbound sheets of paper are not books of account.

In Ishwar Dass v. Sohan Lal, AIR 2000 SC 426, it is pointed out that Books of account, by themselves, being cannot create any liability, it can only be a corroborative evidence, and must be supported by other evidence (See also: Dharam Chand Joshi v. Satya Narayan Bazaz, AIR 1993 Gau 35).

Sec. 32: ‘Presumption Of Truth’ on Documents Falls Relevant Under Sec. 32

Sec. 32 Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant. –– Statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot be found, or who has become incapable of giving evidence, or whose attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or expense which under the circumstances of the case appears to the Court unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:  
  • (1) When it relates to cause of death …. …..
  • (2) Or is made in course of business. –– When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgement written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him
  • (3) …..”

Presumption on Truth on Documents Prepared under Sec. 35

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.

The entries made in the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (CIDCO v. Vashudha Gorakhnath Mandevleka, 2009 (7) SCC 283).

In The State of Haryana v. Amin Lal (SC), 2024-4 CurCC(SC) 222, it is held as under:

  • Revenue records are public documents maintained by government officials in the regular course of duties and carry a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. While it is true that revenue entries do not by themselves confer title, they are admissible as evidence of possession and can support a claim of ownership when corroborated by other evidence.”

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

Our Apex Court, in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act, held that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35 properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

In Durairaju v. Neela, 1976 CriLJ 1507, Ratnavel Pandian, J., it was held that it was the duty of the court, before making the order for maintenance, to find though in a summary manner, the paternity of the child. It was held that Ex. P. 1, the intimation received by the Municipality from the Government Hospital, and Ex. P. 2 a copy of the birth extract made on the basis of Ex, P. 1, were not sufficient to raise presumption of paternity for, the medical officer who made the entries in Ex. P. 1 had not been examined. The author of the information is not mentioned in Ex. P. 1. PW 2 herself had not stated that she mentioned to the doctor that the child was born to her through the petitioner. In the absence of such evidence, the document could not by itself prove the relevant entries made thereon. It was also observed that to prove a document under Section 35 it must be shown that the document was prepared by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law.

Public Register is Public Document; A Certificate, Not

In Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Poonam Kesarwani , (2010) ACJ 1992, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court considered whether the letter/certificate issued by Regional Transport Officer coluld be considered to be a public document as defined in Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act  which required no proof.  It is pointed out –

  • ‘A public document is a document that is made for the purpose of public making use of it. When a public officer is under a duty to make some entries in the official book or register, the entries made therein are admissible in evidence to prove the truth of the facts entered in the official book or register. The entries are evidence of the particular facts which was the duty of the officer to record. The law reposes confidence in the public officer entrusted with public duties and the law presumes that public officers will discharge their duties with responsibility. A driving licence is issued under Chapter II of the Act. Section 26 of the Act makes it mandatory for the State Government to maintain a register known as State Register of Driving Licences. The entries with regard to issuance or renewal of driving licence by the licensing authorities which contains particulars of the licence and the licence holder are entered by the Regional Transport Officer/the licensing authority in discharge of their official duty enjoined by law. The State Register of Driving Licences is record of the acts of public officers. The State Register of Driving Licences is a public record. It can be inspected by any person. We are of the considered opinion that the State Register of Driving Licences is a public document as defined by Section 74 of the Evidence Act.
  • 10. Section 76 of the Evidence Act gives the right to obtain a certified copy of a public document which any person has a right to inspect on payment of fee. A certified copy of the entries made in the public record is required to be issued on payment of fee in Form 54 as laid down by rule 150 (2). Form 54 being a certified copy of a public document, namely, the State Register of Driving Licences need not be proved by examining a witness. Once a certified copy of the entries made in the register maintained under Section 26 (1) read with rule 23 is issued in Form 54 it is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the Evidence Act, and no further proof of Form 54 by oral evidence by examining witnesses is required.
  • 12. The aforesaid information is in the form of a letter written to the investigator appointed by the insurance company. It cannot be deemed to be a certificate or certified copy in Form 54 of the Rules. Deposit of fee would not convert the letter into a certificate under rule 150. Therefore, the aforesaid letter issued by the Regional Transport Officer, Raipur (Chhattisgarh) was required to be proved by the insurance company before the Tribunal by oral evidence by examining witnesses. Insurance company had failed to lead any evidence to prove the aforesaid letter by examining witnesses before the Tribunal. The Tribunal rightly refused to place reliance on the letter dated 20.4.2005.”

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Poonam Kesarwani , (2010) ACJ 1992 is quoted and followed in New India Assurance Company Ltd.  v. Indu Bala, ILR 2016-3 HP 1829 (Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J.).

Wajibul-Arz – Part of Settlement Record Presumption of Correctness Attached

The Privy Council has held in Fatea Chand v. Knshan, 10 ALJ 335, that wajibul-arz is a cogent evidence of rights as they existed when it was made.

The value of wazibul-aiz has been accepted to be very high in Anant Prasad v. Raja Ram, 1984 Supp AWC 194 and Yash Pat Singh v. Jagannath, 1946 ALJ 132.

In Avadh Kishore Das v. Ram Gopal, AIR 1979 SC 861, (1979) 4 SCC 790, it is observed as under:

  • “Wajibularz is village administration paper prepared with due care and after due enquiry by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. It is a part of the settlement record and a statutory presumption of correctness attaches to it. Properly construed, this Wajibularz shows that the entire revenue estate of village Bahawalpura vests in the Temple or the Math as a juristic person.”

Proof on Date of Birth

In Harpal Singh v. State of H. P. , AIR 1981 SC 361; 1981-1 SCC 560, it was held as under:

  • A certified copy of the relevant entry in the birth register which shows that Saroj Kumari, who according to her evidence was known as Ramesh during her childhood, was born to Lajwanti wife of Daulot Ram on 11-11-1957. Mr, Hardy submitted that in the absence of the examination of the officer/chowkidar concerned who recorded the entry, it was inadmissible in evidence. We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author.”

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U. P. , AIR 2006 SC 2157; 2006 5 SCC 584,  it was observed that there was nothing on record to show that the said date of birth was recorded in a register maintained by the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained in Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, and thereafter it was held as under:

  • “22. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder :
  • (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register;
  • (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact;
  • (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and
  • (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.”

In Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, (2003) 8 SCC 673, it is held that transfer certificate issued by a Primary School does not satisfy the requirement of Section 35 of Indian Evidence Act. Para 32 and 33 of the judgment read as under:

  • “32. Under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a register maintained in terms of a statute or by statutory authority in regular course of business would be relevant fact. Had such a vital evidence been produced, it would have clinched the issue. The respondent did not choose to do so.
  • 33. In the aforementioned backdrop the evidence brought on record are required to be considered. The Admission Register or a Transfer Certificate issued by a Primary School do not satisfy the requirements of Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. There is no reliable evidence on record to show that the date of birth was recorded in the school register on the basis of the statement of any responsible person.”

In Ravinder Singh Gorkhi v. State of U.P. (2006) 5 SCC 584, the proof of copy of a school leaving certificate was considered under Section 35 of the Evidence Act was considered, and it is held as under:

  • “17. “The school leaving certificate was said to have been issued in the year 1998. A bare perusal of the said certificate would show that the appellant was said to have been admitted on 01.08.1967 and his name was struck off from the roll of the institution on 06.05.1972. The said school leaving certificate was not issued in ordinary course of business of the school There is nothing on record to show that the said date of birth was recorded in a register maintained by the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained in Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. No statement has further been made by the said Head Master that either of the parents of the appellant who accompanied him to the school at the time of his admission therein made any statement or submitted any proof in regard thereto. The entries made in the school leaving certificate, evidently had been prepared for the purpose of the case. All the necessary columns were filled up including the character of the appellant. It was not the case of the said Head Master that before he had made entries in the register, age was verified. If any register in regular course of business was maintained in the school; there was no reason as to why the same had not been produced.
  • 19. The school leaving certificate was not an original one. It was merely a second copy. Although it was said to have been issued in July 1972, the date of issuance of the said certificate has not been mentioned. The copy was said to have been signed by the Head Master on 30.04.1998. It was accepted before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bulandshahr on 27.01.1999. The Head Master has also not that the copy given by him was a true copy of the original certificate. He did not produce the admission register.
  • 23. Section 35 of the Evidence Act would be attracted both in civil and criminal proceedings. The Evidence Act does not make any distinction between a civil proceeding and a criminal proceeding. Unless specifically provided for, in terms of Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the register maintained in ordinary course of business by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which, inter alia, such register is kept would be a relevant fact. Section 35, thus, requires the following conditions to be fulfilled before a document is held to be admissible thereunder : (i) it should be in the nature of the entry in any public or official register;; (ii) it must state a fact in issue or relevant fact; (iii) entry must be made either by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country; and (iv) all persons concerned indisputably must have an access thereto.
  • 35. We have not been shown as to whether any register was required to be maintained under any statute. We have further not been shown as to whether any register was maintained in the school at all. The original register has not been produced. The authenticity of the said register, if produced, could have been looked into. No person had been examined to prove as to who had made entries in the register. The school leaving certificate which was not issued by a person who was in the school at the time when the appellant was admitted therein, cannot be relied upon.”

Entry on Caste in school admission registers- Relevant and Admissible

Desh Raj v. Bodh Raj, AIR 2008 SC 632; 2008-2 SCC 186, it is held as under:

  • “Having regard to the provisions of Section 35, entries in school admission registers in regard to age, caste etc., have always been considered as relevant and admissible. [See : Umesh Chandra vs. State of Rajasthan, 1982 (2) SCC 202 and State of Punjab vs. Mohinder Singh, – 2005 (3) SCC 702]. In Kumari Madhuri Patil vs. Addl. Commissioner, [1994 (6) SCC 241], this Court observed that caste is reflected in relevant entries in the public records or school or college admission register at the relevant time and certificates are issued on its basis.”

In Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi AIR 1938 Nag 152 (Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ.) held as under:

  • “The initial burden of proving execution of a document when it is denied is upon the person alleging execution. But if nothing else is known the mere fact that a document is admitted to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution. This inference arises in India directly from Sec. 114, Evidence Act. Persons do not ordinarily sign documents without intending to execute them: that is not the common course of human conduct, nor yet the common course their public or private business. Consequently if any person wants to rely on an exceptional circumstance, if he wants to show that in some particular instance the ordinary rule was abrogated surely he must prove it and thus the burden shifts on him”.

Revenue record Presumption of Truth Attached

It is held in Krishnamurthy S.  Setlur v.  O.V.  Narasimha Setty, 2019-9 SCC 488, that revenue record proves possession. It is said as under:

  • “14. In our considered view, the High Court has not given any cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that KS was not in possession of the property. His name figured in the revenue record from 1963 to 1981 as the owner in possession. Presumption of truth is attached to revenue record which has not been rebutted.”

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness‘.

Presumption of Correctness to Revenue Record Entries

In Vishwa Vijay Bharathi v. Fakhrul Hassan, (1976) 3 SCC 642, it is held as under:

  • “It is true that the entries in the revenue record ought, generally, to be accepted at their face value and courts should not embark upon an appellate inquiry in to their correctness. But the presumption of correctness can apply only to genuine, not forged or fraudulent, entries. The distinction may be fine but it is real. The distinction is that one cannot challenge the correctness of what the entry is the revenue record states but the entry is open to the attack that it was made fraudulently or surreptitiously. Fraud and forgery rob a document of all its legal effect and cannot found a claim to possessory title.”

In Karewwa v. Hussensab Khansab Khansaheb Wajantri, AIR 2002 SC 504 : (2002) 10 SCC 315 , it is held as under:

  • “We do not dispute the legal position as stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, but the presumption of correctness of an entry in revenue record cannot be rebutted by a statement in the written statement. Mere statement of fact in the written statement is not a rebuttal of presumption of correctness of an entry in the revenue record. The respondent was recorded as a tenant in the revenue record in the year 1973 and under law the presumption is that the entry is correct. It was for the appellant to rebut the presumption by leading evidence. The appellant has not led any evidence to show that entry in the revenue record is incorrect. We, therefore, do not find any merit in the contention.”

Public Document Admissible per se without Formal Proof

Certified copies of the public documents can be proved without formal proof. See:

  • Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425 ,
  • Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454
  • Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361
  • Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633
  • Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corp. v. Nand Kishore, 2002 ACJ 1564 (Raj)
  • Md. Akbar v. State of A.P., 2002 CrLJ 3167 (And)
  • Collector (L. A. ), South Andaman v. Himangshu Mondal, 2015-2 CalLT 1
  • Arti Meena v. Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, 2020-1 SCT 1 (Raj).

In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthalur Bojjappa (Gajendragadkar , J.), AIR1963 SC1633; 1964-2 SCR 673, it is held as under:

  • “9. … The document in question being a Certified copy of a public document need not have been proved by calling a witness.”(Referred to in Rangaraju v. Kannayal, 10 Jan 2012, (Mad).

In Harpal Singh and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361, it is held as under:

  • “3.…  We cannot agree with him for the simple reason that the entry was made by the concerned official in the discharge of his official duties, that it is therefore clearly admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act and that it is not necessary for the prosecution to examine its author ” (Quoted in: Manikanta v. State of Karnataka, 2024 Kar HC 21233)

In Shyam Lal @ Kuldeep v. Sanjeev Kumar, AIR 2009 SC  3115; 2009-12 SCC 454, it was observed as under:

  • “25. The findings of the learned District Judge holding Ex. P. 2 to be a public documentand admitting the same without formal proof cannot be questioned by the defendants in the present appeal sinceno objection was raised by them when such document was tendered and received in evidence.
  • It has been held in Dasondha Singh and Others v. Zalam Singh and Others [1997(1) P.L.R. 735] that an objection as to the admissibility and mode of proof of a document must be taken at the trialbefore it is received in evidence and marked as an exhibit.
  • Even otherwise such a document falls within the ambit of Section 74, Evidence Act, and is admissible per se without formal proof“.

In Jaswant Singh v. Gurdev Singh, 2012-1 SCC 425, it is held that certified copy of a public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act, in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act, without being proved by calling witness. It is said as under:

  • “9. … To put it clear, the compromise had become a part of the decree which was passed by the court of Sub-Judge Ist Class, Hoshiarpur. Hence, it is a public document in terms of Section 74 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short ‘the Act’) and certified copy of the public document prepared under Section 76 of the Act is admissible in evidence under Section 77 of the said Act. A certified copy of a public document is admissible in evidence without being proved by calling witness.

See also the following cases where documents were accepted in evidence and acted upon on the basis of Section 35 Evidence Act:

  • Umesh Chandra v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1982 SC 1057 (admission forms as also the School’s register)
  • Harpal Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361 (certified copy of the birth register).

REVENUE SETTLEMENT REGISTERS of Travancore in 1910, Basic Record of Land matters

The Kerala High Court held in Mohandas v. Santhakumari Amma, 2018-3 KLT 606 as under:

  • “We notice that, a new survey and settlement was undertaken in the erstwhile Travancore State for the purpose of putting in place a sound Revenue administration. Accordingly, it appears that a complete survey and reassessment of the entire State ’embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping and valuation of properties of every description and a registration of titles, as the basis of a sound Revenue Administration’ was carried out. On the basis of such a statement a proclamation was issued by the Maharaja of Travancore on 14 th Kumbhom 1061 corresponding to 24th February 1886.”

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If Settlement Register says Government Land, Petitioner to Establish Title

In Sahana Industries v. State of Kerala (2021 KHC OnLine 7110), Kerala High Court (Devan Ramachandran, J.) held (October 11, 2021) as under:

  • “… If the Settlement Register shows this land to be Government land, then certainly, the petitioner is obliged to establish their title over the property through competent documents”.

In Travancore Devaswom Board v. Mohanan Nair M.N.,  (2013) 3 KLT 132, (T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J ; A.V. Ramakrishna Pillai, J), it is observed as under:

  • “52. As far as the property herein is concerned, the land register and the settlement register produced herein are relevant. The property having the entire extent of 2.26 acres is described as ‘kavu’ (holy grove) in the settlement register. In the land register also it is described as ‘kshethram irippu sthalam’ (property where the temple is situated). No other document or other evidence is there to prove the contrary. Therefore, these documents will definitely show that the item of property will fit in with the requirement of Section 3(1)(x) of the Act.”

SEC. 35 REGISTRATION ACT: There is Presumption –  “It is VALIDLY EXECUTED

  • Sec. 35 in the Registration Act, 1908 says that the Registrar allows registration of a document (i) if only he is satisfied as to the identity of the person who executes the document, and (ii) if the executant admits the execution of the document.
  • Presumptions can be invoked in view of the Sec. 58 and 59 Sec. 60 (certificate) of the Registration Act. The presumption of regularity of official acts in Illustration (e) of Section 114 of the Evidence is also attached to a registered deed.
  • The certificate endorsed on a registered deed by the registering officer is a relevant piece of evidence for proving its execution – Piara v. Fatnu, AIR 1929 Lah 711.
  • There is a presumption – registered document is validly executed –
    • Prem Singh v. Birbal, AIR 2006 SC 3608;
    • Abdul Rahim v. Abdul Zabar, AIR 2010 SC 211
    • Jamila Begum v. Shami Mohd., AIR 2019 SC 72;
    • Manik Majumder v. Dipak Kumar Saha, AIR  2023 SC 506.
  • A registered document carries with it a presumption that it was executed in accordance with law – Bellachi v. Pakeeran, AIR 2009 SC 3293.

Genuineness can also be drawn onRegistered Deeds, Invoking Presumption

  • Besides the presumption on a registered document that it is validly executed, there is also a presumption that the “transaction is a genuine one” (Vimal Chand Ghevarchand Jain v. Ramakant Eknath Jajoo, 2009- 5 SCC 713.)
  • The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who questions the same.

Presumption of Correctness Attached to a Registered Deed

In the split-verdict in Majumder v. Dipak Kumar Saha, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 37, BV Nagaratna, J., held as under:

  • “18. … The presumption of correctness attached to endorsement made by the Sub-Registrar is in view of the provisions of Sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act. This presumption can be rebutted only by strong evidence to the contrary.”

BV Nagaratna, J. referred the following decisions-

  • Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434 (a registered document is presumed to be valid).
  • Chottey Lal v. The Collector of Moradabad,  AIR 1922 PC 279 (presumption of validity of a power of attorney which formed the basis of a registered deed; the sub-registrar being accepted the document for registration, it is prima-facie evidence that the conditions have been satisfied).
  • Jugraj Singh v. Jaswant Singh, 1970 (2) SCC 386 (presumption of regularity of official acts of sub-registrar).
  • Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, AIR 2021 SC 899 (presumption of validity of a general power of attorney and consequently of the sale deed executed – especially of a 30-year old document).
  • Prem Singh v. Birbal , (2006) 5 SCC 353 (when such a presumption arises, the onus would be on a person who challenges such presumption, to successfully rebut it).

Where Truth Disputed,  Truth of Public Document must be Established

In Om Prakash Berlia v. Unit Trust of India, AIR 1983 Bom 1, it is held that even when the contents of a document is proved, the truth of what the document states must be separately established. It was a case where truth of contents disputed. It is clear from this decision that the proposition as to proving truth is more apposite when a contention was raised regarding the correctness of truth of the documents. It was further held in this case that annual return under the provisions of Section 164 of the Companies Act was prima facie evidence of any matters directed or authorised to be inserted therein by the Companies Act. The said extract prima facie establishes the truth of the contents of its original.

It is made clear in Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, as under:

  • If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

INSTANCES WHERE PRESUMPTION WAS NOT INVOKED

Age of a Person in a School Register – Not Much Evidentiary Value

In Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit ,1988 Supp. SCC 604, it was held as under:

  • “To render a document admissible under Section 35, three conditions must be satisfied, firstly, entry that is relied on must be one in a public or other official book, register or record; secondly, it must be an entry stating a fact in issue or relevant fact; and thirdly, it must be made by a public servant in discharge of his official duty, or any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. An entry relating to date of birth made in the school register is relevant and admissible under Section 35 of the Act but the entry regarding the age of a person in a school register is of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the person in the absence of the material on which the age was recorded

No evidence – On What Material Entry in Voters List Made

In Babloo Pasi v. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2009 SC  314; 2008-13 SCC 133, it is held as under

  • “23. Therefore, on facts at hand, in the absence of evidence to show on what material the entry in the Voters List in the name of the accused was made, a mere production of a copy of the Voters List, though a public document, in terms of Section 35, was not sufficient to prove the age of the accused. Similarly, though a reference to the report of the Medical Board, showing the age of the accused as 17-18 years, has been made but there is no indication in the order whether the Board had summoned any of the members of the Medical Board and recorded their statement. It also appears that the physical appearance of the accused, has weighed with the Board in coming to the afore-noted conclusion, which again may not be a decisive factor to determine the age of a delinquent. Insofar as the High Court is concerned, there is no indication in its order as to in what manner Rule 22(5)(iv) has been ignored by the Board. The learned Judge seems also to have accepted the opinion of the Medical Board in terms of the said Rule as conclusive. Therefore, the afore-stated ground on which the High Court has set aside the opinion of the Board and holding the accused to be a juvenile, cannot be sustained.”

Hath Chitha – Not Proved, Entry in Discharge of Official Duties

In Ram Prasad Sharma v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326; 1969-2 SCC 359, it is held as under:

  • “In this case it has not been proved that the entry in question was made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties. As observed by this Court in 1965-3 SCR 861 (Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha) at p. 864
  • “the reason why an entry made by a public servant in a public or other official book, register, or record stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact has been made relevant is that when a public servant makes it himself in the discharge of his official duty, the probability of its being truly and correctly recorded is high.”
  • No proof has been led in this case as to who made the entry and whether the entry was made in the discharge of any official duty. In the result we must hold that Ex. D, the hath chitha, was rightly held by the High Court to be inadmissible.”

Illiterate Public Servant, Somebody Else Made Entry – Does Not Come Within Sec. 35

Constitution Bench of in Brij Mohan Singh v. Priya Brat Narain Sinha,  AIR 1965 SC 282, observed as under:

  • “The reason why an entry made by a public servant in a public or other official book, register, or record stating a fact in issue or a relevant fact has been made relevant is that when a public servant makes it himself in the discharge of his official duty, the probability of its being truly and correctly recorded is high. That probability is reduced to a minimum when the public servant himself is illiterate and has to depend on somebody else to make the entry. We have therefore come to the conclusion that the High Court is right in holding that the entry made in an official record maintained by the illiterate Chowkidar, by somebody else at his request does not come within Section 35 of the Evidence Act.”

Document Admissible Under Sec. 35 May (still) Require Corroboration

In Satpal Singh v. the State of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714, it is held as under:

  • “22. Therefore, a document may be admissible, but as to whether the entry contained therein has any probative value may still be required to be examined in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. The aforesaid legal proposition stands fortified by the judgments of this Court in
  • Ram Prasad Sharma Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1970 SC 326;
  • Ram Murti Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 SC 1029;
  • Dayaram & Ors. Vs. Dawalatshah, AIR 1971 SC 681;
  • Harpal Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 361;
  • Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 584;
  • Babloo Pasi Vs. State of Jharkhand, (2008) 13 SCC 133;
  • Desh Raj Vs. Bodh Raj, AIR 2008 SC 632; and
  • Ram Suresh Singh Vs. Prabhat Singh @Chhotu Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 681.
  • In these cases, it has been held that even if the entry was made in an official record by the official concerned in the discharge of his official duty, it may have weight but still may require corroboration by the person on whose information the entry has been made and as to whether the entry so made has been exhibited and proved. The standard of proof required herein is the same as in other civil and criminal cases. Such entries may be in any public document; i.e. school register, voters list or family register prepared under the rules and regulations, etc, in force, and may be admissible under Section 35 of the Evidence Act as held in Mohd, Ikram Hussian v. State of U.P. and Santenu Mitra v. State of W.B.”

Judge’s power to put Questions or Order Production

  • Sec. 165 of Evidence Act reads as under:
  • 165 – Judge’s power to put questions or order production The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing; and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question:
  • Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved:
  • Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question, or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under section 148 or 149; nor shall he dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.

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Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Divorce/Marriage

Negotiable Instruments Act

Arbitration

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

What are “Relevant Under Some Other Provisions of this Act” in Sec. 43?

Taken from: Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in Criminal Cases: Does a Civil Court Judgment Bind a Criminal Court?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate Kottayam

Relevant Provisions Fall under “Some Other Provisions of this Act” in S. 43

Following provisions are pointed out frequently, in this regard –

  • Sec. 5 (Facts in issue);
  • Sec. 8 (which refers to motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct);
  • Sec. 11 (which says when facts not otherwise relevant become relevant);
  • Sec. 13 (when existence of right or custom is in question then any transaction or particular instances where the right or custom is claimed, recognized etc. become relevant),
  • Sec. 54 Explanation (2), when a previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad character), etc.
  • Sec. 58 (Admitted Facts)

Import of “Relevant under other provisions of this Act”

  • The relevancy of a previous judgment (in a subsequent case) is governed by Sections 40 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
  • Section 43, inter alia, permits the production of earlier judgments that are deemed “relevant under other provisions of this Act.”
  • There are divergent views on the applicability of Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13, Evidence Act, under this clause in Section 43.
    • First view—Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13 being delineate the general provisions, and the relevance of prior judgments is primarily governed by Sections 40 to 43, the previous judgments will not be liberally permitted (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”).
    • Second view—The phrase “relevant under some other provisions of this Act” as stated in Section 43, must be interpreted to encompass its complete and comprehensive significance.
  • Differences of opinion also exist as to the admissibility of a judgment not inter parties, under Section 13.
  • The legitimate view, it appears, is the following –
    • (i) Previous judgments can be admitted in evidence (invoking the clause “relevant under some other provisions of this Act”) if they fall under Sections 5, 8, 11 and 13. Nevertheless, the admissibility of the previous judgments being essentially governed by Sections 40 to 43, they cannot be allowed to be freely imported, invoking the general provisions.
    • (ii) The probative value of the previous judgment has to be determined by the court, even if such a previous judgment is marked in evidence as ‘relevant’.
    • (iii) In any case, the use of the previous judgment is definitely relevant in certain contexts. For instance:
      • A motive for an offence (Section 8) – i.e., to see whether the judgment provoked anger in the accused.
      • The sentence or damages to be imposed

Disputes of Title, be adjudicated in Civil Procedure

In Smt. Janak Vohra v. DDA, 103-2003-DLT 789, it was held that in case of disputed questions of title, and mutation being asked for, it is appropriate that the disputes of title be adjudicated in appropriate civil procedure and no direction be issued to mutate the property in the name of a party. (Referred to in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528)

Land Acquisition judgments, not inter partes, Relevant under S. 11 and 13

In The Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. H. Narayana, 1976 – 4 SCC 9; AIR 1976 SC 2403 our Apex Court approved the view that in land acquisition cases judgments, not inter partes, are relevant, under Sec. 11 and 13 Evidence Act, if such judgments relate to similarly situated properties and contain determinations of value on dates fairly proximate to the relevant date in a case.

Order directed rectification of Trust Deed Relevant under Sec. 11

In Commissioner of Income Tax, Kanpur v. Kamla Town Trust, 1996-7 SCC 349, it was held that the Order that directed rectification of Trust Deed would be relevant under Sec. 11 Evidence Act.

Judgment not inter partes admissible to find what lands involved

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, 1983-3 SCC 118, our Apex Court approved the view of the Calcutta High Court as under:

  • “129. In Gadadhar Chowdhury v. Sarat Chandra Chakravarty [AIR 1941 Cal 193 : (1940) 44 Cal WN 935 : 195 IC 412 : 72 Cal LJ 320] it was held that findings in judgments not inter partes are not admissible in evidence. In this connection a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed as follows : ‘Though the recitals and findings in a judgment not inter partes are not admissible in evidence, such a judgment and decree are, in our opinion, admissible to prove the fact that a decree was made in a suit between certain parties and for finding out for what lands the suit had been decreed.’
  • 130. This, in our opinion, is the correct legal position regarding the admissibility of judgments not inter partes.” (Quoted in V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, 2020-9 SCALE. 367)

Criminal proceeding will have precedence over the Civil proceeding

In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528, it is held as under:

  • “10. It is, however, now well settled that ordinarily a criminal proceeding will have primacy over the civil proceeding. Precedence to a criminal proceeding is given having regard to the fact that disposal of a civil proceeding ordinarily takes a long time and in the interest of justice the former should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.” (relied on: M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397.)

Also Read:

Relevancy of a Civil Case Judgment in a Criminal Case – Abstract Propositions

1. Independent evidence/finding needed. 

  • M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397 (Vivian Bose, J.)
  • State of Rajasthan v. Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries, AIR 1996 SC 2823,
  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87 (MB Shah, J.)
  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370  (G.P. Mathur, J.)
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765,
  • Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

2. It is not correct to say – a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court.  

  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
  • Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 (SB Sinha, J.)

3. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court, either in civil or criminal proceedings, shall be binding between the same parties (even) while dealing with the same subject-matter.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370,
  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713 (R.F. Nariman, J.)

4.  Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act deal with relevancy alone (Not conclusive except as provided in Section 41).

  • K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87
  • Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713

5.  Criminal liability must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, while civil liability is based on preponderance of probabilities; different principles and different standards of proof.

  • Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370
  • P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana, (2008) 5 SCC 765
  • Radheshyam Kejriwal v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 3 SCC 581.

Sec. 11 and 13, Evidence Act – Not Attracted to Sec. 43

In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh, AIR 1983 SC 684 (Syed Murtaza Fazalali, A. Varadarajan, V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.) it was held as under:

  • “We are, however, of the opinion that where there is a specific provision covering the admissibility of a document, it is not open to the court to call into aid other general provisions in order to make a particular document admissible. In other words, if a judgment is not admissible as not falling within the ambit of sections 40 to 42, it must fulfil the conditions of s. 43. Otherwise, it cannot be relevant under s. 13 of the Evidence Act. The words “other provisions of this Act” cannot cover s. 13 because this section does not deal with judgments at all.“

The same principle also applies to Sec. 11.

It is Not Correct – Civil Decisions Bind Criminal Courts (and Converse)

Our Apex Court had (earlier) observed in V. M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, (1995) 5 SCC 767, that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court. A Two Judge Bench, in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, doubted the correctness of V. M. Shah case and required reconsideration by a larger Bench. Hence, in KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, the Three-Judge Bench (M.B. Shah, Bisheshwar Prasad Singh, H.K. Sema, JJ.) overruled V. M. Shah v. State of Maharashtra, holding that the finding recorded by a criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct.

KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, also considered Karam Chand Ganga Prasad v. Union of India, 1970-3 SCC 694, wherein it was observed that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts, but the converse is not true. KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, also overruled Karam Chand Ganga Prasad.

Referring KG Premshanker v. Inspector of Police (2002) 8 SCC 87, it is held in Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528 (Mukundakam Sharma, SB Sinha, JJ.) as under:

  • “It is, however, significant to notice a decision of this Court in M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Anr. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. [(1970) 3 SCC 694], wherein it was categorically held that the decisions of the civil court will be binding on the criminal courts, but the converse is not true, was overruled, stating:
    • “33. Hence, the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case that the finding recorded by the criminal court stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court is not correct enunciation of law. Further, the general observations made in Karam Chand case are in context of the facts of the case stated above. The Court was not required to consider the earlier decision of the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case (M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) as well as Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act.”
  • 11. Axiomatically, if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, a judgment of a criminal court will certainly not be binding on a civil court. We have noticed hereinbefore that Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of the Act. No other provision of the Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute has been brought to our notice.”

Sans Sec. 41 – 43, No Legal Principle – Findings of Civil Court Bind  Cril. Court

Except as provided in Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, there is no general legal principle that findings of a civil court are binding on a criminal court, and vice versa.

In Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited (Rohinton Fali Nariman, Navin Sinha, Indira Banerjee, JJ.) 2021-4 SCC 713, the principles in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, are followed and held as under:

  • “18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallised to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject-matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.  However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration.”

It is further pointed out in Avitel Post Studioz Limited v. HSBC PI Holdings (Mauritius) Limited, 2021-4 SCC 713 –

  • “Moreover, the judgment, order or decree passed in previous civil proceedings, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case the court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matters decided therein. In each and every case the first question which would require consideration is, whether the judgment, order or decree is relevant; if relevant, its effect. This would depend upon the facts of each case.”

Judgment of a Court is relevant if only conditions u/s 40 to 43 are satisfied

The position of law is laid down in K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87: AIR 2002 SC 3372, as under:

  • “30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is –
  • (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act;
  • (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res-judicata may apply;
  • (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied;
  • (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.”

Court has to Decide – To what extent previous Judgment is Binding

K.G. Premshanker v. Inspector of Police continued as under:

  • “31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein.
  • Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by ‘A’ on ‘B’s property, ‘B’ filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from ‘A’ and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by ‘B’ against ‘A’ for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of ‘B’ over the property. In such case, ‘A’ may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42** which is quoted above makes the position clear.
  • Hence, in each and every case, first question which would require consideration is whether judgment, order or decree is relevant?, if relevant its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose, such as, motive or as a fact in issueThis would depend upon facts of each case.
  • 32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages “such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages”.
    • **Note: Sec. 42 Evidence Act pertains to public right. Illustration also makes it clear. It is obvious that the Apex Court referred to it only to show that the earlier decision may be relevant – to show “motive or as a fact in issue” (under Section 43).
    • That is, where the prosecution case is that ‘the civil court decree made the accused increase enmity towards the victim’, the previous civil court decision may be relevant under “some other provision” stated in Section 43 (as “motive or as a fact in issue“).
  • Sec. 42 Evidence Act reads as under:
    • “42. Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in section 41. Judgments, orders or decrees other than those mentioned in section 41, are relevant if they relate to matters of a public nature relevant to the enquiry, but such judgments, orders or decrees are not conclusive proof of that which they state.
    • Illustration:
    • A sues B for trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a public right of way over the land, which A denies.
    • The existence of a decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit by A against C for a trespass on the same land in which C alleged the existence of the same right of way, is relevant, but it is not conclusive proof that the right of way exists.”

Case to be determined on Evidence, not on Previous Judgment

In Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, AIR 2009 SC 2463, 2009 (11) SCC 545, it is pointed out that the observation in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court (but the converse is not true) may not be entirely correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87]. It is observed in Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad as under:

  • “Mr. Sharma also relies upon a decision of this Court in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC 438] to contend that a judgment of a civil court shall be binding on the criminal court but the converse is not true. Therein it was held:
  • “(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.”
  • With respect, the ratio laid down therein may not be entirely correct being in conflict with a Three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and anr. [(2002) 8 SCC 87].”

A judgment in rem (Section 43is conclusive in criminal and civil proceedings

In Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528, it is held as under:

  • “Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature shall take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view Section 43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is, however, beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding.” (Surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand, AIR 1957 SC 875, is relied on)

Civil or Criminal proceedings be stayed – Depends upon each case

In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397, the Constitution Bench considered whether a civil suit or a criminal case should be stayed in the event both are pending; and it was opined that the criminal matter should be given precedence.

 In P. Swaroopa Rani v. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu, AIR 2008 SC 1884, it was held as under:

  • “13. It is, however, well-settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case.” (Quoted in: Syed Askari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admn.), 2009- 5 SCC 528)

No Statutory Provision nor any Legal Principle – Findings in one treated as Final

Standards of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different

In Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (R.C.Lahoti CJIB.N. Agrawal, Hotoi Khetoho Sema, G.P. Mathur & P.K. Balasubramanyan, JJ.), 2005-4 SCC 370, (relying inter alia on M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397) it was held as under:

  • “32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standards of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle  that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein.”

End Notes:

Sec. 11 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, reads as under:

  • Res Judicata -No Court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a Court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such Court.
  • Explanation I– The expression “former suit” shall denote a suit which has been decided prior to the suit in question whether or not it was instituted prior thereto.
  • Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section, the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to a right of appeal from the decision of such Court.
  • Explanation III.- The matter above referred to must in the former suit have been alleged by one party and either denied or admitted, expressly or impliedly, by the other.
  • Explanation IV.- Any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit.
  • Explanation V.- Any relief claimed in the plaint, which is not expressly granted by the decree, shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to have been refused.
  • Explanation VI– Where persons litigate bona fide in respect of public right or of a private right claimed in common for themselves and others, all persons interested in such right shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to claim under the persons so litigating.
  • Explanation VII.- The provisions of this section shall apply to a proceeding for the execution of a decree and reference in this section to any suit, issue or former suit shall be construed as references, respectively, to proceedings for the execution of the decree, question arising in such proceeding and a former proceeding for the execution of that decree.
  • Explanation VIII.-An issue heard and finally decided by a Court of limited jurisdiction, competent to decide such issue, shall operate as res judicata in as subsequent suit, notwithstanding that such Court of limited jurisdiction was not competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised.

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Read in this Cluster  (Click on the topic):

Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Adverse Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Interpretation

Contract Act

Law on Damages

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce

Negotiable Instruments Act

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Are RTI Documents Admissible in Evidence as ‘Public Documents’?

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Abstract

  1. RTI replies or information (other than certified copies) are not substantive evidence in law. Therefore, they are not admissible in evidence as public documents, or as secondary evidence.
  2. Where copy of a Public Document is issued under the RTI Act, recording it to be a certified copy [under Section 2 (j)(ii)], it is admissible in evidence (to prove the contents of the public documents) under Sec. 77of the Evidence Act.
  3. Where the copy of a document, which is not a Public Document, is issued under the RTI Act, recording it to be a certified copy [under Section 2 (j)(ii)], it is admissible in evidence, only with further evidence as to the non-production of the original (as required under Sec. 65, Evidence Act).
  4. Notwithstanding anything stated above, in a proper case, the court can invoke presumptions as regards official acts, under Sec. 114, Evd. Act (The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case).
    • Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act specifically states that ‘regularity’ can be presumed on Judicial and official acts. Presumptions may include genuineness or truth also.

Law on this Point

Evidence Act 

Section 65 of Evidence Act reads as under:

  • ““65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given – Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition, or contents of a document in the following cases –
  • (a) … (e) …
  • (f). when the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence**;
  • (g) …
  • …. …
  • In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of the document, but no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.”
    • **to be given in evidence ” denotes – giving copy in evidence without reference to “original”.

By virtue of the above provisions in Sec. 65, it is often debated that ‘a certified copy’ of the Sale Deed alone, and “no other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible”. It is not well-founded; because,

  • (1) the copy of the deeds in the Books in the Sub Registrar’s Office is not “a public document within the meaning of section 74” – referred to in clauses (e) of Sec. 65,and
  • (2) the copy of the deeds in the Books in the Sub Registrar’s Office is not “a document of which a certified copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence” – referred to in clauses (f) of Sec. 65.

No (procedural) law permits production of ‘certified copy’ of a sale deed, in the court, without saying where the original is or it is lost (i.e., without laying the foundational evidence for the non production of the original).

Note: Sec. 57 of the Registration Act reads as under:

  • “57. Registering officers to allow inspection of certain books and indexes, and to give certified copies of entries —
  • (1)… (2) … (3) … (4) …
  • (5) All copies given under this section shall be signed and sealed by the registering officer, and shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original documents.”

It is definite – the words, “shall be admissible for the purpose of proving the contents of the original” cannot be read as (or equated to): “certified copy … permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force in India to be given in evidence” (Because, the words in Sec. 57 do not authorise to give (certified) copy in evidence without reference to “original”).

Therefore, it appears that any kind of (admissible) secondary evidence of a sale deed can be given in evidence; and production of certified copy cannot be insisted. (If it falls under clause (e) or (f) of Sec. 65, certified copy alone can be given – as secondary evidence.)

Following decisions considered both Sec. 57 of the Registration Act and Sec. 65 (e) & (f) Evidence Act and found that in the absence of a registered sale deed, a certified copy could be filed as secondary evidence; but, they did not ponder on the point whether “a certified copy alone can be filed”.

  • Puspa Dey v. Sukanta Dey, 2019-3 CalLT 206
  • Upendra Rao v. M. K. Ammini, ILR 2017-1 (Ker) 466;
  • Om Parkash v. Ram Gopal, 2011-4 PLR 364;
  • Ismail Gafurbhai Vohra v. Kirit Bhagvatprasad Vyas, 2013-2 GLR 1230;
  • Sandeep v. State of Haryana, 2011-4 LawHerald 3507,
  • Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti, AIR 1990 SC 306,
  • Nani Bai v. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge, AIR 1958 SC 706,

Sec. 74. reads as under:

  • 74. ‘Public documents‘: The following documents are public documents :-
  • (1) documents forming the acts, or records of the acts
    • (i) of the sovereign authority,
    • (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
    • (iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, of any part of India or of the Commonwealth or of a foreign country;
  • (2) Public records kept in any State of private documents.

Read Blog: Secondary Evidence of Documents & Objections to Admissibility – How & When?

Section 77 of Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 77. Proof of documents by production of certified copies. Such certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies.

RTI – Act

  • Section 2 (j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 defines “Right to Information” as under:
  • “(j). “right to information” means the right to information accessible under this Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to –
  • (i) …. ……
  • (ii) taking notes, extracts, or certified copies of documents or records.

Import of “To be Given in Evidence” in Sec. 65(f)

Sec. 65 Evidence Act deals with “Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given”. Sec. 65 (f) lays down two conditions:

  1. When the original is a document of which a certified copy is permitted, by the Evidence Act, to be given in evidence.
  2. If certified copy is permitted, by any other law in force in India, to be given in evidence.

RTI-Certified-Copy, other than Public Document, Can be received in evidence only on showing reason for non production of Original

The RTI Act, though allows certified copy, it does not permit the same “to be given in evidence“. Therefore, the ‘certified copy’ obtained under the RTI Act can be received in evidence either (i) it is a public document (of which a certified copy is permitted by the Evidence Act) or (ii) it is permitted to be produced on showing reason for non production of original etc. (under Sec. 65 Evidence Act).

In Narayan Singh v. Kallaram, AIR 2015 MP 186, it was observed that RTI documents can be admitted as secondary evidence. The MP High Court held as under:

  • “Clause (f) of Section 65 of Evidence Act makes it crystal clear that a certified copy permitted under the Evidence Act or by any other law in force can be treated as secondary evidence. Right to Information Act, in my view, falls within the ambit of “by any other law in force in India”. The definition of “right to information” makes it clear that certified copies of documents are given to the citizens under their right to obtain information. In my view, the court below has rightly opined that the documents can be admitted as secondary evidence. I do not see any merit in the contention that the documents obtained under the Act of 2005 are either true copies or attested copies. The definition aforesaid shows that the same are certified copies.”

It appears that the High Court did not give effect to the words “permitted … to be given in evidence”.

PRESUMPTION under Sec. 114, Evid. Act read with Sec. 35.

Sec. 35 Evd. Act lays down that ‘an entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record‘ will be a relevant fact.

Sec. 35 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • “35. Relevancy of entry in public record or an electronic record made in performance of duty: An entry in any public or other official book, register or record or an electronic record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register, or record or an electronic record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.
    • Note: Relevancy engrafted to Sec. 35 Evd. Act is “entry in” any public or official book, register etc.; it is not attached to the certificates or information given under the RTI Act.

Besides direct evidence, or admission, the contents of a document can also be proved by circumstantial evidence or by invoking presumption. ‘Common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’ etc. under S. 114, can be used to prove the existence and genuineness/truth of a document.

Illustration (e) of Sec. 114, Evd. Act, demonstrates that presumption as to ‘regularity’ can be invoked on Judicial and official acts, in proper cases.  ‘Regularity’ in Illustration (e) is not exactly the presumption as to ‘correctness or truth’. For such presumption, we have to resort the main section, Sec. 114 – that is, ‘common course of natural events’, ‘human conduct’, etc..

Referring relevant provisions of Himachal Land Revenue Act, 1954 and Sec. 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it is held by our Apex Court in Partap Singh v. Shiv Ram: AIR 2020 SC 1382, that Record-of-rights (Revenue document) carries the ‘presumption of correctness.

In Inder Singh v. S. Raghbir Singh, AIR 1978 P&H 98, it is observed as under:

  • “The principle is that an official record, kept by a person, upon whom there is a public duty to make entries in it only after satisfying himself of the truth of those entries, is presumed to be correct. Such a document itself is evidence of the truth of its contents unless and until its falsity can be demonstrated by any of the various methods by which the evidentiary value of any public book, register or document may be attacked.”

In Shiv Ram v. Shiv Charan Singh, AIR 1964 Raj 126, it is observed as under

  • “Where Sec. 35  properly comes into play, an entry made by a public servant in any public or official book in the discharge of his official duty becomes relevant by itself, and no other proof of such entry is required as a matter of law by our Evidence Act, but this, does not exclude the possibility that such an entry may become admissible otherwise if it is properly proved to have been made by a person ordinarily competent to make it.” (Quoted in Mayadhar Nayak vs Sub-Divisional Officer, Jajpur, AIR 1982 Ori 221).

Read Blog: Presumptions on Documents and Truth of its Contents

RTI Replies are not a Substantive Evidence

As shown above, relevancy attached to Sec. 35 Evidence Act is “entry in” any public or official book made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty; it is not engrafted to the certificates or information given under the RTI Act.

The usual method to prove documents (both, existence and truth of contents) is giving oral evidence or furnishing affidavit. A certificate, in most cases, is an opinion, and prepared on the basis of other documents or evidences. In such cases, when it is an assumption or inference, it by itself, is not admissible, as it will only be, at the most, a secondary evidence. A Wound Certificate is not a substantive evidence. It has to be proved by a competent witness. If presumption cannot be invoked under Clause (e) of Sec. 114 Evidence Act (that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed), especially in the light of ‘best evidence rule’, no certificate or report can be taken as proved unless its contents are proved in a formal manner. (This is why Order XXVI rule 10 CPC specifically says – Commission Report shall ‘form part of the record’.)

Our Apex Court held in Dharmarajan v. Valliammal, 2008 (2) SCC 741, that ‘a certificate issued by the Tahsildar cannot be relied on without examining the Tahsildar who issued the same’. It is referred to in Pankajakshan Nair v. Shylaja, ILR 2017-1 Ker 951.

Our Apex Court observed in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jai Lal, (1999) 7 SCC 280, as regards expert opinion that falls under Sec. 45 Evidence Act, as under as under:

  • “An expert is a witness of fact. His evidence is really of an advisory character. The duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the Judge to form his independent judgment by the application of this criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the case. The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case. The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his conclusions and the data and material furnished which form the basis of his conclusions.”

The information collected from the records of an office by an RTI Officer, or that furnished in RTI Reply, cannot be placed in a higher pedestal than the ‘opinion’ of an expert under Sec. 45 of the Evidence Act. In short, the RTI Reply, by itself, will not be a substantive evidence.

Note:

Following Decisions State the Views of our Courts

  • Kumarpal N. Shah v. Universal Mechanical Works, AIR 2019 Bom 290.
  • Under RTI, usually the applicant gets Photostat copies of the documents which are certified as true copies. They cannot be equated with certified copies mentioned in the Evidence Act. In other words, if the official under RTI certifies and supplies a private document, it still remains a private document. Thus, the RTI Act does not affect the nature of a document (Datti Kameswari v. Singam Rao Sarath Chandra, AIR 2016 AP 112 referred to).
  • Datti Kameswari v. Singam Rao Sarath Chandra, AIR 2016 AP 112.
  • The Xerox copy certified by the designated Public Information Officer under Right to Information Act of the private documents are not certified copies within the meaning of the provisions of Section 65 of the Evidence Act. They are merely true copies of the private documents available in the records of the particular Department. The production and marking of such copies is permissible only after laying a foundation for acceptance of secondary evidence under clauses (a) (b) or (c) of Section 65 of the Act. The condition prescribed under the above cases (a), (b) or (c) of Section 65 of the Act have to be fulfilled before marking the true copies obtained under the Right to Information Act. However, the true copies of public documents certified by the designated Information Officer can be taken as certified copies of the public documents.

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Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act

Will

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Notice to Produce Documents in Civil Cases

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

Important Provisions in the Civil Procedure Code, In a nutshell

Order XI, rule 15.
Inspection of documents referred to in pleadings or affidavits
A party to a suit is entitled at any time to give notice to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document to produce such document for the inspection of the party giving such notice, or of his pleader, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof.
rule 16.
Notice Form
Notice to any party to produce any documents referred to in his pleading or affidavits shall be in Form No. 7 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require
rule 18.
Order for inspection.
Where the party omits to give such notice of a time for inspection or objects to give inspection, the Court may, on the application of the party, make an order for inspection.
rule 21.
Non-compliance with order for discovery.
Where any party fails to comply with order for discovery or inspection of document, the suit may be liable to be dismissed, and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any struck out. Where an order is made dismissing any suit, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action.
Order XII, rule 2.
Notice to admit documents
Either party may call upon the other party to admit, within seven days from the date of service of the notice any document.
rule 3.
Notice Form
Notice to admit documents shall be in Form No. 12 in Appendix C, ‘with such variations as circumstances may require’.
rule 8.
Notice to produce documents
Notice to produce documents shall be in Form No. 12 in Appendix C, ‘with such variations as circumstances may require’.
rule 12.
Notice Form
Form No. 12 says as to Notice “to produce and show to the court at the first hearing of this suit all books, papers, letters, copies of letters and other writings and documents in your custody, possession or power, containing any entry, memorandum or minute relating to the matters in question in this suit, and particularly.”...
Order XVI
rule 6.
Summons to produce document.
Any person is summoned to produce a document, without being summoned to give evidence, shall be deemed to have complied with the summons if he causes such document to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.

Notice to Produce Documents under Order XI rule 16 & Order XII rule 8

Order XI rule 16 (when reference is made to any document, in pleadings or affidavits)

Order XI rule 16 notice is provided after giving the substantive right to give notice to the other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document to produce such document for the inspection, under rule 15. (The form is given in Form No. 7 in Appendix C.)

  • Note: For giving notice under Order XI rule 16, document must have been referred to in pleadings or affidavits.

Order XII rule 8

But, (abruptly) without giving a substantive direction (as in Order XI rule 15**) to one party to the suit, it is stated in Order XII rule 8 that a notice can be given to produce documents (in Form No. 12 in Appendix C) to ‘produce and show to the Court’. #

  • **To give notice to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document to produce such document for the inspection of the party.
  • #The form No. 12 shows that it is given by one party or his advocate to the other.

Order XII Rule 8 reads as under:

  • Notice to produce documents: Notice to produce documents shall be in Form No. 12 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require. An affidavit of the pleader, or his clerk, or of the service of any notice to produce, and of the time when it was served, with a copy of the notice to produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the notice, and of the time when it was served.”
    • Note: Order XII rule 8 itself contains – “with such variations as circumstances may require”; and in the heading of Form No. 12 it is stated – “(General Form)”.

Form No. 12 reads as under:

  • “Take notice that you are hereby required to produce and show to the Court at the first hearing of this suit all books, papers, letters, copies of letters and other writings and documents in your custody, possession of power, containing any entry, memorandum or minute relating to the matters in question in this suit, and particularly.”
  • First Hearing
    • First-hearing is not defined in the CPC. In Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui v. Shri Prem Nath Kapoor, AIR 1993 SC 2525, our Apex Court held as under:
    • “13. The date of first hearing of a suit under the Code is ordinarily understood to be the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to the contentions in the pleadings of the parties to the suit and in the documents filed by them for the purpose of framing the issues to be decided in the suit.”

From the above, it is clear:

  • The Form No. 7 and Form No. 12 (Appendix – C) notices are given by one party or his advocate to the other.
  • Order XII rule 8 Notice is – to produce and ‘show court’ only (as stated in Form No. 12). But, Order XI rule 15 states – notice can be given by one party to the other party ‘to produce document for the inspection of the party, or of his pleader, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof‘.
  • Order XI rule 15 is confined to documents referred to in pleadings or affidavits. But, Order XI rule 8 is not so confined.
  • It is reasonable to conclude that this power given to a party (to give notice by one party to other – under Order XI rule 8) is to be exercised, normally, ‘at the first hearing‘ alone (see: Form No. 12); and, even if it can be given effect to in a subsequent stage (by the orders of the court), it is only in exceptional circumstances. (The reason thereof is plain.)
  • It will also be rationale to infer that the Order XI rule 8 does not allow a party to see the document produced – for, Form No. 12 says as to ‘show court’ only; and does not allow ‘to produce document for the inspection of the party, or of his pleader, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof‘, as provided under Order XI rule 15. (The logic behind it is explicit.)

See Blog: Best Evidence Rule in Indian Law

A Discordant Note – For, Inclusion of rule 8 in Order XII is Incongruent

Order XII deals with ‘Admission’. Rule 8 thereof hands out ‘Notice to produce documents’. It can be seen, on a plain reading, that rule 8 is not confined to “Admission”. Therefore, inclusion of rule 8 in Order XII is incongruent.

No Adverse Presumption Possible

Is it possible to draw adverse presumption for non production of a document (in spite of notice under rule 8 in Order XII) is an interesting question.

The answer will be negative, when we go by provisions of CPC. They are the following:

  • It only gives power to a party to give notice to other party; it does not require court intervention.
  • Order XII rule 8 Notice is – to produce and ‘show court’ only (as stated in Form No. 12)
  • It is directed to be exercised ‘at the first hearing‘ alone (see Form No. 12); and, in any case, even if it is possible to give effect to (by the court), in a subsequent stage, it can be done only in exceptional circumstances.
  • Under Order XI rule 15, where any party fails to comply with order for discovery or inspection of document, the suit may be liable to be dismissed, and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any struck out. Such stringent measures are not attached to non-compliance of Order XII rule 8.

But, the provisions of the Evidence Act (Sec. 66) stipulates that ‘if the adverse party knows that he will be Required to Produce’ a document, it is his duty to produce the document, even if it was not sought-for by notice. (Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act lay down the circumstances in which adverse presumption can be drawn when a document – in possession – is not produced.) Sec. 66 directs that the notice to produce such document must be “as prescribed by law, and if no notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case”.

In view of the words in Sec. 66 of the Evidence Act as to the notice “prescribed by law”, in civil cases, the notice to be issued (for production of document) is that provided under Order XII rule 8.

Important Provisions in the Evidence Act (in this regard) In a Nutshell

66. Rules as to notice to produceSecondary evidence of the documents shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence have given notice to the other party.
Provided that such notice shall not be required
(1) when the document to be proved is itself a notice;
(2) when, from the nature of the case, the adverse party must know that he will be required to produce it;
(3) when it appears or is proved that the adverse party has obtained possession of the original by fraud or force;
(4) when the adverse party or his agent has the original in Court;
(5) when the adverse party or his agent has admitted the loss of the document;
(6) when the person in possession of the document is out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court.
89. Presumption as to due execution, etc., of documents not produced.The Court shall presume that every document, called for and not produced after notice to produce, was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law.  
130. Production of title-deeds of witness not a party.No witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce (i) his title-deeds to any property, or (ii) any document in virtue of which he holds any property as pledge or mortgagee.
131. Production of documents or electronic records which another person could refuse to produce.No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession or electronic records under his control, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession or control, unless such last-mentioned person consents to their production.
144. Evidence as to matters in writing.Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced.
162. Production of documentsA witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.
163. Giving, as evidence, of document called for and produced on notice: When a party calls for a document which he has given the other party notice to produce, and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling for its production, he is bound to give it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.
164. Using, as evidence, of document production of which was refused on notice.When a party refuses to produce a document which he has had notice to produce, he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of the other party or the order of the Court.  

No Notice Required if Adverse Party knows that ‘he will be required to produce it

Sec. 66 of the Evidence Act stipulates that secondary evidence of the documents shall not be permitted unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence have given notice to the other party. But, the proviso to the section states, among other things, that when, from the nature of the case, the adverse party knows that “he will be required to produce it,” then such notice is not required.

 In Hiralal Devji Kharva v. Ladhibai Gokal, 1979- 2 Guj LR 390, it was held that where the adverse party is expected to know from the facts of the case that the document is required to be produced and fails to produce the same the non service of notice would not preclude the party from leading secondary evidence. 

Adverse party must know that he will be Required to Produce it

A witness says ‘whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and he says that it was‘ (Sec. 141 Evd. Act) and the adverse party ‘objects to such evidence being given (Sec. 141 Evd. Act) until such document is produced (expressly or impliedly) it falls under the head, “he will be required to produce it ” (Sec. 66, 2nd proviso, Evd. Act).

In a proper case, the question – “Can you produce the document in court”, and the answer – “Yes”, will exonerate the party from giving a (formal) “notice to the other party” for it attracts – “the adverse party must know that he will be required to produce it“.

Sec. 22 of the Evidence Act (admissions as to contents of documents) is also relevant here. It reads as under:

  • “22. When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.—Oral admissions as to the contents of a document are not relevant, unless and until the party proposing to prove them shows that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such document under the rules hereinafter contained, or unless the genuineness of a document produced is in question.”

Best Available Evidence must be Produced; If Not, Adverse Presumption will be Taken

It may not be safe to a party to a suit to fall-back technically on non-reception of notice under Sec. 66 Evidence Act, in the teeth of the ‘best evidence rule’.

It is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in his possession even though onus of proof do not lie on him, and he is not called upon to produce the said evidence; and the Court will draw adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act if such evidence is withheld.

But this rule cannot be applied blindly. Mere non-production of documents would not result in adverse inference, invariably (as shown below). Courts take into consideration the pleadings and decide whether the document/evidence withheld has any relevance. The court also cannot lose sight of the fact that burden of proof is on the party which makes a factual averment. The conduct and diligence of the other party is also important. Existence of some other circumstances may justify non-production (Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148).

The rule that best available evidence must be produced is taken in the following cases:

  • Murugesam Pillai v. Gnana Sambandha Pandara Sannadhi, AIR 1917 PC 6; 
  • Hiralal v. Badkulal, AIR 1953 SC 225; 
  • A. Raghavamma v. A. Chenchamma, AIR 1964 SC 136; 
  • The Union of India v. Mahadeolal Prabhu Dayal, AIR 1965 SC 1755; 
  • Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413;
  • M/s. Bharat Heavy Electrical Ltd. v. State of U.P.,  AIR 2003 SC 3024;
  • Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 9 SCC 126.

In Mohan Lal Shamlal Soni v. Union of India, AIR 1991 SC 1346, the Supreme Court held as under:

  • “It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the best available evidence should be brought before the Court to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left either for the prosecution or for the defence to establish its respective case by adducing the best available evidence and the Court is not empowered under the provisions of the Code to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness or witnesses on their sides. Nonetheless if either of the parties withholds any evidence which could be produced and which, if produced, be unfavorable to the party withholding such evidence, the court can draw a presumption under illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

Invoking best evidence rule it is observed by the Supreme Court in Musauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam, (2009) 14 SCC 541, as under:

  • “13. It is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in its possession which could throw light on the issue in controversy and in case such a material evidence is withheld, the Court may draw adverse inference under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding that the onus of proof did not lie on such party and it was not called upon to produce the said evidence (vide Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif, AIR 1968 SC 1413).”

In Jitendra v. State of M.P, (2004) 10 SCC 562, our Apex Court observed that charas and ganja seized from the accused was the best evidence in that case and the non-production of the same in court was seriously taken note of by the court and observed that that mere oral evidence as to the same was insufficient.(See also: Mohd. Aman, Babu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SC 2960.)

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P, (2015) 7 SCC 178, it is observed as under:

  • “22. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by the prosecution is that the accused persons were present in the hotel room at the relevant time. PW-1 Ram Singh-Hotel Manager stated that CCTV cameras are installed in the boundaries, near the reception, in the kitchen, in the restaurant and all three floors. Since CCTV cameras were installed in the prominent places, CCTV footage would have been best evidence to prove whether the accused remained inside the room and whether or not they have gone out. CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone out of the hotel. CCTV footage being a crucial piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.”

With regard to adverse presumption the Apex Court held in Tomaso Bruno as under:

  • “28. As per Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, if a party in possession of best evidence which will throw light in controversy withholds it, the court can draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that the onus of proving does not lie on him. The presumption under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary inference. Unlike presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, where the court has no option but to draw statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.”

Directing Production Without Discovery “NOT the Correct Approach

The indisputable reciprocity between ‘discovery’ and ‘production’, and the sequence in which the they are arrayed in Rule 12 and 14, ensure that compliance of Rule 12 is a necessary pre-condition for ordering ‘production’ under Rule 14. Therefore, it is definite that discovery under Rule 12 partakes its ‘production’ (as the next step, under Rule 14).

The afore-stated propositions are fortified by the following:

  1. Ordering production, under Rule 14, is purely a discretionary matter with court.
    • Rule 14 reads – ” It shall be lawful for the court” … to order the production … of such of the documents in his possession or power … ”.
    • Import of these words are obvious in itself. That is, wide-open discretion is given to the court for ordering production under rule 14.
  2. It is unquestionable that a party to the suit has no vested right to seek ‘production’ of any document under rule 14-
    • even after ‘discovery’ of the same under rule 12.
  3. Similarly, the party to the suit has no vested right to seek production of ‘all documents‘ discovered under Rule 12.

Of course, no doubt, the court has discretion to summon a party to produce documents under O.16 R.14 which reads as under:

  • O. 16 R. 14: “Court may of its own accord summon as witnesses strangers to suit: Subject to the provisions of this Code as to attendance and appearance and to any law for the time being in force, where the Court at any time thinks it necessary [to examine any person, including a party to the suit], and not called as a witness by a party to the suit, the Court may, of its own motion, cause such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence, or to produce any document in his possession on a day to be appointed, and may examine him as a witness or require him to produce such document.”

But, the words “of its own accord”, “subject to the provisions of this Code … and to any law” and “the Court may” make it clear that this provision is not intended to use openhandedly.

See Blog: Production of Documents in Court: Order 11, Rule 14 CPC is not independent from Rule 12

Section 130 Evidence Act

  • Sec. 130 stipulates that no witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce
    • (i) his title-deeds to any property, or
    • (ii) any document in virtue of which he holds any property as pledge or mortgagee.

It will be interesting to consider whether the court has jurisdiction to compel a party to produce his title-deeds to any property applying the converse analogy on the negative assertion in Section 130 (otherwise than ‘discovery’ under Rule 12).

The answer is – No.

In Dolagovinda Pradhan Vs. Bhartruhari Mahatab, 1993 CIVCC 394, 1993-3 LJR 506, 1991-2 Ori LR395, 1991-3 CurCC 519, it is observed (obiter) that under Order 11, Rule 14, CPC, it would be lawful for the Court to require, the party to the suit, to produce such documents in his possession relating to any matter in question in the suit subject to its lawful objections. The High Court pointed out the converse analogy on the negative assertion in Section 130 Evidence Act (which provides that no witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property). Though the High Court merely referred to “lawful” authority of the court to require production of the document from a party, it clear that the postulation laid down is that the court has the “power” to order production, because the court placed the proposition in converse to the direction in Sec. 130 of the Evidence Act. It does not appear to be a correct proposition in the light of ML Sethi v. RP Kapur (supra).

Courts to Admit Documents Without Proof

Sections 162, 163 and 164 of the Evidence Act, reads as under:

  • 162. Production of documents. –– A witness summoned to produce a document shall, if it is in his possession or power, bring it to Court, notwithstanding any objection which there may be to its production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection shall be decided on by the Court.
  • The Court, if it sees fit, may inspect the document, unless it refers to matters of State, or take other evidence to enable it to determine on its admissibility.
  • 163. Giving, as evidence, of document called for and produced on notice: When a party calls for a document which he has given the other party notice to produce, and such document is produced and inspected by the party calling for its production, he is bound to give it as evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.
  • 164. Using, as evidence, of document production of which was refused on notice. –– When a party refuses to produce a document which he has had notice to produce, he cannot afterwards use the document as evidence without the consent of the other party or the order of the Court.

In Government of Bengal v. Santiram Mondal, AIR 1930 Cal 370, and R v. Makhan, AIR 1940 Cal 167 it was observed that Section 163 of the Evidence Act applies to Criminal Proceedings also. It is observed in Government of Bengal v. Santiram Mondal, AIR 1930 Cal 370, with respect to a document used under Sec. 163, as under:

  • “The further contention is that if they are to be admitted, they cannot be put in or at any rate used without proof. But the section itself says that the party calling for it is bound to give it as evidence if required to do so, and that certainly means that it goes in as a record of the particular proceeding and that it can be looked at to see what it includes or omits.”

Court’s Jurisdiction to Require to Prove an Admitted Document

In any case, besides the powers of the court under Sec. 165 of Evidence Act, the scheme of the Procedural Acts (Evidence Act, CPC and CrPC) shows that the court has jurisdiction to require the party concerned to prove that document. We can see it in Sec. 58 of Evidence Act, Order XII, Rule 2A Proviso of the CPC and Sec. 294 of the CrPC .

Section 294 of Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

  • “294. No formal proof of certain documents. (1) Where any document is filed before any Court by the prosecution or the accused, the particulars of every such document shall be included in a list and the prosecution or the accused, as the case may be, or the pleader for the prosecution or the accused, if any, shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document.
  • (2) The list of documents shall be in such form as may be prescribed by the State Government.
  • (3) Where the genuineness of any document is not disputed, such document may be read in evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code without proof of the signature of the person to whom it purports to be signed:
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require such signature to be proved.”

See Blog: PRODUCTION, ADMISSIBILITY & PROOF OF DOCUMENTS


Foot Notes:

Provisions in the Civil Procedure Code

Order XI rule 15 and Order XII rule 2 are the main provisions in the CPC to give notice to the other party to produce documents for ‘inspection’ and ‘show court’ (see form of notice in Form No. 12 in Appendix C of the CPC), respectively.

Order XI rule 15 to 21 read as under:

  • 15. Inspection of documents referred to in pleadings or affidavits. Every party to a suit shall be entitled at any time to give notice to any other party, in whose pleadings or affidavits reference is made to any document or who has entered any document in any list annexed to his pleadings or produce such document for the inspection of the party giving such notice, or of his pleader, and to permit him or them to take copies thereof; and any party not complying with such notice shall not afterwards be at liberty to put any such document in evidence on his behalf in such suit unless he shall satisfy the Court that such document relates only to his own title, he being a defendant to the suit, or that he had some other cause or excuse with the Court shall deem sufficient for not complying with such notice, in which case the Court may allow the same to be put in evidence on such terms as to costs an otherwise as the Court shall think fit.
  • 16. Notice to produce. Notice to any party to produce arty documents referred to in his pleading or affidavits shall be in Form No. 7 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
  • 17. Time for inspection when notice given. The party to whom such notice is given shall, within ten days from the receipt of such notice, deliver to the party giving the same a notice stating a time within three days from the delivery thereof at which the documents, or such of them as he does not object to produce, may be inspected at the office of his pleader, or in the case of bankers’ books or other books of account or books in constant use for the purposes of any trade or business, at their usual place of custody, and stating which (if any) of the documents he objects to produce, and on what ground. Such notice shall be in Form No. 8 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
  • 18. Order for inspection. (1) Where the party served with notice under rule 15 omits to give such notice of a time for inspection or objects to give inspection, or offers inspection elsewhere than at the office of his pleader, the Court may, on the application of the party desiring it, make an order for inspection in such place and in such manner as it may think fit :
  • Provided that the order shall not be made when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that, it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.
  • (2) Any application to inspect documents, except such as are referred to in the pleadings, particulars or affidavits of the party against whom the application is made or disclosed in his affidavit of documents, shall be founded upon an affidavit showing of what inspection is sought, that the party applying is entitled to inspect them, and that they are in the possession or power of the other party. The Court shall not make such order for inspection of such documents when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs.
  • 19. Verified copies. (1) Where inspection of’ any business books is applied for, the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of ordering inspection of the original books, order a copy of any entries therein to be furnished and verified by the affidavit of some person who has examined the copy with the original entries, and such affidavit shall state whether or not there are in the original book any and what erasures, interlineations or alterations :
  • Provided that, not withstanding that such copy has been supplied, the Court may order inspection of the book from which the copy was made.
  • (2) Where on an application for an order for inspection privilege is claimed for any document, it shall be lawful for the Court to inspect the document for the purpose of deciding as to the validity of the claim of privilege unless the document relates to matters of State.
  • (3) The Court may, on the application of any party to a suit at any time, and whether an affidavit of documents shall or shall not have already been ordered or made, make an order requiring any other party to state by affidavit whether any one or more specific documents, to be specified in the application, is or are, or has or have at any time been, in his possession or power; and, if not then in his possession, when he parted with the same and what has become thereof. Such application shall be made on an affidavit stating that in the belief of the deponent the party against whom the application is made has, or has at some time had, in his possession or power the document or documents specified in the application, and that they relate to the matters in question in the suit, or to some of them.
  • 20. Premature discovery. Where the party from whom discovery of any kind or inspection is sought objects to the same, or any part thereof, the Court may if satisfied that the right to the discovery or inspection sought depends on the determination of any issue or question in dispute in the suit, or that for any other reason it is desirable that any issue or question in dispute in the suit should be determined before deciding upon the right to the discovery or inspection, order that such issue or question be determined first, and reserve the question as to the discovery or inspection.
  • 21. Non-compliance with order for discovery. (1) Where any party fails to comply with any order to answer interrogatories, or for discovery or inspection of document, he shall, if a plaintiff, be liable to have his suit dismissed for want of prosecution, and, if a defendant, to have his defence, if any struck out, and to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended, and the party interrogating or seeking discovery or inspection may apply to the Court for an order to that effect and an order may be made on such application accordingly, after notice to the parties and after giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
  • (2) Where an order is made under sub-rule (1) dismissing any suit, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit on the same cause of action.

Order XII rule 2 and 8 read as under:

  • 2. Notice to admit documents. Either party may call upon the other party [to admit, within [seven] days from the date of service of the notice any document,] saving all just exceptions; and in case of refusal or neglect to admit, after such notice, the costs of proving any such document shall be paid by the party so neglecting or refusing, whatever the result of the suit may be, unless the Court otherwise directs; and no costs of proving any document shall be allowed unless such notice is given, except where the omission to give the notice is, in the opinion of the Court, a saving of expense.
  • 2A. Document to be deemed to be admitted if not divided after service of notice to admit documents. (1) Every document which a party is called upon to admit, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of that party or in his reply to the notice to admit documents, shall be deemed to be admitted except as against a person under a disability :
  • Provided that the Court may, in its discretion and for reasons to be recorded, require any document so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
  • (2) Where a party unreasonably neglects or refuses to admit a document after the service on him of the notice to admit documents, the Court may direct him to pay costs to the other party by way of compensation.
  • 3. Form of notice. A notice to admit documents shall be in Form No. 9 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require.
  • 8. Notice to produce documents. Notice to produce documents shall be in Form No. 12 in Appendix C, with such variations as circumstances may require. An affidavit of the pleader, or his clerk, of the service of any notice to produce, and of the time when it was served, with a copy of the notice to produce, shall in all cases be sufficient evidence of the service of the notice, and of the time it was served.

Order XVI rule 6 reads as under:

  • 6. Summons to produce document. Any person may be summoned to produce a document, without being summoned to give evidence, and any person summoned merely to produce a document shall be deemed to have complied with the summons if he causes such document to be produced instead of attending personally to produce the same.

Provisions in the Evidence Act

Sec. 66 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 66. Rules as to notice to produce.—Secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to in section 65, clause (a) , shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is, [or to his attorney or pleader,] such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law; and if no notice is prescribed by law, then such notice as the Court considers reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
  • Provided that such notice shall not be required in order to render secondary evidence admissible in any of the following cases, or in any other case in which the Court thinks fit to dispense with it:—
  • (1) when the document to be proved is itself a notice;
  • (2) when, from the nature of the case, the adverse party must know that he will be required to produce it;
  • (3) when it appears or is proved that the adverse party has obtained possession of the original by fraud or force;
  • (4) when the adverse party or his agent has the original in Court;
  • (5) when the adverse party or his agent has admitted the loss of the document;
  • (6) when the person in possession of the document is out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court.

Sec. 89 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  1. Presumption as to due execution, etc., of documents not produced. ––The Court shall presume that every document, called for and not produced after notice to produce, was attested, stamped and executed in the manner required by law.

Sec. 130 and 131 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  1. Production of title-deeds of witness not a party. –– No witness who is not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce his title-deeds to any property, or any document in virtue of which he holds any property as pledge or mortgagee or any document the production of which might tend to criminate him, unless he has agreed in writing to produce them with the person seeking the production of such deeds or some person through whom he claims.
  2. Production of documents or electronic records which another person, having possession, could refuse to produce. –– No one shall be compelled to produce documents in his possession or electronic records under his control, which any other person would be entitled to refuse to produce if they were in his possession or control, unless such last-mentioned person consents to their production.

Sec. 144 of the Evidence Act reads as under:

  • 144. Evidence as to matters in writing. –– Any witness may be asked, whilst under examination, whether any contract, grant or other disposition of property, as to which he is giving evidence, was not contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about to make any statement as to the contents of any document, which, in the opinion of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may object to such evidence being given until such document is produced, or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the witness to give secondary evidence of it.
  • Explanation. –– A witness may give oral evidence of statements made by other persons about the contents of documents if such statements are in themselves relevant facts.

Similar Articles:



Read in this cluster (Click on the topic):

Book No. 1.   Handbook of a Civil Lawyer

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Sec. 65B Evidence Act Simplified

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

PART I – Sec. 65B ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.

  • Note: Analysis of the author and the law rendered by the Supreme Court of India are given.

Point No. 1

What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?

  1. It enables a litigant to prove computer output (secondary evidence)
    • without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), and
    • by producing a ‘certificate’ (as provided in this Section.
  2. Presumption is provided as to the correctness of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c).

Sec. 65B deals with ‘Computer Output’ (copy) and not ‘Electronic Record’ (original) as authoritatively pointed out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

  • Sec. 65B is invoked only when a ‘computer output’ (copy) is used in evidence; and it does not pertain to use of (original) ‘electronic record‘ as evidence in court.
  • Relevant portions of Sec. 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65B. Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is PRINTED ….. or COPIED ….. (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be admissible ….. as evidence of any contents of the original ….”
  • Supreme Court (Anver PV v. PK Basheer, 2014-10 SCC 473) held as under:
  • “24. …… If an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  • This observation is followed in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216)

Point No. 2A.

Non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding Anything’) in Sec. 65B – Not exclude Sec. 65. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • What is enabled by the non-obstante clause is – a copy or printout of electronic evidence ‘shall be deemed to be also a document’.
  • Notwithstanding-clause’ in Sec. 65B keeps all other sections in the Evidence Act undisturbed; and it provides for an additional enabling provision – without disabling the force of existing provisions to prove the copy or printout of electronic evidence. Therefore, the copy or printout can be proved under Sec. 65 of the Evidence Act.
  • Relevant portions of Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information … which is printed …… or copied …….. shall be Deemed to be ALSO a Document
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao) held as under
  • “31. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. …...”
  • 34. …. in Anvar P.V. (supra) … this Court made it clear …… and also that a written certificate under Section 65B(4) is a sine qua non for admissibility of such evidence ……

Point No. 2B.

Sec. 65B deals with ‘Admissibility’ (alone) of a Computer Output/Copy. If ‘truth’ is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the Evidence Act. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • Sec. 65B does not deal with ‘truth’ of the contents of the electronic record; it deals with ‘admissibility of copy’ alone.
  • The electronic record mentioned in Sec. 65B is – that which is ‘relevant‘; for, it must be one “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  • For, Sec. 65B deals with ‘admissibility of copy’ alone, if truth is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the evidence act; ie. by oral, documentary or presumptive evidence.

See Blog (Click): Admissibility of Visual and Audio Evidence (Including Photographs, Cassettes, Tape-recordings, Films, CCTV Footage, CDs, e-mails, Chips, Hard-discs, Pen-drives)

  • Relevant portions of 65A & 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is printed ….. or copied ….. shall be ADMISSIBLE in any proceedings ….. as evidence of any contents of the original … of which direct evidence would be admissible.”
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, held as under
  • “31. The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. …...”
  • “34. …. in Anvar P.V. (supra) … this Court made it clear that the special provisions of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are a complete Code in themselves ……

Point No. 2C.

Sec. 65B does NOT bar proving copy (by) invoking Sec. 65; Sec. 65B is an enabling provision that enables to prove copy otherwise than (by) laying the foundation or conditions laid down in Sec. 65 (such as loss of original). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • Sec. 65B is an added and enabling provision to prove the copy or printout – otherwise than proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65 (such as loss of original, original with other side).
  • By the deeming provision (fiction) in Sec. 65B, a ‘copy’ is raised to the states of a (original) document.
  • Relevant portion of Sec. 65B reads as under:
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information … which is printed …… or copied …….. shall be Deemed to be ALSO a Document ….
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao), held as under
  • 35. …….. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P.V., (supra) and CANNOT be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

Point No. 3A.

STATEMENTS’ alone can be PROVED by ‘Certificate’ under S. 65B(4). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • The ‘statements‘ (such as bank account statements) alone can be PROVED in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4). It is clear from a simple reading of 65B(4). 
  • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not proof. But, it appears that Sec. 65B(4) which takes care of ‘statements‘, deals with authenticity or proof of truth, also;
    • because, it is laid down
    • (i) that the certificate “shall be EVIDENCE (proof?) of any(?matter stated” therein, and
    • (ii) that, for the purposes of this sub-section, “it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”

Sec. 65B(4) reads:

  • “(4) In any proceedings where it is DESIRED TO GIVESTATEMENT  in evidence, by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record CONTAINING the STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be EVIDENCE of any matter stated in the certificate;
  • and for the purposes of this sub-section
  • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”

See Blog: ‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be proved by ‘CERTIFICATE’ u/s. 65B

Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao) held as under

  • 59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of ELECTRONIC RECORD…. . “

Point No. 3C.

Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit, (except for ‘Statements’). (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • The computer output (copy) containing the information, such as CCTV footage, photo or video in a CD, can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2)  (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) are satisfied, through oral evidence or affidavit. Only exception is to “statements”.

Relevant portions of Sec. 65B read as under:

  • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of Electronic Records:
  • (1) …. (computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the CONDITIONS mentioned in this section are SATISFIED ….. without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein (Isn’t “or of any fact stated therein” surpussage?) ……
  • (2) The conditions ….. shall be the following, namely:—
    • (a) …. the computer was used regularly to storeinformation for the purposes (?) of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which ….. information …… was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities (Isn’t the words “during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which” a surplusage?);
    • (c) throughout the material part …. the computer was operating properly ……; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities. (Isn’t the words “or is derived from such information fed into the computer” a surplusage – especially in view of the wordings of clause (b)?)
  • Supreme Court (Arjun Panditrao) held as under
  • “59. ….. Oral evidence in the place of such certificate CANNOT possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”

Point No. 4

Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • It is clear that the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
    • S. 65B(2)(a) computer was USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information
      • of the activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
      • BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
    • S. 65B(2)(b) information was REGULARLY FED
      • in the ORDINARY COURSE,
    • S. 65B(2)(d) the information is REPRODUCED in the
      • ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
    • (For example – Computer Account statements in a Bank.)
  • For all other computer outputs (copy of, photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc.), one has to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65.
  • Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the following computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B:
    • CCTV footage
      • (i) not used to store or process information BY any PERSON [65B(2)(a)] and
      • (ii) not reproduced in the ordinary course [65B(2)(d)] .
    • CDs containing speech
    • Videograph of the scene of crime
    • trap-video
      • (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information [65B(2)(a)],
      • (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course [65B(2)(b)] and
      • (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course [65B(2)(d)].
  • But, the Supreme Court dealt with CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178),
  • CDs/VCDs in respect of video recording by the Election Commission
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phones in:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017-8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ).

See Blog: How to Prove WhatsApp Chats, Facebook Messages and Website Information in Courts?

Point No. 5.

Should the ‘Correctness’ of Copy or Print-out Must be Proved?

No.

S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put; because,  S. 65B(5)(c) lays down-

  • ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 

Sec. 65B(5)(c) reads:

  • S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put, inasmuch as S. 65B(5)(c) lays down that ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 
  • Sec. 65B(5)(c) reads:
    • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

What are to be proved (through a Certificate):

Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216) para 21 reads as under:

  • “Under Sub-section (4), a certificate is to be produced that
    • identifies the electronic record containing the statement and
    • describes the manner in which it is produced, or
    • gives particulars of the device involved in the production of the electronic record to show that the electronic record was produced by a computer,
  • by either a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device; or a person who is in the management of “relevant activities” – whichever is appropriate.

See Blog: EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION


PART II

Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output

Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)

  • (i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
  • (ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
    • of any contents of the original or
    • of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.

The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.

  • Note:
    • (i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
    • (ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
    • (iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.

Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”
  • (See: Blog: EFFECT OF MARKING DOCUMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTION)

Section 65B is a borrowed provision

Section 65B is brought to Indian law from Section 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968. It remains a sheer fact that by the time we borrowed this provision (2000) from the UK law, they repealed (1995) it. (It is pointed out in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216.)

The present UK Act (Civil Evidence Act 1995) does not make any special provision for Electronic Evidence or Computerised Records. It deals this matter under the head ‘hearsay evidence’ and makes ‘safeguards’ with respect to the hearsay evidence.

Who can give Certificate under Sec. 65 B

Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 makes it clear-

  • The certificate can be given by anyone out of several persons who occupy a ‘responsible official position’ in relation to the operation of the relevant device.
  • The person who may otherwise be in the ‘management of relevant activities’ spoken of in Sub-section (4) of Section 65B. (It is provided to give the certificate to the “best of his knowledge and belief”.) See also – Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra 2020-12 SCALE 450.

Can the Certificate u/s 65B be Given Long After the Electronic Record was Produced

  • In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020)3 SCC 216 it was held that by virtue of Section 65B(4), the Certificate u/s 65B can be given long after the electronic record has actually been produced by the computer. (Note: the certificate to be given is to the “best of his knowledge and belief”.) See also – Smriti Madan Kansagra Vs. Perry Kansagra 2020-12 SCALE 450.

PART III – LANDMARK DECISIONS

  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,  two- judge bench decision (on CCTV footage). It is held:
    • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
  2. Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision (on CDs containing election speeches). It is held:
    • “That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
    • But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  3. Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision (on CCTV footage).
    • It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
    • Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
  4. Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570): two- judge bench decision (on Call Detail Records – CDRs – of mobile phones). It is held:
    • “The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
  5. Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ), two- judge bench decision (on videography of the scene of crime). Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
    • “(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
    • (12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
  6. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision (on CCTV footage). It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
    • Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for Sec. 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is ‘clarified’ and directed to ‘read’ Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’ “.
    • “59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”
    • In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
    • “What is clear from this judgment (Tomaso Bruno) is that the judgment of Anvar P. V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P. V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P. V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

PART IV

Presumptions Incorporated in Evidence Act While Introducing Sec. 65 A and 65 B

  • Sec. 81A. Presumption as to Gazettes in electronic forms
  • The Court shall presume the genuineness of every electronic record purporting to be the Official Gazette or purporting to be electronic record directed by any law to be kept by any person, if such electronic record is kept substantially in the form required by law and is produced from proper custody
  • 85A Presumption as to electronic agreements
  • The Court shall presume that every electronic record purporting to be an agreement containing the electronic signature of the parties was so concluded by affixing the electronic signature of the parties.
  • 85B Presumption as to electronic records and electronic signatures
  • (1) In any proceedings involving a secure electronic record, the Court shall presume unless contrary is proved, that the secure electronic record has not been altered since the specific point of time to which the secure status relates.
  • (2) In any proceedings, involving secure electronic signature, the Court shall presume unless the contrary is proved that—
  • (a) the secure electronic signature is affixed by subscriber with the intention of signing or approving the electronic record;
  • (b) except in the case of a secure electronic record or a secure electronic signature, nothing in this section shall create any presumption, relating to authenticity and integrity of the electronic record or any electronic signature.
  • 85C Presumption as to Electronic Signature Certificates
  • The Court shall presume, unless contrary is proved, that the information listed in a 86 Electronic Signature Certificate is correct, except for information specified as subscriber information which has not been verified, if the certificate was accepted by the subscriber.
  • 88A. Presumption as to electronic messages
  • The Court may presume that an electronic message, forwarded by the originator through an electronic mail server to the addressee to whom the message purports to be addressed corresponds with the message as fed into his computer for transmission; but the Court shall not make any presumption as to the person by whom such message was sent.
  • “Explanation: For the purposes of this section, the expressions “addressee” and “originator” shall have the same meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (b) and (za) of sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.


End Note:

Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act read:

  • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
    • The CONTENTS of electronic records may be PROVED in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
  • Sec. 65B. Admissibility of electronic records:
  • (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.
  • (2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—
    • (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
    • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
    • (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
    • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.
  • (3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether—
    • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
    • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
    • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.
  • (4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate)
      • shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate;
    • and for the purposes of this sub-section
    • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.
  • (5) For the purposes of this section,—
    • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
    • (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
    • (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.


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Book No, 1 – Civil Procedure Code

Power of attorney

Title, ownership and Possession

Principles and Procedure

Admission, Relevancy and Proof

Land LawsTransfer of Property Act

Evidence Act – General

Sec. 65B

Law on Documents

Contract Act

Easement

Stamp Act & Registration

Will

Arbitration

Divorce

Book No. 2: A Handbook on Constitutional Issues

Religious issues

Book No. 3: Common Law of CLUBS and SOCIETIES in India

Book No. 4: Common Law of TRUSTS in India

Certificate is Required Only for ‘Computer Output’; Not for ‘Electronic Records’: Arjun Panditrao Explored.

Printer, Desk, Office, Fax, Scanner, Home Office

Saji Koduvath, advocate.

Introspection

No.Analysis of the authorLaw rendered by the Supreme Court
1Sec. 65B deals with ‘Admissibility’ (alone) of a Computer Output/Copy. If ‘truth’ is in question, it must be proved.“31. … admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B …
Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose. ……”
2Sec. 65B is an (additional) enabling provision to prove copy. Non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding Anything’) in Sec. 65B – Not exclude Sec. 65. “34. …. special provisions of Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act are a complete Code in themselves ……”
“34. …a written certificate under Section 65B(4) is a sine qua non  …”  
3Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit, (except for ‘Statements’; they can be by “Certificate” also). “59. … Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. … To hold otherwise would render Section 65B(4) otiose.”
4Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B.
•The computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
• USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information
• activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
• BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
•information was REGULARLY FED
•in the ORDINARY COURSE,
• information is REPRODUCED in the
•ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
Apex Court accepted –
CCTV footage in: Navjot Sandhu, (2005); Tomaso Bruno (2015),
CDs/VCDs in: Arjun Panditrao (2020)
CDs in: Anvar PV (2014).
CDR in: Sonu (2017)
Tape recorded conversation: Vikram Singh (2017)
Videography of scene of crime in: Shafhi (2018).
5‘STATEMENTS’ alone can be PROVED by ‘Certificate’ under S. 65B(4). “59. We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of EVIDENCE by way of ELECTRONIC RECORD…. . “  

What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?

  1. It enables a litigant to prove computer output (secondary evidence)
    • without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), and
    • by producing a ‘certificate’ (as provided in this Section).
  2. Presumption is provided as to the correctness of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c).

Contents in a Nutshell

  1. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, is per incurium as it went wrong in observing:
    • that ‘the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence);
    • that by virtue of the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’) Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot at all be adverted to in proving a computer output (secondary evidence); and
    • that Section 65B being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield; and therefore, the computer outputs (secondary evidence) can be proved by “certificate” alone, and cannot be proved by the usual method of oral evidence or affidavit.
  2. It failed to observe:
    • that “Electronic record containing the statement alone can be proved with Sec. 65B(4) Certificate (statement is confined to the matters that can be made in a written form: e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements); and not all information (includes photo, video etc. in a computer, pen-drive or CD etc.).
  3. It should have noticed:
    • that Section 65B deals with computer output (perceived as secondary evidence) alone; and
    • only formal evidence and admissibility (and not truth of contents) are dealt with in Sec. 65B.
  4. It was thoroughly mistaken in holding:
    • that a certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and belief’, can be brought by ‘force’ (as a ‘thing’).
  5. It missed to see:
    • that the changes made to law by the introduction of Sec. 65A and 65B are:
      1. simplification of procedure for proving electronic record by producing a copy (computer output) by declaring the copy also as a (deemed) document – if the conditions are satisfied (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
      2. only “where it is desired to give a ‘statement’ in evidenceit can be had by “a certificate” as provided in Sec. 65B(4).
      3. the computer output (print or copy) can be tendered in evidence without evidence as to the computer which (finally) produced it – for, it will be presumed (shall be taken) “to have been produced by a computer … by means of any appropriate equipment”, as per Sec. 65B(5)(c).

What is brought about by Section 65B, Evidence Act?

  1. Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act enables a litigant to prove computer output (derived from original – secondary evidence) ‘without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original), provided the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B(2) are fulfilled (such as: the computer was operating properly, the electronic record is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the activities, etc.). Sec. 65B declares that the computer output (copy or print out) ‘shall be deemed to be also a document‘.
    • The (general) provision, in the Evidence Act, to admit a copy of a document is Sec. 65. Under Sec. 65, it must be proved by evidence – oral evidence or affidavit – that one of the conditions laid down in the section, for production of copy, is satisfied (that is: loss of original, original with other side and notice given, etc.). Sec. 63, Evidence Act lays down the sorts of admissible copies (such as: certified copies, copies made from the original by mechanical processes etc.).
    • The non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything’) in Sec. 65B, Evidence Act does not oust Sec. 63 and 65; Sec. 65B is only an added provisionto prove copy or print out.
      • Note: If the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., Sec. 65B cannot be invoked (‘without further proof or production of the original’). E.g. photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’. In such a case, we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act.
  2. Still simpler provisions are introduced to prove ‘statements (call-records of phones, bank-account-statements, etc.), inasmuch as:
    • ‘Statements’ can be proved by a mere ‘certificate provided under Sec. 65B(4).
      • [Note: It is not made applicable to ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD (Contra view in Court decisions) ].
  3. There is presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer output (copy or print out) under Sec. 65B(5)(c), as it provides:
    • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

PART I – GENERAL

Relevancy, Admissibility and Probative Value of Documents

Sec. 5 and 136 of the Evidence Act stipulate that evidence can be given only on ‘facts in issue’ or ‘relevant facts’. Relevant facts are enumerated in Sec. 6 onwards.

Generally speaking, all relevant documents are admissible. But, various provisions of the Evidence Act, Civil and Criminal Procedure Codes, Stamp Act, Registration Act etc. stipulate various formalities or regulations for tendering documents in evidence.

Whenever a document is admitted in court, the probative value thereof will be a matter for the court to determine. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh (AIR 1983 SC 684) it is observed:

  • “Admissibility of a document is one thing and its probative value quite another—these two aspects cannot be combined. A document may be admissible and yet may not carry any conviction and weight or its probative value may be nil.”

Electronic Record

Section 2(1)(t) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 defines an ‘electronic record’ as under:

  • electronic record” means data, record or data generated, image or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or micro film or computer generated micro fiche;

Technically, the ‘electronic record’ will be (i) the data (E-mails, telephonic recordings, CCTV footage, etc.) or (ii) other material in an electronic form (video recordings in CD, DVD), so also the (iii) microfilm, the computer-generated microfiche, etc. attached, or attachable, to a computer, or other electronic equipment.

It can be seen that our Apex Court, in the following (earlier) cases, had held that the tape records of conversations and speeches were admissible under the Indian Evidence   Act:

  • S.   Pratap   Singh   v.   State   of   Punjab, (1964) 4 SCR 753; AIR 1964 SC 72
  • Yusaffalli Esmail  Nagree  v.  State  of  Maharashtra, (1967) 3 SCR 720. 
  • Sri Rama Reddy v. V. V. Giri, AIR 1972 SC 1162
  • R.M. Malkani v. State of   Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157
  • Ziyauddin   Burhanuddin v. Brijmohan   Ramdas, (1976) 2 SCC 17
  • Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3

CD, Pen Drive etc. into which information is directly fed into are ‘Electronic Records

By virtue of the provisions of the Evidence Act (Sec. 3, 22A, 59 and 62) the (original) CD, Pen Drive, Memory Card etc., into which information is directly fed into, are  ‘electronic records‘ [State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande: 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat) ] ; and they are also Primary Evidence. They are subject to Sec. 22A and Sec. 59, Evid. Act.

Sec. 22A Reads as follows:

  • Sec. 22A. When oral admission as to contents of electronic records are relevant: Oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records are not relevant, unless the genuineness of the electronic record produced is in question.”  

Sec. 59 Reads as under:

  • Sec. 59. Proof of facts by oral evidence: All facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence.”

‘Electronic record’ being perceived, in the Evidence Act, as the ‘original’ data, record, etc. that are put in or stored, casually, the ‘hard-disc’ of the computer is the ‘electronic record’ (rather than the computer itself); and it can also be an external hard-disc, CD, DVD or a chip or a memory-card or a pen-drive to which the ‘information’ is directly fed into – using a computer, a video camera, mobile phone, etc. [State of Gujarat v. Shailendra Kamalkishor Pande: 2008 CriLJ 953 (Gujrat) ].   It must have been self-generated without any human intervention. [Kishan Tripathi @ Kishan Painter v. The State (2016) 2 DLT (Cri) 666)].

Audio and Video Recordings were found to be relevant and admissible as ‘documents’ under section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, in earlier cases.  See:

  • Shri N. Sri Rama Reddy v. Shri V. V. Giri: AIR 1971 SC 1162;
  • Rup Chand v. Mahabir Parshad, AIR 1956 P H 173; 
  • Dr. Partap Singh v. The State Of Punjab,  AIR 1963 P H 298;
  • R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra,  1973 AIR 157;
  • Yusufalli Esmail Nagree v. The State of Maharashtra:  AIR  1968 SC 147.
  • See also: K. Ramajayam v. Inspector of Police, 2016 Cri. L.J. 1542;
  • R. Mohanraj v. TN Legislative Assembly, (2016) 6 SCC 82.

CCTV Footage is a strong piece of evidence

In Tomaso Bruno v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 7 SCC 178, Justice R. Banumathi, Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice Anil R. Dave observed as under: 

  • “CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone out of the hotel. CCTV footage being a crucial piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case.”

Computer Output

According to Sec. 65B(1), computer output is ‘any information contained in an electronic record which is

  • printed on a paper,
  • stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer’.

Section 65B(1) declares that the ‘computer output’

  • ‘shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question’ (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.); and
  • ‘shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence’.

See Blog: How to Prove WhatsApp Chats, Facebook Messages and Website Information in Courts?

PART II – SEC. 65A and 65B

Section 65A is only an introductory provision to Sec. 65B. It does not control Section 65B. Sec. 65A reads:

  • “The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B”.

Therefore, it is clear, on a reading of both Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B:

  • Section 65B deals with admissibility’ of computer output (perceived as secondary evidence); and 
  • it does not deal with proof/truth of contents of the ‘electronic record’  (perceived as primary evidence) as such.

Indian Evidence Act is amended in 2000 and introduced Sections 65A & 65B with a view to render a simple procedure to admit ‘computer output’, in evidence. It is explicit from the introductory part of Sec. 65B(1), which reads as under: 

  • “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be … admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence….”

It is noteworthy that the ambiguity as to whether electronic–records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act. (Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.)  ‘Electronic records’ being already declared as ‘documents’ by the Evidence Act, Section 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (perceived as secondary evidence) alone as documents.

Section 65B is a borrowed provision

Section 65B is brought to Indian law from Section 5 of the UK Civil Evidence Act, 1968. It remains a sheer fact that by the time we borrowed this provision from the UK law, they repealed (1995) it. (It is pointed out in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, itself.)

The present UK Act (Civil Evidence Act 1995) does not make any special provision for Electronic Evidence or Computerised Records. It deals this matter under the head ‘hearsay evidence’ and makes ‘safeguards’ with respect to the hearsay evidence.

Landmark Decisions

  1. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,  two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65. It may be that the certificate containing the details in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B is 26 not filed in the instant case, but that does not mean that secondary evidence cannot be given even if the law permits such evidence to be given in the circumstances mentioned in the relevant provisions, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”
  2. Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473), three- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • That (Sections 65A & 65B) is a complete code in itself. Being a special law, the general law under Sections 63 and 65 has to yield.”
    • But finally held: “It is clarified that notwithstanding what we have stated herein in the preceding paragraphs on the secondary evidence of electronic record with reference to Sections 59, 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act, if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act, the same is admissible in evidence, without compliance with the conditions in Section 65B of the Evidence Act.”
  3. Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178), three-bench decision.
    • It is held, as to make CCTV footage admissible, as under:
      • Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act”.
  4. Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570): two- judge bench decision. It is held:
    • “The crucial test, as affirmed by this Court, is whether the defect could have been cured at the stage of marking the document. Applying this test to the present case, if an objection was taken to the CDRs being marked without a certificate, the court could have given the prosecution an opportunity to rectify the deficiency.”
  5. Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ), two- judge bench decision.
    • Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in. It was held as under:
    • “(11) The applicability of procedural requirement under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act of furnishing certificate is to be applied only when such electronic evidence is produced by a person who is in a position to produce such certificate being in control of the said device and not of the opposite party. In a case where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device, applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be held to be excluded. In such case, procedure under the said Sections can certainly be invoked. If this is not so permitted, it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) [sic-65B(4)] is not always mandatory.
    • (12) Accordingly, we clarify the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies.”
  6. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216, three-judge bench decision. It substantially followed PV Anwar (2014) with a ‘clarification’.
    • Because it is held in Anver PV v. PK Basheer that Section 62, 63 and 65 are not applied for electronic evidence – for 65A & B are ‘complete code’ – the further observation that ‘if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62’ stood incongruent and contradictory. Therefore, it is “clarified” and directed to “read” Anver “without the words – ‘under Section 62 of the Evidence Act’  ”.
    • In Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao it is found – Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP is per-incurium as under:
      • “What is clear from this judgment (Tomaso Bruno) is that the judgment of Anvar P. V. (supra) was not referred to at all. In fact, the judgment in State v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 was adverted to, which was a judgment specifically overruled by Anvar P. V. (supra). It may also be stated that Section 65B(4) was also not at all adverted to by this judgment. Hence, the declaration of law in Tomaso Bruno (supra) following Navjot Sandhu (supra) that secondary evidence of the contents of a document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act to make CCTV footage admissible would be in the teeth of Anvar P. V., (supra) and cannot be said to be a correct statement of the law. The said view is accordingly overruled.”

Sub-section (4) of Section 65B

  • The ‘statements‘ (such as bank account statements) alone can be PROVED in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4).
  • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not proof. But, it appears that Sec. 65B(4) deals with authenticity or proof of truth;
    • because, it is laid down
    • (i) that the certificate “shall be evidence (proof?) of any (?matter stated” therein, and
    • (ii) that for the purposes of this sub-section “it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”
  • It is clear from a simple reading – 65B(4) is applicable only to ‘statements’.

Sec. 65B(4) reads:

  • “(4) In any proceedings where it is DESIRED TO GIVESTATEMENT  in evidence, by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—
    • (a) identifying the electronic record CONTAINING the STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
    • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
    • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be EVIDENCE of any matter stated in the certificate;
  • and for the purposes of this sub-section
  • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.”

1. Section 65B(4) allows a simple procedure  of furnishing a Certificate ‘where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section’; that is, to admit a statement (which is a ‘computer output’), without further proof or production of the original. Then the following question is apposite:

What is a ‘statement’ according to the Evidence Act”?

According to Evidence Act, ‘statement’ is – that which can be expressed in the form of ‘oral evidence’. Because, “Evidence” is defined in Sec. 3 of the Evidence Act as under:

  • “Evidence means and includes—
    • all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.
    • all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.”
  • “Evidence means and includes—
    • all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence.
    • all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence.”
  • See also: Sec. 8
    • Explanation 1.––The word “conduct” in this section does not include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts other than statements; but this explanation is not to affect the relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.
    • Explanation 2.––When the conduct of any person is relevant, any statement made to him or in his presence and hearing, which affects such conduct, is relevant.
  • Section–.32
    • Cases in which statement of relevant fact by person who is dead or cannot be found, etc., is relevant.
  • Section–. 34
    • Entries in books of account when relevant. …. but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability
  • .Section–. 36
    • Relevancy of statements in maps, charts and plans.
  • Section–. 32
    • Relevancy of statement as to fact of public nature contained in certain Acts or notifications.
  • Section–. 37
    • Relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law-books.
  • Section–. 38
    • What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
  • Section–. 39
    • What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation, document, electronic record, book or series of letters or papers.
  • Section–. 145
    • Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing
  • Section–. 157
    • Former statements of witness may be proved to corroborate later testimony as to same fact
  • Section–. 158
    • What matters may be proved in connection with proved statement relevant under section 32 or 33.

Thus it appears that the call-records of phones, bank-account-statements etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’. The ‘statement’ referred to herein is that which can be pointed out “identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced” as stated in Section 65B(4)(a); and which can be ‘purporting to be signed‘, as stated in Section 65B(4)(c). And, it is clear that the ‘statement’ does not pertain to other ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD (See also: Sec. 3 (definition of ‘evidence’), Sec. 8 Explanations, Sec. 32 to 39, 145, 157, and 158). (Note – contra view in Supreme Court decisions).

2. It is further stated in Section 65B(4) that such Certificate (i) ‘purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and (ii) for the purposes of this subsection it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it’.

3. It is noteworthy that it is expressly stated:

  • the certificate ‘shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate’.
  • a ‘computer output’ (including printout or computer-copy of statement) can be admitted without further proof or production of the original, if conditions laid down are satisfied (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).

4. The certificate must be ‘doing any of (?) the following things’:

  • (a) particulars for identifying the ELECTRONIC RECORD CONTAINING THE STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced;
  • (b) such particulars of any device involved in the production of that (original) electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the (original) electronic record was produced by a computer;
  • (c) matters that deal with any of (?) the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).

‘Statement‘ in S. 65B(4) is the “STATEMENT ‘CONTAINED‘ IN THE ELECTRONIC RECORD” and NOT that GIVEN IN COURT

Now, the potential question that arises for consideration is the following:

  • Whether the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is
    • (i) that given in court, to support the copy or printout, or
    • (ii) that is contained in the electronic record?

It is beyond doubt that the ‘statement’ mentioned in Sec. 65B(4) is not the one that is given in court; but, the statement ‘CONTAINED‘ in “the electronic record”. Because:

  1. The “statement” referred to in Sec. 65B (4) is one that-
    • may be:
      • desired to give” “in evidence by virtue of this section” (Sec. 65B(4) first clause); and
  2. The “certificate”-
    • must be one that
      • “identifying the ELECTRONIC RECORD CONTAINING THE STATEMENT and describing the manner in which it was produced” [Section 65B(4)(a)].

The above view is fortified by the following:

  • Sec. 65B(4) says that the certificate
    1. must state, under Sec. 65B(4)(c), among other things, facts as to “dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate”
      • Note: Proving matter with’ certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4) is a species and proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B(2) is genus.
    2. could be signed by a person who has
      • “a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities” (Section 65B(4)(c).

Thus, the formal assertions like statements of witnesses, call-records of phones, bank-account-statements, etc. alone can be proved as ‘statements’, by virtue of section 65B; and not ‘information’ like CCTV Footage, photo in a pen-drive or video in a CD.

In short, going by Sec. 65B, it is definite that-

  • the computer-output (copy) containing the ‘information’ (e.g. CCTV Footage, photo or video in a CD) in the electronic-record (original) can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B, if only the conditions (such as: the computer was operating properly, the electronic record is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the activities, etc.) mentioned in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied (that is, the conditions are to be proved through the usual mode of oral evidence or affidavit); and
  • the ‘statements (e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements) alone can be admitted in evidence, under Sec. 65B (by computer-output, without further proof or production of the original electronic-record), through a ‘certificate‘ (Note – Contra view in Court decisions. In the binding Court decisions it is stated that sans the Certificate, no computer-output can be taken into consideration).

Admissibility and Presumption as to correctness of Computer Output

  • Sec. 65B does not deal with ‘truth’ of the contents of the electronic record; it deals with only ‘admissibility of copy’.
  • The electronic record mentioned in Sec. 65B is – that is ‘relevant‘; for, it must be one “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  • Therefore, if truth is in question, it must be proved according to other provisions of the evidence act; ie. by oral, documentary (such as admission) or presumptive (including circumstantial) evidence.
  • Relevant portions of 65A & 65B read as under:
    • Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:
      • The contents of electronic records MAY BE proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 
    • Sec. 65B: Admissibility of electronic records:
      • (1) … any information contained in an electronic record which is printed ….. or copied ….. shall be ADMISSIBLE in any proceedings ….. as evidence of any contents of the original … of which direct evidence would be admissible.”

Sec. 65B declares and expressly lays down that computer output (copy or print)

  • (i) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and
  • (ii) shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence
    • of any contents of the original or
    • of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

If the conditions mentioned in this Section Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, by necessary implication, it will bring a presumption under Sec. 114 with respect to regularity of the computer output . Because, admissibility of ‘any fact stated therein‘ ‘without further proof’ is nothing but ‘presumption’ of its regularity and correctness. The net result is that (if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied) the burden to prove otherwise is cast on the person who opposes it.

The requirement in Sec. 65B(2) as to ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) for ‘regularity‘ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course‘ eloquently support this proposition.

  • Note:
    • (i) ‘Statements’ alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under Sec. 65B(4); other ‘information’ are to be proved by proper evidence.
    • (ii) Presumption of ‘regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act can be applied in Sec. 65B.
    • (iii) Presumption of a ‘fact or regularity’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially presumption of ‘Truth’ and ‘Correctness’.

Presumption of Fact Means Truth/Correctness of Fact

St. of West Bengal Vs. Mir Mohammad Omar (AIR 2000 SC 2988) it is held by our Apex Court as under:

  • “Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the Court exercises a process of reasoning and reach a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process Court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case.”

A combined reading of Section 65A and 65B will show:

  • (i)Electronic record’ is primary evidence (original) and computer output’  is derived-from-original;
    • Computer output’ (derived from original) stands akin to secondary evidence because: (i) it is (Sec. 65B) an ‘information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer‘;
  • (ii) it is stated that a ‘Computer output’  “shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible”;
    • Sans Sec. 65B, the provision for proving ‘computer output’ is Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63.
    • Certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act is required only for proving ‘computer output’ (derived from original)  and not for proving an ‘Electronic Record'(original);
  • (iii) Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act enables a litigant to prove computer output (derived from original) without further proof or production of electronic record’ (original) if the conditions laid down in Sec. 65B are fulfilled (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course, etc.).
  • (iv) Original (electronic record) can be given in evidence producing and proving ‘original’.  Sec. 65B is an enabling provision to prove ‘computer output’ (copy/print).
  • (v) The enabling provision, Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act does not stand as a bar for proving a secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’ (original – primary evidence), under Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act. (Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).
  • (vi) There is presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B 5(c), as it reads ‘a computer output (print or copy) shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

Then, the very important question in this subject is the following:

Does the duo by Sec. 65A & 65B Evid. Act Oust the Operation of Sec. 63 & 65?

  • That is, whether ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘ electronic record’) can be proved only by Sec. 65B and it Constitute a ‘Complete Code’?

The Answer is No.

Then, what does the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything’) denote? It is clear that Sec.62 to 65 are independent from the new provisions, Sec. 65A and 65B; and Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘ electronic record’). It is definite that the non-obstante clause (‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. ’) in Sec. 65B does not oust Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act in proving a computer output (secondary evidence). Because:

  1. Sec. 65A is an introductory provision to Sec. 65B.
  2. Sec. 65A does not control Sec. 65B.
  3. Sec. 65A directs only an (enabling) method to PROVE (not the only one method) the CONTENTS of electronic records –  by print/copy – invoking Sec. 65B.
    • (Sec. 65A reads: The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B.) 
    • Thus, Sec. 65B is an Enabling or Added provision; and, other enabling (existing) provisions in the Indian Evidence Act, to prove documents by secondary evidence invoking Sec. 63 and 65, are not taken away.
  4. Sec. 65B(1), further lays down that the computer output (copy) shall be “deemed to be ALSO” an (original) document, if the conditions in Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Act”.
    • That is, Sec. 65B, does not bar proving a print/copy (as secondary evidence) by satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit, as to loss of original, original with other side and notice given, original not easily movable, etc., as the case may be.
  5. Sec. 65B deals with ‘ADMISSIBILITY of ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone. 
  6. The conditions in Sec. 65B(2) (such as: computer was used regularly and operating properly, information was regularly fed into in the ordinary course) have to be satisfied by oral evidence or affidavit. In case of ‘statements’ alone, it can be had by the ‘certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4).
  7. If the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., Sec. 65B cannot be invoked (‘without further proof or production of the original’). E.g. photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’. In such a case, we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act.

In short, compliance of this enabling provision is not an invariable or imperative condition precedent to the admissibility’ of ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence); and it does not stand in the way of proving a secondary evidence of the contents of the ‘electronic record’, invoking the usual method laid down in Sec. 65 read with Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act – that is, satisfying the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, by oral evidence or affidavit. (Note: Contra view in: Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216).

Photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc. cannot be used under Sec. 65B. (Note – Contra view by Supreme Court)

  • It is clear that the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’ if only the conditions mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, that is:
    • S. 65B(2)(a) computer was USED REGULARLY to STORE or process information
      • of the activities REGULARLY CARRIED ON
      • BY THE PERSON having lawful control,
    • S. 65B(2)(b) information was REGULARLY FED
      • in the ORDINARY COURSE,
    • S. 65B(2)(d) the information is REPRODUCED in the
      • ORDINARY COURSE of the SAID ACTIVITIES.
    • (For example – Computer Account statements in a Bank.)
  • For all other computer outputs (copy of, photo or video captured in a mobile phone, ‘trap-video’, CCTV footage, etc.), one has to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65.
  • Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that the following computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B:
    • CCTV footage – (i) not used to store or process information BY any PERSON and (ii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
    • CDs containing speech – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
    • videograph of the scene of crime or trap-video – (i) not used REGULARLY to store or process information, (ii) not regularly fed in the ordinary course and (iii) not reproduced in the ordinary course.
  • But, the Supreme Court dealt with CCTV footage in the following landmark cases:
    • State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600,
    • Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP, (2015-7 SCC 178),
    • Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216
  • CDs containing election speeches and songs in:
    • Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014-10 SCC 473).
  • Call Detail Records – CDR – of mobile phones in:
    • Sonu v. State of Haryana (2017-8 SCC 570)
  • Tape recorded conversation on the landline phone
    • Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518
  • Propriety of videography of the scene of crime or scene of recovery during investigation, in:
    • Shafhi Muhammed v. State of HP, (2018-2 SCC 801 ).

Computer output’ can be got produced by ‘any computer‘ and no evidence/certificate required

A ‘Computer Output’ can be got copied or printed by ‘any computer’. It need not be the part of the device that was “used regularly to store or process information”. It is clear from the phrase – shall be taken to have been produced by “a computer” – in 65B(5)(c). It stands contradistinct to “the computer” in Sec. 65B(2).

Presumption on ‘Computer Output’ (print or copy)

From the very wordings in Sec. 65B(5)(c), the ‘proof’ (through witnesses or certificate) as to the involvement of the computer which (finally) produced the computer output (print or copy) need not be furnished. Because, the legislature contemplated a presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B(5)(c), as it reads:

  • ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.

It is similar to Sec. 63 clause (2) which reads as under:

  • “Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy …. …”

Sec. 63 lays down the sorts of secondary evidence accepted by the Evidence Act. It is seen that Sec. 65B(5)(c) expressly says also as to presumption on correctness, as stated above.

Mere marking– not dispense with proof (of truth of contents)

In Sait Tarajee Khimchand v. Yelamarti Satyam, AIR 1971 SC 1865, the Supreme Court observed that mere marking of a documents (day book and ledger) as exhibits do not dispense with the proof of documents. In Nandkishore Lalbhai Mehta Vs. New Era Fabrics, AIR 2015 SC 3796, it is observed that mere marking as exhibit and identification of executor’s signature by one of witnesses does not prove contents of a document.

In Kaliya Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013-10 SCC 758) it is held as under:

  • “Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Nor, mere marking of exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof, which is otherwise required to be done in accordance with law. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission Vs. The State, AIR 1966 SC 1457; Marwari Khumhar Vs. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri AIR 2000 SC 2629; RVE Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu AIR 2003 SC 4548; Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K.M. Shaffi, AIR 2004 SC 4082; and LIC of India  Vs. Rampal Singh Bisen,2010-4 SCC 491).”
  • “The court is obliged to examine the probative value of documents produced in court or their contents and decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence.”
  • [Note: Further held: “In case, an objection is not raised at that point of time, it is precluded from being raised at a belated stage.”]

IF the TRUTH is IN ISSUE mere proof of handwriting or execution not evidence of truth:   IF the TRUTH of the facts stated in a document is IN ISSUE mere proof of the hand-writing and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document.

In Ramji Dayawala Vs. Invest Import: AIR 1981 SC 2085, it us held as under:

  • “If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e. by the evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue.”

If ‘truth’ is in issue, or in dispute, marking without objection by itself does not absolve the duty to prove the truth as to the contents of the documents. (See: Achuthan Pillai vs Marikar (Motors) Ltd., AIR 1983 Ker 81, 1976 Cr.LJ 1507; 2016 (1) Gau. LJ 88,  2012(1) CTC 53; 2013-1 KLT 293.)

PART III – Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020)3 SCC 216: 

In the recent decision of our Supreme Court in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, substantially following Anvar v. Basheer [(2014)10 SCC 473] and overruling Shafhi Mohammad v. The State of Himachal [(2018)2 SCC 801], it is observed as under:

  • “The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records.”
  • “The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose.”
  • “However, Section 65B(1) clearly differentiates between the “original” document – which would be the original “electronic record” contained in the “computer” in which the original information is first stored – and the computer output containing such information, which then may be treated as evidence of the contents of the “original” document. All this necessarily shows that Section 65B differentiates between the original information contained in the “computer” itself and copies made therefrom – the former being primary evidence, and the latter being secondary evidence.”
  • “However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, and require that such certificate be given by such person/persons.” 
  • So long as the hearing in a trial is not yet over, the requisite certificate can be directed to be produced by the learned Judge at any stage, so that information contained in electronic record form can then be admitted, and relied upon in evidence.
  • “The …. required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him.”

Analysed

  1. Re: Provisions in Sec. 63 and 65, are taken away or not: The Supreme Court, in Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, (2020) 3 SCC 216, followed Anvar PV v. PK Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473, which held that Sections 65A and 65B constitute a complete code as to admissibility of electronic records.
    • Therefore, it is laid down that Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to prove a computer-output (print or copy derived from original); and
    • the drill of Section 65A and 65B should be invariably followed, and a computer-output can be proved only by the ‘Certificate’ provided under Sec. 65B(4) of the Evidence Act.
  2. It requires a re-look; because:
    • The other enabling provisions in the Indian Evidence Act to prove documents by secondary evidence, invoking Sec. 63 and 65, are not taken away by the new enabling provisions, Sec. 65A and 65B, as shown above.
  3. Re: “statement”: Electronic record containing the statement” (e.g. call-records of phones, bank-account-statements) alone are dealt with in Sec. 65B(4) Certificate. (Contra view in Supreme Court decisions).
    • It does not pertain to ‘information’ like photo, video etc. in a computer, pen-drive or CD.
    • According to the Evidence Act, ‘statements’ are confined to the matters that can be made in a written form. [See: Sec. 3 (definition of ‘evidence’), Sec. 8 (Explanations), 32 to 39, 145, 157, and 158.]
  4. Re: ‘admissibility’ and presumption of ‘computer output: The intent of the legislature in enacting Sec. 65B was to specifically assign the principles as to presumption under Sec. 114 to the ‘computer output’, as far it considered possible. Section 65B deals with ‘admissibility’ of computer output (perceived as secondary evidence). Only formal evidence (and not truth of contents) is envisaged in Sec. 65B.
    • Sec. 65B (1) states that the computer output shall be “admissible” ‘without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein’ (if the conditions mentioned Sec. 65B(2) are satisfied).
    • The requirement of condition as to ‘regularity’ of feeding information into the computer in the ‘ordinary course’ eloquently supports this proposition.
    • Though, generally, presumption of a ‘fact’ or ‘common/ordinary course’ under Sec. 114 Evd. Act is, essentially, presumption of ‘Truth’ (See: State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar, AIR 2000 SC 2988) , it does not apply, here (in view of the wordings in Sec. 65B).
  5. Re: Certificate: Certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and belief’, cannot be brought by ‘force’ (as a ‘thing’).
  6. Re: Process of taking print or copy need not be Proved: From the very wordings in Sec. 65B, the ‘evidence’ (through witnesses or certificate) as to the involvement of the computer which (finally) produced the computer output (print or copy) need not be furnished.
    • The legislature contemplated a presumption as to correctness of the computer output (not truth of contents), under Sec. 65B (5)(c), as it reads: ‘a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment’.
  7. Re: Whether “document” includes electronic records’: The observation in Arjun Panditrao that ‘the deemingfiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records’ is not correct,
    • inasmuch as the ambiguity as to whether electronic records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3, Evd. Act, which declared – ‘Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’. 

Substance and Conclusion

  1. Sec. 65B is invoked only when a computer output (copy) is used in evidence.
    • Sec. 65B pertains to ‘admissibility'(not truth) of a computer output/copy.
    • It deals with computer output/copy alone; and it does not deal with (original) electronic record.
  2. Non-obstante clause does not oust S. 63 and 65.
    • The non-obstante clause in Sec. 65B does not oust operation of Sec. 63 & 65 of the Evidence Act; and, therefore, secondary evidence of an electronic record can be given in evidence, invoking Sec. 65, read with Sec. 63.
    • Sec. 65B is an added and enabling provision to prove the copy or print out (otherwise than by proving the conditions laid down in Sec. 65, such as loss of original, original with other side).
    • It relates to relevant matters alone “of which direct evidence would be admissible”.
  3. Conditions in S. 65B(2) are to be satisfied through oral evidence or affidavit.
    • The computer output (copy) containing the information, such as CCTV footage, photo or video in a CD etc., can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) mentioned in S. 65B(2) are satisfied, through oral evidence or affidavit.
    • A computer output (copy) cannot be used under Sec. 65B if the computer was one not used regularly, or the information was one not ‘regularly fed’ into the computer in the ordinary course, etc., (as in the case of a photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.).
    • In such a case (photo or video captured in a mobile phone; ‘trap-video’, etc.), we have to resort other provisions of the Evidence Act, by producing the original or by producing the copy after satisfying the circumstances under Sec. 65; because, if only the conditions (such as: computer was used regularly, information was regularly fed in the ordinary course, computer was operating properly) mentioned in S. 65B(2) are fulfilled, then only the computer output (copy) is ‘deemed to be (also) a document’.
  4. Statements alone can be proved by ‘certificate’ under S. 65B(4).
    • The statements (such as e-mail, call records of phones, bank account statements, etc.) alone can be admitted in evidence under S. 65B, through a ‘certificate’ provided under S. 65B(4). 
    • Sec. 65B(2) conditions are to be satisfied for ADMISSIBILITY; and not authenticity. Sec. 65B(4) alone deals with authenticity; because, it is laid down that the certificate “shall be evidence of any(?) matter stated” therein.
  5. Presumption as to correctness of the copy or print-out ‘produced by a computer’ under S. 65B(5)(c)
    • S. 65B(5)(c) lays down a presumption as to correctness (not truth) of the computer out-put, inasmuch as S. 65B(5)(c) lays down that ‘a computer out-put shall be taken to have been produced by a computer’. 

It is definite that that the new enabling provisions (Sec. 65A and 65B) are introduced in the Evidence Act to confer a right to a party who wishes to rely upon the contents of an electronic record by ‘computer output’ (copy or print – derived from original), adopting the procedure/drill given in Sec. 65B ‘without further proof or production of the original’; that is, without accounting for (original) electronic record. It is to simplify the proceedings and procedures. The purport of the enabling provision should not be allowed to be defeated.



End Notes – 1

What is ‘certificate’, in law

  • The usual method to prove documents is by giving oral evidence or furnishing affidavit. A certificate, in most cases, is an opinion, and prepared on the basis of other documents or evidences. In such cases, when it is an assumption or inference, it by itself, is not admissible, as it will only be, at the most, a secondary evidence. A Wound Certificate is not a substantive evidence. It has to be proved by a competent witness. If presumption cannot be invoked under Clause (e) of Sec. 114 Evidence Act (that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed), no certificate or report can be taken as proved unless its contents are proved in a formal manner. (This is why Order XXVI rule 10 CPC specifically says – Commission Report shall ‘form part of the record’.)
  • Our Apex Court held in Dharmarajan v. Valliammal, 2008 (2) SCC 741, that ‘a certificate issued by the Tahsildar cannot be relied on without examining the Tahsildar who issued the same’. It is referred to in Pankajakshan Nair v. Shylaja, ILR 2017-1 Ker 951.

End Notes – 2

APPARENT INCONSISTENCIES APPEAR IN ARJUN PANDITRAO v. KAILASH KUSHANRAO (2020)3 SCC 216: 

Observations in   Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash KushanraoCriticism
1. Non-obstante clause is given in Sec. 63B – because, ‘Electronic Record’ is not a ‘document’. Arjun Panditrao v. Kailash Kushanrao, para 21 reads as under:1. Electronic records’ are already declared as ‘documents’(When defined ‘Evidence’ in S. 3 ). Section 65B (1) needed to declare ‘computer output’ (derived from original) alone as documents.
“Section 65B(1) opens with a non-obstante clause, and makes it clear that any information that is contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document, and shall be admissible in any proceedings without further proof of production of the original, as evidence of the contents of the original or of any facts stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible. The deeming fiction is for the reason that “document” as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act does not include electronic records.The deeming fiction in S. 65B (1), need not be applied to an ‘electronic record’ (primary evidence). The principles of ‘presumption’ are introduced herein.  It is needed only for the ‘computer output’; and not for ‘electronic record’. The doubt as to whether electronic – records are also ‘documents’ is already removed by the amendment to Sec. 3 Evd. Act. (Evidence’ means and includes … .. all documents including electronic records’.)
Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65. (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.)
2. Non-obstante clause (‘notwithstanding anything …’) excludes S. 62 and 65. It is observed in para 31:2. Non-obstante clause does not exclude Sec. 62 and 65 –
“The non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) makes it clear that when it comes to information contained  in an electronic record, admissibility and proof thereof must follow the drill of Section 65B, which is a special provision in this behalf – Sections 62 to 65 being irrelevant for this purpose.”  
Para 59: “We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section 65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and incorrectly “clarified” in Shafhi Mohammed (supra).”
The non-obstante clause is given to provide an enabling provision to admit ‘computer output’   (derived from original)  as ‘document’ itself, in a simpler manner, by the deeming provision notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’.

The non-obstante clause is an enabling provision. (See ‘Note’ – 1 below.)
3. Production of Certificate  under Sec. 65B(4):3. A certificate cannot be ordered to be given as a thing:
In Arjun Panditrao para 50 it is observed as under: “However, in cases where either a defective certificate is given, or in cases where such certificate has been demanded and is not given by the concerned person, the Judge conducting the trial must summon the person/ persons referred to in Section 65B(4) of the Evidence  Act, and require that such  certificate be given by such person/ persons.” Arjun Panditrao directs  to seek help of the court to obtain the required certificate under S. 65B(4) invoking Sec. 165, Evidence Act; Order XVI, CPC or Ss. 91 & 349 of the Cr.P.C.  
This certificate ‘to the best of the knowledge and belief’ of a person, is based on his ‘subjective-satisfaction’.
It cannot be ordered to be given as a thing’ under S. 165 and Ss. 91 & 349 Cr.P.C.
(Order XVI  Rule 6, CPC says as to document alone; not any ‘thing’.) 
A certificate, swearing ‘best of the knowledge and (or?) belief’, cannot be brought by ‘force’ also. (See ‘Note’ – 2 below.)
4. Tomaso Bruno was held to be ‘per incurium‘:4. Should have been referred to a higher bench. 
 PV Anwar (2014-10 SCC 473), three-judge bench decision, was not followed in the three-judge bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015-7 SCC 178).
Tomaso Bruno (2015) was followed in Shafhi Muhammed (2018-2 SCC 801 ).
Arjun Panditrao substantially followed PV Anwar (2014).
It was observed in Arjun Panditrao (3-judge bench) that Tomaso Bruno was per incurium.  Tomaso Bruno being of a 3-judge bench, the case should have been referred to a higher bench.  
[PV Anwar (2014) was rendered by Kurian Joseph, J.  He was a judge in the unanimous 3-bench decision in Tomaso Bruno (2015) which was ‘followed’ in Shafhi Muhammed (2018) ].

End Note – 3

Why the Non-obstante Clause (The Entire Confusion Centers Round it)

The non-obstante clause is not to exclude Sec. 62 and 65. Because, on a combined reading of Section 65A and 65B it is clear that these provisions deal with evidence ‘derived from original’ (computer output) alone; and not about original (electronic record).

  • Sec. 65B speaks: ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act .. .. the computer output shall be deemed to be ALSO a document’ (if the conditions laid down are fulfilled).

Sec. 65B is an enabling provision. Sec. 65A and 65B do not bar proving (i) (original) ‘electronic records’ under Sec. 62 and (ii) computer outputs (derived from original ) under Sec. 65 (Sec. 65 provides for adducing secondary evidence if the original is lost, not easily movable etc.).  From Sec. 65A and 65B it is clear that Sec. 62 to 65 are independent from Sec. 65B (‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Act’); and, therefore,

  • Sec. 62 to 65 can also be invoked to prove ‘computer output’ (secondary evidence of the ‘electronic record’). That is, otherwise than by producing the Certificate under Sec. 65B(4).

It is held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu,  (2005) 11 SCC 600, as under:

  • “Irrespective of the compliance with the requirements of Section 65-B, which is a provision dealing with admissibility of electronic records, there is no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely, Sections 63 and 65.”(Contra view in Arjun Panditrao).

Assume, the competent person gives a ‘statement’ that he cannot vouchsafe as to the truth and veracity of the document, then what will be the next step? Or, what will be the position if that person gives a false statement with respect to the document (though he knows it to be true and genuine)? Further, if the circumstances or admission by the parties show it is a genuine copy and the competent person pretends ignorance as to the truth of the document, how it will be dealt with?

  • In all these circumstances, the ultimate way-out is to apply the principle accepted by Tomaso Bruno v. State of UP (and followed in Shafhi Muhammed – the overruled decision).

End Notes – 4

Sec. 65A and Sec. 65B of the Evidence Act reads:

Sec. 65A: Special provisions as to evidence relating to electronic record:

The contents of electronic records may be proved in accordance with the provisions of section 65B. 

65B. Admissibility of electronic records

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer (hereinafter referred to as the computer output) shall be deemed to be also a document, if the conditions mentioned in this section are satisfied in relation to the information and computer in question and shall be admissible in any proceedings, without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any contents of the original or of any fact stated therein of which direct evidence would be admissible.

(2) The conditions referred to in sub-section (1) in respect of a computer output shall be the following, namely:—

  • (a) the computer output containing the information was produced by the computer during the period over which the computer was used regularly to store or process information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period by the person having lawful control over the use of the computer;
  • (b) during the said period, information of the kind contained in the electronic record or of the kind from which the information so contained is derived was regularly fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities;
  • (c) throughout the material part of the said period, the computer was operating properly or, if not, then in respect of any period in which it was not operating properly or was out of operation during that part of the period, was not such as to affect the electronic record or the accuracy of its contents; and
  • (d) the information contained in the electronic record reproduces (sic?) or is derived from such information fed into the computer in the ordinary course of the said activities.

(3) Where over any period, the function of storing or processing information for the purposes of any activities regularly carried on over that period as mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) was regularly performed by computers, whether—

  • (a) by a combination of computers operating over that period; or
  • (b) by different computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (c) by different combinations of computers operating in succession over that period; or
  • (d) in any other manner involving the successive operation over that period, in whatever order, of one or more computers and one or more combinations of computers, all the computers used for that purpose during that period shall be treated for the purposes of this section as constituting a single computer; and references in this section to a computer shall be construed accordingly.

(4) In any proceedings where it is desired to give a statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing any of the following things, that is to say,—

  • (a) identifying the electronic record containing the statement and describing the manner in which it was produced;
  • (b) giving such particulars of any device involved in the production of that electronic record as may be appropriate for the purpose of showing that the electronic record was produced by a computer;
  • (c) dealing with any of the matters to which the conditions mentioned in sub-section (2) relate, and purporting to be signed by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) shall be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate;
  • and for the purposes of this sub-section
  • it shall be sufficient for a matter to be stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it.

(5) For the purposes of this section,—

  • (a) information shall be taken to be supplied to a computer if it is supplied thereto in any appropriate form and whether it is so supplied directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment;
  • (b) whether in the course of activities carried on by any official information is supplied with a view to its being stored or processed for the purposes of those activities by a computer operated otherwise than in the course of those activities, that information, if duly supplied to that computer, shall be taken to be supplied to it in the course of those activities;
  • (c) a computer output shall be taken to have been produced by a computer whether it was produced by it directly or (with or without human intervention) by means of any appropriate equipment.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section any reference to information being derived from other information shall be a reference to its being derived therefrom by calculation, comparison or any other process.



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