Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343: Suit Dismissed for Order II Rule 2 Bar: For No ‘Consequential Declaration’ on Title, in the Earlier Suit 

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam.

There were two suits in the matter of Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343.

Facts of the First  Suit

• Parvatewwa adopted Channappa in 1961.
• In 2002, Parvatewwa filed a suit for a declaration that the 1961 adoption deed was null and void, and for an injunction.
• [No consequential declaration of title on property sought for.]
• The suit was dismissed.
• Parvatewwa filed appeal in 2006.
• The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal.
• It confirmed the judgment on the ground of limitation, though the finding on the validity of the adoption deed was reversed.
• The Regular Second Appeal of Parvatewwa was allowed and the cross-objections were dismissed.

Facts of the Second Suit

• During the pendency of the appeal Parvatewwa instituted a fresh suit in 2007.
• In the second suit she alleged that Channappa had illegally dispossessed her and sought a declaration of her ownership and recovery.
• The Second suit was  dismissed by the Trial Court Suit holding that the suit was barred by limitation and further hit by the principles of res judicata, constructive res judicata and Order II Rule 2, CPC.
• The First Appellate Court held that the suit was not barred by limitation.
• However, it confirmed the dismissal of the suit on the grounds of res judicata, constructive res judicata and under Order II Rule 2 of CPC.
• The High Court allowed the said Regular Second Appeal. The Suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff.

The issues Considered

The issues considered were the followiong –

• 1. Effect of dismissal of I.A. No. 4 questioning the maintainability of the suit under Order II Rule 2, CPC – for not seeking “consequential declaration” of title and recovery.
• 2. Whether Suit II was barred –
  • the priis of rdr ue
  • the prins of re ue
• 3. Whether Suit II was barred by Constructive res judicata.

Effect of dismissal of I.A. No. 4 and Section 105 CPC

I.A. No. 4 was filed under Order II Rule 2, CPC. It was argued that the cause of action in both suits was the same.  In the petition, the maintainability of the second suit was questioned. It was prayed that the suit was liable to be dismissed. The court held that the cause of action in both suits was different. The revision petition preferred against the same before the High Court was also dismissed. Hence, it has attained finality and cannot now be re-agitated. This submission was not accepted.

Whether an appeal would lie or not from an Order on an IA is determined under  Section 104 read with Order 43, CPC. The Order in I.A. No. 4 filed under Order II Rule 2, CPC is not independently appealable.

But, Section 105 CPC provides that when an appeal is filed against the decree, any error, defect or irregularity in an Order (though no appeal lies from an Order) can be raised as a ground in the memorandum of appeal.

Section 105 reads as under:

• ‘105. Other orders – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by a Court in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction; but, where a decree is appealed from, any error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memorandum of appeal.
• (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any party aggrieved by an order of remand made after the commencement of this Code from which an appeal lies does not appeal therefrom, he shall thereafter be precluded from disputing its correctness.’

It was explained by Das Gupta, J. in Satyadhan Ghosal v. Smt Deorajin Debi, (1960) 3 SCR 590, as under:

• ‘Does this, however, mean that because an earlier stage of the litigation a court had decided an interlocutory matter in one way and no appeal has been taken therefrom or no appeal did lie, a higher court cannot at a later stage of the same litigation consider the matter again? …
  • It is clear therefore that an interlocutory order
    • which had not been appealed from
    • either because no appeal lay or
    • even though an appeal lay an appeal was not taken
  • could be challenged in an appeal from the final decree or order.’ (Quoted in: Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993)

Defendants Can Urge in Appeal – The Suit is Barred Under O II r 2 CPC ; No Res Judicata

In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993, it is held that this proposition is subject to Sec. 105.

After quoting Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (supra), it is held in Channappa v.  Parvatewwa, 2026 INSC 343, it is observed – notwithstanding the earlier rejection of the application raising the plea on Order II Rule 2 CPC, it is open to the defendants to urge before the Appellate Court that the suit was barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC. Thereafter, it is held as under:

• “Therefore, the contention that the dismissal of the application would operate as a bar to re-agitate the issue is misconceived.”

Order II Rule 2 – Principle Defendant Ought Not to be Vexed Twice

The doctrine underlying Order II Rule 2, CPC, is founded upon the salutary principle that a defendant ought not to be vexed twice for the same cause of action. The plaintiff must also claim all reliefs arising from a single cause of action in one proceeding. Where a plaintiff omits to claim a relief, he is precluded from instituting a subsequent suit in respect of such omitted relief.

The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Gurbux Singh v. Bhooralal AIR 1964 SC 1810 . held as follows:

• “6. In order that a plea of a Bar under Order 2 Rule 2(3) of the Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the plea must make out; (i) that the second suit was in respect of the same cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to more than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one relief the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the Court omitted to sue for the relief for which the second suit had been filed.”

Pleadings in the first suit

It was stated in the plaint –

• “The defendant told the plaintiff that he is the absolute owner of all the properties of the plaintiff mentioned above ….The plaintiff also came to know that the defendant has created document to show that he is the adopted son and the said document of adoption is registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Bijapur on 23.3.1961 itself.”

The Court pointed out – Despite being fully aware that Channappa had denied her ownership and had asserted rights based on the family arrangement deed of 1998, Parvatewwa chose to institute Suit – I merely seeking injunction simpliciter, without seeking the necessary and consequential relief of declaration of title. Once Channappa had clearly contested Parvatewwa’s ownership in the pleadings, it became incumbent upon Parvatewwa to seek the comprehensive relief of a declaration of title.

The court relied on Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast Cuddalore Vinyls Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82, which clarified that the rule under Order II Rule 2, CPC is founded on the principle that a person should not be vexed twice for the same cause of action and that the object of this rule is to prevent harassment of the defendant through successive litigation.

The Apex Court finally pointed out –

• “The omission to seek such relief in Suit – I is significant and cannot be cured through a subsequent suit”.
• “27. In the present case, Parvatewwa herself had pleaded in the earlier proceedings that Channappa was asserting rights over the suit properties on the basis of the adoption. The dispute as to the parties’ respective rights over the property was, therefore, already in existence at the time of institution of Suit – I. In such circumstances, the relief of declaration of title and the consequential relief relating to possession could and ought to have been claimed in the earlier proceedings.”
• “The subsequent institution of Suit – II seeking declaration of ownership and recovery of possession in respect of the same property and between the same parties is, therefore, clearly hit by the provisions of Order II Rule 2, CPC.”

Constructive res judicata

The principle of constructive res judicata is embodied in Explanation IV to Section 11. A matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of attack in the former proceedings shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in such proceedings. Parvatewwa, having omitted to seek appropriate relief in Suit – I despite being aware of Channappa’s claim, cannot be permitted to agitate the same issue by way of a subsequent suit.

The Court quoted the following three decisions:

(i)  Forward Construction Co. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.): It observed as under:

• “20. So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court in our opinion was not right in holding that the earlier judgment would not operate as res judicata as one of the grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its absence in the earlier petition.
• Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC provides that any matter which might and ought to have been made ground of defence or attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such suit. An adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming within the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim or defence. The principle underlying Explanation IV is that where the parties have had an opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to be the same thing as if the matter had been actually controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has been constructively in issue it cannot be said to have been actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have been heard and decided. The first reason, therefore, has absolutely no force.”

(ii) Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta, (1986) 1 SCC 100 2010 SCC OnLine SC 1085: It observed as under:

• “25. The principle underlying Explanation IV to Section 11 becomes clear from Greenhalgh v. Mallard [(1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA)] thus:
•  “… it would be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so clearly part of the subject-matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them.”

(iii)  Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715: It observed as under:

• “35. … an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence.”