Can the Appeal Court Allow a Relief Not Appealed Against?

Jojy George Koduvath

Summary

  • Two reliefs prayed for in the suit.
  • One is granted, and the other is refused.
  • Appeal filed by the defendant alone – against the relief allowed.
  • Can the refused relief be allowed by the appeal court, even though it is not appealed against?
  • Answer — Normal rule is that a party aggrieved by a decree should file appeal against him. But in certain rare cases it may be necessitated to allow certain reliefs even if it is not appealed against invoking O. 41 r. 33 CPC. Instances include:
    • (i) it may become necessary to readjust the rights of other parties
    • (ii) some times the other (un-appealed) relief may be inseparably connected with the appealed reliefs and it may also have to be modified
    • (iii) to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit.

Relevant Provisions – Order XLI Rule 33

R. 33 of O. 41 says that the Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree notwithstanding that the appeal is not filed. R. 33 is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. material portion of Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

  • “33 Power of Court of Appeal: The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may, w here there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees.”
  • Illustration. —A claims a sum of money as due to him from X or Y, and in a suit against both, obtains a decree against X. X appeals, and A and Y are respondents. The Appellate Court decides in favour of X. It has the power to pass a decree against Y.”

Normal Rule: Independent Appeal or Cross-objection Necessary

In Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, AIR 1965 SC 1874: (1965) 3 SCR 550, while dealing with the scope of Order 41 Rule 33, it is observed as under:

  • “The rule is undoubtedly expressed in terms which are wide, but it has to be applied with discretion, and to cases where interference in favour of the appellant necessitates interference also with a decree which has by acceptance or acquiescence become final so as to enable the Court to adjust the rights of the parties. Where, in an appeal, the Court reaches a conclusion which is inconsistent with the opinion of the Court appealed from, and in adjusting the right claimed by the appellant, it is necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, the power conferred by Order 41 Rule 33 may properly be invoked. The rule, however, does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.”
  • “When a party allows a decree of the Court of first instance to become final, by not appealing against the decree, it would not be open to another party to the litigation, whose rights are otherwise not affected by the decree, to invoke the powers of the appellate Court under Order 41 Rule 33, to pass a decree in favour of the party not appealing so as to give the latter a benefit which he has not claimed. Order 41 Rule 33 is primarily intended to confer power upon the appellate Court to do justice by granting relief to a party who has not appealed, when refusing to do so, would result in making inconsistent, contradictory or unworkable orders.”.

in Giani Ram v. Ramji Lal, (1969) 1 SCC 813, it is said as under:

  • “12. The object of this Rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The Rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate court does not agree with the opinion of the court appealed from.
  • 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this Rule will be confined to those cases where, as a result of interference in favour of the appellant, further interference with the decree of the lower court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this Rule, the court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of other laws, viz., the law of limitation or the law of court fees, etc.”

In Choudhary Sahu v. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 S.C. 98; (1982) 1 SCC 232, it is cautioned that the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection. The Court will exercise the power according to justice, equity and good conscience. In this decision it is held that while exercising the power conferred under Order 41 Rule 33, the Court should not lose sight of the provisions of the other laws, viz., the law of limitation or the law of court fees etc. It is said as under:

  • “12. The object of this rule is to avoid contradictory and inconsistent decisions on the same questions in the same suit. As the power under this rule is in derogation of the general principle that a party cannot avoid a decree against him without filing an appeal or cross-objection, it must be exercised with care and caution. The rule does not confer an unrestricted right to reopen decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from.
  • 13. Ordinarily, the power conferred by this rule will be confined to those cases where as a result of interference in favour of the appellant further interference with the decree of the lower Court is rendered necessary in order to adjust the rights of the parties according to justice, equity and good conscience. While exercising the power under this rule the Court should not lose sight of the other provisions of the Code itself nor the provisions of the other laws viz. The Law of Limitation or the Law of Court-fees etc.
  • 14. In these appeals the Collector on the basis of the material placed before him allowed certain units to the various appellants. In the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar, there was no justification for the Commissioner to have interfered with that finding in favour of the appellants. The facts and circumstances of these appeals are not such in which it would be appropriate to exercise the power under Order 41, Rule 33. The Commissioner as well as the High Court committed a manifest error in reversing the finding regarding allotment of units to the various appellants in the absence of any appeal by the State of Bihar when the same had become final and rights of the State of Bihar had come to an end to that extent by not filing any appeal or cross-objection within the period of limitation.”

Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, is an authority on this matter.

Paras 6, 7 and 15 read thus:

  • “6. The appeals raise a short but interesting question of frequent recurrence as to the power of the appellant court to interfere with and reverse or modify the decree appealed against by the appellants in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objection by the respondent under Order 41, Rule 22 CPC and the scope of power conferred on the appellate court under Rule 33 Order 41 CPC.
  • 7. The first question is whether without cross-objection by the respondent, could the appellate court have set aside the decree passed by the trial court and instead granted straight away a decree for specific performance of contract. This would require reference to the principles underlying right to file an appeal and right to prefer cross-objection or when does it become necessary to prefer cross-objection without which decree under appeal cannot be altered or varied to the advantage of the respondent and/or to the disadvantage of the appellant. It has also been held by this Court in Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur SCC (2008-9 SCC 100: para 21), that this power under Order 41, Rule 33 CPC cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict.
  • 15. Rule 4 seeks to achieve one of the several objects sought to be achieved by Rule 33, that is, avoiding a situation of conflicting decrees coming into existence in the same suit. The abovesaid provisions confer power of widest amplitude on the appellate court so as to do complete justice between the parties and such power is unfettered by consideration of facts like what is the subject matter of appeal, who has filed the appeal and whether the appeal is being dismissed, allowed or disposed of by modifying the judgment appealed against. While dismissing an appeal and though confirming the impugned decree, the appellate court may still direct passing of such decree or making of such order which ought to have been passed or made by the court below in accordance with the findings of fact and law arrived at by the court below and which it would have done had it been conscious of the error committed by it and noticed by the Appellate Court. While allowing the appeal or otherwise interfering with the decree or order appealed against, the appellate court may pass or make such further or other, decree or order, as the case would require being done, consistently with the findings arrived at by the appellate court. The object sought to be achieved by conferment of such power on the appellate court is to avoid inconsistency, inequity, inequality in reliefs granted to similarly placed parties and unworkable decree or order coming into existence. The overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice. Wider the power, higher the need for caution and care while exercising the power. Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow.
  • The power is subject to at least three limitations:
    • firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the Court;
    • secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and
    • thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party.
  • A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 Order 41.” (Quoted in: Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016-13 SCC 165; State of Andhra Pradesh v. B. Ranga Reddy, 2020-15 SCC 681).

In Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458, it is held that in the absence of an independent appeal or cross-objection (under Order 41 Rule 22) being filed by the aggrieved party, the relief which was denied by the courts below cannot be granted in the second appeal filed by the appellant. (Referred to in: Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016-13 SCC 165.)

In Lakshmanan v. G. Ayyasamy, 2016 (13) SCC 165, it is observed as under:

  • “7… Usually the power under Rule 33 is exercised when the portion of the decree appealed against or the portion of the decree held liable to be set aside or interfered by the appellate court is so inseparably connected with the portion not appealed against or left untouched that for the reason of the latter portion being left untouched either injustice would result or inconsistent decrees would follow. The power is subject to at least three limitations: firstly, the power cannot be exercised to the prejudice or disadvantage of a person not a party before the court; secondly, a claim given up or lost cannot be revived; and thirdly, such part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against or objected to by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. A case where there are two reliefs prayed for and one is refused while the other one is granted and the former is not inseparably connected with or necessarily depending on the other, in an appeal against the latter, the former relief cannot be granted in favour of the respondent by the appellate court exercising power under Rule 33 of Order 41 .” (Banarsi v. Ram Phal , (2003) 9 SCC 606] , SCC p. 619, para 15).
  • 8 . In support of the same proposition of law, the learned counsel for the appellants placed reliance upon another judgment of this Court in Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra [Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 212] , wherein this Court after interpretation of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC has clearly held that in the absence of an independent appeal or cross-objection being filed by the aggrieved party, the relief which was denied by the courts below cannot be granted in the second appeal filed by the appellant.”

In Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors (P) Ltd., (2025) 2 SCC 208, it is observed as under:

  • “32. From the decision above, which has been consistently followed, it is clear that for exercise of the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice; and one of the limitations on exercise of the power is that that part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against, or objected to, by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party.

In Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen , (2026) 3 SCC 460 it is held as under:

  • “30. By applying the ratio in Banarsi [Banarsi v. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606, we notice that the impugned judgment [Dharmrao v. Arifa Parveen, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 1671] has not considered whether a ground is made out for modifying a decree or not. The High Court has disturbed a finding of fact, leading to modifying the decree of the trial court in OS No. 212 of 2013 without there being an appeal/cross-appeal. To this extent, the findings of the High Court are not tenable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The other reasons assigned by the High Court are independently examined while considering the plea of Hiba and the plaintiff as the daughter of Khadijabee. The finding on this point, noted as an illegality, may not conclude the consideration of other issues.”

O. 41 r. 33 is an Enabling Provision for Adjusting the Right claimed by the Appellant.

As shown above, the normal rule is that a party aggrieved by a decree should file appeal. If he fails to do so, Order 41, Rule 33 cannot be invoked. This rule does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final merely because the appellate Court does not agree with the opinion of the Court appealed from — even where an appeal Court reaches a conclusion inconsistent with the opinion of lower court. (Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose , 1965-3 SCR 550).

But, for adjusting the right claimed by the appellant it may become necessary to grant relief to a person who has not appealed, invoking O. 41 r. 33. In Nirmala Bala Ghose v. Balai Chand Ghose, 1965-3 SCR 550, it was held that the rule however does not confer an unrestricted right to re-open decrees which have become final. (See also: Banarsi v. Ram Phal, AIR 2003 SC1989, (2003) 9 SCC 606; Kok Singh v. Deokabai AIR 1976 S.C. 634.)

Order 41 Rule 33 has Limited Application

In Samundra Devi v. Narendra Kaur, AIR 2008 SC 3205, 2008-9 SCC 100 (SB Sinha, J.), it is held that Order 41 Rule 33 CPC has limited application. In that case it was found that the High Court went wrong in reducing compensation, awarded to the claimant in a Motor Vehicles Claim, without a proper Appeal. The claimant was given liberty to recover the amount of compensation from the owner of the vehicle. The insurance company has been held to have no statutory liability as the driver was not holding a valid driving licence. It was found that in the fact situation, even Order 41 Rule 33 was not applicable as the Insurance Company ordinarily could not have maintained an independent appeal on the quantum of compensation and that no appeal had been preferred by the owner or driver of the vehicle as also the insurance company. The Apex Court relied on S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75.

In S. Nazeer Ahmed v. State Bank of Mysore, (2007) 11 SCC 75, it is stated:

  • “8. We also see considerable force in the submission of learned Counsel for the appellants that the High Court has misconceived the object of Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code and has erred in invoking it for the purpose of granting the plaintiff Bank a decree. This is a case where the suit filed by the plaintiff Bank had been dismissed by the trial court. The plaintiff Bank had come up in appeal. It was entitled to challenge all the findings rendered against it by the trial court and seek a decree as prayed for in the plaint, from the appellate court. Once it is found entitled to a decree on the basis of the reasoning of the appellate court, the suit could be decreed by reversing the appropriate findings of the trial court on which the dismissal of the suit was based. For this, no recourse to Order XLI Rule 33 is necessary. Order XLI Rule 33 enables the appellate court to pass any decree that ought to have been passed by the trial court or grant any further decree as the case may require and the power could be exercised notwithstanding that the appeal was only against a part of the decree and could even be exercised in favour of the respondents, though the respondents might not have filed any appeal or objection against what has been decreed. There is no need to have recourse to Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code, in a case where the suit of the plaintiff has been dismissed and the plaintiff has come up in appeal claiming a decree as prayed for by him in the suit. Then, it will be a question of entertaining the appeal considering the relevant questions and granting the plaintiff the relief he had sought for if he is found entitled to it. In the case on hand therefore there was no occasion for applying Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code. If the view of the High Court was that the suit was barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Code, it is difficult to see how it could have resorted to Order XLI Rule 33 of the Code to grant a decree to the plaintiff in such a suit. In that case, a decree has to be declined. That part of the reasoning of the High Court is therefore unsustainable.”

Read Also:

End Notes

No Relief if No Prayer; No Relief if No Pleading

No Relief if No Prayer

It is well settled that reliefs not specifically prayed for cannot be granted merely on the basis of evidence or incidental observations, particularly when such reliefs involve substantive civil rights. The Trial Court, by granting findings on notional partition clearly acted contrary to the mandate of Order VII Rule 7 CPC, thereby travelling beyond both the pleadings and the relief clause of the plaint.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235, it is held as under:

  • “22. …. It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plain, the court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.” (Quoted in: Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544)

In Fertilizer Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Sarat Chandra Rath, AIR 1996 SC 2744, 1996-10 SCC 331 held as under:

  • “The High Court ought not to have granted reliefs to the respondents which they had not even prayed for.”

The Apex Court in Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi, AIR 2010 SC 475, it is held as under:

  • “Though the Court has very wide discretion in granting relief, the Court, however, cannot, ignoring and keeping aside the norms and principles governing grant of relief, grant a relief not even prayed for by the petitioner.”

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436, it is held that without pleadings, relief could not be granted.

In Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 149, it is observed as under:

  • “77. This Court while dealing with an issue in Kalyan Singh Chouhan V C. P. Joshi (2011) 11 SCC 786), after placing reliance on a very large number of it earlier judgments including Trojan & Co v. Nagappa Chettiar (AIR 1953 SC 235), Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256), Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (LA) (2005) 7 SCC 190) and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co Ltd (2010) 4 SCC 518), held that relief not founded on the pleadings cannot be granted. A decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. No evidence is permissible to be taken on record in the absence of the pleadings in that respect. No party can be permitted to travel beyond it pleading and that all necessary and materials facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. It was further held that where the evidence was not in the line of the pleadings, the said evidence cannot be looked into or relied upon.
  • 85.6. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings as no party can lead the evidence on an issue/point not raised in the pleadings and in case, such evidence has been adduced or a fining of fact has been recorded by the court, it is just to be ignored. Though it may be a different case where in spite of specific pleadings, a particular issue is not framed and the parties having full knowledge of the issue in controversy lead the evidence and the court records a finding on it.”

In Akella Lalitha v. Konda Hanumantha Rao, AIR 2022 SC 3544, 2022 SCC Online SC 928, it is held that it is settled law that relief not found on pleadings should not be granted. If a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer or pleading was made depriving the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such relief, it would lead to miscarriage of justice.

See Also:

  • Krishna Priya Ganguly v. University of Lucknow, (1984) 1 SCC 307; AIR 1984 SC 186
  • State v. M. Maridoss, (2023) 4 SCC 338.

No Relief outside Pleadings

Generally, courts cannot grant relief completely outside the scope of the pleadings or surprise litigants without a fair opportunity to be heard . Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, (1987) 2 SCC 555, it was observed that it is well settled that no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleadings and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by a party in support of the case set up by it.

In Trojan & Co. Ltd. v. Rm. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, (1953) 1 SCC 456, the Apex Court held as under:

  • “It is well settled that the decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties and it is the case pleaded that has to be found. Without an amendment of the plaint, the Court was not entitled to grant the relief not asked for and no prayer was ever made to amend the plaint so as to incorporate in it an alternative case.”

In Chinta Lingam v. The Govt. of India, AIR 1971 SC 474, this it is held that unless factual foundation has been laid in the pleadings no argument is permissible to be raised on that particular point.

In Ram Sarup Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College, AIR 1987 SC 1242, it is held as under:

  • “…… in the absence of pleadings, evidence if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered…… no party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading and that all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it.”

In Syed and Company v. State of Jammu & Kashmir, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 422, it is held as under:

  • “Without specific pleadings in that regard, evidence could not be led in since it is settled principle of law that no amount of evidence can be looked unless there is a pleading. Therefore, without amendment of the pleadings merely trying to lead evidence is not permissible.”

In J. Jermons v. Aliammal, (1999) 7 SCC 382, it is held held as under:

  • “…… there is a fundamental difference between a case of raising additional grounds based on the pleadings and the material available on record and a case of taking a new plea not borne out of the pleadings. In the former case no amendment of pleading is required, whereas in the latter it is necessary to amend the pleadings…The respondents cannot be permitted to make out a new case by seeking permission to raise additional grounds in revision.” (Quoted: The National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, AIR 2012 SC 264; 2011-12 SCC 695).

In Bachhaj Nahar v. Nilima Mandal, 2008 (17) SCC 491 it is observed as under:

  • “13. The object of issues is to identify from the pleadings the questions or points required to be decided by the courts so as to enable parties to let in evidence thereon. When the facts necessary to make out a particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint, the court cannot focus the attention of the parties, or its own attention on that claim or relief, by framing an appropriate issue. As a result the defendant does not get an opportunity to place the facts and contentions necessary to repudiate or challenge such a claim or relief. Therefore, the court cannot, on finding that the plaintiff has not made out the case put forth by him, grant some other relief. The question before a court is not whether there is some material on the basis of which some relief can be granted. The question is whether any relief can be granted, when the defendant had no opportunity to show that the relief proposed by the court could not be granted. When there is no prayer for a particular relief and no pleadings to support such a relief, and when the defendant has no opportunity to resist or oppose such a relief, if the court considers and grants such a relief, it will lead to miscarriage of justice. Thus it is said that no amount of evidence, on a plea that is not put forward in the pleadings, can be looked into to grant any relief.” (Quoted in: Venkatesha v. K.M. Venkatamuniyappa, 2026-4 ALD (SC) 261; 2026 INSC 705)

It is further held as under:

  • “16. It is fundamental that in a civil suit, relief to be granted can be only with reference to the prayers made in the pleadings. That apart, in civil suits, grant of relief is circumscribed by various factors like court fee, limitation, parties to the suits, as also grounds barring relief, like res judicata, estoppel, acquiescence, non- joinder of causes of action or parties, etc., which require pleading and proof. Therefore, it would be hazardous to hold that in a civil suit whatever be the relief that is prayed, the court can on examination of facts grant any relief as it thinks fit. In a suit for recovery of rupees one lakh, the court cannot grant a decree for rupees ten lakhs. In a suit for recovery possession of property ‘A’, court cannot grant possession of property ‘B’. In a suit praying for permanent injunction, court cannot grant a relief of declaration or possession. The jurisdiction to grant relief in a civil suit necessarily depends on the pleadings, prayer, court fee paid, evidence let in, etc.” (Quoted in: R.M. Sundaram @ Meenakshisundaram v. Sri Kayarohanasamy And Neelayadhakshi Amman Temple, 2022-11 SCR 475; J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, it is held as under:

  • “No amount of evidence or arguments can be looked into or considered in the absence of pleadings and issues, is a proposition that is too well settled.” (Quoted in: J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, 2011-1 SCC 429)

In Kalyan Singh Chouhan v C. P. Joshi , (2011) 11 SCC 786, the Court stated, after noticing various earlier pronouncements:

  • “19. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted”. Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho [(1897-98) 25 IA 195], Trojan & Co. v. Nagappa Chettiar [(1953) 1 SCC 456: AIR 1953 SC 235], Raruha Singh v. Achal Singh [AIR 1961 SC 1097], Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal [(2002) 2 SCC 256: AIR 2002 SC 665], Ishwar Dutt v. Collector (L.A.) [(2005) 7 SCC 190: AIR 2005 SC 3165] and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. [(2010) 4 SCC 518: (2010) 2 SCC (Civ) 207]) xxx
  • 28. Therefore, in view of the above, it is evident that the party to the election petition must plead the material fact and substantiate its averment by adducing sufficient evidence. The court cannot travel beyond the pleadings and the issue cannot be framed unless there are pleadings to raise the controversy on a particular fact or law. It is, therefore, not permissible for the court to allow the party to lead evidence which is not in the line of the pleadings. Even if the evidence is led that is just to be ignored as the same cannot be taken into consideration.” (Quoted in: A. Raja v. D. Kumar, 2025 INSC 629; 2025 KLT(Online) 1888 ; 2025 KHC(Online) 6440)

In State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty, 2011-3 SCC 436, it is held as under:

  • “55. Pleadings and particulars are required to enable the court to decide the rights of the parties in the trial. Thus, the pleadings are more to help the court in narrowing the controversy involved and to inform the parties concerned to the question in issue, so that the parties may adduce appropriate evidence on the said issue. It is a settled legal proposition that “as a rule relief not founded on the pleadings should not be granted.” Therefore, a decision of a case cannot be based on grounds outside the pleadings of the parties. The pleadings and issues are to ascertain the real dispute between the parties to narrow the area of conflict and to see just where the two sides differ. (Vide : Sri Mahant Govind Rao v. Sita Ram Kesho, (1898) 25 Ind. App. 195; M/s. Trojan & Co. v. RM. N.N. Nagappa Chettiar, AIR 1953 SC 235; Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 3165; and State of Maharashtra v. Hindustan Construction Company Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518.)

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