Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar: Partnership Firm Need Not be an Accused in S. 138 NI Act Complaint

Where a partner of a firm commits a breach, all the partners would be liable for the penalties arising therefrom.

Saji Koduvath, Advocate, Kottayam

Contents in a Nutshell

Supreme Court of India (Nagarathna, Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.) held in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831 –

  • A partnership firm need not be an accused in a Complaint under Section 138, Negotiable Instruments Act.
  • Notice under Section 138 of the Act need not be issued to the firm.
  • If the ‘firm commits’ any breach, all the partners would become liable for the penalties.

Genesis of the Controversy

Section 141 of the NI Act speaks as to ‘Offences by Companies‘. It says:

  • “If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly…”

Then it is explained in this Section as under:

  • (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
  • (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

The scope of the Explanation—“company means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals”—came up for consideration in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831.

That is, whether it is necessary –

  • (i) to join the firm as a party in Section 138 Complaint, and
  • (ii) to issue notice under Section 138 of the Act to the firm?

In Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, the Apex Court answered the aforesaid questions in the negative.

Kerala High Court Decisions Stand Overruled

The following decisions took the view that a prosecution under Section 141 of the NI Act is not maintainable if the cheque is issued ‘by the firm’ (or society), without arraigning the firm (or society) as an accused in the complaint.

  • (i) S.  Balakrishna Prabhu v. V. Indira, 2023-7 KHC 587; 2024-1 KLT 84,
  • (ii) P.I.  Moideen Kutty v. Abdul Rasheed, 2023-5 KLT(SN) 15,
  • (iii) Binu v. State of Kerala, 2023-2 KLD 565,
  • (iv) Dominic Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2017-1 KHC 790; 2017-2 KLT(SN) 19,
  • (v) Shishan M. A.  v. M. K.  Murali, 2016-5 KHC 810; 2016-4 KLT 876,
  • (vi) Sheeja Mol v. State of Kerala, 2015 (4) KLT 748,
  • (vil) Babu v. State of Kerala, 2017-4 KLT(SN) 33,
  • (viil) Fakruddin V.P. v. State of Kerala, 2014 (4) KHC 815,
  • (ix) Vijaya Lekshmi v. Indian Bank, Tvm., 2016 (1) KLD 639.

In the light of Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, the aforesaid decisions no longer hold the field and cannot be regarded as laying down good law.

Submissions of the Appellant in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar

  • A company is a separate legal entity from its shareholders. But a partnership is only a compendious name for its partners.   The shareholders in a company have limited liability, whereas in a partnership firm, the partners have unlimited liability.
  • The partnership firm cannot be arraigned as an accused or being issued notice under Section 138 of the Act.
  • A partnership firm cannot enter into any contract and that either those partner(s) authorized by all the partners or all the partners of the firm, must execute the contract.
  • Though Order XXX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allow for suing of partners in the name of the firm, it is only a convenient method for referring to the persons who constitute the firm and that a decree in favour of or against a firm, in the name of the firm, has the same effect as a decree in favour of or against all the partners.

Submissions of the respondents (Sr. Advocate  S. Nagamuthu)

  • Explanation (a) of Section 141(1) of the Act states that a “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals.
  • The terms ‘association of persons’ or ‘body of individuals’ have a legal connotation. In this regard, a partnership firm is not an association of persons in the literal sense. 
  • The expression ‘person’ in Section 141 of the Act includes a partnership firm, as Section 141 of the Act deems a partnership firm to be a company.
  • That this deeming fiction is also seen when the “director” is defined.
  • Thus, a firm is deemed to be a company and if a firm commits an offence under Section 138 of the Act, and firm should also be added as an accused and found guilty.
  • The partners of a firm should be arraigned as accused along with the firm and such partners should be liable for punishment vicariously/constructively for the offence committed by the firm.
  • In the absence of the firm being issued the statutory notice or arraigned as an accused in the complaint, the same was not maintainable at all.

The senior counsel, Sri S. Nagamuthu referred the following  judgments:

1.  Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661.  

  • Note: It is held (in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) that Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661, was not applicable in the facts of this case, since it concerned the vicarious liability of directors of a company where the company itself was neither prosecuted nor made liable (and did not consider the position of a partnership firm); and there is distinction between a company and a partnership firm.

2.  Dilip Hariramani v. Bank of Baroda, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 579.

  • Note: This decision is also distinguished in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar. The notice was not served to the appellant therein but it was served only on the authorized signatory of the firm. In the instant case, the notice was sent by the complainant to both the partners of the firm. 

Even if partnership firm is a juristic entity, it is Not Distinct from Partners

The Court (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) held as under:

  • “6.9  On considering the aforesaid judgments, we observe that even if we have to come to the conclusion that the juristic entity i.e., the partnership firm is the primary accused in the instant case it would be necessary for us to also state that such a juristic entity, namely, a partnership firm is not distinct from the partners who comprise the partnership. ….
  • 6.10 Alternatively, notice to the partners/accused could have been construed as notice to the partnership firm also. We say so for the reason that unlike a company which is a separate juristic entity from its directors thereof, a partnership firm comprises of its partners who are the persons directly liable on behalf of the partnership firm and by themselves. ….. The complainant herein has not arraigned the firm but has arraigned the partners of the firm as accused and has also issued notice to them; therefore, we find that the defect, if any, is not significant or incurable in these circumstances. Permission is therefore to be granted to the complainant to arraign the partnership firm also as an accused in the complaint.….”

Liability of Partners

The Court (Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar) held as under:

  • “7.19 The liability of partners for the debts of the business is unlimited and they are jointly and severally liable for all business obligations of the partnership firm. Sections 25 and 26 of the Partnership Act are relevant in this regard, which are reproduced as under:
    • “25. Liability of a partner for acts of the firm.—Every partner is liable, jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm done while he is a partner.
    • 26. Liability of the firm for wrongful acts of a partner.—Where, by the wrongful act or omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of a firm, or with the authority of his partners, loss or injury is caused to any third party, or any penalty is incurred, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner.” 
  • 7.23 Moreover, since the firm by itself cannot transact any business, if a partner of the firm commits any breach, all the partners would become liable for the consequent penalties, just as the firm would be liable. Further, if a penalty is imposed on a partnership firm for contravention of a statute, it amounts to levy of penalty on the partners also and there is no separate or independent penalty on the partners for the said contravention.”

Conclusion

The controversy in Dhanasingh Prabhu v. Chandrasekar, 2025 INSC 831, revolved around the interpretation of Section 141 of the NI Act.

Section 141 of the NI Act envisages that:

  • (i) a company or firm may be deemed guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act; and
  • (ii) the company or firm, along with the persons in charge of and responsible for its conduct of business, may be subjected to punishment.

Without detracting from the legal propositions in Section 141, the Supreme Court proceeded (in the light of the Partnership Act, 1932) as under:

  • (a) the Partnership firm need not (necessarily) be an accused in a complaint filed under Section 138 (“The defect, if any, is not significant“); and
  • (b) when a complaint is filed ‘against a firm’, under Section 138, all the partners are required to be prosecuted.

End Notes

Section 138 of the NI Act reads as under:

  • “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. — Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

  • .(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months* from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
  • (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
  • (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.
  • xxx

Section 141 of the NI Act reads as under:

  • 141. Offences by companies.— (1) If the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
  • Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he  had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
  • Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this chapter.
  • (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.
  • Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—
  • (a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and
  • (b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.”

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